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THE INSTITUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING-CLASS
MOVEMENT

The International Working-Class Movement

PROBLEMS
OF HISTORY
AND THEORY

In seven volumes

Introduction by Academician
B.N. PONOMAREV

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The International Working-Class Movement

PROBLEMS
OF HISTORY
AND THEORY

Volume 3

REVOLUTIONARY
BATTLES
OF THE EARLY 20th CENTURY



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VOLUME 3

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R. Y. Yevzerov, Cand. Sc. (Hist.)

Contributors:

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O. G. Obichkin, D. Sc. (Hist.)	M. A. Zaborov, D. Sc. (Hist.)
M. A. Okuneva, D. Sc. (Hist.)	

Individual chapters were written by:

T. V. Anitskaya, Cand. Sc. (Hist.)	Y. S. Oganisyan, D. Sc. (Hist.)
A. N. Baikova, Cand. Sc. (Hist.)	A. S. Oganova, Cand. Sc. (Hist.)
Z. V. Chernukha, Cand. Sc. (Hist.)	M. Y. Orlova, Cand. Sc. (Hist.)
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Y. P. Mador, Cand. Sc. (Hist.)	Z. P. Yakhimovich, D. Sc. (Hist.)
L. B. Moskvina, D. Sc. (Hist.)	

Statistics prepared by:

L. V. Makushina, N. F. Rydvanov, Cand. Sc. (Econ.)

S. I. Vasil'tsov, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), L. F. Yukhnina

Materials by other researchers of the Institute of the International Working-Class Movement have also been used in this volume.

This volume covers the period immediately preceding the era ushered in by the 1917 Socialist Revolution in Russia. Dealing both with the development of the international working-class movement historically and with its major issues, it discusses the positive and negative experience, the features common for the labour struggle internationally and its distinctions in various countries and regions. An analysis is presented of the theoretical contribution and practical work of V. I. Lenin and his Bolshevik comrades and other revolutionary forces in the international labour movement, the book contains an account of their fight against the opportunists. Special attention is devoted to the Russian revolutions of 1905-1907 and February 1917 that paved the way towards the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

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INTRODUCTION

The third volume of this many-volume publication traces the development of the international working-class movement during the period which preceded the onset of the era of the transition from capitalism to socialism ushered in by the Great October Socialist Revolution. Based on the scientific principles of the division into periods of the history of the proletariat's class struggle, which were set forth in the Introduction to the entire publication,¹ the present volume begins with the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907. The latter attested to the fact that mighty revolutionary struggles led by the working class have unfolded in world history since the start of the 20th century.

"Imperialism is the eve of the social revolution of the proletariat,"² wrote Vladimir Lenin in describing the essence of the qualitative changes in the capitalist system which paved the way for its replacement by socialism, exacerbated all capitalist antagonisms, developed the mainsprings of social revolution and made it a question of direct practice.

Due to the tremendous growth of capitalist production and the high level of its concentration, monopoly rule had taken shape and become the determinant in social life by the turn of the 20th century. The bank monopolies were instrumental in the growth of a close network of channels "centralising all capital and all revenues, transforming thousands and thousands of scattered economic enterprises into a single national capitalist, and then into a world capitalist economy".³ The financial oligarchy of the imperialist states spread their rule, the economic underpinnings of which was the export of capital, all over the world. Huge international "super-monopolies" divided the world into "spheres of influence", while the colonial powers were concluding its territorial division.

The social division of labour nationally and internationally, the

¹ *The International Working-Class Movement. Problems of History and Theory*, Introduction by Academician B. N. Ponomarev, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980.

² V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p. 194.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

unprecedented development of large-scale production by individual monopolies and international alliances of monopolies, the monopolisation of sources of raw materials, transport, the process of technological inventions and improvements and even of skilled labour, and the specialisation of production, cooperation between industries, and their amalgamation—all these processes which came to the fore in the early 20th century, mirrored the progress being made in the socialisation of production. "Capitalism in its imperialist stage leads directly to the most comprehensive socialisation of production," Lenin wrote, elucidating this trend. "It, so to speak, drags the capitalists, against their will and consciousness, into some sort of a new social order, a transitional one from complete free competition to complete socialisation."¹

The necessity for a revolutionary transition to socialism was dictated by the deepening and exacerbation of the fundamental contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, the main contradiction being between the social nature of the production process and the private capitalist form of appropriation.

Industry developed while the sway of private capital was preserved: productive forces were controlled by a handful of monopoly associations which selfishly took advantage of "amazing technical progress",² which appropriated the main results of social progress and the wealth created by the working classes. The chaos inherent in production as a whole heightened. Capitalist production relations limited the development of productive forces and the utilisation of its results in the interests of the whole of society. Moreover, these interests were dealt a tremendous blow by the imperialist rivalry of monopolies, supermonopolies and states; the economic and territorial division of the world only served to bring about a constant striving to recarve it, and to heighten militarism and an overall atmosphere of tension.

Monopoly rule was creating an oppressive atmosphere for the broad masses in all spheres of bourgeois society. "Politically," Lenin wrote, "imperialism is, in general, a striving towards violence and reaction."³ The violation and limitation of proclaimed democratic freedoms became a sign of the times. To enable the financial oligarchy to draw handsome profits, the people were subjected to wide-scale plunder in the form of taxes and privileges for the monopolies via the provision to them of enormous state orders, particularly in the arms field. For its interests colonial seizures were made and wars waged to recarve the world. Powerful repressive forces

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", Collected Works, Vol. 22, p. 204.

² Ibid., p. 241.

³ Ibid., p. 268.

were employed to buttress the oligarchy's positions—the use of the police, army and other punitive bodies against actions by the working class and other working people was expanded. Not content with the support they were receiving from bourgeois parties, monopolistic circles began to form new organisations—alliances of employers, which fought the working-class movement. The drastically heightened militarism, which became part and parcel of imperialism, was an instrument not only for the obtaining of huge profits and for the struggle to recarve the world, but also for maintaining “order” and for suppressing the mounting opposition being offered by the working class and the national liberation movement. Chauvinism and racism, the advocacy of colonial seizures and the expansion of spheres of influence became an important ideological weapon for the imperialists.

The oppression of national minorities was stepped up in the imperialist states. In the United States the rights of the “emancipated” blacks and the indigenous Indian population were infringed upon: they were subjected to segregation; in Great Britain the ruling classes perpetrated repressions against the Irish; in Germany the Germanisation of Poles and other national minorities was intensified; national problems were exacerbated to the extreme in Austria-Hungary. The Russian Empire was a prison for peoples oppressed by military-feudal imperialism.

Thus, a situation took shape in the early 20th century which was fraught with social upheavals. The unevenness inherent in capitalist development heightened markedly, bringing with it ever more conflicts. As a result, interimperialist contradictions became aggravated to the limit. The chain of “local” conflicts led, like a burnt-out safety fuse, to a worldwide explosion. The year 1914 witnessed the outbreak of the First World War, the preparations for which had been undertaken for years by the ruling classes of “civilised” countries—a war which plunged the working masses into unparalleled hardships. The war mirrored and exacerbated the entire gamut of contradictions plaguing bourgeois society; it led to the start of the general crisis of capitalism.

The world imperialist system was encompassing countries on different levels of political and socio-economic development. Within the framework of individual national economies, monopoly rule combined with backward forms of capitalist and even pre-capitalist production. Imperialist oppression was frequently deepening via the preservation of vestiges of feudalism, absolutism and all manner of medieval reaction.

The financial oligarchy secured itself political support on the part of the biggest bourgeois parties, land magnates, heads of republics and semi-absolute monarchies, and top civil and military echelons—

in short, all forces with a vital interest in buttressing the foundations of capitalism. However, this did not remove the contradictions among various groups of the bourgeoisie and their clashes with landowners and other differences within the ruling classes.

The manifestations of supremacy and coercion which heightened at the monopoly stage of capitalism were supplemented by social demagoguery and separate concessions to the working masses. Placed at the service of the ruling classes at the time were the compromising expertise of the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, the bourgeois-reformist manoeuvres of US presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, the social veering of Italian Premier Giovanni Giolitti, who tried to win the imperialists the support of the working class via a "liberal course", the nationalistic demagoguery of Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, and the reactionary reformism of Prime Minister Stolypin in Russia. A sign of the times was the intensification of bourgeois reformism, which was designed to pacify the proletariat through the partial modernisation of the existing system. Describing this tendency, Lenin wrote in 1911 that "the bourgeoisie of Europe and America, as represented by their ideologists and political leaders, are coming out increasingly in defence of so-called social reforms as opposed to the idea of social revolution".¹ This essentially was a policy of fortifying the underpinnings of capitalism.

In order to get the working-class movement on the bourgeois reformist bandwagon, the utilisation of the influence of the labour aristocracy was accompanied by gradual emphasis being placed on drawing heads of trade unions and other mass proletarian organisations into the capitalist camp. In several European countries and in the United States a stratum of labour bureaucrats was formed with the involvement of ruling circles, which was concerned primarily with ensuring its own well-being by collaborating with the state and entrepreneurs, and which refused to defend the fundamental interests of the mass of proletarians. The bourgeoisie did everything in its power to support opportunism, revisionism in particular, proclaiming the "end of Marxism" and calling upon the Social-Democrats to reject their "extremes", and strove to guide the activity of labour parties in the direction of reformism.

Enormously intensifying and complicating the entire gamut of capitalist contradictions, monopoly rule prepared the ground for the social revolution of the proletariat and hastened its advent. At the same time, it created rather powerful barriers along the road of the revolutionary current in order to prevent it from breaking through. The international bourgeoisie was consolidating its forces.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Reformism in the Russian Social-Democratic Movement", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1968, p. 229.

By virtue of the law of the unevenness of the economic and political development of capitalism, the formation of the objective political, economic and social prerequisites for a proletarian revolution and the subjective factors connected with the struggle of the working class proved under imperialism to be a process which differed highly in its pace and forms from country to country.

What, in this tumultuous historical period, when great revolutionary battles were in the offing, was the proletariat, the class to whom history preordained the decisive role in the revolutionary transformation of capitalism into socialism? What was its strength and potential?

By 1910 the proletariat in the eight leading countries of Europe and North America numbered some 90 million people. However, its proportion in the gainfully employed population was quite varied: in Russia—one-fourth, France, Austria-Hungary and Italy—over one-third, Belgium and Germany—over one-half, Britain and the United States—approximately two-thirds.

The bulk of the working class was the industrial proletariat, which numbered over 50 million in the above-mentioned countries. Their nucleus was factory employees—the most united, organised and receptive to socialist ideas. The very development of large-scale capitalist production, accelerated by monopoly rule, facilitated the unity of these workers. Working at enterprises employing over 500 persons at the end of the first decade of the 20th century were: in Russia—approximately 54 per cent of all factory employees, in the United States—some 33 per cent of all workers in the manufacturing industry, in France—30 per cent of the workers employed in industry, construction and transport. In Japan enterprises with over 100 persons took in about half of all industrial workers. But even in a number of the most industrialised capitalist countries the proportion of workers employed at small-scale enterprises and domestically, with manual production predominating, was quite high. Around half the total number of workers in France and over one-sixth in Germany were employed at minute enterprises, 1 to 5 persons in each. In Italy, approximately 90 per cent of all enterprises had from 1 to 10 employees.

In the outlying areas of imperialist domination, in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the same process of growth of the industrial proletariat was taking place, except that it was still at the initial stage, with small semi-artisan enterprises predominating. However, even here—in a number of Latin American countries, separate areas in Asia and Australia, and in parts of Africa—a factory proletariat was taking shape.

A considerable part of the hired workers in many leading capitalist countries was comprised of the agricultural proletariat: in the United

States and Germany—around one-fourth, in Russia, France and Austria-Hungary—around one-third and over, and in Italy—a bit less than half. Farm hands were normally engaged in primitive manual labour. Their living and working conditions were extremely difficult, especially in colonial and dependent countries.

The turn of the century in the industrialised countries also witnessed the acceleration of the process of the formation of the “intellectual proletariat” which, according to Frederick Engels, was “intended to play a formidable role in the imminent revolution side by side with its brothers, the manual workers”.¹

The development of the proletariat as a class took place in a tense struggle against capital, during which workers in a number of countries in the period under review achieved a certain improvement in their working conditions. Of importance in this respect was the movement for an eight-hour working-day, a weekly day off and paid holidays. Under the onslaught of mounting class battles waged by the workers, the ruling elite was forced to introduce legislative limitations on the working-day of women and minors, and to prohibit child labour, arbitrary delays of wages, and deductions, etc., social security laws were adopted in a number of countries.

Socio-economic and other gains of the proletariat made for a growth in its needs. This was dictated by the very conditions of capitalist production, which was making ever higher demands of the proletariat, of its skills and educational level, health and tenacity. The change in the workers’ needs was also affected by the rapid burgeoning of cities with their accelerated pace of social life, different set of values of the working population, new cultural life and human intercourse. A great influence was also exerted by the constantly growing number of women in production and public life.

However, the substantial broadening of the vital needs of the proletariat was being accompanied by an unprecedentedly wide gap between them and the level—which was frequently dropping—of real earnings, which led to the worsening of the economic and social position of the proletariat. Economic crises had a particularly baleful effect on it. As the party programmes prepared with Lenin’s participation pointed out, “crises and periods of industrial stagnation ... lead still more rapidly to the relative and sometimes to the absolute deterioration of the condition of the working class”.²

¹ Friedrich Engels, “An den Internationalen Kongress sozialistischer Studenten”, Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Vol. 22, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1963, p. 445.

² *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee*, Vol. 1, Progress, Moscow, 1970, p. 61; Vol. 2, Moscow, 1963, p. 38 (in Russian); V. I. Lenin, “Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 467.

The chief forms of the capitalists' onslaught against the workers were the raising of prices on consumer goods by the monopolies, the intensification of labour, and unemployment. The tax burden—the result of the exacerbation of imperialist contradictions, the arms race and skyrocketing military spending—grew by leaps and bounds. Typically, military expenditures in the leading capitalist countries were many times the size of allocations for social needs.

The worsening hardships and growing dissatisfaction of the workers with their lot were mirrored in the increased emigration from a number of countries, which in turn exerted a great influence on the formation of the working class in other countries.

The development of the international proletariat proceeded amidst the growing polarisation of the social structure of bourgeois society. On the one hand, there was taking place an enormous concentration of economic and political power in the hands of the financial oligarchy and big capital, and their intertwining with the landed aristocracy and the state bureaucracy. A small fraction of the population had concentrated in its hands the lion's share of the wealth of the biggest capitalist countries in the world. On the other hand, the army of hired labour was growing. It was being formed by the spontaneous growth of the proletariat and as a result of the rapid stratification of the peasantry, urban petty bourgeoisie and craftsmen, which was creating new masses of proletarians and semi-proletarians.

The shifts taking place in the social structure of society and the tremendous growth of capitalist contradictions engendered a situation whereby the proletariat was being provided an opportunity to rely on the majority of the population of its own country in its struggle. The awakening of Asia and the development of democratic and national liberation movements on imperialism's periphery became a new factor behind the upsurge of the revolutionary movement.

Socialist and democratic tasks acquired increasing prominence in the mounting working-class movement and were more and more organically intertwined. The heightening of monopoly rule, aimed at negating democracy, was accompanied by the growing importance of the democratic goals of the proletariat. Both in countries where extensive bourgeois-democratic transformations were a matter of the future and in those where they had already been effected, the working class addressed itself to the tasks of struggle against monopoly rule, reaction, militarism, etc.

The mass working-class movement had a huge store of fuel. One tidal wave of revolutionary struggle after another was rising in Russia. Strikes in England, Belgium, Sweden and the United States were acquiring unprecedented proportions; a revolutionary atmosphere was taking shape in Germany; fierce outbreaks of the

class struggle were occurring in Italy, Spain and France. The influence of socialist ideas was spreading and growing everywhere. The working-class movement proved to be an important factor for the development of the liberation struggle of the Balkan peoples. It increasingly made itself felt on the periphery of imperialism as well. The anti-militarist actions of broad strata of the working people acquired vast proportions. The world army of labour was growing in terms of strength and organisation.

The internationalisation of the whole of public life and the Russian revolution of 1905-1907 both made for the intensification of the tendency to the unity of the world revolutionary movement spear-headed against the absolute power of the capitalists. The 1905-1907 revolution the mainspring of which was the proletariat, stimulated the militant international unity of workers, showing, as Lenin had said, that an international alliance of the revolutionary proletariat—the only force capable of countering the international alliance of capital—"with respect to political solidarity... is already fully formed".¹ There gradually formed the prerequisites for other, non-proletarian democratic social strata to be incorporated into the united anti-imperialist stream of the struggle of the working class, and for the unity of the revolutionary movement in imperial countries and the national liberation movement of the peoples of colonial and dependent countries.

Yet, translating the revolutionary potential of the proletariat into reality was a highly complicated matter. The level of the class consciousness of the working class was quite varied. Several strata can be singled out in it based on Leninist methodology. The advanced stratum were the most class-conscious workers, who were the earliest to embrace socialist ideas, and dedicated themselves to educating and organising the masses. Their tremendous thirst for knowledge, constant study and self-education, firmness of character and purposefulness turned them into the vanguard of the conscious class movement of the proletariat. Alongside them there existed a broad stratum of average workers—the bulk of the proletariat, which strove for socialism, read socialist newspapers and books and took part in socialist propaganda. Finally there were the numerous "lower strata" of the proletariat, which, while even voting for the Social-Democrats, had not yet risen to the level of conscious fighters; it took a great and protracted effort to channel their dissatisfaction along a revolutionary course.²

¹ V. I. Lenin, "European Capital and the Autocracy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 273.

² V. I. Lenin, "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1962, pp. 279-85.

The realisation of the proletariat's revolutionary potential hinged to a tremendous extent on the degree it was organised politically and on the ability of the proletarian parties to take charge of the struggle of the masses. However, even in this respect the state of affairs was highly complex. International Social-Democracy, particularly the European version, was a significant force in the early 20th century. It was frequently embraced by large masses of workers who had been incorporated into trade unions, cooperatives and youth, women's and other labour organisations.

Yet, international Social-Democracy was affected by symptoms of the protracted disease of opportunism, which brought about a special, qualitatively new situation in the working-class movement during the First World War.

The social base of the growing opportunism was the petty bourgeoisie, the labour aristocracy and the labour bureaucracy. The necessitated concessions of the capitalists to the workers and particularly the imperialists' bribing of the upper crust of the working class, the provision of privileges for the labour aristocracy and the labour bureaucracy, and the specific conditions of the so-called peaceful period in capitalist development fed opportunist tendencies in the working-class movement. The intensifying departure of many leaders of Social-Democratic parties from Marxism and their reformist adaptation to the bourgeoisie, the substitution by them of bourgeois nationalism for proletarian internationalism, and finally, the open shift of the majority of the leaders of the Second International at the start of the world imperialist war to the side of the governments to overtly defend the interests of "their own" bourgeoisie—all this led to the collapse of the Second International. During the First World War, a critical period in the development of the international liberation movement, the opportunist leaders of the Second International deprived the proletariat of prospects for ridding mankind once and for all of the horrors of imperialism, and did all in their power to prevent the war from ending in revolution.

It was only the internationalist revolutionaries, the Bolshevik Party in particular, which manifested a high sense of principle and political perspicacity and identified the true meaning and essence of what was taking place, evaluating it from a class, Marxist viewpoint. Thanks to the Bolsheviks, the ideological and organisational separation of the Social-Democrats into a revolutionary and an opportunistic wings took place in good time in Russia. The idea of the necessity for such separation was paving a way for itself more and more in the international working-class movement and was beginning to take practical forms. Having emerged on the scientific basis of Marxism-Leninism, the Bolshevik Party was able to integrate "scientific socialism with the mass working-class movement and

was thoroughly prepared to lead the proletariat towards the seizure of power. It absorbed everything honest, thinking, courageous and self-sacrificing that had been accumulated by generations of revolutionaries and creatively analysed the experience of the revolutionary struggle of the working people. The Bolshevik Party gave the proletariat of Russia a scientific programme for a democratic and socialist revolution, organised it politically and rallied it to a struggle against the autocracy and capitalist system. Its policy conformed to the basic interests of the working class and all other working people and was therefore supported by the majority of the population."¹

The Bolshevik Party was headed by the leader of the Russian and world proletariat, Vladimir Lenin. All his work was permeated with resolute striving to prepare the working class and its allies for the decisive revolutionary battles to come.

The epoch-making gains of the international proletariat were unthinkable without the consistent struggle waged by the Bolsheviks, and other revolutionary Social-Democrats against opportunism and revisionism of all types and shades. The opposition of the two main trends in the working-class movement—revolutionary proletarian and opportunist—ran through the entire ideological and political life of the parties of the Second International. It depended on the outcome of this struggle whether the working class, despite the opportunists of the right and “left” persuasion would be able to prepare for the socialist revolution and carry it out, or would sink in the swamp of the notorious “social peace” and nationalistic prejudices, or would wind up embracing baleful sectarian positions.

A vital condition for the successful triumph of the revolutionary line was the creative development of revolutionary theory, which refuted dogmatism and revisionism, in tune with the new historical situation. The major role here, too, was played by Lenin, to whom history entrusted the mission of creatively developing for practical application the teaching of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Leninism was an inevitable stage in the continued development of Marxism, of the enrichment of all its components.

During the 1905-1917 period Lenin, drawing on the experience of the multi-million masses and finding in it answers to the burning issues of the working-class movement, comprehensively elaborated a number of fundamental questions of the scientific theory, politics, strategy and tactics of the revolutionary proletariat. The ideological and theoretical work which Lenin did, explaining the meaning of the

¹ *Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution*, Moscow, 1970, p. 6.

new conditions of the class struggle under imperialism, mercilessly unveiling the impotence and falsehood of bourgeois "refutations" and revisionist distortions of scientific proletarian ideology, and elaborating a theory of revolution, was of tremendous importance for bringing out the creative initiative of proletarians in many countries.

Similar to the way Marxism in the 19th century synthesised the experience of the world proletarian movement, in the 20th century it was summarised in Leninism, which drew on the legacy of Marx and Engels. Lenin continued their cause. The enrichment by Lenin and other revolutionaries of the proletariat's theoretical arsenal represented the development of a uniform Marxist theory, and prepared the prerequisites for its successful practical realisation and for the implementation of the imminent revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism.

The leading role in these accomplishments was played by the Russian proletariat. The centre of the revolutionary movement shifted to Russia. It was here that over a period of 12 years three revolutions occurred and the working class took power into its hands in 1917.

The prominence of early 20th-century Russia in the revolutionary movement was due to subjective as well as objective conditions, which made the country the chief point of contradictions and the weakest link in the entire imperialist system. The events in Russia bore out the predictions of Marx and Engels to the effect that the accomplishment of the lofty task facing the Russian socialists "is essential as a pre-condition for the general liberation of the European proletariat",¹ and that the coming revolution in Russia would have tremendous repercussions and be a "turning point in world history".² And whereas previously the struggle of the proletariat in Germany could provide an example to the working-class movement in other countries by virtue of the fact that it was developing, in Engels's words, "on the shoulders" of the English and French movement, in the early 20th century such an example was the struggle of the Russian proletariat, which utilised the experience of the international working-class movement and stood, as Lenin put it, "on the shoulders" of the Paris Commune.

During the three revolutions Russia's working class, drawing on the experience of the world proletariat, acted as a class of internationalists, marching ahead of the other contingents of the worldwide army of working people. The foresight of the following statement

¹ *The General Council of the First International, 1868-1870, Minutes*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 366.

² "Engels an Johann Philipp Becker, 19. Dezember 1879", Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Vol. 34, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1966, p. 433.

by Lenin was borne out: "History has now confronted us with an immediate task which is the *most revolutionary* of all the *immediate* tasks confronting the proletariat of any country. The fulfilment of this task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not only of European, but (it may now be said) of Asiatic reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat."¹ The revolution of 1905-1907 in Russia, which came to have a tremendous impact on the growth of revolutionary actions by workers and peasants in many countries, and which generated a powerful upsurge in the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples of the colonial East, attested to the fact that the period of political upheavals and revolutionary battles had begun in world history. All of this shook the world capitalist system and hastened the onset of its general crisis.² The 1905-1907 revolution was the dress rehearsal, while the February 1917 revolution was the direct prologue of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The triumph of the October Revolution, the main event of the 20th century, in turn changed fundamentally the course of the development of the whole of mankind. With all the variety of the conditions in which the proletarian revolution in Russia matured and then unfolded, it mirrored the chief patterns of the imminent new era, which were conditioned by preceding socio-economic development. It resolved "primarily Russia's problems, posed by its history, by the concrete conditions existing in it. But basically, these were not local but general problems, posed before the whole of mankind by social development."³

In terms of the tremendous shifts which took place in world history and the development of the international working-class movement, the twelve years which separated the first Russian revolution and the October Revolution of 1917 were equal to many decades of ordinary life. Pointing at the start of this period to the "tremendous acceleration of worldwide capitalist development, a quickening of history's pace", Lenin emphasised that it was resulting in the acceleration of the social revolution of the proletariat.⁴

¹ V. I. Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?", *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 373.

² See "On the Seventieth Anniversary of the Revolution of 1905-1907 in Russia. Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee", *Kommunist*, No. 2, 1975, p. 5.

³ L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1978, p. 171.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Fall of Port Arthur", *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 48.

Part One

THE UPSURGE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT
(1905-1907)

Chapter 1

THE PROLETARIAT IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905-1907

THE FIRST POPULAR REVOLUTION OF THE IMPERIALIST PERIOD

Events in the capital of the Russian Empire on January 9 (22), 1905 shocked the world. On that day the army fired upon a demonstration of workers who had naively hoped that justice and protection from tyranny would be given by the autocratic ruler. Approximately 1,000 were killed and several thousand wounded. That bloody, senseless crime by tsarism finally broke the people's patience. A revolution began. As Lenin put it, "dormant Russia was transformed into a Russia of a revolutionary proletariat and a revolutionary people".¹

The country had been prepared for this transformation by the entire course of previous development. Lenin wrote about it as "the contradiction which most profoundly of all explains the Russian revolution, namely, the most backward system of landownership and the most ignorant peasantry on the one hand, and the most advanced industrial and finance capitalism on the other".² The main bastion of the preservation of landed estates in the country and of the landlords' domination in society was the autocracy. The peasantry was landless and suffered from the complete lack of rights. By preserving outmoded semi-feudal forms of landownership and limiting the bourgeoisie politically, tsarism impeded the in-depth development of capitalism, creating, via its great-power aggressive course, conditions for its in-breadth expansion. The autocratic state provided the Russian bourgeoisie an opportunity to obtain superprofits through the use of the crudest, truly barbaric methods of exploiting hired labour. The "labour question" was becoming extremely poignant. The tsar's reactionary colonial policy was generating

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p. 238.

² V. I. Lenin, "Political Notes", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 442.

indignation and mounting protest on the part of the numerous ethnic groups inhabiting Russia.

Although capitalist development in the empire's outlying areas was of an economically progressive nature, under the autocratic reactionary system it led to the merciless exploitation of the indigenous population of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, the Volga region, the Baltics, the Caucasus and Central Asia. It was compounded by the intensification of national oppression and the exacerbation of national strife and contradictions between the local and the Russian bourgeoisie, between the local aristocracy and the peasant population.

Thus, the most acute contradictions engendered by the development of imperialism were monstrosly combined in Russia with numerous vestiges of the Middle Ages. The reactionary autocratic regime and the historical ineptitude of the ruling classes contrasted sharply with the presence of the militant revolutionary proletariat, the potentially revolutionary multi-million peasant masses and the oppressed non-Russian peoples. All of this was fraught with an unprecedented explosion of various social contradictions and class antagonisms.

The economic crisis of the early 20th century and the tsar's defeats in the Russo-Japanese War, which demonstrated the complete bankruptcy of the existing political and economic system, the powerful upsurge of the working-class movement, the widespread democratic ferment, and the inability of the tsarist government to rule by old patterns created a tense revolutionary situation in Russia. The country was rapidly proceeding in the direction of revolutionary upheavals which were to put an end to the tsar's despotism and manorial landownership and give the people basic political rights and freedoms, i.e., solve approximately the scope of problems that bourgeois revolutions had faced in other countries. However, the revolution of 1905-1907 in Russia took place in completely different historical conditions, when capitalism, Russian capitalism included, had grown into its highest, imperialist, stage, and the proletariat had become the leading force in social development. This substantially spread the framework of bourgeois revolutions, objectively drawing them closer timewise to socialist ones, advanced the working class to the forefront of the world liberation movement and imparted unprecedented dimensions to this movement. The new conditions engendered a new type of bourgeois-democratic revolution, a popular revolution of the period of imperialism.

Not fortuitously, it was Russia, where all the basic economic structures and the main social processes and contradictions of the time were represented, and where the proletariat rapidly amassed expe-

rience of class battles and had its own revolutionary Marxist party headed by such a leader as Vladimir Lenin, it was that country that proved to be the weakest link in the entire imperialist system and inaugurated in the 20th century a new cycle of anti-imperialist popular bourgeois-democratic and proletarian revolutions. These were to lead to a fundamental change in the balance of revolutionary and reactionary forces in the international arena and to become a turning point in world history. The revolution of 1905-1907, which emerged on the basis of the profound contradictions of Russian life, in a way also combined the leading tendencies in national and international development; it graphically mirrored the basic social antagonisms and the alignment of class forces in the entire world capitalist system, and became the prototype of the many forthcoming revolutionary battles of the 20th century, the first to demonstrate in practice a number of the features of the liberation movement in conditions of imperialism.

One of them was the intertwining of two social wars during the bourgeois revolution—the struggle of the entire nation under the leadership of the working class against the autocratic regime, the landlords, and all vestiges of serfdom, and the struggle waged by the proletariat and the poor peasants against the urban and rural bourgeoisie. The revolution of 1905-1907 in Russia was brought about not only by the conflict conditioned by the vestiges of serfdom, but also by contradictions inherent in the capitalist system itself. At that time the proletariat and its Bolshevik Party did not yet aim at eradicating capitalism forthwith. However, there could no longer be a lengthy gap between the bourgeois-democratic revolution, doing away with the vestiges of serfdom, and a socialist revolution, which would destroy capitalism.

Aimed against the medieval vestiges, landlords and the autocracy, which was solidly intertwined with Russian and international capitalism and continued to be one of the chief bastions of world reaction, and against the big bourgeoisie, the revolutionary movement in Russia was acquiring marked anti-imperialist features. In case it succeeded, it could develop into a struggle for socialism. The anti-imperialist thrust of the revolution of 1905-1907 was also determined by the fact that while it was taking place the working masses of Russia, led by the proletariat, came out against the Russo-Japanese War, which was aggressive on both sides, and against the imperialist foreign and national-colonial policy of the tsar.

The Russian revolution, bourgeois-democratic in its nature and content, intended to overthrow the autocracy and complete the capitalist transformation of the country's agrarian system (Lenin called the struggle against the strong vestiges of serfdom in the countryside "the touchstone of the bourgeois revolution as a whole"

in Russia¹), was to a certain extent a proletarian revolution, since the proletariat had become the guiding force, the vanguard of the movement, while the strike—this tried and tested specific method of struggle employed by the working class—had become a main-spring of the entire revolutionary process, the “principal means of bringing the masses into motion and the most characteristic phenomenon in the wave-like rise of decisive events”².

Another feature of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of the new type was the alignment of class forces, which was completely different from that in preceding bourgeois revolutions. The proletariat played the leading role in the revolution; its allies were the peasantry and the urban petty-bourgeois strata while the liberal bourgeoisie proved to be a counter-revolutionary class fearing the growth of the independent proletarian movement and peasant uprisings, and organically incapable of resolute struggle against the old regime; all it sought was sharing power with the tsar and the landlord class.

Three camps thus came into play in Russia’s political arena: 1) the government, its nucleus the reactionary nobility and the bureaucratic, military and Court elements which sought to preserve the autocracy; 2) the liberals—landlords who had become bourgeois, the bourgeoisie and the upper crust of the bourgeois intelligentsia advocating the limitation of the tsar’s power via a parliament and constitution, and 3) the revolutionary democrats (the proletariat, peasantry and petty-bourgeois strata of the urban population and the democratic intelligentsia), fighting to overthrow the tsar, establish a republican system in Russia, and achieve sweeping political, economic and social transformations within the framework of a democratic republic.

The underpinnings of the revolutionary-democratic camp consisted of the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry of the multinational Russian Empire, with the leading role being assigned to the working class and its vanguard, the party. This determined both the scope of the revolution, the upsurge of the class struggle, and the role which the fundamental social problems played in it. Lenin had good reason to stress that the revolution of 1905-1907 was a truly popular revolution, in which “the very lowest social groups, crushed by oppression and exploitation, rose independently and stamped on the entire course of the revolution the imprint of *their* own demands, *their* attempts to build in their own way a new society in place of the

¹ V. I. Lenin, “The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 292.

² V. I. Lenin, “Lecture on the 1905 Revolution”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 239.

old society that was being destroyed",¹ a revolution in which the working class, organised by the Bolsheviks and being the vanguard, fought "for the cause of the whole people, at the head of the whole people".²

THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY AT THE START OF THE REVOLUTION

The proletariat was the only class in Russian society which had before the revolution an independent political party and a strategic plan of action. Unlike the parties of the Second International, where for years revolutionary and opportunist elements coexisted and peaceful parliamentary forms were recognised as the chief means of struggle, this was a new type of proletarian party which rested on the ideological and theoretical foundation of revolutionary Marxism. This party utilised the rich arsenal of ways and means of struggle developed by the international and Russian working-class movement. It was mastering the complicated art of combining Marxism with the mass struggle of the proletariat and the broad democratic movement. At the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) held in 1903 the revolutionary Social-Democrats headed by Lenin defined the nature of the forthcoming revolution, the role of the proletariat as the vanguard in the fight for democracy and the role of the peasantry as an ally of the proletariat, and formed a closely-knit revolutionary party. The RSDLP programme reflected the crucial needs of the country's political and economic development and the interests of the broad masses of workers.

The Russian proletariat, by virtue of its position in the social production system and the specifics of its development, the class with rich revolutionary traditions and experience of class struggle, led by a Marxist-Leninist party, its militant political vanguard, and having profound vested interests in a decisive victory over tsarism, this class was historically groomed for its role as leader of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. No other class in Russia was capable of assuming leadership of the revolution.

The Bolsheviks believed organisation of the proletariat to be vital to the realisation of the class independence of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution and, in the final analysis, to the success of all revolutionary gains of the working people. The

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 421.

² V. I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 112.

Bolsheviks embodied Lenin's teaching about the new type of proletarian party in clear-cut organisational forms.

At that time, the Bolshevik Party numbered some 8,500 members. More than half of them were workers at large enterprises. They were people who had gone through the tough school of underground struggle, who had mastered the skills of that struggle and knew how to lead the proletarian masses. The dangerous work of a revolutionary in tsarist Russia forged staunch fighters prepared to give their all, even their lives, in the struggle. A large proportion of the party was made up of professional revolutionaries from among the workers and the intelligentsia, who were adept at propaganda, agitation and organisation. Most party members had received a Marxist education in underground circles, taking part in the theoretical debates held in them and studying Marxist theory in "prison universities" with the aid of more knowledgeable comrades. All this honed dedicated leaders of the mass revolutionary movement during the first Russian revolution.

At the start of the revolution the RSDLP was a nationwide organisation with branches in all main political and economic centres of the country. In accordance with the Rules of the Party, the leadership in the period between Party congresses was exercised by the Party Council, the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Party's Central Organ. All the three bodies had been formed at the Second RSDLP Congress. The Council and the editorial board were located abroad, while the majority of Central Committee members were in Russia and met from time to time for plenary sessions. In the illegal conditions in which the Party existed, particular emphasis had to be placed on underground methods at all levels of party work. Overall guidance of technical and financial matters was continuously effected by Central Committee member L. B. Krasin, a talented engineer and brilliant organiser who maintained his legal position and worked in Baku, in Moscow vicinity and in St. Petersburg throughout the entire period of the first revolution in Russia.

Party work in large economic regions was directed either by regional bureaux of the Central Committee which ran local committees and were appointed by and accountable only to the CC, or by regional associations of the RSDLP headed by committees formed locally.¹ The local RSDLP committee was the main link in the party structure. The Rules invested it with complete leadership of the working-class movement in a given district or city. The unity of principles guiding the formation and functioning of committees, defined at the

¹ *The Third Congress of the RSDLP. April-May 1905. Minutes*, Moscow 1962, pp. 472-74 (in Russian).

time of the struggle to set up the party in Lenin's "Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks", was combined with a considerable variety of concrete forms formalised in local Rules.

The largest committees, in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Baku, Odessa and elsewhere, consisted of a dozen or two party members who had experience in underground work. From among its members a committee assigned an executive organiser to maintain contacts with lower-standing organisations. As the mass base of the party grew, the organiser's work became increasingly important. As early as 1904 district organisers were incorporated in the St. Petersburg and Baku committees, and in 1905 the executive organiser was ever more frequently becoming the head of the respective committee. The role played by district committees was gradually growing within the urban party organisation. The Social-Democratic organisation was structured according to the territorial-production principle.

Workers united and organised at capitalist enterprises were the basis and support of the revolutionary Social-Democrats. The focal point of the proletariat's economic and political struggle, the enterprise, became also the centre of the party organisation of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, which in many ways corresponded to their leading role in this struggle.

This pattern of party work was also prompted by the living and working conditions of workers who had no democratic rights locally, who were forced to work 10-12 hours daily, etc. Lenin wrote: "The important thing is living conditions, conditions of assembly, conditions under which people meet, conditions of joint work, because the primary nucleus should meet frequently and regularly and function in a particularly lively fashion."¹

Alongside the predominantly working-class Social-Democratic organisations, there were party organisations of students. The first steps were also taken to coordinate mass agitation work among peasants and soldiers. On the eve and at the outset of the first Russian revolution, the RSDLP set up special organisations to work among the proletariat of the Empire's non-Russian areas. Hummet (Energy), one of the first, was formed in 1904 and operated under the leadership of the Baku committee. It was followed by an Armenian section under the same committee. The Baku committee later set up the Faruk organisation to work among the mountain dwellers of Daghestan. A Tatar Social-Democratic circle began functioning in 1904 under the Kazan Committee of the RSDLP, and eventually developed into a group.

National groups functioned on the footing of district party organisations and in political matters were subordinated to single party

¹ V. I. Lenin to Olga Vinogradova, April 8, 1905, *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 310.

centres. The press was assigned a prominent role in work among ethnic contingents of Russia's proletariat. The Hummet organisation printed a newspaper in Azerbaijani under the same title, and, together with the Armenian section of the Baku committee, it published the legal newspaper *Koch Devet* in two languages, followed by *Tekemyul* and *Yeldash*.

Indubitable success was scored in the formation and consolidation of the Russian labour party. However, the functioning, development and improvement of the party organisation of the new type formed under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, was impeded by the splitting of the RSDLP by the Mensheviks. The split further intensified on the eve and at the outset of the first Russian revolution. The overwhelming majority of party committees, including the major ones (the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Odessa, the Northern, the Ural, the committees of the Caucasian Union, etc.), firmly supported the stand of the majority at the Second Congress of the RSDLP and upheld its decisions. The Mensheviks, undermining the fulfilment of the decisions, gradually took over the Foreign League of Russian Social-Democracy and the editorial board of the Central Organ, gained predominance in the Party Council and co-opted their supporters into the Central Committee. With the help of these bodies they were able to gain control of the leadership of some committees, mostly those just newly formed, and to set up, in violation of the Rules, their own parallel groups in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Odessa, Nikolayev and other centres. The Mensheviks were subverting the organisation's unity and coming out against centralism and discipline. Lenin pointed out in early 1905 that in comparison to the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks were "*materially ... very much weaker. We have yet to convert our moral strength into material strength.*"¹

The party was also greatly harmed by an opportunistic conciliatory current which saw the path to party unity to lie in concessions to Menshevik "generals" and which thereby encouraged the splitting moves of the Mensheviks. Instead of providing political leadership for the mounting revolutionary movement which was in dire need of clear-cut guidelines and organisation, the compromisers essentially stood for merely "positive work" in providing purely technical services to local organisations.

It was in these conditions that Lenin launched the struggle to consolidate the Bolshevik ranks and to convene the next congress of the party, the supreme body empowered to settle all disputed issues. The Party Council refused to convene a congress, and the Bolsheviks took the initiative. In late 1904, the Northern, Southern

¹ V. I. Lenin, "A Letter to A. A. Bogdanov and S. I. Gusev", *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 145.

and Caucasian conferences formed the Bureau of Majority Committees, the guiding centre of the Bolsheviks, and their newspaper *Vperyod*, began to be published under Lenin's editorship. Thus, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks both had their own leadership bodies and their mouthpieces. At the start of the revolution in Russia in March 1905 there were 32 Bolshevik committees and 35 groups, the Mensheviks had 23 committees and 27 groups, and 10 committees and 43 groups embraced conciliatory positions.

The Third Congress of the RSDLP, held in April and May 1905 in London, addressed itself to the task of shaping the party line in the revolution and of ensuring the functioning of a united militant party organisation capable of putting this line into practice.

The congress elaborated a strategy and tactics of the proletariat and all working people in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and formalised the unity of the Bolsheviks on the organisational principles proposed by Lenin. The Rules of the RSDLP adopted at the congress established the Leninist formulation of party membership according to which "any person who accepts the programme of the Party, supports the Party with material means, and participates in the work of one of its organisations shall be considered a member of the Party".¹ The autonomy of local committees was broadened and the role of party members from among the workers heightened. The congress raised the issue of introducing universal electivity of committees, as the situation in the country would grow conducive to this and the composition of party organisations would become more consistent and homogeneous.

The congress renounced duocentrism (the Central Committee and the editorial board of the Central Organ) and elected a single leading centre, the Central Committee headed by Lenin. The editorial board of the party's central newspaper, the *Proletary*, was made subordinate to the Central Committee. Lenin became its editor and the representative of the RSDLP in the International Socialist Bureau (ISB) of the Second International. The formation of the Party Council was not stipulated in the new Rules.

The Third Congress of the RSDLP was a Bolshevik congress, as delegates of the minority committees did not attend. Menshevik leaders abroad gathered them in Geneva for a factional conference which expressed the opportunistic course of the Mensheviks in the revolution.

At the outbreak of the revolution the Mensheviks consolidated the split of the proletarian party into two independent parties adhering to two different political lines and tactics in the revolution.

¹ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1970, p. 124 (in Russian).

LENIN'S STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WORKING-CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

The elaboration of a strategy and tactics of the proletarian party in the first bourgeois-democratic revolution under imperialism was based on a profound Marxist analysis of Russian reality, a thorough examination of the main tendencies in world development, and a generalisation and critical interpretation of the theoretical legacy and practical experience of the international working-class and democratic movement and the emancipation struggle in Russia per se. Lenin constantly stressed that the ascertaining of identical basic processes of capitalist development in Russia and in the West, and the advancing of the same chief tasks of the Socialists and the working class "must not, under any circumstances, lead to our forgetting the *specific features* of Russia which must find *full expression* in the specific features of our programme".¹ Before the onset of the decisive events of the revolution, the Bolsheviks led by Lenin already worked out a consistently revolutionary action programme, and a strategy and tactics of struggle for the proletariat and all working people. Lenin substantially supplemented and creatively developed Marxist theory as applied to new historical conditions, armed the Russian and international proletariat ideologically, and upheld the great teaching of Marx and Engels in the fight against right and "left" opportunism.

A special role in this was played by the Bolshevik decisions drafted by Lenin at the Third Congress of the RSDLP and Lenin's book *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*. Concluding the book Lenin expressed the very essence of his approach to the working class's tasks in the democratic revolution. He wrote: "At the head of the whole people, and particularly of the peasantry—for complete freedom, for a consistent democratic revolution, for a republic! At the head of all the toilers and the exploited—for socialism! Such in practice must be the policy of the revolutionary proletariat, such is the class slogan which must permeate and determine the solution of every tactical problem, every practical step of the workers' party during the revolution."²

In the course of the revolution, the fundamental difference between the revolutionaries and the opportunists, first and foremost between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, was manifest. That difference had become evident during the formation of the party at

¹ V. I. Lenin, "A Draft Programme of Our Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 235.

² V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 114.

the Second Congress of the RSDLP in 1903 and increasingly deepened in the period that followed.

The basic antithesis in attitude towards Russian reality, as well as towards the experience of the proletarian struggle, was vividly manifested during the polemics between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in the very first months of the revolution of 1905-1907. Beginning with the debate on the question of whether the Social-Democrats should take part in a provisional revolutionary government following the toppling of the autocracy, the polemics revealed the different conceptions of the dynamics of the very process of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, its mainsprings, tasks and strategic perspectives.

Menshevism was objectively leading to the transformation of the working class into an appendage of the liberal bourgeoisie, and was hindering the solution of the basic tasks facing the proletariat and the broad working masses. Bolshevism geared the working class to the role of vanguard of the popular movement, developing extensively and utilising to the full the revolutionary potential of all the country's genuinely advanced forces.

Lenin exposed the complete untenability and unscientific nature of the argumentation of the Mensheviks who worshipped the canons of European bourgeois revolutions. In the spring of 1905, comparing the situation in Russia with that in the Germany of 1848, he noted a number of specific features of the Russian revolution: "(1) An immeasurably greater store of resentment and revolutionary feeling among the lower classes in Russia than there was in the Germany of 1848. With us the change is *sharper*; with us there have been *no* intermediate stages between autocracy and political freedom (the Zemstvo does not count); with us despotism is Asiatically virginal. (2) With us a disastrous war increases the likelihood of a *severe* collapse, for it has involved the tsarist government completely. (3) With us the international situation is more favourable, for proletarian Europe will make it impossible for the crowned heads of Europe to help the Russian monarchy. (4) With us the development of class-conscious revolutionary parties, their literature and organisation, is on a much higher level than it was in 1789, 1848, or 1871. (5) With us the various nationalities oppressed by tsarism, such as the Poles and Finns, provide a powerful impulse to the attack on the autocracy. (6) With us the peasantry is in particularly sorry plight; it is incredibly impoverished and has absolutely nothing to lose."¹ All these factors bespoke the fact that the Russian bourgeois revo-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "A Revolution of the 1789 or the 1848 Type?", *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 257-58.

lution would traverse its own path, a path different from the bourgeois revolutions of the age of "free" capitalism.

In the struggle against Menshevism, Lenin revealed the dialectical interconnection, especially important for Marxist theory, between the socio-economic content of the revolution and its mainsprings and means of struggle; he showed that there is no direct relationship between them. Lenin explained that in terms of its socio-economic content the impending revolution in Russia would be a bourgeois one, i.e., one which would not directly touch upon the foundations of the bourgeois system. Not only would it not destroy the system, but, to the contrary, it would further deepen and exacerbate the contradictions of the capitalist system, including the main contradiction—that between labour and capital. However, it does not follow at all from this that the bourgeoisie, as the Mensheviks thought, would become the leading force of the revolution. Under imperialism, not only a revolution in a form benefitting predominantly the big capitalist, the financial tycoon and the "progressive" landlord was possible, but also a sweeping democratic revolution in the interests of the worker and peasant. The concrete historical form in which the bourgeois-democratic revolution would take place in Russia was to be eventually determined by the outcome of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for leadership in the liberation movement, by the outcome of the struggle to win the support of the peasant masses.

The leadership of the proletariat in the liberation struggle underlay the Bolsheviks' political line. Lenin convincingly showed that the proletariat was most interested in the decisive triumph of a bourgeois revolution which would not only ensure it democratic rights and social gains (freedom of speech, coalition and assembly, an eight-hour working-day, etc.), but also create the prerequisites for the struggle for socialism. Lenin stressed here that the proletariat was free of any class "selfishness", that it was waging a struggle not for the narrow interests of its own class, but for the interests of the entire people, that it was acting as the representative of the broadest working masses in town and country, as the ideological leader of the entire democracy.

However, the position the working class occupied in the system of social production and in the country's social structure, as well as the proximity of its interests to those of other working classes and strata, only created the objective possibility for the proletariat's leadership in the liberation movement. For this possibility to become a reality the vanguard class had to win the confidence and support of the non-proletarian strata of Russia's working population, forge a solid alliance with them (particularly with the peasantry), assume leadership of their struggle against the autocratic system and para-

lyse the striving towards political leadership of the masses on the part of the liberal bourgeoisie, isolating it from the masses. It was the Bolshevik Party that had the hard job of purging petty-bourgeois democratism of "non-democratic admixtures", that had to battle liberalism and constitutional illusions. Thus, the proletariat and its Marxist vanguard faced a complex struggle for leadership of the democratic movement, and that struggle ran through the entire political history of the Russia of the early 20th century.

In Lenin's analysis the vanguard role of the proletariat is revealed as the consistent, profound and extensive influence of the working class on the development and prospects of the revolutionary process. This influence is exerted under the direct leadership of the Marxist party of the proletariat, without which the vanguard role of the proletariat would be unfeasible. Being the vanguard class, Lenin pointed out, means not only mounting a most vigorous and selfless struggle against the autocracy and against capitalist oppression, but also bringing a revolutionary consciousness to the people, awakening the latter to active political life, responding to any act of coercion and injustice perpetrated against the oppressed. The tasks of the vanguard class and its party further include a theoretical interpretation of the goals of the revolution, the formulation of corresponding slogans and the selection of the most effective ways and means of revolutionary struggle. The proletariat and its Marxist vanguard lead the movement of the non-proletarian masses, the peasantry in particular, both ideologically and organisationally. This leadership is an absolute necessity, since the peasantry is divided and disorganised, prone to endless vacillations and, finally, it is politically too underdeveloped to independently attain victory in the struggle against the autocratic-landlordist system.

Lenin posed and resolved the problem of the working class's allies in the democratic and socialist revolutions. It would seem that the logical march of history suggested that the bourgeois democrats could have become such an ally in the bourgeois revolution. However, in imperialist conditions they had already ceased to be something uniform, having irrevocably split into the liberal bourgeoisie, with regard to whom the proletariat had to pursue the tactics of political isolation, and the petty-bourgeois, particularly peasant, revolutionary democrats, allies of the working class in its struggle against autocracy. Accordingly, the proletariat had to orient itself not on an agreement with the bourgeoisie, but on an alliance with left forces—petty-bourgeois revolutionary democrats, especially the peasantry whom Lenin called the revolutionary-republican bourgeoisie. In this fashion, the leftist bloc tactics, some examples of which were observed in previous bourgeois revolutions, was now becoming a vital common pattern of the liberation movement. The

success of the bourgeois-democratic revolution as a whole depended largely on the success of a broad militant alliance between proletarian and petty-bourgeois democrats and the concrete political agreements of revolutionary parties and organisations in the struggle against tsarism. The historic merit of Lenin lay in his brilliant realisation of the policy of the proletariat's leading role in the revolution based on the leftist bloc tactics which later attained renown in the ranks of the international working-class movement as well.

Lenin elucidated the essence of the Bolshevik tactics as follows: "The further the bourgeois revolution advances, the farther left the proletariat seeks for allies among the bourgeois democrats, and the deeper it goes from their upper ranks to their lower ranks.... The revolution has gone far beyond that. The upper ranks of the bourgeois democrats have begun to desert the revolution. The lower ranks have begun to awaken. The proletariat has begun to seek allies (for a *bourgeois* revolution) in the lower ranks of the bourgeois democrats."¹ Lenin invariably stressed that the proletariat supported the bourgeois democrats only when and inasmuch as they actually fought the autocracy.

The Bolsheviks believed that at the democratic stage of the revolution, the proletariat's ally is the entire peasantry, which despite the deeply developed process of its social differentiation, continued to come out against the landlords as a single class or a social stratum. The peasants demanded the complete abolition of manorial ownership, and were prepared to support the slogan of the nationalisation of all land. And if the popular forces were successful, this would make it possible to advance the bourgeois revolution in Russia much further than bourgeois revolutions had gone in the West and, the main thing, it would facilitate the subsequent development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one.

In his work *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, Lenin formulated the essence of the growth of the one process into the other as follows: "*The proletariat must carry the democratic revolution to completion, allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush the autocracy's resistance by force and paralyse the bourgeoisie's instability. The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, allying to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population, so as to crush the bourgeoisie's resistance by force and paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie.*"²

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P", *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp. 360-61.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 100.

It is for this reason that Lenin attached prime importance to the elaboration of a correct agrarian programme and to the agitation and organisational work of the proletariat and its party in the countryside. At the Third RSDLP Congress, when it became clear that the struggle for land was acquiring the nature of an extensive peasant revolution and that the slogan of struggle for the return of plots of land expropriated by the nobility after the abolition of serfdom in 1861 was not enough now, a decision was taken to vigorously support all revolutionary demands made by the peasantry, including the confiscation of all land belonging to landlords, the state, the church, monasteries and the Crown. A congress resolution called for the "immediate organisation of revolutionary peasant committees to implement all revolutionary-democratic transformations that would rid the peasantry of the oppression of the police, officials and landlords". At the same time, consistently following a course for the independent class organisation of the rural proletariat, the Bolsheviks reaffirmed at the Congress the necessity for constant work in this area.¹

The decisions of the Third Congress were formalised and expanded upon in December 1905 at the Bolshevik Tammerfors Conference. Later, at the Fourth RSDLP Congress in 1906, Lenin set forth an extensive agrarian programme geared to making maximum use of the peasantry's militant potential in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Added to the former Bolshevik demands for the confiscation of manorial holdings and the establishment of peasant committees for the actual disposal of confiscated lands was the demand that land be nationalised, that is, made state property (under definite conditions). "In politics, as in all the life of society," Lenin wrote, "if you do not push forward, you will be hurled back. Either the bourgeoisie, strengthened after the democratic revolution (which naturally strengthens the bourgeoisie), will rob both the workers and the peasant masses of all their gains, or the proletariat and the peasant masses will fight their way further forward. And that means a republic and the complete sovereignty of the people. It means—if a republic is established—the nationalisation of all the land as the most that a bourgeois-democratic revolution can attain, as the natural and necessary step from the victory of bourgeois democracy to the beginning of the real struggle for socialism."²

To counter Lenin's revolutionary agrarian programme, the Mensheviks advanced a reformist, half-baked municipalisation programme. According to it, the peasants would retain only their allotted plots, while the landed estates would be taken over by the municipi-

¹ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, p. 117.

² V. I. Lenin, "Revision of the Agrarian Programme of the Workers' Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 190-91.

palities, from which the peasants could rent these lands. This programme overlooked one of the country's basic needs—that for a break with all medieval forms of land ownership. Neither did it tie the solution of the agrarian question in with the democratisation of Russia's entire political system. Instead of stimulating an upsurge in the peasant movement, which had begun to spread all over the country, it narrowed it to a local framework. As a result, it provided a solution neither to the agrarian issue nor to the tasks of forging an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, nor to the tasks of overthrowing the autocracy.¹

While speaking out against such a programme, the Bolsheviks were not united in their approach to the agrarian issue. Many of them rejected nationalisation and upheld the division of the landed estates making them private property of the peasants. This principle, implying as it did the preservation of peasant land ownership, lost track of the fact that, in itself, it was a vestige of the Middle Ages. However, even with such inconsistency, the programme of the "divisionists" aimed at the abolition of manorial ownership was of a revolutionary-democratic nature, and when it became clear that it would be impossible to push through the nationalisation programme at the Congress, Lenin voted along with the "divisionists". The majority at the Congress supported the municipalisation programme. However, the Bolsheviks managed to include in the Congress resolutions a direct demand that lands belonging to the church, monasteries, the tsar's family and all private landowners (aside from small holdings) be confiscated, and that revolutionary actions by the peasantry, up to and including the confiscation of manors, be supported.²

The Bolsheviks felt that it was highly important to draw to the proletariat's side broad strata of the petty-bourgeois urban population, the democratic intelligentsia and students, who were active in the struggle against autocracy, accounting between 1905 and 1908 for some 23 per cent of all "state criminals", as revolutionaries were called when put on trial.³

Also participating in the overall struggle against the autocratic system was the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples of the Russian Empire. The working masses of ethnic areas were an inalienable part of the international revolutionary-democratic camp. They joined the Russian workers and peasants in

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 333.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Unity Congress of the RSDLP", *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 279-88.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Role of Social Estates and Classes in the Liberation Movement", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 329-30.

dealing blows at tsarism and the bourgeoisie, as well as fighting the feudal lords.

The task of the vanguard of the working class was to unite all these revolutionary forces where possible, organise them and prepare them for an armed insurrection. The slogan of the uprising as a practical militant task of the proletariat was advanced by the party right after the events of January 9, and the Third RSDLP Congress adopted an ad hoc decision which stated that the diversified ideological, organisational and tactical preparations for the insurrection were one of the most crucial and pressing tasks of the Bolshevik organisations. Lenin called upon the proletariat to master all the forms of class struggle and use them as the situation dictated. He especially studied questions of the armed struggle. As Nadezhda Krupskaya recalled, "he not only read and carefully analysed everything Marx and Engels wrote about the revolution and insurrection, he also read many books about the art of war, examining from all angles the technique and organisation of armed insurrection".¹

Marxists have never absolutised armed methods of struggle. Marx wrote addressing himself to bourgeois governments: "We shall advance against you peacefully, where this is possible, and shall use weapons if this becomes necessary."² As if expanding upon this thought, Lenin pointed out in 1899 that the working class would prefer to take power peacefully.³ However, the actual alignment of forces within the country and in the international arena in the early 20th century was such that only the armed onslaught of the oppressed classes could resolve the conflict between the autocracy and the people in Russia.

The flame of a popular insurrection was to yield the solution to the principal question of any revolution—the question of state power. It is not enough to recognise the revolution and talk about it, Lenin said, it is essential to determine which class should be toppled and which class or classes should take charge of the state. The slogan of the revolution is empty and meaningless without this. Proceeding from the new alignment of class forces, in which the proletariat should assume leadership in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, Lenin formulated the all-important conclusion that the victorious bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia would bring not the bourgeoisie to power, as was the case in all previous bourgeois revolutions, but the proletariat and the peasantry, and would conclude with the establishment of their revolutionary-democratic dictatorship. "Real-

¹ N. K. Krupskaya, *Recollections of Lenin*, Moscow, 1972, p. 99 (in Russian).

² "Aufzeichnung einer Rede von Karl Marx über die politische Aktion der Arbeiterklasse", Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Vol. 17, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1968, p. 652.

³ V. I. Lenin, "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 276.

isation of the changes urgently and absolutely indispensable to the proletariat and the peasantry," Lenin wrote, "will evoke desperate resistance from the landlords, the big bourgeoisie, and tsarism. Without a dictatorship it is impossible to break down that resistance and repel counter-revolutionary attempts."¹

From the standpoint of Marxist teaching about the class struggle, Lenin pointed out, the existence of such a dictatorship at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution is quite possible, for the fundamental interests of the proletariat and the peasantry in the struggle for democratic change inevitably coincide.

Lenin singled out the most substantial features of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

First, this would be a democratic, not a socialist, dictatorship which would not extend beyond the framework of bourgeois socio-economic transformations and would realise only the RSDLP minimum programme of redistributing land in favour of the peasants, broadly democratising the political system, improving the condition of the workers, etc., without as yet affecting the foundations of capitalism. Accordingly, this was reflected in the Bolshevik slogans for a democratic republic, eight-hour working-day, and confiscation of manors.

Second, although under this dictatorship the proletariat would share power with the petty bourgeoisie, particularly the peasantry, such a dictatorship is conceivable and feasible only given the leading role of the proletariat in the liberation movement.

Third, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, as Lenin repeatedly pointed out, would be a transitional type of power, no longer bourgeois but not fully proletarian either, which would develop into the dictatorship of the proletariat as the bourgeois-democratic revolution deepened and grew into a socialist revolution.

A provisional revolutionary government was to become the political organ of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. Its functions would include convening the Constituent Assembly, arming the nation and effecting broad democratic reforms in town and country, so as to consolidate, both "from below" and "from above", the people's principal gains by way of exerting pressure on the ruling classes.

The 1905-1907 period witnessed the beginnings of the Soviets (people's councils) in a number of areas in Russia as the embryos of the state form of the dictatorship of the revolutionary people. The "sovereignty of the people" which the Bolsheviks advocated during that period clearly did not fit within the historically limited confines

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 56.

of bourgeois democracy and a parliamentary republic. The Soviets of Workers' Deputies, the peasants' committees and other similar organisations of the insurgent people formed during the revolution were already the beginnings of a fundamentally new type of revolutionary power. Lenin immediately appreciated their significance. As the Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on the Seventieth Anniversary of the 1905-1907 Russian Revolution stated, the Soviets "were bodies of revolutionary power, of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. Lenin keenly identified them as the prototype of Soviet power".¹

Lenin's conclusion about the dictatorship of the revolutionary people opening up the way for the bourgeois-democratic revolution to develop into a socialist revolution was a fresh contribution to Marxist theory. It dealt a heavy blow to the opportunists, who were coming out against the attainment of political power by the proletariat and its allies as a task of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry would provide the oppressed classes an opportunity to take action not only "from below" but also "from above", and would open up broad vistas for combining spontaneous actions of the masses with the purposeful work of the proletarian vanguard employing a wide range of revolutionary methods. Thus, prospects opened up for the proletariat to fight for power not only in the highly developed capitalist countries but also in countries with a medium level of capitalist development so as to help the bourgeois-democratic revolution mature into a socialist one.

It should be pointed out that in imperialist conditions Lenin posited the question of the relationship between the struggle for democracy and the struggle for socialism in a new way. The early 20th century was marked by the intertwining of the goals of the democratic and socialist stages of the revolution. "Whoever wants to reach socialism by any other path than that of political democracy," Lenin wrote, "will inevitably arrive at conclusions that are ... reactionary."² The very term democracy had deepened considerably in meaning. The working masses had come face to face with the task of attaining a truly popular democracy which would pave the way directly to a socialist revolution. Lenin, who invariably approached the elaboration of the strategy and tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy from the standpoint of the socialist prospects for the proletarian movement, was the first Marxist to appreciate the significance of this new situation and to show that under imperialism the policy of alliance between the proletariat

¹ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 2, p. 475.

² V. I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 29.

and the middle strata in the struggle for democracy and socialism was becoming particularly important. The development of revolutionary events in Russia and other countries corroborated Lenin's prediction.

Lenin clearly delineated the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions in terms of their tasks and composition of struggling forces and warned the party against unreal, adventuristic prospects of fighting for socialism right at the outset of the revolution. Nevertheless, already in the 1905-1907 period he saw no insurmountable wall between the democratic and socialist revolutions. Marx's idea about an uninterrupted revolution underlay Lenin's theory of the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution, which represented a further development of the Marxist doctrine of social revolution. Lenin wrote: "From the democratic revolution we shall at once, and precisely in accordance with the measure of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organised proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution. We stand for uninterrupted revolution. We shall not stop half-way."¹

Lenin tackled the problem of the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one on the basis of an exact scientific analysis of the objective and subjective preconditions for a revolution and the prospects for its development.

It was objective conditions that inevitably gave rise to the country-wide struggle against the tsar and the manorial estate, for a democratic republic at the first stage, which grew into the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie, at the second. However, already at the first stage it was the proletariat, the consistently revolutionary and most organised social class, that became the force uniting the masses. Its leadership in the course of the bourgeois-democratic revolution would naturally develop into leadership of the masses in the socialist revolution.

The dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, later opening up the way to the struggle for socialism, was to become the chief political weapon with which the revolution would progress from the first stage to the second. "Like everything else in the world, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry has a past and a future. Its past is autocracy, serfdom, monarchy, and privilege. In the struggle against this past, in the struggle against counter-revolution, a 'single will' of the proletariat and the peasantry is possible, for here there is unity of interests. "Its future is the struggle against private property, the struggle of the wage-worker against the employer, the struggle for socialism.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Social-Democracy's Attitude Towards the Peasant Movement", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, pp. 236-37.

Here singleness of will is impossible. Here the path before us lies not from autocracy to a republic, but from a petty-bourgeois democratic republic to socialism."¹ It was in 1905 that Lenin strongly emphasised that the outcome of the revolution, the possibility of the workers and peasants holding power in Russia would be determined largely by the alignment of class forces within the country, and by the character of the democratic revolution taking place in it.² This approach to the issue was of great importance from the standpoint of the subsequent development of Lenin's theory, which led to the fundamental conclusion, drawn during World War I, that socialism could triumph, initially, in several and even in one, separate, country. Lenin's theory of the development of the bourgeois democratic revolution into a socialist one was an outstanding contribution to Marxism. "Based on a scientific analysis of the new historical era and the alignment of class forces, it paved the only true road of revolutionary practice," the CPSU Central Committee noted in the Resolution on the Seventieth Anniversary of the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907.³

In elaborating the strategy and tactics of the revolution, the Bolsheviks were well aware of the fact that "the cause of Russian freedom and of the struggle of the Russian (and the world) proletariat for socialism depends to a very large extent on the military defeats of the autocracy".⁴ Under Lenin's leadership the Bolsheviks worked out a political line of fighting for peace, which ran drastically counter to the pacifist line of the Mensheviks. Instead of platitudes about peace at all costs, that glossed over the importance to Russia's proletariat of the defeat of the autocracy, the Bolsheviks advanced a concrete anti-war programme of action. Here Lenin stressed the importance of continual anti-militarist struggle and anti-war propaganda by the revolutionary proletariat.⁵ The preparation of conditions for the revolution was the key to the solution of the peace issue. The Bolsheviks advocated the defeat of the Russian government, since this would weaken tsarism and lead to the fall of the entire system based on oppression and coercion. Lenin consistently elucidated the difference between the interests of the people of Russia and those of the tsar and the bourgeoisie in this war. The Bolsheviks showed the workers that their enemy was not Japan, but the tsarist autocratic government. Lenin pointed out that the revo-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, pp. 84-85.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 83-85.

³ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 2, p. 474.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Fall of Port Arthur", *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 53.

⁵ *Ibid.*

lution would be an upshot of military ventures and the defeat of tsarism on the one hand, and the extension of a major revolutionary onslaught by the proletariat organised and prepared by the Social-Democrats, on the other.¹ Thus, it was in this period that the foundations were laid for the policy of transforming the imperialist war into a civil war and advocating the defeat of "our" government, a policy the Bolsheviks pursued during World War I.

Lenin's truly dialectic concept of the social revolution, of its strategy and tactics, was countered by the abstract doctrinaire stand of the Menshevik opportunists. In their assessment of the prospects of the struggle they exhibited extreme pedantry and shallowness, adherence to stagnant dogmas and banalities, and historical fatalism. Their reasoning could not go beyond the habitual conceptions of "classical" bourgeois revolutions which were accomplished under the leadership of the bourgeoisie. The Mensheviks were ready to give away the fruits of the popular struggle to this class.² Even when they verbally recognised the leadership of the proletariat in the incipient revolution they actually stripped this conception of its revolutionary essence. Their schemes gave quarter neither to the leadership role of the working class vis-à-vis the peasantry, nor to the consistent struggle against counter-revolutionary Russian liberalism. The keynote of the entire Menshevik philosophy of revolution was that victory over the autocracy would be ensured only if bourgeois democracy, whether the Cadet or any other party of that type, would become the political nucleus of the liberation movement in Russia.³ Thus, the Mensheviks virtually assigned the Russian proletariat only the role of the chief physical force of the revolution, its "unskilled worker" voluntarily conceding power to the bourgeoisie, which in practice meant the surrender of the Mensheviks to the liberals. Instead of working to organise the masses the Mensheviks demagogically called for their spontaneous "action on their own" and constantly lagged behind the revolutionary events. One example of this is their attitude to armed insurrection—the proletariat's chief weapon in the struggle against the autocracy. Although they did not deny the need for a resolute struggle between the revolutionary people and tsarism, the Mensheviks nonetheless considered practical military preparation for it absolutely unrealistic and limited the party's task in this sphere solely to agita-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Fall of Port Arthur", *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 55; "The Third Congress", *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 447.

² See, for example, *The Fourth (Unity) RSDLP Congress. Minutes*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 141-42, 217; *Otkliki Sovremennosti*, No. 1, 1906, p. 31 (both in Russian).

³ See *The Social Movement in Russia in the Early 20th Century*, Vol. III, Book 4, St. Petersburg, 1914, p. 610; *Otkliki Sovremennosti*, No. 2, 1906, p. 178; No. 3, pp. 16, 31 (both in Russian).

tion and calls for the "self-arming" of the people, which turned all their discussions about armed insurrection into empty phrasemongering.¹

The idea of a revolution accomplished with the participation of the peasants under the leadership of the working class was alien to the Mensheviks. They placed the emphasis not on peasant democratism, but on the prejudices and backwardness of the peasant masses, sharply condemning the Bolshevik leftist bloc tactics, and especially the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.²

The prospects of the Social-Democrats' participation in the provisional revolutionary government seemed "tragic" to the Mensheviks. The bourgeois revolution, as the Menshevik ideologists surmised, was to inaugurate a period of relatively lengthy "free bourgeois development" during which the proletariat would have to limit itself solely to the role of "extreme left opposition". For this reason the Mensheviks equated the Bolshevik aims for the participation of Social-Democrats in the provisional revolutionary government, so as to fight ruthlessly counter-revolution and to uphold the interests of the working class, with those once espoused by the Narodnaya Volya, alleging them to be premature attempts to effect a socialist revolution. The democratic republic to which we aspire, Georgi Plekhanov emphasised, is a *bourgeois* republic.³ Any upsurge in the revolution "several steps at a time"—and this is what Plekhanov viewed as the fundamental "flaw" in the Bolshevik tactical plan—would mean its death, an inevitable step backwards, for only a slow advance of the revolution, one step at a time, corresponding to the French pattern of the 18th century, was capable of accomplishing, according to him, a "maximum of useful historic work".⁴

"One must have a schoolboy's conception of history," Lenin wrote in reply to Plekhanov and other Mensheviks, "to imagine the thing without 'leaps', to see it as something in the shape of a straight line moving slowly and steadily upwards: first, it will be the turn of the liberal big bourgeoisie—minor concessions from the autocracy; then of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie—the democratic republic; and finally of the proletariat—the socialist revolution. That picture, by and large, is correct, correct *à la longue*, as the French

¹ *Iskra*, January 27, 1905; *The Fourth (Unity) RSDLP Congress. Minutes*, p. 372; *The Fifth (London) RSDLP Congress. Minutes*, Moscow, 1963, p. 62 (both in Russian).

² G. V. Plekhanov, *Works*, Vol. XV, Moscow-Leningrad, 1926, p. 205; N. Cherevanin, *The Struggle of Social Forces in the Russian Revolution*, Moscow, 1907, p. 57; *Otgosloski*, Issue V, St. Petersburg, 1907, p. 20; *Kuryer*, June 10, 1906 (all in Russian).

³ G. V. Plekhanov, *Works*, Vol. XV, p. 75 (in Russian).

⁴ G. V. Plekhanov, *Works*, Vol. XIII, p. 285.

say—spread over a century or so (in France, for instance, from 1789 to 1905); but one must be a virtuoso of philistinism to take this as a pattern for one's plan of action in a revolutionary epoch."¹

A characteristic feature of Menshevik ideology was dogmatic play on the theoretical legacy of Marx and Engels, a desire to interpret it not only as a system of absolutely true general principles of the revolutionary proletariat's strategy and tactics, but as a kind of code of recipes and directives which could be mechanically applied irrespective of the concrete conditions of time and place. While verbally recognising the creative nature of Marxism, Menshevik theoreticians, including Plekhanov, the most prominent of them, stubbornly refused to realise that the experience of former bourgeois revolutions could not be applied to early 20th-century Russia without substantial clarifications and additions, that a particular statement by Marx or Engels concerning the events of 1848 in Germany did not free the Russian Marxists of the necessity to independently analyse and tackle (from the general methodological Marxist positions, of course) each concrete issue posed by the development of revolutionary events.

Whereas the Mensheviks embraced those facets of Marx's and Engels's theoretical legacy that fixed the historically conditioned limitations of the proletarian movement in the 1848-1849 revolutions, the Bolsheviks drew on the fundamental principles from the same legacy which foresaw incipient tendencies in the proletarian movement. They developed, in terms of the new conditions of the early 20th-century world, the outlines of ideas which could not have been fully elaborated in the setting of mid-19th century Europe. Lenin considered one of Marx's prime principles to be his conclusion regarding the counter-revolutionary nature of the bourgeoisie which clearly came to the fore in the revolutions of 1848-1849 and which rendered it incapable of assuming leadership of a truly democratic bourgeois revolution and meeting, among other things, the demands of the peasants. Lenin also had a very high opinion of Marx's idea of the "popular dictatorship" as a weapon of struggle against feudal and bourgeois reaction, and about the leadership of the working class and its alliance with the peasantry. "There is no doubt," Lenin stressed, "that the proletariat and the peasantry are the chief components of the 'people' as contrasted by Marx in 1848 to the resisting reactionaries and the treacherous bourgeoisie." Here Lenin also pointed to the differences between the Germany of 1848 and the Russia of 1905, where the proletarian features of the movement and

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry", *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 299.

the proletariat's ability to be the leader of the peasant masses exhibited themselves to a much greater degree. "The proletariat *leading* the peasantry," he wrote. "The Bolshevik resolutions contain no other formula to express the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry."¹

Once having embraced the Marxist idea of uninterrupted revolution, Lenin soon found in Russian reality that political body of power, the Soviets, which could become—and indeed did become—instrumental in carrying the revolution from its bourgeois-democratic to the socialist stage.

Marx's idea of uninterrupted revolution was grossly distorted by Trotsky, who set forth a clearly adventurist action plan. According to it, Russia's only revolutionary force was the proletariat, which was capable of immediately forming a government of "labour democracy" and of beginning to restructure the country on socialist lines ("without the tsar, and with a labour government"). Trotsky believed a conflict between the working class and the peasantry inevitable, and surmised that a European revolution alone could somewhat bolster the positions of the Russian proletariat which without it were supposedly "hopeless".

Trotsky thereby denied the revolutionary role of the peasantry, and adventuristically called for "skipping" the as yet incomplete stage of the democratic revolution. He denied the role of the proletariat as the principal force of the revolution, capable of leading the broad popular masses at that stage. The particular danger and harm of Trotsky's scheme was that for all its outward "leftism" and formal references to the Marxist idea of uninterrupted ("permanent") revolution, it grossly distorted the fundamental tenets of revolutionary Marxism and Marx's concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It could deprive this dictatorship of a mass democratic base, isolate the working class from its allies, and thus ultimately doomed the revolution to defeat. Trotsky's impressive-sounding but empty "ultra-revolutionary" phrases actually led to adventurism and impotent outbursts, diverting the proletariat from the correct, revolutionary path. The Bolsheviks resolutely came out against Trotsky's eclectic concept, exposing it as a dangerous variety of opportunism.

The Bolsheviks were also fighting the adventurist trends of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party (SR) and the anarchists.

At that time, the SR Party was the left wing of "an exceedingly broad and undoubtedly mass Narodnik or Trudovik trend, which

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 136; "The Aim of the Proletarian Struggle in Our Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 362-63.

expressed the interests and point of view of the peasantry in the Russian bourgeois revolution".¹ This is why, for all the fallacies in the Socialist-Revolutionaries' doctrine, the Bolsheviks based their relations with them within the framework of leftist bloc tactics, concluding a number of practical agreements with the SRs and involving SR workers in joint revolutionary actions.

The Bolsheviks nonetheless constantly waged a relentless ideological struggle against the harmful SR influence on the masses of workers and peasants, unmasking, among other things, the complete untenability of the Socialist-Revolutionaries' claims to leadership of the revolutionary movement. It should be kept in mind that SR "workers' unions" functioned between 1905 and 1907 in many of Russia's cities, SR extreme militancy winning the sympathies of unorganised, politically unaware workers. The land socialisation programme it advanced, having nothing in common with socialism but objectively reflecting the peasants' desire to see manorial ownership abolished and land "shared alike", struck a responsive chord among some workers just fresh from the countryside. In addition, the SRs were speculating on a split in the RSDLP, attracting part of the workers dissatisfied with this into their ranks. All this made it necessary for the Bolsheviks to criticise the SR programme most energetically and wage a continuous struggle against the adventurism of the SRs who did not reckon with the objective situation and the degree to which the masses were prepared for open action when the moment for insurrection would be chosen.

The left wing of the SRs, united in 1906 in the Union of Maximalist Socialist-Revolutionaries and calling upon the workers to immediately achieve socialist goals via socialisation of industrial enterprises as well as of land, was very close to anarchism. The latter had also become widespread to a certain extent in the country's western and southern regions, in St. Petersburg and in parts of the Caucasus. Russian anarcho-syndicalism made a name for itself in late 1905 as well.

Thus, the working-class movement in Russia was marked by an acute ideological struggle in which the proletarian masses gradually rallied around revolutionary Social-Democrats. The clash between Bolshevism and Menshevism, which embodied two revolutionary lines, was the crucial one. The Bolsheviks assumed leadership of the proletariat which boldly went into battle against the autocracy and, allied with the peasantry, fought for the resolute victory of the popular insurrection. The Mensheviks geared themselves to "coordinating the actions" of the working class with those of the liberal

¹ V. I. Lenin, "How the Socialist-Revolutionaries Sum Up the Revolution and How the Revolution Has Summed Them Up", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 340.

bourgeoisie, and objectively slowed down the development of the revolutionary struggle in a bid to turn the proletariat into a simple appendage of the liberal movement.

The Bolshevik Party was, as the events showed, the genuine vanguard of the working-class movement and the entire revolutionary people. The revolution, Lenin pointed out, corroborated all the fundamental theoretical tenets of Marxism and all the basic slogans of Bolshevism, and justified the Party's faith in the revolutionary Russian proletariat.¹

THE PROLETARIAT—THE LEADING FORCE OF THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The struggle waged by the proletariat against the autocratic-landlordist system became the mainspring of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia and determined the development of the liberation movement on the whole. Not a single other class or social group did as much to rid the country of autocratic oppression as the proletariat, the chief motive force of the revolutionary process.

In the early 20th century, there were some 17 million hired hands in Russia, including over 3 million factory workers, railwaymen and miners.² The extremely difficult living and working conditions of the working class—the almost complete absence of labour protection, the 10- to 12-hour working-day, meagre wages, life in overcrowded dirty barracks, scanty food, etc.—were complemented by the complete lack of political rights. The ban on strikes and coalitions deprived the workers of the opportunity to fight for an improvement in hiring and labour conditions. The tendency discovered by Marx toward the growth of poverty, oppression, enslavement, degeneration and exploitation inherent in the capitalist mode of production, operated with full force in tsarist Russia as it had entered the bourgeois stage of development. The working class did not have the possibility of legally expressing its class interests, of influencing public opinion, let alone openly and directly influencing state authority.

The very position of the working class objectively pushed it first and foremost into the struggle against absolutism, to establish such conditions in political life that would make it possible to fulfil proletarian tasks of the class struggle. The unbearably hard living conditions inevitably engendered sentiments of revolutionary protest in the working class. Advanced workers exhibited an interest

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Reorganisation of the Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 32.

² E. E. Kruze, *The Condition of the Working Class in Russia in 1900-1914*, Nauka, Leningrad, 1976, pp. 42-45 (in Russian).

in gaining knowledge, in politics and socialism. The high concentration of the proletariat at big enterprises enabled it to unite and organise. Each important action by the workers had great political and social repercussions. The charge of social energy that the working class accumulated, its will to struggle and the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, all quite naturally made it the centre of attraction for all currents of the mighty popular movement spearheaded against tsarist despotism.

No matter how complex, and at times contradictory, the course of the working-class movement was during the years of the revolution, no matter what conflicting trends collided in it, the events of 1905-1907 indisputably attested to the fact that it was developing from lower forms of struggle to higher, from a free-wheeling process to an organised and conscious one.

The progress of the revolution reflected better than anything else the process of the political maturing of the working class, the overcoming of various misconceptions and prejudices which were due to the lack of maturity and experience and were cultivated in the working class by tsarism and the bourgeoisie. The leap forward which the Russian proletariat made in its development in 1905 becomes particularly evident when one considers that the revolution began with the Gapon Affair, which was an unsuccessful attempt by the tsarist government to gain control of the working-class movement and channel it into the course of "police socialism".

In February 1904, Georgi Gapon, a priest, who was connected with the tsarist secret police, organised the Assembly of Russian Factory Workers of St. Petersburg. Taking advantage of the naive monarchistic and religious sentiments of a certain portion of the workers, the authorities hoped to use this organisation to reduce the working-class movement to peaceful, legal trade-unionism and to disprove the need for political struggle. By 1905, 11 sections of the Assembly had been functioning in St. Petersburg, numbering several thousand members. The workers protesting against their lack of rights did not immediately comprehend the actual designs of Gapon the impostor. However, under the impact of the crisis developing in the country, the mass working-class movement overstepped the narrow framework of Gapon's organisation and foiled his deceptive schemes.

In early January of 1905, a strike began at the Putilov Armoury, St. Petersburg's largest munitions plant. It was supported by other enterprises in the city. Within five days, from January 4 (17) to 8 (21), the number of strikers jumped ten-fold, to 150,000. The entire life of the city with a population of a million and a half was paralysed. In a bid to ease the atmosphere of mass dissatisfaction, Gapon proposed that the workers organise a religious procession to the Winter

Palace on Sunday, January 9 (22), to hand the tsar a petition containing a list of their needs and demands. The petition was discussed and signed at mass workers' meetings. "Everything was mixed together here—both the Gapon movement and the healthy seeds of the Social-Democratic ideas spawned during the last decade on this fertile soil," wrote the Bolshevik newspaper *Vperyod*, describing these meetings. "Social-Democrats, too, constantly spoke at the meetings. They were eagerly listened to (at least beyond Nevskaya Zastava; in other areas they sometimes met with a strong rebuff on the part of the Gapon people, and in some cases were even beaten up).... However, the idea of going to the palace with a petition captivated the minds to such an extent that it was impossible to fight it."¹

On Sunday morning, January 9, over 100,000 festively dressed workers and their wives and children went to the Winter Palace, the tsar's residence, with the petition. In it they pleaded with Nicholas II to satisfy a number of their economic and political needs. However, troops, prepared beforehand, were sent out against the peaceful procession, the unarmed people were met with bullets and sabres. The naive belief in the tsar was shattered.

The call "To arms!" was the reply of the St. Petersburg proletariat. It sounded in revolutionary leaflets printed in the evening of the very same day. The next day the city went on strike. Of St. Petersburg's 600-plus enterprises, less than 30 operated. Between January 10 and 12, 1905, the strikes engulfed Moscow and several other industrial centres of the country.

The work which revolutionary Social-Democrats had done for years was not in vain. It was not fortuitous that the petition the workers carried to the tsar contained some demands from the RSDLP Programme. Nor was it fortuitous that Bloody Sunday, which began with a peaceful procession to the tsar's palace, ended with the first barricades flying the red revolutionary flags. The dialectic of the class struggle lay in the fact that in the atmosphere of the revolutionary crisis even such a brain-child of the secret police as the Gapon Affair in the final count proved objectively to be a spur to the revolution.

January 9 was a watershed in the history of the Russian proletariat. "The lesson of January 9 was a hard one," Lenin wrote, "but it revolutionised the temper of the entire proletariat of the whole of Russia."² The wave of worker protest action swept the country. According to conservative estimates, over 440,000 persons participated in strikes in January 1905, more than in the entire decade prior

¹ *Vperyod*, February 1, 1905.

² V. I. Lenin, "Revolution Teaches", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9. p. 147.

to the revolution. Workers' actions acquired acute forms in the Baltics and the Polish lands where the economic and social oppression was supplemented by national oppression, which heightened the workers' hatred for tsarism. In Riga, Warsaw and Revel protest strikes were combined with massive demonstrations and accompanied by clashes with troops. The working-class movement from the very start of the revolution exhibited a profoundly internationalist nature, organically merging the struggle of different national contingents of the Russian proletariat into a single whole.

Marching in its front ranks were the metal workers. As a rule, descendants of more than one generation of skilled urban workers, they were distinguished for their higher cultural level, organisation, political awareness and tenacity in the struggle to attain their goals. These qualities made the metal workers, among whom the Social-Democrats worked successfully, the vanguard of the proletarian movement.

What with the mighty upsurge of the working-class movement in the country, students and the democratic intelligentsia stepped up anti-government actions, and the liberal opposition movement became more active. In February and March, the revolution reached the countryside.

Between the January events and the upsurge of the working-class movement in the spring and summer, there lay an extremely important period marked by the ideological and organisational growth of the proletariat and its vanguard, the Bolshevik Party. Even though economic motives (wage increments, reduction of the working-day, improvement of living and working conditions) sometimes predominated, the proletariat was increasingly upholding more radical slogans, such as an eight-hour working-day, state insurance, and the formation of special bodies of representatives of the workers and management to examine labour disputes, monitor hiring and firing practices, etc.

This period differed from the preceding one chiefly by the sharply increased political tinge of the movement. The Bolsheviks were making every effort to get the masses to embrace the demands for fundamental political freedoms, a countrywide Constituent Assembly and a democratic republic. They worked to enhance interest in politics among the working class. This resulted in a growth in the number of political strikes and strikers, and a rise in demand for Social-Democratic literature. Another consequence was a swelling of the ranks of the Bolshevik Party. In 1905, 60 per cent of its membership was comprised of workers.

The revolution put a new slant on a number of issues regarding the development and functioning of the proletarian party. Lenin pointed out that in any outcome of the revolution "all its real gains

will be rendered secure and reliable only insofar as the proletariat is organised".¹ All Lenin's works of the 1905-1907 period are permeated with thoughts about heightening the party's leading role, expanding the membership and related organisations and about strengthening contacts between the vanguard and the masses. Lenin noted that as the revolution was getting under way, independent actions were developing everywhere, and the political awareness of the masses was growing, making it both possible and mandatory for the Social-Democrats to concentrate more and more on political leadership of the mass movement and on its organisation. To do so it was essential above all to expand and consolidate the party membership and the organisations closely related to the party. In February and March 1905, Lenin wrote about the need to make the most of all the concessions which were being wrenched from the autocracy, to explore new forms and methods of organisation attuned to the revolutionary situation, and not to stop half-way. He placed a special emphasis on drawing politically aware young people into the party. Lenin pointed out here that the lack of preparation of the new replenishment was nothing to be overly concerned about, that the party, a closely-knit organisation with its own Programme and Rules, would easily absorb it, all the more so since this would be facilitated by the revolutionary situation.

The Bolshevik party branches were becoming ever more closely bound up with the working masses. In 1905, committees of the RSDLP sprang up at large factories (in Moscow, for example, there were as many as 40 factory committees and 95 circles incorporating over 1,000 party members by the late summer of 1905).²

Simultaneously, party organisations of railwaymen, dockers and water-transport workers were being formed on the industrial basis. Organisations were being formed among artisans according to the craft principle.

As the proletarian party organisations grew stronger in large centres, their influence was spreading ever more widely through the emergent Social-Democrat circles. The course of the revolutionary movement was marked by the rapid growth of these circles and groups, on the basis of which independent district committees began to take shape in the summer of 1905. They engulfed a territory gravitating towards a large industrial centre irrespective of administrative division. Thus, the Moscow district organisation included a number of circles and groups located not only in Moscow Gubernia, but also in Vladimir, Tver and Ryazan gubernias. Such an organisation was internally subdivided along the railway tracks, which facilitated

¹ V. I. Lenin, "New Tasks and New Forces", *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 219.

² See *Proletary*, October 18, 1905.

communications. Local organisations developed substantially in the Central Industrial Region and the Urals, where many factories and plants were scattered over a wide territory outside big cities. RSDLP organisations conducted propaganda and organisational work not only among workers, but also among the peasants in the area, incorporating circles and groups of peasants and rural teachers.

The major events of the spring and summer upsurge of 1905 were the widespread May Day celebrations that involved work stoppages, demonstrations and rallies, a large-scale strike in Ivanovo-Voznesensk and a strike turned uprising in Lodz. The two latter events marked the beginning of mass actions by the largest contingent of the Russian proletariat—the textile workers. Despite the fact that the economic situation of the textile workers was much harder than that of the metal workers, they were much slower to rise up in struggle. This was because most textile enterprises were scattered among “factory villages”, and also because the textile workers were more closely connected with the land (most had recently migrated from the countryside), plus the characteristics of their mentality which had frequently come to the fore. However, revolutionary sentiments gradually caught fire with the textile workers as well.

The Ivanovo-Voznesensk strike began on May 12 (25), 1905 and lasted 72 days, engulfing as many as 70,000 workers all told. Initially, it was of an economic nature, but later it acquired a striking political trend. The strike was led almost completely by the Bolsheviks. Russia's first city Council (Soviet) of Workers' Deputies (assembly of authorised deputies) was formed during the strike. It immediately went beyond the bounds of the ordinary strike committee and proved itself to be the embryo of the new, revolutionary power: it organised the workers' militia and a combat unit, and formed ad hoc commissions in its own composition, which ran urban affairs (maintenance of order in the city, price control) and were also in charge of the distribution of funds received from the proletariat of other Russian cities.¹ Attempts by the authorities to use armed force to disperse the strikers' rally, on June 3, outside the city by the Talka River, met with counter-actions: factory owners' houses were set on fire, and a barricade arose in one of the streets. The authorities retreated, frightened by the popular outburst. The bosses agreed to partial concessions. The strike not only led to an improvement of working conditions at a number of the city's factories and mills, it also exerted a tremendous influence on the growth of the workers' political

¹ See *The First in Russia. The Ivanovo-Voznesensk City Soviet of Workers' Deputies of 1905 in Documents and Reminiscences*, Sovetskaya Rossiya, Moscow, 1975. pp. 28-49, 238 (in Russian).

awareness. It developed new forms of the proletarian organisation: the Soviet of Workers' Deputies had become a real force which the tsarist authorities had to reckon with. It is not for nothing that an Ivanovo factory owner wrote at the time that a "duocracy" was in evidence in the city.¹

In Lodz, the movement began with strikes, during which demands for higher wages and a shorter working-day were advanced. In June, the struggle reached its apex and approached a general strike which was growing into an insurrection. The dispersing of the demonstrations by the police and troops caused a rebuff by the proletariat. On the morning of June 22 (July 5), a Social-Democratic leaflet came out with the appeal: "Take to the streets, brothers!... Stage a general one-day strike! Down with the autocracy of murderers! Long live the revolution!" The workers who responded to the appeal of the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania began to attack the police and small groups of troops, disarm them and erect barricades. More than 50 barricades topped with red flags and revolutionary slogans had been put up by the morning of June 23.²

For three days actual street fighting went on in the city: the troops repressed the almost unarmed defenders of the barricades. The workers of Warsaw, Sosnowiec, Częstochowa and Dąbrówka expressed their solidarity with the Lodz proletarians, and the RSDLP committees of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Minsk, Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Lugansk, Riga, Voronezh, Saratov and other cities also responded with leaflets. Lenin assessed the actions of the Lodz proletariat as follows: "... The workers, even those who are unprepared for the struggle, even those who at first confined themselves to defence, are now, through the proletariat of Lodz, setting a new example, not only of revolutionary enthusiasm and heroism, but of superior forms of struggle."³

Another indication of the growing revolutionary crisis in the country was the mutiny on the battleship *Potemkin*—the first major mutiny in the tsarist armed forces. On the eve of the decisive events of 1905, the Social-Democrats conducted propaganda work on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet. Formed in 1904, the Central Fleet Committee of the RSDLP or, as it was called, the "Sevastopol Sailors' Central", was preparing a revolutionary action in the Black Sea Fleet scheduled for the autumn of 1905. However, on June 14, the men of the battleship *Prince Potemkin-Tavrishesky*, agitated by rumours about a strike of Odessa workers and indignant over the

¹ See *The Revolution of 1905-1907. Documents and Materials*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1975, p. 235 (in Russian).

² Ludwik Mroczka, Władysław Bortnowski, *Dwa powstania*, Wydawnictwo Łódzkie, Łódź, 1974.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Struggle of the Proletariat and the Servility of the Bourgeoisie", *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, p. 537.

outrages perpetrated by the commanders, staged a mutiny. Command of the ship fell into the hands of the "ship commission" headed by Afanasy Matyushenko, a non-commissioned officer. True, the actions of the mutineers were not energetic enough—the crew was not able to establish contact with the insurgent workers of Odessa, disembark a landing force and stage mutinies on other ships of the Fleet. Eleven days later, running out of coal and foodstuffs, the *Potemkin* left for Constanța, Romania. The crew disembarked and became political émigrés. Despite the failure of the mutiny, the very fact of the open insubordination to the authorities on the part of the sailors was of tremendous significance. The revolutionary events on the Black Sea were followed by other armed actions in the army and navy. Lenin had a very high regard for the revolutionary initiative of the *Potemkin* sailors. "The tremendous significance of the recent events in Odessa," he wrote, "lies precisely in the fact that, for the first time, an important unit of the armed force of tsarism—a battleship—has openly gone over to the side of the revolution Whatever its fate may be, the undoubted fact and the point of highest significance is that here we have the attempt to form the *nucleus of a revolutionary army*."¹

The upsurge of the proletarian movement in the country and the first mutinies in the army caused wide repercussions in the countryside. The peasant movement rapidly engulfed the country's central regions, the Polish lands and part of the Baltic area. A major hotbed of the peasant revolutionary struggle emerged in Georgia. In the period spanning May to August 1905 alone as many as 113 districts of European Russia, one-fifth of their total number, were swept by peasant unrest. Peasant actions were spearheaded against the landlords. The peasant movement also exhibited growing political awareness—chiefly in areas where contacts were established between peasants and the revolutionary Social-Democrats. The peasant unrest imparted a truly countrywide character to the incipient revolution. However, the centre of the struggle was definitely in the big cities, and the proletariat was its chief force.

As the working-class movement developed, it became increasingly clear that in the course of the revolution the strikes were acquiring a new quality, becoming mass revolutionary actions. They engulfed plants, towns and whole regions, holding the authorities and bourgeoisie in constant tension. During the intertwining economic and political strikes the proletariat advanced a number of general demands which were of vital importance for the widest strata of the

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government," *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, pp. 561, 562. For details on the revolutionary events of the summer of 1905 see *The Revolution of 1905-1907 in Russia*, Mysl, Moscow, 1975, pp. 102-24 (in Russian).

country's working population. The main thing, however, was that the mass strikes were now usually combined with political demonstrations and came right up to the point beyond which a peaceful strike becomes an uprising.

In the autumn of 1905, the revolutionary wave approached its apex, the countrywide strikes and armed insurrections. The September strikes in Moscow, the railway workers' general strike which began there on October 6(19) and which was the prologue of the All-Russia October Political Strike, the powerful November actions of the proletariat and, finally, the December armed uprising were milestones of the highest upsurge of the revolution.

The All-Russia October Strike began under the decisive influence and leadership of the Social-Democrats, the Bolsheviks in particular. In preparing for the strike, the Bolsheviks viewed it as a stage in the further revolutionary struggle. Lenin wrote, regarding the Central Committee's decision to boycott the Duma and stage the strike, that the focus of the campaign would be the slogan of insurrection and the formation of a provisional revolutionary government.¹ This instruction of Lenin's was reflected in the Central Committee's Resolution on the State Duma. Its leaflet read: "The road to the revolution is clear—through a popular insurrection to popular rule."²

The plans of the authorities to squelch the growing wave of the popular movement were stultified.

Fourteen railways held strikes on October 11, and on October 17, the strike paralysed the country's entire rail system. A general strike engulfed Moscow and St. Petersburg. Electric power stations, city transport and the telephone system ceased functioning. It took only 5 days for the strike to spread all over the country. Employees spontaneously introduced an eight-hour working-day at enterprises. Freedom of speech, the press and assembly was exercised without any formal permission on the part of the authorities.

The All-Russia Strike, in which 2 million industrial and office workers, students and representatives of the democratic intelligentsia took part, gave the national liberation movement an unprecedented scope. It gathered particular momentum in the Polish lands, in Latvia and in Finland. Armed struggle developed in the Ukraine and the Caucasus. This was a momentous democratic upsurge in which the vanguard role of the proletariat came to the fore. It pro-

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "To the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971, pp. 149-50.

² *Bolsheviks Leading the All-Russia Political Strike in October 1905. Collected Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1955, p. 139 (in Russian); for details see N. A. Ivanova, *Lenin on the Revolutionary Mass Strike in Russia*, Nauka, Moscow, 1976, p. 102 (in Russian).

ceeded under the slogans "Down with Autocracy!", "Long Live Political Freedom!" and "Long Live Armed Uprising!" The powerful upswing of popular indignation nipped in the bud the consultative Bulygin Duma, announced back in August 1905, and it wrested from the tsar the Manifesto of October 17 (30) promising to introduce fundamental political freedoms in the country, to expand the electorate and to impart a legislative nature to the future popular assembly.¹

An important indicator of the new stage in the proletarian movement and the entire revolution was the further development of the just emergent Soviets of Workers' Deputies. They were usually formed from strike committees, elective workers' commissions and assemblies of delegates which, as the revolution progressed, began to exercise democratic functions, won renown among broad strata of workers and became the embryo of the new, revolutionary power. "These bodies were set up exclusively by the *revolutionary* sections of the people," Lenin wrote. "They were formed irrespective of all laws and regulations, entirely in a revolutionary way, as a product of the native genius of the people, as a manifestation of the independent activity of the people which had rid itself, or was ridding itself, of its old police fetters."²

Soviets became particularly widespread between October and December of 1905, i.e., precisely in the period when the revolution was most distinctly exhibiting proletarian features and when the people acutely sensed the need for bodies which could become leading centres of the armed struggle against the autocracy and replace the old, tsarist administration. Aside from St. Petersburg and Moscow, Soviets emerged in more than 50 cities and workers' settlements scattered all over the country.

The Soviets embodied the militant alliance of the Social-Democrats, non-party revolutionary-minded workers and the revolutionary petty-bourgeois democrats; the factory proletariat predominated in them. Thus, elected to the St. Petersburg Soviet were 562 deputies from 147 factories, 34 workshops and 16 trade unions of the capital. All told, the Soviet represented no less than 250,000 St. Petersburg workers. Among the deputies, 351 were metal workers, 57 textile workers and 32 printers; 65 per cent of them were members of the RSDLP, 13 per cent—SRs, and 22 per cent—without party affiliations (although most of them leaned towards Social-Democracy). Bolsheviki played the leading role in approximately 80 per cent of the Soviets.

¹ For details see V. S. Kirillov, *Bolsheviki Leading Mass Political Strikes During the First Russian Revolution (1905-1907)*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1976, pp. 172-211 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, "The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 243.

Researchers have established the names of 1,709 deputies of 31 Soviets, among whom were 1,318 industrial workers (77 per cent), 73 white-collar workers, 56 representatives of trade unions of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, 12 medics, and 11 teachers and students.¹ A number of Soviets also included peasants, soldiers and sailors. This social breadth and multi-party nature of the Soviets were, as Lenin pointed out, a boon rather than a bane for these organisations, which had become the true embodiment of the fundamental principles of leftist-bloc policy. Lenin stressed that the revolutionary Social-Democrats should strive to consolidate their position to the full in these mass proletarian organisations, which were to play a major role in introducing the working class and other democratic strata to the revolution and to Bolshevik ideas.

The practical work of the Soviets in the autumn of 1905 was multifarious. They organised strikes, introduced an eight-hour working-day at factories and plants, maintained public order, monitored the work of the municipal services, retail trade, etc.; the resolutions and orders of the Soviets enjoyed great authority among the masses. In their appeal to the workers, the officials of the Moscow Soviet wrote during the December armed uprising: "Remember, comrades, that we want not only to destroy the old system. but also to create a new one in which each citizen will be free from any and all coercion.... We shall prove that under our leadership the life of society will run more correctly; the life, freedom and rights of all shall be protected to a greater extent than they are today."²

The main tendency in the development of the Soviets was their transformation into bodies of revolutionary democratic power, into headquarters for preparing the armed struggle which had become imminent in the country. It was only this role which could give the Soviets genuine strength and turn them into a real authority, and this is precisely what the Bolsheviks sought to do, sharply criticising the muddled stand of the Mensheviks, who were in effect minimising the Soviets' revolutionary role.

The development and consolidation of the proletariat's party organisations proceeded in step with the upswing and expansion of the people's revolution. In October 1905, when political freedoms had been won *de facto*, the RSDLP effectively emerged from underground. The period of the revolutionary upsurge was a time marked by the rapid swelling of the party ranks; the influx of thousands of workers who had risen to the revolutionary struggle was one of the vital preconditions for the reorganisation of the party. Lenin wrote in connection with the change in the situation: "Our Party has stagnated while

¹ *The Leading Role of the Proletariat in the Three Russian Revolutions*, Mysl, Moscow, 1975, pp. 88, 90 (in Russian).

² *Bulletin of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies*, December 9, 1905.

working underground.... It has been suffocating underground during the last few years.... Forward, then, more boldly; take up the new weapon, distribute it among new people, extend your bases, rally all the worker Social-Democrats round yourselves, incorporate them in the ranks of the Party organisations by hundreds and thousands.”¹

The restructuring of party organisations was now taking place on the basis of the consistent implementation of the principle of democratic centralism. Its tasks were outlined in the letter by the RSDLP Central Committee “To All Party Workers” of October 27, 1905, and in the first article written by Lenin after he had returned from emigration, entitled “The Reorganisation of the Party”, which was published in the legal Bolshevik newspaper *Novaya Zhizn* in November 1905.

These documents keyed, with due account of the political freedom won yet remaining relative, the task of preserving the clandestine party apparatus and developing alongside it new, open forms of a mass workers’ party organisation, expanding the party ranks, introducing the principle of election everywhere, and overcoming the split in the Social-Democratic movement.

Centralism in the leadership of party organisations was now being combined with their restructuring on the basis of electivity from the grass roots to the top. The Bolsheviks had previously, too, made wide use of the principle of electivity for forming the higher levels of the party, but they considered it inadvisable to implement it everywhere in underground conditions. From the autumn of 1905 onward, absolutely all leading party organs locally began to hold elections and report regularly to the organisations that elected them. The procedure according to which they were set up was determined by local Rules, and differed from place to place, which reflected a search of the most advisable norms of intra-party life in the context of relative freedom. Co-optation was substantially limited. The number of elected committee members was several times that of the co-opted members.

The opportunities for legal work which the revolution wrested from the tsar in October 1905 invigorated first and foremost, the work of factory party organisations in the main industrial regions. The Social-Democratic party organisation, based on territory and enterprise, rallied the proletarian masses, which had risen to conscious political struggle. In the new situation Lenin called for the establishment of legal strongholds of proletarian Social-Democratic organisations in the form of libraries, reading rooms, communal dining halls, etc. They were to serve as bases, independent as much

¹ V. I. Lenin, “The Reorganisation of the Party”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 32.

as possible from the arbitrariness of factory owners and providing support for the persecuted Social-Democratic workers.

With the aid of legally organised shooting-ranges workers received an opportunity to learn how to handle weapons, which was for them, as Lenin put it, "very far from useless".

The freer conditions in which the party worked, and the expansion of the sphere of action of the democratic centralism principle contributed to the changes in the structure of its local organisations. The role played by the general meeting of the membership or party conference increased in the spring and summer of 1905 on. But while in that spring and summer they were the consultative bodies at the top party level, the RSDLP Committee, and proclaimed decisions solely on individual questions on which the Committee wanted to know the opinion of party members, in the autumn the meetings and conferences began to be regular directive bodies, while the Committee became an executive body accountable to them.

The revolutionary endeavour of the membership advanced new forms of an open mass party organisation. They were, first and foremost, factory party assemblies which had united all party members working at a given enterprise. They met weekly, during strikes—practically daily, and discussed politics, the local situation, issues pertaining to the economic and political struggle of the enterprise employees, and current party matters. (Shop party assemblies functioned at large plants.) The plant's RSDLP Committee and representatives of district and city committees reported to them periodically. The committee members were elected at the factory or shop party meeting.

"Party exchanges", which had emerged in the Northwest Territory during the years of the struggle for the formation of the party, became widespread in the summer and autumn of 1905 chiefly in the cities and workers' settlements in the South and Northwest. They were something like permanently functioning party conferences, regularly taking place at the same hour in the same place. Here one could listen to an out-of-town reporter, meet a committee member, find a speaker for a workers' meeting, and receive or give a party assignment. The attempts by the police to disperse these large meetings proved fruitless, as the oral nature of the exchanges work left no tangible evidence. Of course one had to be on the look-out for stool pigeons.¹

Social-Democratic clubs appeared in the autumn of 1905 in workers' districts and organised political reports, theoretical reviews, talks, debates and shows. A club normally had a library. The high-

¹ See *Proletary*, August 16; October 4; November 18, 1905; *Proletarskaya Revolutsiya*, No. 2 (14), 1923, pp. 352-53.

est body of a club was the general assembly of its members, which elected a board and various commissions. The club's role in the party organisation differed in various regions: in some, such as in Nizhni Novgorod, it became the centre of the party organisation and its board played the role of the district party committee¹; in others, such as in St. Petersburg and its environs, the club was an institution of the regional party organisation and functioned under the leadership and control of the RSDLP regional committee. In the working-class suburbs, where the police did not risk appearing in the tumultuous days of the revolution, party clubs operated virtually in the open.

The democratic and mass nature, and the consistency of the new forms of the party organisation made for the invigoration of the work of the party members and for their participation in the debates on all issues of the party's political life and activity. The open character of such forms made it possible to influence the broad masses not affiliated with the party, educating them politically and recruiting new party members. Following the 1905-1907 revolution, the "party exchanges", suppressed by reaction, disappeared. The clubs held out as legal strongholds of the party, functioning under the guidance of its illegal organisation. The most solid gain of the building of the party during the period of revolutionary upsurge was the factory chapter, which existed under various names, such as factory assemblies, leagues and cells. The latter name, proposed by Lenin, gradually became the predominant one.²

The expansion of party membership did not lead to the dissolution of the party in the non-party mass; a guarantee of this was its revolutionary programme, consistent tactics, solid organisation and experience of work in the masses. The requirements party members had to be up to in revolutionary conditions were no less exacting than before. New conditions for membership were advanced subordination to all party decisions and regular payment of membership dues. Since the autumn of 1905, a prospective member of the Bolshevik Party had to be confirmed by the general meeting of the local organisation on the recommendation of two or three of its members, sometimes after a preliminary test period.

Thus, the tumultuous autumn days of 1905 were a time marked by the consolidation of the politically most aware portion of the proletariat; mass party organisations were formed which varied in form

¹ See *The Revolutionary Movement in Nizhni Novgorod and the Nizhni Novgorod Gubernia, 1905-1907*, Knizhnoye Izdatelstvo, Gorky, 1955, pp. 155-56 (in Russian).

² See V. I. Lenin, "The Reorganisation of the Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 33-35; V. I. Lenin to Olga Vinogradova, *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, pp. 310-11.

but were uniform in essence. They stood apart for the high demands made of their members, strict discipline and centralisation, broad democratism and close ties with the general mass of workers. Lenin wrote the following about this period in Bolshevik history: "Despite the split, the Social-Democratic Party earlier than any of the other parties was able to take advantage of the temporary spell of freedom to build a legal organisation with an ideal democratic structure, an electoral system, and representation at congresses according to the number of organised members."¹ The decisions of the First (Tammerfors) RSDLP Conference, which recognised "the principle of democratic centralism as indisputable", keyed the need to implement the "broad elective principle with the provision of election centres with complete power in ideological and practical leadership, along with their removability, widest publicity and strict accountability for their actions".²

The formation of trade unions, a form of the organisation of the working class new to Russia, was also connected with the revolutionary events of 1905-1907. It was in the January and February 1905 strikes in the country's major industrial centres that workers spontaneously started forming organisations which were the beginnings of trade unions.

Metal workers' unions appeared in St. Petersburg, and somewhat later in Moscow, Kharkov, Nizhni Novgorod and in the Urals. Textile workers set up their own organisations as well. The All-Russia Rail Union was established in April 1905. By the autumn of 1905, there were some 40 trade unions with a total membership of over 30,000 functioning in St. Petersburg. Trade unions were created with particular intensity during the All-Russia October Political Strike of 1905, which opened up certain prospects for legal activity. The trade union movement gradually spread to almost all of Russia's big cities. Prominent Bolsheviks (A. Ye. Badayev, P. A. Japaridze, Ye. A. Dunayev, N. A. Yemelyanov, M. I. Kalinin, P. V. Tochisky, N. M. Shvernik and others) were active in it. In October 1905, on the Bolshevik initiative, the First All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions decided to convene an all-Russia congress of trade unions in December 1905 for the purpose of creating a nationwide trade union movement centre. Although the congress could not be held at the time set, the tendency towards unification persisted.

In November 1905, the Central Bureau of St. Petersburg's trade unions was organised. It actively cooperated with the St. Petersburg Soviet (representatives of the Bureau were members of it). Municipal metal workers' trade unions in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Tula

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Preface to the Collection *Twelve Years*", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 103.

² *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, p. 136.

and elsewhere in Russia were formed in 1906. Trade unions also emerged and developed in the ethnic areas. Some 10 trade unions were organised in October 1905 in Latvia, about 15 appeared between October and December 1905 in Lithuania, and sections of the Baku oil workers' union were set up in the summer of 1906 in Azerbaijan; in the autumn of 1906 several dozen Tiflis trade unions became incorporated in the City Council of Worker Deputies of Trade Unions. By early 1907, Russia had 652 trade unions with a total membership of 245,000 persons.¹

After October 1905, it became particularly clear that the peaceful strike was no longer relevant. Uprising became the priority. Lenin called November and December 1905, a time when the country was witnessing the irreversible process of the development of the general strike into a nationwide armed insurrection, two great months of revolution. Problems of combat readiness of the party became particularly crucial in this respect. Recognising a victorious armed insurrection as a necessary vehicle in overthrowing the autocracy, the Bolsheviks mounted a struggle for the creation of revolutionary armed forces. Combat bodies of the party comprised their nucleus.

In January 1905, N. Ye. Burenin was commissioned by St. Petersburg Bolshevik Party secretary S. I. Gusev to form the Combat Technical Group; following the Third RSDLP Congress it came under the direct leadership of the Central Committee, whose representative was Central Committee member L. B. Krasin. The group's chief task was manufacturing weapons. Various types of bombs and ammunition were made and improved at great risk. It organised a number of instructor training schools, armouries posing as toy factories, photography shops and so on, and numerous arms depots. Weapons and ammunition were delivered by workers of the Sestroretsky arms factory under the management of N. A. Yemelyanov; they were purchased in Belgium, Germany, France and Switzerland and were shipped by Bolsheviks M. M. Litvinov and A. M. Ignatyev with the aid of Belgian, German and Finnish Social-Democrats, members of the Finnish Active Resistance Party, and others.

Following the example of the Combat Technical Group, the Southern Military Technical Bureau and the Moscow Military Technical Bureau of the RSDLP were subsequently formed under the Central Committee, as well as combat technical groups under a number of party committees.²

In the summer of 1905, local party organisations began forming workers' self-defence detachments and fighting squads. They guarded

¹ See *Trade Unions of the USSR, Documents and Materials*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1963, p. 177.

² For details see *The First Combat Bolshevik Organisation, 1905-1907. Articles, Reminiscences and Documents*, Moscow, 1934 (in Russian).

workers' rallies and meetings, maintained order in working-class neighbourhoods, and rebuffed the perpetrators of pogroms. Lenin had a high opinion of these actions, stressing that they "constitute the organisation of an insurrection, the organisation of *revolutionary rule*, which matures and becomes stronger through these small preparations, through these minor clashes, testing its own strength, learning to fight, training itself for victory".¹ In his articles and correspondence with leaders of local party organisations Lenin recommended developing initiative and supporting bold actions, and cautioned against formalism in organising fighting squads.² While being highly secretive, they did not consist exclusively of Party members. At Lenin's advice, they admitted non-Party workers and students. The Bolshevik fighting squads concluded agreements on joint actions with the Socialist-Revolutionary and other squads.

November and December 1905 witnessed the particularly intensive formation, arming and training of workers' fighting squads (between 1905 and 1907 they existed in over 300 populated areas), and the intensification of revolutionary work in the army and navy.³ Thus, the idea of a nationwide armed uprising, which had been taking hold of the masses more and more, had acquired concrete forms. The Bolsheviks viewed combat organisations solely as the vanguard of the mass revolutionary army, which would play the role of leader and nucleus, but it would in no way replace the actions of the workers', peasants' and soldiers' masses. Such a mighty opponent as the autocracy with its repressive apparatus honed over the centuries could not be toppled by few and poorly armed militants.

Winning the army over to the side of the revolution was becoming particularly important in this regard. Lenin wrote during the period of the revolution: "The armed forces cannot and should not be neutral. Not to drag them into politics is the slogan of the hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie and of tsarism, who in fact have always dragged the forces into reactionary politics..."⁴ Lenin demanded that utmost attention be accorded to the soldiers' demands, which were shared by the majority of the people, that they be brought together into a single, whole programme. The Bolsheviks' work among officers and men began long before the revolution with the creation of illegal Social-Democratic groups. Highly clandestine,

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Black Hundreds and the Organisation of an Uprising", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 203.

² V. I. Lenin, "To the Combat Committee of the St. Petersburg Committee", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, pp. 344-45; "To Maria Essen", *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, p. 361.

³ L. T. Senchakova, *The Combat Host of the Revolution*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1975, pp. 186-94 (calculations by author; in Russian).

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Armed Forces and the Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 56.

these groups confined themselves to propaganda among a narrow circle of the more politically conscious soldiers, sailors and individual officers. With the start of the revolution, military organisations of the RSDLP were formed in large garrisons on the basis of these groups. There were 27 of them in 1905.¹ They held soldiers' and sailors' meetings and secret gatherings, and distributed leaflets.

At Lenin's instructions the Bolsheviks expanded propaganda among the troops, and formed cadres of politically conscious revolutionaries in the army. They made use of the legal press and illegal publications, oral propaganda and personal influence to show the soldiers and sailors the true path in the revolution. Lenin wrote on October 25 (November 7), 1905: "The revolutionary proletariat has succeeded in neutralising the army, after paralysing it in the great days of the general strike. It must now work to bring the army completely over to the side of the people."² At the same time, Lenin pointed to the fact that the soldiers' taking the path of the revolution could not be the result of persuasion alone. The army's ideological indoctrination was insufficient, he stressed; to fight for the troops was also a must at the moment of the uprising.³

The autumn of 1905 witnessed 195 mass revolutionary actions in the army, almost a third of which developed into various forms of armed struggle, including insurrections.⁴ The leading role in individual actions by the army was played by Bolsheviks I. F. Dubrovinsky, F. A. Sergeyev (Artem) and others. The name of Lieutenant P. P. Schmidt, the "socialist outside the party", who led the mutiny on the cruiser *Ochakov* in November 1905, won renown. In the autumn of 1905, soldiers began more and more resorting to such a form of protest as the strike, and refusing to execute police punitive functions, etc., simultaneously advancing a series of extensive democratic demands. These were, however, only the first steps in winning the army over to the side of the revolutionary people, for the majority of the soldiers at the time still blindly obeyed the orders of the tsarist commanders.

The leading and organising role which the Bolshevik Party played in the development of the revolution was implemented with the direct participation of Lenin, who had returned to St. Petersburg

¹ *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 11, 1965, p. 24.

² V. I. Lenin, "The First Victory of the Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, pp. 432-33.

³ See V. I. Lenin, "The Army and the People", *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 87; "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising", *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 174.

⁴ V. A. Petrov, *Essays on the History of the Revolutionary Movement in the Russian Army in 1905*, Nauka, Moscow-Leningrad, 1964, p. 292 (in Russian).

from emigration on November 8 (21), 1905. He ran the work of the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Bolshevik Committee, took part in conferences, wrote articles for the Bolshevik press, and guided the activity of the Bolshevik group in the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies. Lenin was the inspiration behind the preparations for the armed uprising. His advice had an effect on the work of the Moscow Bolshevik Committee which took charge of this uprising.

The decision to propose to the Moscow Soviet to declare a general strike, which was to develop into an armed uprising, was unanimously adopted by the Moscow City and District conferences of Bolsheviks on December 5 (18), 1905. It was supported by the Moscow Soviet on the next day. This was preceded by a referendum of sorts, which was held by Moscow workers themselves directly at factories and which ascertained the proletariat's resolve to go ahead with the uprising. Recalling the atmosphere in which the decision to stage a strike and an uprising was taken at the Moscow Bolshevik conference, an eyewitness wrote: "...In December, there could not have been a force capable of holding back the Moscow workers. Never in my life had I observed such irrepressible revolutionary enthusiasm as on that night. The enthusiasm was tremendous, and what was most remarkable was the fact that not a single representative of a factory ever mentioned that we would strike if others would. No, everyone said: We would strike and develop the strike into an armed uprising at all costs, irrespective of whether or not others would do so."¹ On December 7 (20), a general political strike began in Moscow, in which 100,000 persons took part. On December 8 (21), over 150,000 in the city walked off their jobs. Work stoppages were registered not only at industrial enterprises and transport facilities, but also at institutions and in offices, shops, schools and theatres. Clashes with troops took place on December 7 and 8. By the logic of the struggle, the strike developed into an uprising.

The first barricades in Moscow appeared on the evening of December 9 (22), and by the next day they had encircled the entire centre of the city, cutting it off from the working-class districts. Non-proletarian strata of the population as well as the broad masses of the workers were drawn into the struggle. However, the combat forces of the fighting squads did not exceed 8,000, and many were not even armed, the organisation and leadership of the struggle lagged behind the upsurge of the movement. The insurgents were unable to win the garrison over to their side and impede the transfer of troops from St. Petersburg.

¹ N. Rozhkov, A. Sokolov, 1905, *Moskovsky Rabochy*, Moscow, 1925, pp. 24-25 (in Russian).

The Moscow insurrection was of a mass, popular nature. Its participants heroically battled the tsar's troops. During the struggle, the fighting squads began to employ tactics of guerrilla warfare successfully. The barricades, which numbered over a thousand in Moscow in December 1905, impaired the movement of tsarist troops and protected working-class neighbourhoods from artillery fire. The fighting squads operated in small mobile detachments, from ambushes, not giving decisive battle with the superior enemy troops. They fought in this fashion until substantial reinforcements arrived in Moscow. It was only after the authorities sent some 20,000 troops and police up against the insurgents that the outcome of the struggle was decided in favour of the autocracy.

For nine days the Moscow proletariat fought with arms in hand in defence of its right to build a new life. "The unmatched heroism of the Moscow workers," Lenin wrote, "provided the toiling masses of Russia with a model in the struggle."¹ The Bolsheviks were in the midst of the masses during the strike and uprising. The Moscow Bolsheviks and their leaders, V. L. Shantser (Marat) and M. I. Vasilyev-Yuzhin, did extensive work in preparing for the workers' December action. Outstanding among the leaders of the December armed uprising were the Bolsheviks Z. Ya. Litvin-Sedoi, chief of staff of the fighting squads, I. F. Dubrovinsky, R. S. Zemlyachka, A. V. Shestakov, V. M. Zagorsky and M. V. Frunze, to name a few. Socialist-Revolutionary A. V. Ukhtomsky, an engine-driver and chief of the railwaymen's fighting squad, fought valiantly; N. P. Schmit, a factory owner in the Presnya district of Moscow, aided the Bolsheviks. Following Lenin's instructions, the Bolsheviks of St. Petersburg strove to do all in their power to aid the insurgents in Moscow.

The struggle of the Moscow workers was supported with armed actions by the proletariat in several other regions of Russia—in the Donbas, Rostov-on-Don, Yekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Sormovo and Motovilikha, and by uprisings in Siberia, Latvia and the Transcaucasus. In a number of cities, such as Novorossiisk, Krasnoyarsk and Chita, "republics" of sorts were formed, where power actually belonged to the Soviets. The workers showed heroism and selflessness everywhere, valiantly repeating the feat of the Paris Communards who, as Marx put it, stormed the heavens. The Bolshevik Party marched at the head of the proletariat.

The December armed uprising debunked the capitulationist views of the impossibility of revolutionary forces waging an armed struggle in conditions of large cities against government troops armed

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Letter to the Workers of Red Presnya District of Moscow, December 25, 1920", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, 1966, p. 535.

with sophisticated military hardware. The main battles unfolded in Presnya, where the Soviet of Workers' Deputies was in charge. The struggle reached such a frenzied pitch here that the tsarist punitive troops literally had to take many houses by storm. It is highly symbolic that the final appeal of the headquarters of the Presnya fighting squads to the workers contained the following words: "The future belongs to the working class. Generation after generation in all countries will learn staunchness from the Presnya experience... We are invincible! Long live the struggle and victory of the workers!"¹

However, the realisation of the need for armed uprising was, according to Lenin, "not sufficiently widespread and firmly assimilated among the revolutionary classes"; the uprising "was not concerted, resolute, organised, simultaneous, aggressive".² The preparations for it from the military and technical standpoints were clearly insufficient. The insurgents were unable to win the troops over to the side of the people; they were not active, bold and resourceful enough in the struggle for the vacillating troops. Moreover, tactical miscalculations (the insurgents chiefly waged defensive battles) were made. All this led to the defeat of the working class in December 1905. However, unlike the Mensheviks who declared through Plekhanov that the struggle was hopeless from the very outset and therefore they should not have taken to arms, the Bolsheviks arrived at a completely opposite conclusion, urging the masses to prepare for a new uprising, to take up arms again and again, and to fight more resolutely and energetically than they had done in the heroic December 1905.

The defeat of the December uprising did not mean the end of the revolution. It was not even clear whether its apex had been reached or a more powerful outburst of popular indignation was in the offing. This was why the Bolsheviks kept their slogan of armed uprising. In early 1906, they began forming broader Bolshevik combat party organisations and uniting them on a countrywide basis and in terms of large geographical areas.³

In November 1906, the initiative of the largest Bolshevik military and combat organisations resulted in the convening of the representative First Military and Combat Conference of the RSDLP, which mapped out their tasks and determined the Russian centre—the

¹ *The 1905-1907 Revolution in Russia. Documents and Materials*, Part I, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1955, p. 689 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, "The Revolutionary Upswing", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, 1973, p. 107.

³ For details see *Military Organisations of the Russian Proletariat and the Experience of Its Armed Struggle, 1903-1917*, Nauka, Moscow, 1974, pp. 152-157 (in Russian).

Interim Bureau of RSDLP Military and Combat Organisations.¹ The provision of the party leadership with military and combat work was becoming particularly crucial. A plan which envisaged establishing "equality" between general proletarian organisations of the RSDLP on the one hand, and military and combat ones on the other was rejected at the conference. Lenin ardently supported this decision, stressing: "The unconditionally dominant character and deciding voice belong to the general proletarian organisation; the *complete* subordination of all military and combat organisations to it...."² It was on this basis that relations between party committees and Bolshevik military and combat organisations were structured. Committee directives were recognised as binding for them. Its members were incorporated in the leading bodies of military and combat organisations with the right of deciding vote; their representatives, in turn, were delegated to the committee.

Headquarters or military councils with detachments of reconnaissance men, medical orderlies and technicians served as operative bodies of the preparation for the armed uprising. The Bolsheviks conducted systematic military training for party members.

The problem of the unity of the working class became more acute as the revolutionary struggle developed. The objective logic of the events and the pressure exerted by the working masses from below forced the leaders of Menshevik and national Social-Democratic organisations to coordinate actions with the Bolsheviks. By the autumn of 1905, the movement for unity among the Social-Democrats locally had progressed from separate practical agreements to the formation of federative councils, uniting, on a parity basis, representatives of Bolshevik committees, Menshevik groups, Bund committees, Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPL) and the Latvian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Unification talks the Bolshevik Central Committee and the Menshevik Organising Commission held since July concluded in late December with the formation of the Joint Central Committee of the RSDLP and its single central organ—the newspaper *Partiiniye Izvestia*. The Bolsheviks' plan for the convocation of the Unity Congress on the basis of direct votes for delegates in proportion to the number of party members was adopted.

The Bolsheviks agreed to amalgamation or, to be more precise, "semi-amalgamation" with the Mensheviks at the Fourth RSDLP

¹ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, pp. 192-202; *The First Military and Combat Conference of the RSDLP. Minutes*, Partizdat, Moscow, 1932 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, "Apropos of the Minutes of the November Military and Combat Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, 1972, p. 416.

Congress in April 1906 because it was conducive to eliminating the split of Social-Democracy which was harmful to the cause of the revolution, and to the desire of the proletarian masses for a united working-class front. The Bolsheviks considered this demand of the workers fully legitimate, but they constantly stressed that the unification of the party was possible only if carried out on a principled, Marxist basis, that it has nothing in common with a mechanical merger of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Therefore, the movement for amalgamation within the RSDLP became feasible only when the Mensheviks, influenced by the first lessons of the revolution, took definite steps in the autumn of 1905 to recognise a number of Bolshevik tactical principles, particularly on the armed uprising issue.

The unification of the RSDLP at the Fourth (Unity) Congress in Stockholm (April and May 1906) took place on the basis of organisational principles advanced by Lenin. The new RSDLP Rules adopted at the Congress formalised Lenin's formulation of party membership and the building of all its organisations in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism. The Congress also settled the issue of uniting national Social-Democratic parties—the SDKPL, the Latvian Social-Democratic Labour Party and the Bund—with the RSDLP. They received rights to autonomous organisations within the framework of the united party. The SDKPL and the Latvian Social-Democrats were supposed to conduct work among the proletarians of all nationalities in their respective areas. In order to unite the working-class movement internationally in the shortest time possible, the Congress agreed to a practical compromise and concessions to national organisations on a number of organisational and even policy-making issues in a bid to rapidly eliminate disagreements on them during joint work.¹

The historical record corroborated the perspicacity of these moves. Admittedly, even afterwards heads of national Social-Democratic organisations wavered repeatedly, trying to play the role of arbiter in the struggle between the revolutionary and opportunistic trends in Russian Social-Democracy. However, the coalescence of most Polish, Lithuanian and Latvian Social-Democrats with the Bolsheviks locally prompted national organisations to gradually discard former special views on a number of policy-making issues and scuttle their separatist leanings. The Bund alone maintained its nationalist position.

While having become a milestone in the struggle for the establishment of Leninist organisational principles, the Fourth RSDLP Congress was unable to bring the struggle to a victorious conclusion.

¹ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, pp. 158-59, 165-66, 178-82.

because of the small preponderance of the Mensheviks at the Congress, which did not reflect the correlation of party forces. The situation was complicated by the fact that they were also dominant in the Party's central bodies formed at the Congress. Praising the results of the Unity Congress, Lenin considered them the underpinnings for waging the further struggle for the implementation of the organisational principles of the new type of proletarian party. "Disagreements on organisation have been almost entirely eliminated," he pointed out. "There remains an important, serious and extremely responsible task: really to apply the principles of democratic centralism in Party organisations...."¹

Following the Fourth (Unity) Congress, a restructuring of regional organisations took place in the RSDLP on the basis of democratic centralism. A single form replaced the variety of the past. The conference (congress) was the highest body of the regional RSDLP organisation. It elected the corresponding committee (bureau) for exercising leadership of autonomous local committees. The regional amalgamations encompassed virtually the entire country, and national Social-Democratic organisations also functioned enjoying their rights. A single structure for forming local party organisations was elaborated as well.

The Bolsheviks proceeded from the proposition that leadership of the workers' struggle aimed at the revolutionary solution of the urgent fundamental tasks of transforming society could be exercised only by the party of the proletariat, which was its solid revolutionary vanguard and political leader at all stages of its revolutionary activity. The entire record of the implementation of Leninist principles of party up-building confirmed the fact that such a vanguard's fighting capability could be ensured by unity between consistently Marxist, creative theory and practice, by the resultant ideological and political unity and organisational unity based on democratic centralism, the strictest party discipline, political awareness and energetic activity of each party member, and by a high sense of responsibility for the implementation of party policy. During both revolutionary upsurge and periods of slow decline in the revolution, the Bolsheviks remained such a revolutionary vanguard, irreconcilable to any form of splitting, political opportunism and theoretical revisionism.

Within the RSDLP organisations, which had amalgamated on the basis of the decisions of the Fourth (Unity) Congress, a fierce struggle was raging on issues of policy, tactics and organisation. Great damage was inflicted to the cause of the working class by the

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Report on the Unity Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. A Letter to the St. Petersburg Workers", *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, p. 376.

opportunistic line of the Menshevik Central Committee and the RSDLP central organ. In these conditions, the Bolsheviks resumed printing in August 1906 their own mouthpiece, which came out until 1910 under the title *Proletary* (edited by Lenin) as the organ of the Moscow, St. Petersburg and several other RSDLP committees. The *Proletary* editorial board played the role of a Bolshevik centre. The Bolsheviks' struggle against the Mensheviks was waged within the RSDLP Central Committee, the Duma group and local organisations. It resulted in winning over the majority in local organisations to the Bolsheviks' side. As early as 1907, the Bolsheviks had a solid majority, and were supported by the SDKPL and the Latvian Social-Democrats.

The Mensheviks' obvious shift to the right in 1906-1907 made it necessary for the Bolsheviks to launch a campaign to convene the Fifth Party Congress (April and May 1907). Represented at this forum were 145 party organisations with a membership of 150,000. Proceeding from the experience of the revolution, the Congress endorsed a general party line which was elaborated by Lenin and other Bolsheviks and which was persistently pursued by them despite the Mensheviks throughout the 1905-1907 period. A struggle again unfolded at the Congress over issues pertaining to the party organisation of the proletariat. Behind the veil of demagoguery about consolidating ties with the working masses, the Mensheviks tried to push through the idea of a "labour congress" which would have meant replacing Social-Democracy with, or subordinating it to, a non-party, in effect liberal, labour organisation. Lenin pointed out that such principles, which were embraced by the anarcho-syndicalists, reflected an opportunist and philistine weariness with the revolution, rejection of the political tasks of the working class, and a tendency "to *weaken* the class independence of the proletariat and *subordinate* that class to the bourgeoisie".¹ The Bolsheviks countered this with a line, endorsed at the Congress, for organising trade unions, stepping up Party work in them and other labour organisations and institutions, and substantially bolstering the Party ranks with the proletariat. The Congress accepted the Bolshevik characterisation of the Social-Democratic Party as "the only organisation uniting the politically-conscious section of the proletariat, the vanguard leading the working class's struggle for a socialist system, and the political and economic conditions necessary for its realisation". It was stressed that the idea of a labour congress was definitely "harmful to the development of the proletariat as a class".²

The Mensheviks' attempts to attain the trade unions' neutrality as regards the Party and the independence of the parliamentary

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Angry Embarrassment", *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 331.

² *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, pp. 214, 215.

group of the Social-Democratic Party from its Central Committee were rejected as well. In addition, in pursuance of the line of the Third RSDLP Congress despite the Mensheviks, a decision was taken in accordance with which there no longer existed two centres—the Central Committee and Central Organ. In accordance with the Party Rules it adopted, the Congress, as its supreme body, was to elect the Central Committee, which would organise, lead and coordinate the entire activity of the Party and would also appoint the editors of the Central Organ.

The decisions of the Fifth RSDLP Congress concluded the stage (which embraced the period of the revolution) of the Bolsheviks' struggle to implement Lenin's principles of the party of the new type, and to unite the RSDLP on this basis. They affirmed the victory of Bolshevism.

The first stage of the revolution, its advance, ended with the defeat of the December armed uprising of 1905. The second stage of the revolution had begun, on a decline, although this was not discovered immediately at all.

The strike movement remained the main form of the class struggle during the period of the retreat of the revolution. Despite intensified tsarist repressions, the proletariat retreated slowly, continuing to fight. Twice—in the spring and summer of 1906 and the spring of 1907—it attempted to halt the offensive of reaction. Moreover, it was these new upsurges of the working-class movement, followed by the peasant movement, that maintained revolutionary sentiments in the country and considerably staved off the revolution's ultimate defeat. Awakened by the 1905 events, the more backward sections of the proletariat entered the struggle, as if taking over from the vanguard of the movement. In 1906, broad masses of the proletariat marked the May Day, and made an attempt to support the uprisings of sailors and soldiers in Kronstadt and Sveaborg in the Baltic which erupted in July. In the spring and summer of 1906, came a wave of strikes by mine and factory workers in the Donbas, and a strike by seamen of the merchant marine in Odessa.

The combat sentiments of the masses influenced the decisions of the Second All-Russia Conference of Trade Unions (February 1906), which took place illegally in St. Petersburg. Thus, the resolution on organisational questions stated that trade unions should not turn into charitable institutions, that their purpose was to be combat organisations of the workers for struggle against the capitalists. The delegates resolved to remit a large part of membership dues and all trade union income to a special strike fund.¹

¹ *Trade Unions of the USSR*, Vol. 1, pp. 103-09.

In a bid to check the further development of the revolutionary movement, the tsarist government was forced to legalise the trade unions: in March 1906, it issued the "Interim Rules on Trade Societies Instituted for Persons Employed in Commercial and Industrial Enterprises, or for Owners of These Enterprises". This law envisaged protective and police regulation of trade union activity: they were forbidden to fight for a shorter working-day and higher wages by means of strikes, and strike funds were banned. The trade unions only had the right to "ascertain" and "coordinate" the interests of the workers, distribute allowances from mutual assistance funds, etc. Many forms of amalgamating trade union organisations were outlawed as well.¹

However, despite the Interim Rules, the trade unions under the RSDLP leadership continued to be strongholds of revolutionary work among the masses. Through the trade unions the Bolsheviks organised the struggle for higher wages and better working conditions. The trade unions were the initiators of new forms of strikes; so, in 1907, they organised a number of successful strikes at factories owned by the same firm in different towns (the strike of tea-packers in Moscow, Odessa, etc.). Between 1905 and 1907, trade unions in Moscow and St. Petersburg managed to have over 20 collective agreements concluded.² The trade unions concentrated on aiding the unemployed, including those in other towns; thus, at the initiative of the Moscow textile workers' union, an assistance fund was formed in January 1907 for Lodz workers who had been subjected to a lockout.³ The trade unions also took part in the political struggle.

Another manifestation of the proletariat's stiff opposition to the mounting onslaught of the bourgeoisie was the movement of the unemployed—a response by the workers to the mass lockouts to which the capitalists were resorting more and more often at the time. The movement proceeded under the slogan "Work and Bread!" and was accompanied by demands for public works, free food, etc. Councils of unemployed appeared in a number of towns with representatives from revolutionary parties, trade unions and workers from operating enterprises.

The guerrilla warfare was a new form of the revolutionary movement during the period of the revolution's decline. Workers and members of revolutionary organisations fought with arms in hand against the violence of punitive detachments and the Black Hundreds, liquidated spies and provocateurs, etc. These actions were, in fact, a form of civil war in conditions "when the mass movement has

¹ For details see V. Ya. Laverychev, *Tsarism and the Labour Issue in Russia (1861-1917)*, Mysl, Moscow, 1972, p. 207 (in Russian).

² Ibid., p. 187.

³ *Trade Unions of Moscow*, Moscow, 1975, p. 49.

actually reached the point of an uprising and when fairly large intervals occur between the 'big engagements' in the civil war".¹

In 1907, the proletariat was already waging the final, rearguard battles, but even then the workers' strikes in St. Petersburg District, Vladimir Gubernia and Baku stood out for their staunchness, proving once again that the working class was the first to enter the struggle and the last to leave the battlefield.

The second stage of the revolution was the time when the Russian proletariat, with the autocracy still intact, nonetheless received an opportunity to employ parliamentary forms of struggle for its rights. True, the State Duma, the decision on the convocation of which was formalised by the tsarist manifesto of October 17 (30), 1905, was only peripherally reminiscent of a bourgeois parliament. The most important facets of state rule were removed from its sphere of competence, the ministers were answerable only to the tsar, and the Duma's budget rights were extremely curtailed. Elections to it were neither general, nor equal, nor direct or secret. The extent to which the electoral rights of the workers were limited can be judged from the fact that one vote of a landlord was equal to 45 workers' votes; moreover, only male workers of enterprises employing no less than 50 persons were allowed to vote.

However, no matter how fictitious and threadbare the promised freedoms were, the convocation of the Duma opened up for the proletariat a number of additional opportunities for class organisation and political education, for rallying around itself other sections of the working people, the peasantry above all, as well as for levelling criticism at the anti-popular policy of the tsarist government and the treacherous conduct of the liberal bourgeoisie. These opportunities were used in part by the working class and its Party during the proceedings of the First State Duma, which opened in April 1906.

The Social-Democrats boycotted the elections to the First Duma. Lenin wrote later that this step was a tactical blunder, since the elections were held during the revolution's decline. This blunder was soon corrected. Leadership in the First Duma was gained by the most "left" of the Russian bourgeois parties—the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets). Representing the interests of the country's bourgeois development, it constantly wavered between opposition to the autocracy and a desire to reach accord with it against the revolutionary people. It was the counter-revolutionary line that eventually took the upper hand in it. The big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie did not support the Cadets: it either teamed up with the Union of

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "Guerrilla Warfare", *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 219; for the international significance of the tactics of guerrilla warfare see Rodney Arismendi, *Lenin, la revolución y América Latina*, Ediciones Pueblos Unidos, Montevideo, 1970, pp. 429-83.

October 17 (the Octobrist Party) or tried to form other party groupings which, however, dissolved quickly. After October 1905, the big Russian industrialists and bankers continued unconditionally to support the tsarist government and unequivocally came out against the revolutionary forces.¹

However, the accord between the autocracy and the people which the bourgeois liberals had worked for proved impossible, and after 72 fruitless days of debate in the Duma the tsarist government dissolved in July 1906 what it termed the overly "left" first Russian "parliament". The Social-Democratic group of the Duma, which consisted of 18 deputies, was particularly odious to the tsarist authorities. The group included 10 workers, who had passed in the elections without the sanction of the appropriate Party committees, and 8 Mensheviks, who had been elected in areas where the elections were held after the decision of the Fourth RSDLP Congress to lift the Duma boycott. The Menshevik nature of the work of the group, its overestimation of the Duma as the centre of the anti-government movement, the lack of political experience of the first labour deputies, their illusions about the possibility of joint actions with the Cadets—all this combined accounted for the series of mistakes which the representatives of the working class initially made in parliamentary activity. However, under the influence of criticism by the Bolsheviks, above all by Lenin, who closely followed each move of the Social-Democratic deputies in the Duma and urged them to work for unity of actions not with the Cadets but with the peasant deputies—the Trudoviks, the group began to act more decisively and consistently. To counter the half-baked Cadet bill on assemblies it tabled its own draft, which rejected any police restrictions on the freedom of people's assemblies. The attempt by the workers' deputies to establish contacts with their constituency and to develop extra-Duma propaganda work was also a positive phenomenon. Substantial headway was likewise made in bringing together workers' and peasants' deputies of the Duma—the Trudoviks. Suffice it to say that in June 1906 they jointly filed 31 requests with the government.² After the First Duma was dissolved the Social-Democrats and Trudoviks issued an appeal to the army and navy in which it called upon the soldiers and sailors to take the side of the people and train their guns on the criminal government. The Executive Committee of Left Groups which was formed by these groups proposed to the peasants to topple the government authorities and appropriate the manorial holdings. At the same time, however, the Social-

¹ For details see Ye. D. Chermensky, *The Bourgeoisie and Tsarism During the First Russian Revolution*, Mysl, Moscow, 1970 (in Russian).

² *Istoriya SSSR*. No. 4, 1973, p. 60.

Democrats, exhibiting a lack of consistency, also supported the Cadet slogan of "passive resistance" to the government.

In the Second State Duma, the activity of the workers' deputies was more effective and purposeful.¹ The RSDLP group consisted of 65 deputies, including 18 Bolsheviks. They had been elected in the largest of Russia's industrial centres, while the Mensheviks had got in chiefly through the votes of the petty-bourgeois electorate.

A fierce struggle between two political lines—the Bolshevik and the Menshevik—immediately developed in the Social-Democratic group. The Bolshevik parliamentarians established close contact with Lenin, who was in Finland at the time, as well as with the St. Petersburg Party Committee, and the proletarian masses. Following Lenin's instructions, the Bolshevik deputies set out to pursue leftist bloc tactics in a bid to reach accord with parties representing the interests of the peasants. The Mensheviks, on the contrary, tried to saddle the group with the opportunist line of "coordinating actions" with the Cadets. Through the Bolsheviks' efforts the Social-Democrats managed in a number of instances to attract peasant representatives; thus, leftist-bloc votes scuttled the Cadets' amendment to the bill on aid to the unemployed which excluded strikers from among the recipients; a united front of workers' and peasants' representatives also emerged during the debate on food and agrarian issues. What especially brought the left groups together was the threat that the Second Duma would be dissolved, when, on the Social-Democrats' initiative, they had decided to refuse to ratify the state budget.²

The Bolshevik deputies of the Second Duma launched extensive propaganda and organisational work among the masses. They frequently spoke before the workers and intensively corresponded with their constituencies. Special councils of factory representatives were set up in St. Petersburg and several other towns to maintain contact with deputies of the Duma. The Mensheviks, on the contrary, limited themselves chiefly to work in the Duma.

Yet, even this Social-Democratic group made a good number of mistakes and tactical blunders, the main responsibility for which lay with the Mensheviks. These mistakes were sharply criticised at the Fifth Congress of the RSDLP, where the revolutionary and opportunist line in the assessment of parliamentary work again clashed. The Bolsheviks considered it an important but by no means the principal form of the Social-Democrats' work. Harboured no illu-

¹ For details see M. Pavlov, *The Duma Tactics of the Bolsheviks During the 1905-1907 Revolution*, Lenizdat, Leningrad, 1947; G. I. Zaichikov, *The Duma Tactics of the Bolsheviks*, Vysshaya Shkola, Moscow, 1975 (both in Russian).

² *Problems of the Leadership of the Proletariat in the Democratic Revolution (1905-February 1917)*, pp. 225-29.

sions about the possibility of the Duma's constructive legislative work under the autocracy, the Bolsheviks viewed the Russian "parliament" chiefly as a legal tribune for levelling criticism at the government and the liberals, a vehicle for unmasking the pseudo-constitutional nature of the state system existing in Russia. Contrary to the parties of the Second International, where the parliamentary groups were relapsing more and more to reformist positions and frequently acted independent of party centres, the Bolsheviks insisted that the workers' deputies strictly submit to the Party decisions, and viewed everyday contact with the working class and the entire people as a guarantee of success. Thus, the Bolsheviks' revolutionary line on issues of parliamentary work, which also took into consideration the positive elements of revolutionary parliamentarianism in West European countries, was of fundamental importance for the worldwide working-class movement. The Fifth RSDLP Congress adopted a Bolshevik resolution on the State Duma assailing the opportunist tactics of the Mensheviks in the Duma. "For us," Lenin said, "there is only one, single and indivisible, workers' movement—the class struggle of the proletariat. All its separate, partial forms, including the parliamentary struggle, must be fully subordinated to it. For us it is the extra-Duma struggle of the proletariat that is decisive."¹

Despite the calculations of the government, the Second Duma proved to be even more left than its predecessor. The struggle within the Duma was at a frenzied pitch. The land question—the most topical for Russia—was particularly hotly debated. The Bolsheviks, using Lenin's draft speech on the agrarian question in their statements, were the first to proclaim from the Duma rostrum the demand that all manorial holdings be confiscated, and urged the peasants to take the solution of this vital nationwide problem into their own hands.

On June 3 (16), 1907, the government, with the aid of a forged document provided by the police concerning a "plot" by the Social-Democratic deputies against the existing system, dissolved the Duma; moreover, this act was accompanied by an illegal change of the statute of elections. The coup d'état of June 3, 1907 marked the end of the first Russian revolution, the mainspring and leader of which was the proletariat.

The entire period of the revolution proceeded with the vigorous involvement of the working class in the struggle against the autocracy and the bourgeoisie. At enterprises under the factory inspection supervision alone 2,863,000 strikers were registered in 1905, 1,108,000 in 1906, and 740,000 in 1907. Even the latter, most mod-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Fifth Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, April 30-May 19 (May 13-June 1), 1907", *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 485.

est, figure exceeds the maximum number of strikers in any of the three largest capitalist countries—the United States, Germany and France—during the entire 15-year period from 1894 to 1908.¹

The overall picture of the struggle of all contingents of the industrial proletariat of European Russia in 1905 looks even more impressive; during this time over two-thirds of the workers took part in strikes (see Table 1).

Table 1

**Russian Proletariat in the Strike Struggle,
1905 (European Russia)**

	Metal workers	Textile workers	Miners, iron-and- steel workers	Railway workers	Others	Total
Total number of factory workers (thousands) . .	392.5	693.3	650.0	640.4	694.9	3,071.1
Number of strik- ers (repeats not included) . . .	300.7	473.6	279.8	640.4	392.3	2,086.8
Percentage of total number of work- ers of a branch	76.6	68.3	43.0	100.0	56.4	67.9
Total number of strikers (repeats included) . . .	1,011.3	1,269.5	723.5	1,126.4	879.4	5,010.1

Source: *Historical Notes*, Vol. 52, Institute of History, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1955 p. 182.

The particular staunchness of the advanced sections of the proletariat exerted an influence here. Whereas in 1905 economic and political strikes registered an identical number of participants, in 1906 there were many more political strikers than participants in economic strikes (650,000 against 458,000), and in 1907 the former exceeded the latter by more than 150 per cent (540,000 against 200,000). Among metal workers, in 1905 the number of political strikers substantially exceeded that of participants in economic strikes, while in the period of the highest revolutionary upsurge (the final three months of 1905) the proportion was 10 to 1.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Strike Statistics in Russia", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, 1977, pp. 395, 413.

During the revolution, the proletariat convincingly proved that it was the country's most revolutionary class. In addition, it was able to win the position of leader of all the workers and the exploited.

The first Russian revolution was a major test of Lenin's teaching of the leading role of the proletariat in the liberation movement. "When the Social-Democrats, from an analysis of Russia's economic realities, deduced the leading role, the hegemony of the proletariat in our revolution," Lenin wrote in 1907, "this seemed to be a bookish infatuation of theoreticians. The revolution confirmed our theory, because it is the only truly revolutionary theory. The proletariat actually took the lead in the revolution all the time. The Social-Democrats actually proved to be the ideological vanguard of the proletariat."¹

Other working people's classes and social groups followed the proletariat in one way or other; they oriented themselves to its slogans and employed the forms of struggle and organisation it had elaborated. The proletariat's example inspired the peasants, office workers, democratic intelligentsia, students, soldiers and sailors; it heightened sentiments of protest and created a special atmosphere of revolution in which the most downtrodden and oppressed stood with their head held high.

The proletariat exerted an influence on the masses through legal and illegal Party literature, leaflets in particular, through the workers who travelled to the countryside, through meetings and rallies, military Social-Democratic organisations and student groups, cultural and educational societies, and the rostrum of the tsarist Duma. All these channels were employed to rally the working people in town and country around the working class and its party, to lead them on the road of struggle. A tremendous role in stirring the petty-bourgeois masses was played by the strike movement and especially the highest form of proletarian struggle—armed uprisings.

The countryside followed the towns during the years of the revolution. It was not for nothing that Lenin wrote that the word "striker" had acquired an entirely new meaning among the peasants: it signified a rebel, a revolutionary, and the strikers themselves evoked trust and sympathy in the countryside.² The reports of tsarist officials from different parts of the country frequently spoke of how unrecognisably the peasants had changed under the influence of workers who had come on visits or who had been exiled for revolutionary work, how difficult it was becoming to prevent them from taking

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 115.

² V. I. Lenin, "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 243.

action against the landlords. Although the advanced workers still lacked the strength and means to exert an influence over the entire countryside, the ties between the proletariat and the peasantry were consolidating and augmenting from one day to the next.¹ Many RSDLP committees formed special agrarian groups whose members travelled to villages and spoke at meetings and rallies, explaining the Social-Democratic programme to the peasants in a bid to rid them of the influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and liberals.

The revolutionary activity of advanced workers in the countryside largely contributed to the consolidation of the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry. As was pointed out at the conference of the Volga RSDLP District Organisation in October 1906, "the peasants are beginning to understand the necessity to combine the revolutionary struggle of town and country (workers and peasants). They believe that the signal for the uprising should be given by the workers. This signal is the general political strike (the railway strike in particular), which in the eyes of the peasants means an armed uprising".²

The peasants were attracted to the urban workers; they attended their meetings and turned to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies for assistance. Following the example of the urban proletariat, they frequently staged strikes demanding easier land rent terms and higher wages for seasonal work on manorial holdings, and they took part in the guerrilla movement (Latvia, Georgia). The countryside was also receptive to the Bolsheviks' appeal to form revolutionary peasants' committees, the organisers of which were workers in many cases. An important form of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry were joint actions by workers' and peasants' deputies—Trudoviks—in the State Duma, the Bolsheviks doing everything in their power to rid the Trudoviks of the Cadets' influence.³ All this combined gave Lenin cause to draw the conclusion that during the years of the revolution the alliance between the working class and the peasantry with the leading role being played by the proletariat and its party was formed "scores and hundreds of times, in the most diverse forms ... from the vague and unofficial to definite and official political agreements".⁴

That the working class exerted an influence on the revolutionary struggle of the peasants was evidenced by the fact that the peasant

¹ P. I. Klimov, *The Revolutionary Activity of the Workers in the Countryside in 1905-1907*, Sotsekgiz, Moscow, 1960, pp. 65, 92, 124, 125 (in Russian).

² *The Second Period of the Revolution 1906-1907*, Part II, Book II, Nauka, Moscow, 1962, p. 239 (in Russian).

³ *Problems of the Leadership of the Proletariat in the Democratic Revolution (1905-February 1917)*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1975, pp. 220-29 (in Russian).

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Aim of the Proletarian Struggle in Our Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 371-72.

movement seemed to echo somewhat later the upswings and declines of the strike movement of the urban proletariat; moreover, the highest upsurge of the working class' struggle during the final four months of 1905 coincided with the period in which the peasants acted most intensively against the landlords. "In October 1905, at the very height of the revolution," Lenin wrote, "the proletariat was at the head, the bourgeoisie wavered and vacillated, and the peasantry wrecked the landed estates."¹

According to far from complete statistics, over 3,200 peasant actions took place in 1905, almost half of them at the height of the revolution; in 1906, the figure was 2,600, 60 per cent of them coming in May, June and July, i.e., the time of the upswing of the working-class movement that spring and summer; the first half of 1907 witnessed approximately 900, 69 per cent of them taking place between April and July, when the working class made its last attempt to halt the decline of the revolution.²

An important component of the struggle for the leading role of the proletariat was the efforts to win the petty-bourgeois sections of the urban population over to the side of the working class. The alliance between the working class and the urban petty-bourgeois revolutionary democrats was particularly evident during the All-Russia October Strike, the November post and telegraph workers' strike, and the December armed uprisings. In 1906 and 1907, the proletariat and the Bolshevik Party exerted an influence on these strata during the election campaigns prior to the First and particularly the Second State Duma; they took advantage of the Duma rostrum for addressing the masses, and they also influenced them through the trade unions.

One of the proletariat's vital tasks during the revolution was its participation in the liberation struggle of the oppressed ethnic groups inhabiting the Russian Empire. Given the leading role of the working class the national liberation movement would be able to become an inalienable component of the struggle of the whole people for democracy and national equality under the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination. With the leading role of the bourgeoisie this would have inevitably degenerated into a narrow nationalist movement, which would threaten to divorce the working masses of national areas from the life-giving alliance with the Russian prole-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Fifth Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, April 30-May 19 (May 13-June 1), 1907", *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, p. 459.

² S. M. Dubrovsky, *The Peasant Movement in the 1905-1907 Revolution*, Nauka, Moscow, 1956, p. 42 (in Russian). According to more complete estimates made by M. S. Simonova on the basis of statistics available in Soviet historical literature, some 18,000 peasant actions took place during the revolution (*Historical Notes*, Vol. 95, Institute of History, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1975, p. 212, in Russian).

tariat and thus inflict irreparable harm to their fundamental national interests.

On the whole, the proletariat succeeded in paralysing the ambition of the national bourgeoisie to lead the national liberation movement. The revolutionary struggle of the working masses of the national areas—the Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic region, the Caucasus, Byelorussia, the Volga region, Finland and Central Asia—were extensively supported by the Russian proletariat. Owing to this it became possible to put through a democratic constitution in Finland and lift martial law in Poland, introduce in a number of areas tuition and legal proceedings in the native language without preliminary permission, and other democratic measures. The national liberation movement in turn aided the Russian proletariat in its struggle against the autocracy. The 1905-1907 revolution laid a firm foundation for the cooperation among the peoples of Russia in their common struggle against tsarism which was to yield fruit in 1917. The mainspring and ideological leader of this cooperation was the Russian proletariat headed by the Bolshevik Party.

Thus, the proletariat was the leader of the popular struggle at all stages of the 1905-1907 revolution. The working class and the Bolshevik Party took the initiative in positing the most crucial issues in the life of society, and their selfless struggle for the workers' interests won them the trust and support of the entire people.

THE MAIN RESULTS AND INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 1905-1907 REVOLUTION

The first Russian revolution was an important turning-point in the history of Russia and the entire world liberation movement. The reactionary autocratic regime buckled for the first time under the blows of the revolutionary forces. As a result, tsarism ceased being the chief bastion of international reaction. Moreover, thereafter the autocracy itself began to need support from without to preserve its wavering positions within the country and in the international arena. This created a completely new political atmosphere in the world and unleashed the initiative of the revolutionary forces.

The first Russian revolution drew into its orbit all the strata of the working population, and part of the army and navy; it engulfed the centre of the country and its outlying regions, and made tens of millions of workers and peasants of many nationalities energetic participants in the political struggle. In none of the previous bourgeois revolutions did the revolutionary endeavour of the popular masses attain such an upsurge and scope, nor did it enrich the practice of the liberation movement with such an abundance of new

forms of organisation and struggle. The 1905-1907 revolution in Russia was a big stride forward in the development of the world liberation movement, providing a brilliant example to workers in other countries. The Russian proletariat acted as the vanguard of the international proletariat, showing the prospects for the revolutionary struggle to come.

The Russian proletariat scored immediate, palpable gains. Suffice it to say that in 1905 70.6 per cent of all the strikes staged ended in complete or partial victory for the workers; in 1906, the figure was 66.5 per cent, and in 1907, when the movement was already on the decline, it was 42.3 per cent.¹ Wages of factory workers rose by an average of 15 per cent in 1907 over the 1904 level.² Incomes also increased for other categories of workers, including farmworkers. The sizes and number of fines were sharply reduced under the influence of the strike movement. The bourgeoisie and tsarist authorities were also forced to agree to a somewhat shortened working-day at many private and state-owned factories. At most enterprises it now lasted 9-10 hours, and even 8 hours at some. As a result, the working week after the revolution was shortened to 50-60 hours (as against 75 hours in the late 19th century).³ Even though the proletariat's position remained extremely difficult (especially considering the increase in prices for staple goods), the year 1905 "improved the worker's living standard to a degree that normally is attained during several decades".⁴

The tsarist authorities virtually had to permit economic strikes, abolishing the 1897 circular according to which the "unauthorised leaving of the job" was considered a criminal offence. Despite a number of substantial reservations impinging upon the workers' rights, the Interim Rules of December 2, 1905 were an important gain of the proletariat. The government was also forced to legalise the trade unions. Even more important was the fact that during the revolution the working class won, albeit for a short time, basic political rights and freedoms, and also received, according to the law of December 11, 1905, access to the State Duma (far from all workers, however, could take part in the elections).

The main thing were the changes which had taken place in the consciousness, mentality and in the very make-up of the workers. The proletariat had felt its strength and significance as a class, and

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Strike Statistics in Russia", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 418.

² *Reports of Factory Inspectors for 1910*, St. Petersburg, 1911, p. XXXVII (calculated by the author; in Russian).

³ K. A. Pazhitnov, *The Situation of the Working Class in Russia*, Novy Mir, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 296 (in Russian).

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Strike Movement and Wages", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 259.

its faith in the tsar had been shattered. The workers had developed a lively interest in politics and the realisation of their own dignity. It was not coincidental that precisely in 1905 the proud word "comrade" emerged from underground groups to the streets and factories, and came into common usage.

The first Russian revolution was an important stage in the further consolidation of the proletariat as a major political force of country-wide scope, as the leader of all the working and the exploited people. These years witnessed the expansion and deepening of a process which had begun back in the 1890s, the process of combining scientific socialism with the mass working-class movement, the process of assimilating by the proletariat of the Bolshevik ideology, tactics and organisational principles.

Therefore, the first Russian revolution elevated the working class and its Party to a new level and prepared them for the subsequent struggle for democracy and socialism.

The 1905-1907 revolution, however, suffered defeat for a number of reasons. The proletariat was still unable to raise the majority of the people to the armed struggle against the autocracy. The actions of the workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors, and the democratic intelligentsia, as well as the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples, had not yet merged into a single current. In conditions of mass, spontaneous protest, only "a minor part of the peasantry," noted Lenin, "really did fight, did organise to some extent for this purpose; and a very small part indeed rose up in arms to exterminate its enemies".¹

Cohesion and organisation in the actions of the workers themselves was also insufficient. It was not fortuitous that Lenin pointed out that they "did not resolutely, widely and quickly enough pass to the aggressive economic and armed political struggle".² Despite the tremendous ideological, political and organisational growth of the Russian proletariat during the revolution, it was still unable to put all its inner reserves into motion. A negative role was also played by the split in the working class, the opportunism of the Mensheviks and the insufficient Social-Democratic leadership of the spontaneous proletarian movement of such dimension.

Other factors contributing to the temporary victory of counter-revolution were the constant support the tsar received from the international bourgeoisie, the conclusion of peace with Japan in August 1905, and the treacherous stand of the Russian liberals.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Leo Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 207.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 385.

Despite the defeat of the revolution, it is nonetheless difficult to overestimate the tremendous importance it held for the subsequent history of Russia's and the international working-class movement. It dealt a powerful blow to the autocracy and to the rule of the landlords and capitalists, and it added a glorious page to the history of the class struggle of the world proletariat. Assessing the significance of the revolutionary battles of 1905-1907, Lenin wrote: "Without such a 'dress rehearsal' as we had in 1905, the revolutions of 1917—both the bourgeois, February revolution, and the proletarian, October revolution—would have been impossible."¹

The proletariat was forged and strengthened in the flames of the revolutionary battles, and a united contingent of workers of all of Russia's nations was formed. "It won the *emancipation* of the working masses from the influence of treacherous and contemptibly impotent *liberalism*. It won for itself the *hegemony* in the struggle for freedom and democracy as a pre-condition of the struggle for socialism. It won for all the oppressed and exploited classes of Russia the *ability* to wage a revolutionary mass struggle...."²

The events of 1905-1907 convincingly showed the tremendous role that the revolutionary Marxist party of the working class played in the struggle of the popular masses. The Bolshevik Party, which alone had a clear-cut, scientifically substantiated action programme, became the genuine embodiment of the leading role of the proletariat in the revolution. Raising aloft the banner of revolution, the Bolsheviks creatively developed Marxist teaching, combining it during the revolution with the mass proletarian and democratic movement. Moreover, not only did they teach the masses, they also learned from the masses themselves, carefully selecting all the valuable and historically promising elements that emerged as a result of the awakening of the people to vigorous revolutionary endeavour.³

The talent of many fine Bolshevik Party figures came to the fore during the revolution, during which they showed their best in the various spheres of party work. History will never forget N. E. Bauman, who gave his life for the revolution, and whom Lenin called "the Party's executive technician, financier and transporter", L. B. Krasin, and many prominent Party organisers, such as M. A. Azizbekov, A. S. Bubnov, V. Ya. Chubar, M. V. Frunze, P. A. Japaridze, F. E. Dzerzhinsky, S. I. Gusev, Kamo (S. A. Ter-Petrosyan), S. V. Kosior, A. V. Lunacharsky, G. K. Orjonikidze,

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Third International and Its Place in History", *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, 1977, p. 310.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle in Russia", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 387.

³ For details see N. N. Yakovlev, *The People and the Party During the First Russian Revolution*, Mysl, Moscow, 1965 (in Russian).

V. L. Shantser, and S. G. Shahumyan, P. G. Smidovich, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, S. S. Spandaryan, J. V. Stalin, Ya. M. Sverdlov, V. V. Vorovsky, Ye. M. Yaroslavsky, and others. An important role in the leadership of the struggle of the proletarian masses was played by a large group of worker-revolutionaries. They included F. A. Afanasyev and I. V. Babushkin, who died for the cause of the revolution; K. Ye. Voroshilov, M. I. Kalinin, G. I. Petrovsky, and many others. The Bolshevik cohort was headed by Lenin—the brilliant Marxist theoretician and leader of the working people, the founder and leader of the party of Russia's Communists.

The role played by Lenin as a theoretician of the world revolutionary movement was especially manifest during the years of the revolution. His teaching of the leading role of the proletariat in the liberation movement, of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, his conclusion on the need for a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry—on all these issues Lenin came forward with a fundamentally new approach during the revolution, creating an integral theory of the development of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one.

The contribution made by Russia's proletariat to the treasure-store of the collective experience of the working-class movement was also truly great. Revolutionary mass strikes and the combining of them with armed uprisings, the tactics of revolutionary guerrilla warfare, left bloc tactics, the Soviets, the formation of which signalled "something great, something new and unprecedented in the history of world revolution",¹ revolutionary parliamentarianism—this is only a fraction of the list of important forms of struggle and the organisation of the masses with which the first Russian revolution enriched the theory and practice of world socialism. Russia, where the centre of the international revolutionary movement had shifted to, logically became a laboratory of new forms and methods of struggle which were later employed in other countries. "For the first time in world history," Lenin wrote, "the revolutionary struggle attained such a high stage of development and such an impetus that an armed uprising was combined with that specifically proletarian weapon—the mass strike. This experience is clearly of world significance to *all* proletarian revolutions."²

Bolshevism became the model of the revolutionary party of the new type, one which was irreconcilable with any manifestations of opportunism and dogmatism. It was not coincidental that during

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Speech on the Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly Delivered to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, January 6 (19), 1918", *Collected Works*, 1972, Vol. 26, p. 437.

² V. I. Lenin, "A Contribution to the History of the Question of the Dictatorship", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 341.

the years of the revolution it won new important positions in the international working-class movement and received the support of revolutionary Social-Democrats in other countries. The experience of the Bolshevik Party acquired during the 1905-1907 revolution is truly vital as a model of a flexible, scientifically substantiated strategy and tactics of a revolutionary proletarian party in conditions of a popular revolution under imperialism.¹ During the revolution, such cardinal problems of the international working-class movement were solved as the ensuring of unity of action in the revolutionary struggle, the leading role of the proletariat in the anti-imperialist movement, and concrete forms of political alliances between the revolutionary Marxist party and other left parties and organisations. Today Communists in many countries are successfully using the Bolshevik leftist bloc tactics, and Lenin's policy of the alliance of all democratic, anti-monopolistic forces. Ever relevant are the lessons of the struggle of the Bolshevik Party against right-wing opportunism and "leftist" revolutionism, whose representatives, like the Trotskyites, Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists in Russia, are trying to push the masses into untimely actions and to disorganise the ranks of democratic forces. Lenin's appeal to the Russian proletariat to master all the methods of struggle and forms of organisation, skilfully combining them and progressing from one tactical line to another in good time has never been so poignant. Highly significant are Lenin's tenets that during the period of the revolution the ideal proletarian party is the party which is able to raise the masses to resolute struggle to overthrow the outmoded social system and then to safeguard the gains of the people from the infringements of reactionaries. Today, when the role of the armed forces has heightened in the political life of a number of countries, the experience of the Bolsheviks' work in winning the armed forces over to the side of the revolution is also topical. Also highly relevant are the cardinal conclusions made by Lenin about the leading role of the working class and its relations with its allies, and about the vital importance of the new type of workers' party as the staunch leader of all working people in the struggle for democracy and socialism. "The history of the first popular revolution in Russia is an inexhaustible source of creative inspiration, a school of political struggle for the generations of revolutionary fighters to come. Today, when the international working class is gaining the leading role in the broad and powerful general democratic, anti-imperialist movement, the historical experience of the first Russian revolution, and Lenin's ideas on the

¹ For details see K. I. Zarodov, *The Three Revolutions in Russia and Our Times*, Mysl, Moscow, 1977 (in Russian).

leading role of the proletariat in the revolutionary struggle of the working masses become particularly topical."¹

The 1905-1907 revolution in Russia was a milestone in the development of world history. It was a catalyst for the advance of the working-class and national liberation movements and exerted a tremendous influence on the growth of revolutionary actions in many countries, shaking the entire world capitalist system in the process. "By its great and heroic struggle," Lenin wrote, "the Russian proletariat has made itself a talking point throughout the civilised world. The working class of Russia has by rights taken up its place in the workers' International, and it is safe to say that with every passing year its role in the international arena will be ever bigger and more important."²

* * *

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¹ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 2, p. 475.

² V. I. Lenin, "Russian Workers and the International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 303.

Chapter 2

THE GROWTH OF THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND JAPAN

CONSOLIDATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY OF WORKERS

The years from 1905 to 1907 were a period marked by the upsurge of the working-class movement in many countries and by the expansion of international proletarian ties, particularly ties of solidarity with revolutionary Russia. Assistance to it was closely interwoven with the struggle for democratic freedoms and an improvement in the position of working people in other countries, while the Russian revolution exerted a powerful influence on the class struggle under way in them. The objective ground for such influence and hence the underpinnings of international proletarian solidarity were the community of interests and a certain similarity of the tasks of different national contingents of the working class, as well as the non-proletarian strata following it.

The very first reports about Bloody Sunday and the expanding struggle of the proletariat of the Russian Empire evoked a stormy response abroad on the part of the working class. On January 23, the Union des Syndicats de la Seine decided to hold a meeting devoted to the revolution in Russia, and issued the following statement to the Russian workers: "The working people of Paris, the city of revolution, are with you heart and soul, and address this appeal to you: Count on us! Our aid to you is ensured! Down with tsarism! Down with the exploiters! Long live the social revolution!"¹ In Vienna, a large meeting convened on January 23 by the Social-Democrats in connection with the forthcoming opening of the parliament, turned into a rally devoted to the Russian revolution. The threats by a government official to close the meeting if the "revolution is celebrated in that fashion" did not produce the desired effect, but another rally was dissolved by the police for similar "disturbances".² That same

¹ *L'Humanité*, January 24, 1905.

² See S. V. Ovnanyan, *The Upsurge of the Working-Class Movement in Austria (1905-1906)*, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1957, pp. 75-76 (in Russian).

day, speakers at rallies in Brno and Plzeň expressed solidarity with the Russian proletariat.¹ In Trieste, where on January 22 at a mass meeting of Italian and Slovenian workers speakers stated, during the discussion of the situation in Austria, that Russia was showing the way to the solution, demonstrations were held on January 23 and 24 outside the Russian consulate under the slogans: "Down with Absolutism!", "Long Live Socialism!"² The resolution of a meeting held by the Serbian Social-Democratic Party (SSDP) in Belgrade on January 16 (29) stated that the victory of the Russian proletariat is simultaneously a victory for the Serbian working class, and an international victory.³ In Bucharest, a 2,000-strong rally held on January 24, 1905 was a milestone in the development of the proletarian movement in Romania; the workers later decided to mark this date every year.⁴

The labour press acclaimed the struggle of Russia's proletarians, qualifying it as the start of the revolution. "It Is Revolution" was the title of an article of the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* on January 23, 1905. On the same day, the headline of *L'Humanité* read "Revolution in St. Petersburg", and Jean Jaurès expressed confidence in its triumph. The Vienna newspaper *Arbeiter-Zeitung* wrote on January 25 about the proletariat representing the Russian revolution, about its main hero. On January 15 (28), *Rabotnicheski Vestnik*, the organ of the Bulgarian Labour Social-Democratic Party (BLSDP) (Tesnyaks) stated that the cause of the Russian proletariat is the cause of the workers of every country. The central organ of the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party acclaimed the beginning of the revolution in Russia with the leading article entitled "We Salute the Revolution".

The Social-Democratic parties and trade unions launched wide-scale efforts to explain the significance of the Russian revolution and to render it support. Particular credit in this work, in developing the movement of solidarity with the Russian proletariat is due to the revolutionary wing of the socialists. Rosa Luxemburg, who won great prestige in the Social-Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and among the ranks of the international working-class movement for her uncompromising struggle against revisionism and opportunism, attentively and inspiredly followed the progress of the revolution in Russia. She assessed the events of January 1905 as historic milestones in the liberation struggle of the entire internation-

¹ See *The First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 and the International Revolutionary Movement*, Part I, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1955, p. 424 (in Russian).

² See Yu. A. Pisarev, *The Liberation Movement of Southern Slav Peoples of Austria-Hungary, 1905-1914*, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1962, pp. 68-69 (in Russian).

³ *Радничке новине*, January 19, 1905.

⁴ *Documente din istoria mișcării muncitorești din România, 1900-1909* (hereafter *DIMMR*), Editura politică, București, 1975, pp. 208-12.

al proletariat.¹ Responding to the desire of German workers to learn more about the Russian revolution, Rosa Luxemburg subsequently presented analyses of the Russian events in the press, and at meetings of party, trade union, women's and youth organisations.² These events were also praised by Karl Liebknecht, who by then had won recognition as an energetic fighter against militarism and reformism. Speaking on February 12, 1905 before an audience of 2,500 in Leipzig, he defined the Russian revolution as "the turning-point in the history of the peoples of Europe".³ The *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, edited by Franz Mehring, wrote on January 23, immediately after the events of January 9 in St. Petersburg, that "the victory of the Russians is a German victory, a European victory, an international victory". Louis de Brouckère, a left-winger active in the Belgian Labour Party, predicted that the revolution in Russia "will not settle for the limited freedoms which we possess—bourgeois freedoms", that "it is even influencing us against our will.... If we come out on top of the situation we will make a decisive step forward in emancipating the working people."⁴ In that period, too, the biggest socialist organisations in France in their manifesto adopted at a rally in Tivoli Hall stressed the international significance of the Russian revolution and enthusiastically noted: "The proletarians of Russia are fighting not only for their own goals—they are fighting for the proletariat of the entire world."⁵ Henriette Roland-Holst van der Schalk, who was a member of the left wing of the Dutch Social-Democratic Party, viewed the struggle against the autocracy as a signal for the West European proletariat to storm the capitalist system.⁶

Even members of the working-class movement who did not share the views of revolutionary Social-Democrats recognised the tremendous importance the 1905 Russian revolution had for the whole of world development. Victor Adler, who did much for the mass Social-Democratic movement in Austria but strove to limit it to the framework of parliamentary struggle, wrote that it was difficult to forecast the consequences the revolution in Russia would have for Europe in general, as it created the feeling that the world was on the threshold of a critical time.⁷ In a message of greeting to the Russian people in

¹ Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 1, Zweiter Haldband, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1970, S. 485-86.

² R. Ya. Yevzerov, I. S. Yazhborovskaya, *Rosa Luxemburg. A Biographical Essay*, Mysl, Moscow, 1974, pp. 141-44 (in Russian).

³ Karl Liebknecht, *Ausgewählte Reden, Briefe und Aufsätze*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1952, S. 84.

⁴ Louis de Brouckère, *Œuvres choisies*, t. III, Fondation Louis de Brouckère, Anvers, 1956, pp. 255, 261.

⁵ *L'Humanité*, January 27, 1905.

⁶ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. I, Nr. 7, 1905-1906, S. 215-16.

⁷ *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, June 11, 1905.

1905, the United Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Austria expressed the hope that their victory over tsarism would also strike a deadly blow to West European reaction.¹

The movement of solidarity with the revolution in Russia was broadening in scope.

In late January-early February, meetings of solidarity with the Russian revolution were held in Berlin, Leipzig, Stuttgart and other German cities. In Berlin alone, there were 21 such meetings, in which thousands of workers took part.²

In France, rallies were held in support of the Russian revolution starting on February 18, 1905, in accordance with a decision of the Commission for the Uniting of the Socialist Forces. On the very first day, meetings and rallies were staged in 21 cities, and on one of the subsequent days, in 39 cities.³ France's progressive intelligentsia formed the Society of Friends of the Russian People, which mounted a propaganda campaign in support of the revolution, and against the tsarist autocracy.⁴

The events in Russia caused great repercussions in Italy, where a countrywide protest movement against tsarism, unprecedented in scope, took shape. It was mirrored in the press and parliament, in street demonstrations and meetings which were held not only in the capital and industrial and university centres, but also in small communes.⁵

Mass meetings were organised in Vienna, Prague, Przemyśl, Czeronowitz, Lvov, Budapest, Ljubljana, Zagreb and other parts of Austria-Hungary. It is commonly held that the brisk invigoration of political activity here in January and February 1905 was largely due to the events of the Russian revolution.

The revolution immediately came into the focus of the British workers as well. In late January and February, mass meetings of solidarity were held in Glasgow, Northampton, London, Newcastle and Liverpool. In Whitechapel, a working-class district of London, labour

¹ *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Gesamtparteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in Österreich. Abgehalten zu Wien vom 30. Oktober bis zum 2. November 1905*, Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung Ignaz Brand, Wien, 1905, S. 85.

² *Die Auswirkungen der ersten russischen Revolution von 1905-1907 auf Deutschland*, Bd. 2/I, Rütten und Loening, Berlin, 1964, S. 69-78.

³ A. Z. Manfred, *Essays on the History of 18th-20th Century France*, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1961, pp. 436-37 (in Russian).

⁴ For details see S. N. Gurvich, *The Radical Socialists and the Working-Class Movement in France in the Early 20th Century*, Nauka, Moscow, 1976, pp. 269-74 (in Russian).

⁵ K. F. Miziano, "Russo-Italian Relations in the Early 20th Century", in *Russia and Italy*, Nauka, Moscow, 1972, pp. 104-05, 119-23 (in Russian); Gastone Manacorda, *Rivoluzione borghese e socialismo*, *Studi e saggi*, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1975, pp. 204-08.

organisations held a mass meeting in conjunction with Russian Social-Democrats. Many meetings were prepared by the joint efforts of the Social Democratic Federation (SDF), the Independent Labour Party (ILP), and the trade unions. At a conference of the Committee of Labour Representation (CLR) it was decided to support the workers of Russia—to raise a fund “to aid the strikers in their noble struggle for freedom and to satisfy the needs of widows and orphans”. The newspaper *Justice* of the Social Democratic Federation wrote on January 28: “The hour has struck at last! After centuries of bondage and misery, the people of Russia has risen, and the throne of the Czar is shaking to its very foundations.”

Resolutions of solidarity with the Russian proletariat were adopted at mass meetings of workers in the United States. The American Society of Friends of Russian Freedom was formed. Figures prominent in the Socialist Party (SP), including Eugene V. Debs and Jack London, called for assistance to be rendered to Russia’s working class and the Social-Democratic Party.¹ In April 1905, the organ of the Socialist Party published an article by Bolshevik Isador Ladoff about the historical meaning of the events in Russia and the tactics of the RSDLP.²

Protest meetings were held in Sweden, organised by Social-Democratic youth clubs. They were attended by prominent figures in the socialist movement, such as the leader of the right wing of Swedish Social-Democratic Party, Branting, and the leader of the left wing, Carleson.³ “The Japanese workers,” attested Sen Katayama, “were profoundly interested in the development of the Russian Revolution, and the heroic fight and sacrifices of the Russian workers for the cause of revolution called forth the highest praise and admiration of the Japanese comrades.... The influence of the revolution of 1905 has been growing in the minds and thoughts of the workers of Japan and, strengthened by the November revolution, will bear fruit.”⁴ As the outstanding Bulgarian revolutionary Dimitar Blagoev pointed out, “the eyes of the entire organised proletariat are trained on the tremendous struggle which the Russian proletariat has begun against the Russian absolutism”.⁵ There was not a national contingent of the

¹ Jack London, Dr. S. Ingerman et al., “The American Socialists for Contributions to the Social Democratic Party of Russia”, *The International Socialist Review*, Vol. V, No. 8, February 1905, p. 495.

² Isador Ladoff, “Why Socialism Is a Power in Russia”, *The International Socialist Review*, Vol. VI, No. 2, August 1905, pp. 395-99.

³ Knut Bäckström, *Arbetarrörelsen i Sverige*, Andra boken, “Arbetarkultur”, Stockholm, 1963, s. 37.

⁴ *International Press-Correspondence*, Vol. 5, No. 76, October 26, 1925, p. 1137.

⁵ Димитър Благоев, Съчинения, том 9, Издателство на Българската комунистическа партия, София, 1959, стр. 493.

world working class whom news from revolutionary Russia did not reach, who was alien to its struggle.

The solidarity campaign which began all over the world from the very outset of the revolution in Russia expanded and developed throughout the stormy 1905-1907 period. Its scope and depth attested to the growing feeling of proletarian internationalism, to the heightening awareness of the role which the Russian revolution was destined to play in the world liberation movement. Solidarity was manifested in the demonstrations and mass meetings of sympathy for the Russian proletarians, in the resolutions of protest against the brutality of tsarism and against the support which the bourgeois governments of Europe were rendering it, in the articles in the labour press and by speakers from the rostrums of party and trade union congresses and parliaments, in the strikes, and in the collection of funds for Russia in its struggle. The solidarity movement was headed by national and international organisations.

The numerous resolutions labour parties, trade unions and other organisations adopted at the local and nationwide level voiced support for the struggle of their Russian class brothers. Such resolutions were adopted, for example, at the Social-Democratic Party of Germany congresses in Jena (September 1905) and Mannheim (September 1906),¹ and at the Chalon Congress of the French Socialists (1905).² Conferences of the Independent Labour Party, CLR and Social Democratic Federation (SDF) and trade unions of Britain expressed solidarity with the Russian proletariat in their resolutions.³ Enthusiastic support of the militant working class of Russia and its leader—the RSDLP—and wishes for victory in the near future were expressed at the 12th Congress of the Bulgarian Labour Social-Democratic Party (Tesnyaks) in August 1905. Greetings were sent to the workers of Russia by many organisations of the French General Confederation of Labour (CGT), which contributed greatly to the campaign to support the Russian revolution. The resolution of the Founding Convention of the Industrial Workers of the World

¹ *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Abgehalten zu Jena vom 17. bis 23. September 1905*, Berlin, 1906, S. 141-42; "Resolution zur russischen Revolution", *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Abgehalten zu Mannheim vom 23. bis 29. September 1906*, Berlin, 1906, S. 473-74.

² *L'Humanité*, October 30, 1905.

³ *Report of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the SDF on April 13th, 14th and 15th*, London, 1906, p. 18; *Independent Labour Party, Report of the Thirteenth Annual Conference ... April 1905*, London, 1905, p. 32; *Report of the Sixth Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Held in the Memorial Hall, Farringdon Street, London, on Thursday, February 15, 1906, and the Two Following Days*, The Labour Party, Letchworth, 1906, p. 11; *Justice*, April 21, September 8, 1906.

(IWW), a new militant labour organisation in the United States, stressed in June 1905 the extreme importance of the struggle in Russia for the proletarian struggle in all countries. The Convention stated: "We ... express our solidarity with our Russian brother workers in their struggle, we express our sincere sympathy to the victims of violence, oppression and brutality and pledge our moral support, and also promise financial assistance, to the extent that we are able, to our persecuted, struggling and suffering comrades in far-off Russia."¹

The International Socialist Bureau undertook vigorous action in support of revolutionary Russia. On the initiative of the French Socialist Party, the Bureau Executive Committee issued an appeal, on January 31, 1905, to the workers and socialists of all countries to express their indignation over the tsarist autocracy and support the Russian revolution. In June 1905, the Executive Committee called for all means to be taken to demonstrate solidarity with the Russian proletariat. On a proposal by the International Socialist Bureau, in January 1906—on the anniversary of Bloody Sunday—mass meetings of protest against tsarism were held in many countries, as well as internationalist demonstrations of solidarity with the Russian proletariat. In October 1906, the International Socialist Bureau called upon the socialist parties to thwart the provision of foreign loans to the tsarist government. The significance of the Russian revolution was discussed by the International Socialist Bureau in March 1906, in June 1907, and at the first session of the newly formed Inter-Parliamentary Commission of Socialists.²

The socialist, union and youth press continued to print numerous articles and material about the Russian revolution and impassioned debates on issues raised by it which were topical for the entire working-class movement.

Throughout the whole course of the revolution, labour parties and trade unions in many countries furnished material support to the Russian revolutionary movement. Thus, soon after the revolution in Russia started the Board of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany took a decision to send 10,000 marks for its needs; two-fifths of this amount was received by the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.³ Local organisations of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany also provided funds. Reminding its readers that the Russian workers were waging a struggle for the freedom of the Ger-

¹ *The Founding Convention of the IWW. Proceedings*, New York, 1969, pp. 213-14.

² *Bureau Socialiste International. Comptes rendus des réunions. Manifestes et circulaires*, vol. I (1900-1907), Mouton et Co., Paris-La Haye, 1969, pp. 129-31, 156-57, 203-07, 222-29, 236-39, 283.

³ *Vorwärts*, February 2, 1905; CPA IML, f. 17, op. 1, d. 375, l. 1-2.

man proletarians as well, *Leipziger Volkszeitung* wrote: "Sitting at the table of the class-conscious proletariat in Europe and, in particular, in Germany, today is a welcome guest—the Russian revolution, and from each loaf of bread a piece will be given to our Russian brothers."¹ During the years of the Russian revolution, the Social-Democratic Party of Germany remitted 339,613 marks to its fund.² A drive to collect contributions to support the Russian revolution was immediately launched in France as well. On the whole, these were small personal donations which were frequently collected by a group of workers. According to the subscription list of *L'Humanité* alone, the total amount collected between January 24 and February 15 reached 18,500 francs.³ The drive to furnish assistance to the Russian proletariat was also joined by trade union federations, labour exchange and individual unions which remitted part of the funds from membership dues. In Britain, aid to the Russian revolution was organised by the socialist press, as well as by workers' parties and trade unions. An ad hoc "Russian fund" and committee was formed by the British Labour Party for this purpose.⁴ In the Social Democratic Federation, a campaign was headed by Executive Committee member Theodore Rothstein, later one of the founders of the Communist Party of Great Britain.⁵ Fund-raising was also organised in Austria-Hungary, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Serbia, the Netherlands, the United States, Bulgaria, Australia, Canada, Finland, Japan, Argentina, the Scandinavian countries and several others.⁶ On

¹ *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, July 15, 1905; see also, for example, the appeal of the Social-Democratic organisations of Magdeburg (*Volksstimme*, March 4, 1905).

² *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Abgehalten zu Essen vom 15. bis 21. September 1907*, "Vorwärts", Berlin, 1907, S. 61. By October 1908, 341,500 marks had been collected (*Die Auswirkungen der ersten russischen Revolution...*, Bd. 2/II, S. LIX).

³ *L'Humanité*, February 15, 1905.

⁴ *Report of the Sixth Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Held in the Memorial Hall, Farringdon Street, London, on Thursday, February 15, 1906, and Two Following Days*, Garden City Press, Ltd., Letchworth, w.d., pp. 11, 12.

⁵ *Report of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Conference of the Social Democratic Federation*, p. 18.

⁶ Thus, for example, the Spanish socialists reported in the summer of 1907 that they had contributed 6,000 pesetas to the Russian revolution (*Die sozialistische Arbeiter-Internationale. Berichte der sozialdemokratischen Organisationen Europas, Australiens und Amerikas an den Internationalen Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart (18. bis 24. August 1907) über ihre Tätigkeit in den Jahren 1904-1907*, Buchhandlung Vorwärts (Hans Weber), Berlin, 1907, S. 43); approximately 30,000 crowns were collected in response to the appeal of the National Trade Union Centre of Denmark (*Vierter internationaler Bericht über die Gewerkschaftsbewegung, 1906*, Berlin, 1908, S. 58; according to statistics of the Bulgarian Labour Social-Democratic Party (Tesnyaks), the Central Party Bank had received 1,175 leva by late March 1905 for the Russian revolution (The Bulgarian Communist Party Documents of the Central Leading Body, 1903-1905, Vol. 3, pp. 364, 423).

Lenin's instructions, Maxim Gorky went to the United States to raise funds; he was unable to collect a substantial amount, however.¹ The International Socialist Bureau also formed a Russian Fund, of which nearly one-third was received by the RSDLP.²

Workers in many countries rendered assistance to the Russian revolution in different ways. The Social-Democratic organisations of East Prussia helped secretly to send weapons for the Russian proletarians.³ Dutch seamen sent the Russian workers 2 million cartridges on the initiative of the trade unions. In Romania, following the internment of the crew of the insurgent battleship *Potemkin*, revolutionaries provided the seamen with money, found jobs for them, helped those who wished to emigrate elsewhere and protected them from police spies and tsarist agents; the *Potemkin* crew in turn played a formidable role in the Romanian revolutionary movement.⁴ Norwegian Social-Democrats helped the Social-Democrats of Murmansk start the publication of revolutionary literature in the town of Vardö, and they lodged a protest with the Storting against the illegal attempt by the authorities to close down a warehouse containing printed material. They later initiated legal proceedings against the government and won the case.⁵

The revolution unmasked the hypocrisy of bourgeois democracy: hardly had the autocracy found itself in a critical situation than "democratic" governments rushed to its aid. There constantly remained the threat of counter-revolutionary intervention. In the summer of 1905, Lenin warned the International Socialist Bureau that "there is a great danger that the European peoples may be forced to play the part of executioners of Russian freedom". He asked that the existing situation be discussed and an appeal made to the workers of all countries to "influence public opinion and frustrate the designs of the Russian Government—designs that would be fatal to freedom".⁶ What was at issue was the government's intentions to use

¹ In connection with this trip, Camille Huysmans requested Daniel de Leon on July 9 to assist Gorky (CPA IML, f. 480, op. 1, d. 1, l. 1).

² *Bureau Socialiste International. Comptes rendus des réunions...*, vol. I, pp. 143, 323-24, 330-31, 357, 365-68, 412-13, 419-24, 437.

³ K. A. Vishnyakov-Vishnevetsky, *V. I. Lenin and the Revolutionary Ties Between the Russian and German Proletariat (1903-1910)*, Leningrad University Press, Leningrad, 1974, p. 94 (in Russian).

⁴ *DIMMR, 1900-1909*, pp. 267-68; for details see Mikhail Roller, Victor Keresteshiu, "The Revolutionary Movement in Romania from 1905 to 1907", *The First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 and the International Revolutionary Movement*, Part I, pp. 492-97 (in Russian).

⁵ *Die sozialistische Arbeiterinternationale. Berichte der sozialdemokratischen Organisationen ... an den Internationalen Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart (18. bis 24. August 1907)...*, S. 83.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, "To the International Socialist Bureau", *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 555.

warships enched at the Constantinople roadside to suppress the revolution. At the same time British leaders, concerned over the events in Russia, openly began talking about sending naval vessels to its shores; the appropriate preparations were made, right up to dispatching a cruiser to Kiel, closer to Russian shores.¹

The socialist press exposed the counter-revolutionary plans of international reaction. A meeting in London's Trafalgar Square adopted a resolution in which the participants stated that they considered it their duty to "make any intervention by Great Britain on behalf of reaction absolutely impossible".²

In late 1905, when the Russian revolution reached its zenith, the military preparations of the Prussian militarists who were readying the army and navy to save tsarism became particularly dangerous. Alarmed by this threat, the Russian Social-Democrats turned to the German proletarians for support.³ The newspaper *Vorwärts*, the central organ of the SPD, wrote that the German Social-Democrats would come out against intervention in Russia down to the last man. In November 1905, the Socialist Federation of Milan adopted a resolution urging international socialist action in case of German intervention, and demanded that the Italian Socialist Party call upon the entire world to defend the Russian workers. Numerous meetings and rallies were held in Italy under the slogan of defending the Russian revolution from international reaction. Their participants also protested against the provision of a loan to the tsarist government.⁴

Preparations for foreign military assistance to the tsar were stepped up anew in mid-1906. German and Austrian troops were ready to furnish the autocracy military support against the revolution in the Polish lands. British leaders intended to send a squadron to Kronstadt on a "friendly" visit. It was then that the leadership of the Serbian Social-Democratic Party proposed to the French Socialist Party (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière—SFIO) to organise international protest actions. Milanese Socialists repeated their appeal to counter the intrigues of reaction. The International Socialist Bureau issued an appeal to all the parties of the Second

¹ See Ye. B. Chernyak, "The First Russian Revolution and the Working-Class Movement in England and Ireland", in: *The First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 and the International Revolutionary Movement*, Part I, pp. 145, 146, 149 (in Russian).

² *Justice*, November 4, 1905.

³ *Die Auswirkungen der ersten russischen Revolution von 1905-1907, auf Deutschland*, Hrgs. von Leo Stern, Rütten und Loening, Berlin, 1955; *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, December 2, 1905.

⁴ See K. F. Miziano, op. cit., pp. 130-34; *A History of Italy*, Vol. 2, Nauka, Moscow, 1970, p. 364; *A History of the Second International*, Vol. 2, Nauka, Moscow, 1966, p. 146 (all in Russian).

International warning them about the reactionaries' fresh interventionist plans. The appeal stated that a plot of international reaction incorporating the radical government in France, the reactionary government in Germany and the bourgeoisie of every country had been hatched against the revolution and in support of the tsar with his gendarmes, hangmen and Black Hundred.¹

Karl Liebknecht stated from the rostrum of the SPD Congress in Mannheim (1906) that "it is better to be hanged by the hangmen of tsarism and its henchmen than be henchmen of tsarism's hangmen".² He urged that any and all sacrifices be made to defend the Russian Revolution.

The German military, which was preparing its troops to fight revolutionary Russia, was forced to cool its ardour. The Prussian war minister, irritated that the reactionaries' plot was uncovered, demanded that the most resolute measures be taken against the anti-war propaganda launched by the Social-Democrats.

In Britain, the ruling circles' counter-revolutionary plans were also opposed by the working-class movement. The Social Democratic newspaper *Justice* wrote that the attempt by Britain's Liberal government to help the tsar who had besmirched himself because of the brutalities of the military and the police, graphically attested to the price of British liberalism.³ James Keir Hardie and Will Thorne, Labour MPs, requested in the House of Commons that the Foreign Secretary report on everything pertaining to relations with Russia. Their action was supported by mass protest meetings, and the proposed demonstration by the navy did not take place. Meanwhile, the British government began preparing the ground for an alliance with Russia. One of the major considerations behind this course was a desire to support the autocracy and the Russian bourgeoisie who were frightened by the revolution. Criticising the government's foreign policy line, James Keir Hardie, leader of the Independent Labour Party, pointed out that British workers' sympathies were with the martyred reformers, not with their oppressors.⁴

In France, Jean Jaurès, Edouard Vaillant, Anatole France and others protested their country's siding with the tsarist government which was formalised in a 1904 treaty. They emphasised that this alliance served to save the autocracy, and offset it with an alliance between the working classes of both countries.⁵

¹ *Bureau Socialiste International. Comptes rendus des réunions...*, vol. I, p. 235.

² Karl Liebknecht, *Ausgewählte Reden, Briefe und Aufsätze*, S. 100.

³ *Justice*, June 23, 1906.

⁴ *Keir Hardie's Speeches and Writings (From 1888 to 1915)*, "Forward" Printing and Publishing Company, Glasgow, w.d., p. 135.

⁵ For details see A. Z. Manfred, *op. cit.*, pp. 440-44.

In late 1905, when the tsarist government sought loans from the French bourgeoisie—a step which caused heated debates—Marcel Sembat, one of the SFIO leaders, protested in the Chamber of Deputies against the provision of aid to the Russian counter-revolutionaries.¹ The Socialists were unable to block the loan, however.

The movement of solidarity with the Russian revolution did not always achieve immediate success. Many obstacles stood in its path. Ruling circles did all in their power to impede the development of international proletarian solidarity. While expressing their support of revolutionary Russia, opportunists in socialist parties and trade unions took a supercilious attitude to it, ignoring the positive significance of its experience. However, despite this, cooperation among the workers of many countries strengthened. The working class across the globe came to have a clearer understanding of the community of their interests.

The international proletariat owes its development and consolidation chiefly to the revolutionary Social-Democrats. A tremendous contribution was made by the Bolsheviks, by Lenin in particular. A great role was played by the familiarisation of the workers of foreign countries with the experience of the Russian revolution, with Lenin's ideas, and with Bolshevik policy. Many working-class newspapers began printing articles and reports about their activity. The growth of international proletarian solidarity in turn served to invigorate the revolutionary trend in the working-class movement.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT GAINS MOMENTUM

The 1905-1907 period was marked by a general upswing in the working-class movement. It showed the organic unity between the first Russian revolution and the revolutionary processes taking shape in other countries. They were brought by the intensified onslaught of the monopolies, political and national oppression, and the plight of the workers aggravated by the economic crisis of 1900-1903. The influence of the factors which had put a damper on the struggle now weakened, while the policy of appeasement pursued by the governments and the leadership of a number of parties and trade unions misfired. The political situation in many countries was so acute that it raised the workers to struggle during economic crises too, as was the case in the Hungarian and Southern Slav areas of Austria-Hungary, or created the preconditions for such an upswing, as in Bulgaria or Japan in wartime. The decline of the working-class movement due to its failures was gradually overcome. The Russian revolution

¹ *Le Socialiste*, December 9-16, 1905.

was the catalyst for these processes, its example influencing the widest social circles all over the world.¹

With all its complexity, this new upswing in the working-class movement in different countries exhibited a number of substantial differences as compared to the preceding period. The numbers of participants in the struggle broadened considerably, drawing new strata and groups of the working class and other workers. Between 1905 and 1907, for example, 50 per cent more workers went on strike in nine countries, not counting Russia, than in the previous three years. Improvement of the workers' living and working conditions and the democratisation of the political system continued to be in the limelight. On the whole, however, the working class was now aiming for more fundamental changes; the range of its demands had broadened and the intensity of the struggle had heightened. The movement against militarism and predatory wars was an important sphere of this struggle. The workers were employing more frequently than before tried and tested forms of struggle—strikes, demonstrations, mass meetings, participation in election campaigns, to name a few. They also used new forms, such as mass political strikes, the effectiveness of which was clearly manifested by the events of the Russian revolution.

As the working-class movement gained momentum, the proletariat became more class-conscious and better organised. This was mirrored in the increased number of workers' parties, trade unions and other proletarian organisations, and in their wider influence. The revolutionary trend grew stronger and became more active in international Social-Democracy. In a number of countries, the views and actions of revolutionary Social-Democrats, who sought to sum up the experience of the mass struggle and map out ways of tackling the problems of the day, became more precise and consistent.

On the other side of the coin, the working-class movement did not develop evenly: its characteristic features manifested themselves to varying degrees in different countries.

Mass actions aimed at extending democratic rights became most widespread in Austria-Hungary and Germany. The working class was their vanguard and mainspring.

In *Austria-Hungary*, the struggle for universal suffrage was stepped

¹ See *The International Working-Class Movement. Questions of History and Theory*, Vol. 2, Mysl, Moscow, 1976, pp. 376-84; *The First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 and the International Revolutionary Movement*, Part I, pp. 383-84, 419-23, 487-88, 512-13; Part II, pp. 46, 134, 184, 210; S. V. Ovnanyan, op. cit., pp. 53-54; Yu. A. Pisarev, op. cit., pp. 43-50, 66-67; *A History of Italy*, Vol. 2, pp. 353-56; D. I. Goldberg, *An Essay on the History of the Working-Class and Socialist Movement in Japan (1868-1908)*, Nauka, Moscow, 1976, pp. 106-07, 120-24 (all in Russian).

up in the spring of 1905.¹ However, this demand had invariably been tabled the previous winter at numerous mass meetings in Hungary during debates on the Russian events. Demonstrations and rallies in Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, and Slovak, Polish, Ukrainian and Southern Slav regions drew thousands of people. Strikes became commonplace and more frequent in all areas ruled by the dual monarchy, blending into the overall current of the democratic movement. A general strike engulfed Osijek, Slavonia, from March to May. A protest against intervention by the authorities imparted a political nature to the strike. It was supported by workers in Zagreb, Brod and other cities. Spring brought a wave of strikes by farm workers in Hungary, including Vojvodina and Slavonia. A six-week strike by 30,000 metal workers began in May in Budapest.

An acute political crisis began developing in Hungary in the spring of 1905. The direct pretext for it was the crude violation of constitutional rights by the emperor, who had appointed the head of the government disregarding the results of the parliamentary elections held that February. The parliament refused to ratify laws, and the population to pay taxes. A wave of strikes engulfed Hungary and Croatia. In June and July—the height of the harvesting season, farmers' strikes again broke out in farming areas of Vojvodina, Slavonia and Croatia, involving some 20,000 persons. The strikers put up an organised struggle, and local Social-Democrats took part. Bloody clashes with the police were taking place everywhere. Although 5,000 troops were dispatched to the areas hit by the strikes, they ended in an overall triumph for the workers.

The idea of a mass political strike began to materialise. On September 15, 1905—"Red Friday"—Budapest workers, who were fighting for universal suffrage, staged it along with a huge demonstration for the first time in Hungarian history. Workers in Prague and its environs began a strike on October 10 for the same purpose. On October 17, a demonstration involving thousands took place in Brno. When a report to the effect that the struggle waged by the Russian proletariat had forced the tsar to proclaim on October 30 a manifesto on freedoms was read at the United Congress of Austrian Social-Democrats in late October and early November 1905, there were heard cries: "Our place is out on the streets!" It was decided to "take extreme measures" if necessary to attain universal, equal and direct suffrage.² Responding to the Congress's appeal, tens of thousands

¹ For details see S. V. Ovnanyan, *op. cit.*; T. M. Islamov, *The Political Struggle in Hungary in the Early 20th Century*, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1959; *A History of the Hungarian Revolutionary Working-Class Movement*, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976; Yu. A. Pisarev, *op. cit.*

² *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Gesamtparteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in Österreich ... 1905*, S. 120-25.

of demonstrators proclaimed in Vienna on October 31, 1905 the slogans: "We must achieve what has been achieved in Russia!" and "Let us struggle for political freedom!" The leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of Austria were forced to agree to the staging of a mass political strike. However, they had decided beforehand to limit themselves to a one-day strike and a demonstration to be held under the slogan of voting rights reform, timing them to coincide with the opening day of the session of the Austrian Reichsrat.

This meant that the action would be postponed by almost a month. Meanwhile, stormy demonstrations were taking place almost daily in Austria, and they frequently developed into clashes with the police and gendarmes. On November 2 a demonstration in Vienna ended in bloody reprisals against workers, women and children. This resulted in a wave of protest demonstrations in Vienna, Salzburg, Graz, Brno, Moravska Ostrava, Plzeň, Lvov, Cracow and other cities. In Lvov, the police used force to break up a demonstration. In Prague the population erected barricades; the town was sieged by troops and looked like a battlefield. Mass demonstrations and meetings were held in succession. On November 28, 1905, on the day the Austrian Reichsrat opened, demonstrations involving many thousands of people took place in Vienna (250,000), Prague (150,000), Trieste (40,000), Ljubljana (12,000) and other cities. The democratisation movement engulfed the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire. Things went as far as street fighting in a number of cities. In Galicia, an active role was played by farm workers and peasants. Their actions intertwined with the general railway strike of October and November 1905. There was also unrest in the army and navy. The upsurge of the mass movement was stimulated by news from revolutionary Russia. It could be halted neither by military measures by the authorities, pressure by the capitalists, the widely-used lockouts, nor by the reassuring appeals of the Social-Democratic leaders.

The working-class action in Hungary doubled in scope between January and March 1906 as compared with the same period in 1905. The Hungarian parliament was dissolved in February with the aid of troops. Workers in Debrecen and Szeged in turn arrested government representatives. The momentous events in Russia, a delegate of the Social-Democratic Party of Hungary pointed out at a session of the International Socialist Bureau, were exerting a direct influence on the Hungarian people's struggle for democratic rights.¹

On the whole, the level of the strike movement in the Austrian districts of the empire in 1906 exceeded the 1905 level by 50 to 100 per cent. In the summer of 1906, a general strike of farm workers during the harvesting period engulfed Hungarian districts, Vojvodina,

¹ *Bureau Socialiste International, Comptes rendus des réunions...*, vol. I, p. 206.

Srem, Slavonia, Transylvania and a portion of Croatia. In May 1906, a general strike was staged in Sarajevo. Repeating the 1905 experience, the strikers demanded political rights and freedoms.

The growing mass democratic movement forced the ruling circles to make concessions. On January 26, 1907, Emperor Francis Joseph signed a law on elections to the Reichsrat based on universal, equal suffrage and secret ballot. Servicemen and women did not receive the right to vote, however. The stringent age and residence qualifications prevented men under the age of 24 and those who lived in one place for under a year from voting; this hit workers the hardest. The distribution of constituencies provided the Austrian population an advantage over the other, oppressed nationalities residing in the empire. The reform did not affect the procedure of elections to the landtags or other local bodies of power.

During the struggle for universal suffrage, the leadership of the Austro-Hungarian Social-Democratic organisations did not avail itself of the tremendous potential of the mass movement for genuinely universal and equal suffrage, or for advancing a wider range of democratic and social demands. Hardly had the government promised to enact voting reforms than the leadership of the Austrian and Czech Social-Democratic parties, in a bid to confine the movement to a "legal" course, urged the proletariat to refrain from taking mass action. In Hungary, Social-Democratic leaders, particularly Ernő Garami (from 1905 he edited the party's mouthpiece, the newspaper *Népszava*), concluded an agreement with the government, which had promised voting reforms (the Kristóffy-Garami Pact), and were deceived.¹ In early 1907 the Hungarian workers launched a new round of struggle for their rights.

An extensive movement for the democratisation of government in separate lands in Germany began in November and December 1905 under the direct influence of the General October Political Strike and the December Armed Uprising in Russia.² Demands that political rights be observed and broadened, and that the three-class electoral system extant in Prussia, Saxony and other lands be abolished became increasingly persistent. Non-proletarian strata of the population began to join this struggle which was headed by the Social-Democrats along with the working class.³ It reached a feverish pitch in the latter half of November in Saxony, where dozens of workers' meetings were being held. Mass meetings began to develop into

¹ For details see Ferenc Mucsi, *A Kristóffy-Garami-Paktum*, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1970.

² For details see B. A. Aizin, *The Upsurge of the Working-Class Movement in Germany in the Early 20th Century*, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1954, p. 282 et seq. (in Russian).

³ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 2, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1966, S. 101.

demonstrations. A huge demonstration was staged in Leipzig on November 17, 1905. The *Leipziger Volkszeitung* justly wrote about the connection of the events in Saxony with the struggle of the Russian proletariat and the democratic movement in Austria-Hungary.¹ On December 3, workers in Saxony replied to the officials' refusal to enact voting reforms with fresh mass meetings. Large demonstrations were held in Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, Plauen, Zwickau and other cities. The number of clashes with the police increased. Sentiments in favour of staging mass strikes heightened among the workers.² The German proletariat increasingly came to know the instructive experience of the Russian revolution and the decisions of the Jena Congress of the SPD (September 1905) on the use of mass strikes as one of the working class' most effective weapons.³

In January 1906, German workers also staged their first mass political strike. It was an upshot of an attempt by the Hamburg Senate to restrict the voting rights of the working population so as to hinder the consolidation of the Social-Democrats' position. The massive protest meetings did not attain their goal. It was then that the indignant proletariat of Hamburg rose up in a political protest strike that involved 80,000 persons. It was accompanied by street demonstrations in which many thousands marched, the erection of barricades, and bloody clashes with the police. Social-Democratic newspapers called the events of January 17 Red Wednesday. The *Hamburger Echo* wrote on January 21, 1906 that Germany had not seen anything like it. As one of the participants in the events noted, the action of the Hamburg proletarians, which flowed in the mainstream of the struggle for the democratisation of the electoral system, also mirrored the deep sympathies of the German workers for the Russian revolution.⁴

German reaction was sent into a rage. Proletarian activists were subjected to searches, arrests and sentences; the police and gendarmie broke up demonstrations by workers, prohibited meetings, and resorted to the use of weapons. The German workers continued their struggle, however. On January 21, 1906, they marked the anniversary of the start of the Russian revolution with unprecedentedly large and stormy political meetings, rallies, manifestations, etc. in all large and many small towns. A total of 95 meetings were held in Berlin and its environs. *Vorwärts* commented on these events as follows: "Thousands were just waiting for the signal. The half-day strike after the Hamburg model, the demonstrations after the model of

¹ *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, November 20, 1905.

² *Sächsische Arbeiter-Zeitung*, December 4, 1905.

³ For details see the next section of this chapter, p. 139 et seq.

⁴ Dieter Fricke, *Der Ruhrbergarbeiterstreik von 1905*, Rütten und Loening, Berlin, 1955; *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. I, Nr. 19, 1905/1906, S. 618.

Dresden, Chemnitz and Leipzig, the mass political strike—such were the possibilities which were discussed everywhere and prepared for. All they were waiting for was an appeal, but the appeal was not forthcoming.”¹ Apprehensive over the worsened political situation, the SPD leaders did not use all the avenues open to them; they did not coordinate the movement for democratic rights, the masses’ struggle for an improvement in the economic situation, and the anti-militarist actions with regard to the ventures of the German imperialists in Morocco.

In spring 1906, following a short lull, the movement of the proletariat in Germany for its rights was invigorated anew. Workers from the Polish lands (in Wrocław and other areas) were active in it. Although the struggle did not generally attain its former scope, the strike movements of 1906 engulfed some 300,000 persons.

The strikes and demonstrations staged by the workers of *France* were acquiring the political nature of a struggle for democracy.² This was even the case at times with strikes which had begun for economic reasons; economic and political demands were intertwined in other instances.

One major political event was the metal workers’ strike at enterprises in Longwy which, having started in June 1905, continued intermittently for a number of months. It united French, Italian and Belgian workers who struggled with the support of employees of other enterprises and cities against the government’s arbitrariness.³ Personnel of armouries in Brest, Cherbourg, Toulon and Rochefort went on strike in November 1905 as a sign of protest against repressions for anti-militarist speeches, i.e., in defence of the right of freedom of speech and assembly.⁴ The demand for an eight-hour working-day, freedom of conscience in political and trade union issues, and for the possibility for Socialists to live in mining districts were advanced along with economic claims during the big strike of miners and steel workers of the Pas de Calais and Nord departments. It broke out in the wake of a catastrophe in which a landslide buried 1,200 miners, and lasted 52 days, from March to May 1906. The strike encompassed over 60,000 persons, and a number of sources place the figure as high as 65,000.⁵

The miners’ strike at the final stage blended with the vast movement for an eight-hour working-day which was timed to coincide with May 1, 1906. According to a decision of the Bourges National

¹ *Vorwärts*, August 25, 1906.

² For details see A. Z. Manfred, op. cit., pp. 446, 465, 474-80; G. N. Yefimova, “Strike Actions by the French Proletariat in 1906”, *French Yearbook*, 1964, Nauka, Moscow, 1965, pp. 203-18.

³ *Le Socialiste*, July 23-30, 1905.

⁴ *Le Socialiste*, November 18-25, 1905.

⁵ *La Revue Socialiste*, No. 256, 1906, pp. 468, 469, 475.

Syndicalist Congress (1904), workers were, from that day on, to take the initiative and work no more than eight hours. The preparations for May Day 1906 coincided with strikes by miners and postal and publishing house employees. A general strike engulfed Lorient and half of the enterprises of Toulon. The bourgeoisie was panic-stricken, and a part of Paris's propertied strata began to flee on the eve of May Day. The culmination was May 1, 1906, when a general strike began in the capital involving no less than 200,000 workers. The government called in troops who occupied vital strategic points in the city; mass arrests began, and leaders of the CGT were put behind bars as well. The trade unions were unable to establish a *de facto* eight-hour working-day. The outcome of the strike was affected by the absence of the proper preparatory organisation, which, in turn, was the result of the predominance of anarcho-syndicalism in the CGT. Nevertheless, the 1906 May Day strike was of great importance. As the Bolshevik newspaper *Volna* wrote, "this May 1st was a most spectacular demonstration in favour of an eight-hour working-day which France has ever seen".¹ The movement for an eight-hour working-day continued everywhere, becoming the determinant of the strike struggle of 1906.

In *Bulgaria*, the chief role in the development of the workers' struggle for democratic rights was played by a mass political demonstration—the first in the country's history—and a one-day political strike which were organised by the Bulgarian Labour Social-Democratic Party (Tesnyaks) on December 12 (25), 1905. They were held as a sign of solidarity with the revolution in Russia and against the law on corporating craftsmen which prevented them from uniting into class trade unions, for the enactment of labour legislation, and against higher taxes. The action in Sofia was supported in other cities, and encompassed all the workers. The government was forced to make concessions. The workers' protest against the ruling circles' policies was also mirrored by the strike of 1906, which encompassed several thousand persons—all railwaymen throughout the country. It lasted 42 days, but, lacking leadership, ended in defeat. The government called in troops to force the railwaymen to go back to work; the most active strikers were subjected to criminal prosecution. The mass actions by the Bulgarian workers were rendered extensive support by trade unions incorporated in the General Labour Syndicalist Union (GLSU) headed by the Tesnyaks. The Second Congress of the GLSU, convened in the summer of 1905, called upon the trade unions to struggle resolutely for the enactment and extension of labour legislation.²

¹ *Volna*, April 26 (May 9), 1906.

² See В. Хаджиниколов и др., *Стачните борби на работническата класа в България*, Профиздат, София, 1960, стр. 114-20.

In *Italy* the workers were fighting for the right to strike, celebrate May Day, and to form internal workers' commissions at enterprises. Such were the demands advanced by workers in the engineering, chemical and motor works of Turin during their actions in 1905 and 1906. In the spring of 1905, all the country's main railway junctions were engulfed by a strike: the workers were defending their right to strike. In 1907, a general five-day strike by railwaymen was their response to the enactment of a law prohibiting strikes on state-owned railways. During the struggle for their rights, Italian workers usually clashed with the police and troops. Bloody repressions against the strikers engendered a fresh exacerbation of the protest movement, which was becoming political in nature.¹

In the *United States*, workers, confronted by the pooled forces of entrepreneurs and local and federal authorities, had to fight fiercely for their rights and to improve their situation. The struggle of Colorado miners for a guaranteed minimum wage and an eight-hour working-day lasted from 1903 to 1907, although the strike in effect came to a close in late 1904 owing to the treachery of trade union leaders. The bosses strove to destroy trade union organisations and deprive proletarians of a chance to obtain work.² For this reason, the workers' desire to defend their right to organise into trade unions was becoming particularly important. Trade union activists, too, energetically joined this struggle. During the conflict at the Buck Stove and Range Co. factory in Saint. Louis, where the management tried to break up the trade union organisation, officials of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) were forced to give active support to the strike.

The struggle further intensified after the formation, in 1905, of the Industrial Workers of the World, the more so that it was against this militant labour organisation that the bosses and the authorities now directed their main blows. A characteristic case in point was the miners' strike at Gold Fields, Nevada, to counter the attempts by the bosses to smash the IWW chapter and force its members to cross to the AFL which suited the mine owners. The workers led by the IWW and the Western Federation of Miners put up a courageous fight for their right to organise of their own accord. The gangs of thugs in the service of the bosses met with a resolute rebuff. Federal troops were moved in, but the strike continued. The workers upheld their organisations and won guaranteed minimum wages and an eight-hour working-day. Before long, another attempt to smash the militant labour organisations followed. In early 1906, Charles Moyer and Bill Haywood, leaders of the WFM, were indicted on

¹ See *A History of Italy*, Vol. 2, pp. 358, 359, 362, 363, 371.

² See L. I. Zubok, *Essays on the History of the Working-Class Movement in the United States, 1865-1918*, Sotsekgiz, Moscow, 1962, p. 384 et seq. (in Russian).

a frame-up charge of murder of the ex-governor of Idaho. The case had the blessing of US President Theodore Roosevelt who described the labour leaders as "undesirable citizens". However, the IWW, the left unionists and the Socialists led by Debs and De Leon came out jointly in their defence. The progressive public opinion both inside the country and abroad rendered the defendants all possible support. The trial ended in the summer of 1907 with Haywood and Moyer cleared of the charge. The Stuttgart Congress of the Second International sent a greeting to Haywood on the occasion, which emphasised that the American bourgeoisie had no sense of honour at all whenever it felt that its profits and power were being threatened. The Congress hailed the Socialists of the United States, who had frustrated the attempts by the reactionaries to have an innocent person convicted, and emphasised his services to organised labour.

In other countries, workers also had to fight for their right to organise and stage strikes. In *Denmark*, in 1907, joiners struck for four and a half months, blocking the employers' efforts to curb the union activities and deprive the workers of the right to strike. The trade unions of *Sweden* launched a spirited campaign against an anti-labour bill, making it the central point in the 1905 May Day demonstrations. Under popular pressure, the government's bill was eventually turned down by the Riksdag. In the autumn of 1905, the Swedish metal workers' union forced concessions from the association of manufacturers, including the right to trade unions and to collective bargaining. In *Britain*, in 1906, the working people won the Trades Disputes Act which specified legal immunity of trade unions and union officials in any of their actions (except criminal) that might be associated with an industrial conflict; the law also provided for the right to picket.

The workers of *Romania*, led by trade union and socialist organisations, advanced economic demands and, alongside, came out against reprisals and persecution by the authorities and against mandatory membership of workers in employer-sponsored "corporations"—the joint associations of employers and employees. They also moved for greater political freedoms, universal suffrage and a democratic labour legislation. The workers supported peasants' actions (this was especially manifest during the uprising of 1907), and the peasants were expressly ready to stand by the workers in their drive for universal suffrage. In *Serbia*, the workers campaigned for the rights of trade unions, the right to strike, for a progressive labour legislation and electoral rights.

The 1905-1907 period was marked by an upsurge in the strike struggle of the working class (Table 2). The dynamics of the strike movement naturally differed from place to place. In some countries this struggle began gaining momentum before 1905, in others, after.

Table 2

The Strike Movement, 1905-1907

	1905			1906			1907		
	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
Austria-Hungary:									
Austrian part	686	100	1,151	1,083	154	2,192	1,086	177	2,088
Hungarian part	346	58	1,839	652	61	1,919	488	44	1,825
Belgium	133	76	—	207	25	—	221	45	—
Bulgaria	47	—	—	119	—	—	67	—	—
France	830	178	2,747	1,309	438	9,439	1,275	198	3,562
Germany	2,403	420	14,536	3,328	297	8,176	2,266	203	6,205
Great Britain *	358	94	2,470	486	218	3,029	601	147	2,162
Italy***	715	155	913	1,649	382	2,424	2,268	575	3,352
Romania	34	—	—	146	—	—	23	—	—
Serbia	37	2.2	62	37	2.3	51	26	2.5	59
Spain **	153	20	—	145	24	—	152	13	—
Sweden*	189	33	2,390	290	19	479	312	24	514
Canada*	96	13	246	150	23	378	188	34	520
USA*	2,186	302	—	3,655	383	—	3,724	502	—
Japan	19	5.0	—	13	2.0	—	57	9.9	—

Notes

I—number of strikes; II—number of strikers (thous.); III—number of man-days (thous.).

Figures are based on official statistics and, in their absence, on the following sources: Bulgaria—В. Хаджиниколов и др., *Стачните борби на работническата класа в България*, Профиздат, София, 1960, стр. 114-20; USA—John Ignatius Griffin, *Strikes. A Study in Quantitative Economics*, New York, 1939; Serbia—*Синдикални покрет у Србију (1903-1919)*, Рад, Београд, 1958; Romania—I. Iacos, V. Petrișor, "Crearea și activitatea sindicatelor din România în anii 1905-1906", *Analele Institutului de istorie a partidului de pe lângă CC al P.M.R.*, No. 1, 1962, pp. 76-102; A. K. Moshanu, *The Working-Class and Socialist Movement in Romania. 1907-1914*, Shtiintsa, Kishinev, 1974 (in Russian).

* Including lockouts.

** The number of strikers corresponds to the following number of strikes: 1905—130; 1906—122; 1907—118.

*** Number of man-days in industry.

The zenith of this upswing likewise came in different years. On the whole, however, the period under examination witnessed a growth, and a quite considerable one at that, in the number of strikes, the mass nature of the movement, and in the intensity of the strikes, which was reflected in the number of working-days lost.

Between 1905 and 1907, the strike movement was increasingly on the offensive, aiming for higher wages, a shorter working-day and better working conditions. Offensive strikes, which frequently exceeded half of the overall number of actions, sometimes accounted for two-thirds of them (for example, in Hungary in 1905, and in France in 1906), and even three-fourths (Sweden and Britain in 1906), while in Belgium in 1905 this proportion amounted to nine-tenths.

The results of the strikes panned out differently from country to country. The number of strikes which ended in triumph for the workers in Sweden and Hungary increased considerably. In Sweden, the workers emerged victorious more frequently than owners. In Britain, the strikes most often ended in defeat for the strikers or in compromise, the latter generally prevailing. Whereas in Germany this was the outcome of from one-third to one half of the strikes annually, in France and Sweden, from two-thirds to three-fourths ended in compromise, while in Austria the proportion stood consistently at approximately three-fourths.¹ In Germany, Austria and France the workers were less successful in the strikes than the employers. Germany registered an increase in the proportion of strikes which ended in victory for the employers or in compromise. The dynamics of the efficacy of the strikes gives grounds for contending that in France and Austria these compromises were more often than not a partial success for the working-class movement, and a certain concession to it on the part of the employers, while in Germany the compromises more likely signified incomplete success for the employers.

The strike struggle between 1905 and 1907 was marked by large-scale actions of workers in many countries. In Germany, they got under way with a general strike by Ruhr miners (January 17-February 10, 1905). Over 217,000 persons took part in it, demanding higher wages, an eight-hour working-day, and the cessation of persecution for political activity. The strike involved both organised and unorganised workers. It received support not only within the country but abroad as well. Monetary contributions covered the expenses of the strike fund, which stood at almost 1.9 million marks..

¹ *Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands*, No. 7, February 15, 1908, *Statistische Beilage; Fourth Abstract of Foreign Labour Statistics, 1911*, Published by His Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1911; *Report on Strikes and Lock-outs and on Conciliation and Arbitration Boards in the United Kingdom in 1907*, Darling and Son, London, 1908.

Despite the will of the workers to go on fighting, the strike was halted by a decision of the trade union leadership.¹ The action taken by miners in Belgium was a massive one, too. Some 80,000 persons walked off their jobs here in February and March 1905 as a sign of solidarity with the Ruhr miners. In 1906, the entire working class of Belgium came to the aid of textile workers in Verviers, who were subjected to a lockout. As a result, the employers were forced to conclude a collective agreement—a first in the country's history. As has already been mentioned, large-scale actions took place in Austria-Hungary. On September 15, 1905, a general strike engulfed Budapest, and on November 28—all of Austria.

Massive strikes also took place in countries where capitalism was more weakly developed. In Bulgaria, for example, a prominent role was played by the miners' strike in Pernik (1906), which marked the start of the BLSDP's broad influence among industrial workers.²

The forms and methods of the strike struggle were diverse. A special type of strike originated in Italy, entering the arsenal of the proletariat of various countries under the name "Italian."³

It emerged when the government, which had nationalised the railways, demanded strict compliance with the rules it had enacted, imposing harsh punishments for "disruption of the normal functioning of transport". This was in effect depriving the workers of the right to strike. In way of reply, the railwaymen held a strike in February 1905 in the form of "work to rule": while formally observing the rules they did everything to sabotage and disorganise the functioning of the railways. On the initiative of the IWW, 3,000 workers in Schenectady, United States, staged a sit-down strike in December 1907.⁴

As they took on a more acute nature, the workers' actions were often accompanied by arson and vandalism. This was a result of both the immaturity of a portion of the proletariat and the anarcho-syndicalist influences. Thus, in 1907 during disturbances at mines in Ashio, Japan, miners dynamited administration offices, cut communication lines, destroyed a fuse-making shop and a rice storehouse and burned down hundreds of buildings. Such actions also accompanied a strike by 1,700 miners in Poronai and elsewhere.⁵

¹ For details see Dieter Fricke, *Der Ruhrbergarbeiterstreik von 1905*, Rütten und Loening, Berlin, 1955.

² For details see B. Хаджииников и пр., *op. cit.*, стр. 102-10.

³ See *Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands*, No 10, March 11, 1905, p. 146.

⁴ See L. I. Zubok, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

⁵ See *Essays on the History of the Working-Class Movement in Japan*, Foreign Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1955, pp. 45 et seq. (in Russian); D. I. Goldberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-96.

A characteristic feature of the struggle of the international proletariat from 1905 to 1907 which attested to its upsurge was the combination of strikes with mass demonstrations and meetings. Some examples of this are the above-mentioned Red Friday and the actions of November 28 in Austria-Hungary, the events of December 12 (25), 1905, in Bulgaria, the manifestation of August 15, 1906 in Brussels, which drew 70,000 persons from all over Belgium, the Red Wednesday of 1906 and other actions in Germany, the movement which was launched in April and May 1906 in France, and the many actions in Italy and other countries.

In Britain, marches of the unemployed, accompanied by mass meetings and demonstrations, became widespread. In the spring of 1905 such action took place in Lancaster, Glasgow, Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester, and Liverpool. Demands were made that the government provide jobs; this resulted in the adoption of the Unemployed Workmen Act of 1905. However, in the autumn of 1905, the country was once again swept by a wave of demonstrations staged under the right to work slogan.

The upsurge of the working-class movement was supplemented in 1907 by mass peasant actions in southern France and in Hungary, and by the unprecedented uprising of Romanian peasants against vestiges of feudalism.¹ Although the actions by the peasants and workers (aside from agricultural workers) remained chiefly disunited, they clearly manifested not only the possibility of their unity, but also the great revolutionary potential implicit in it.

During the period under review, bourgeois governments, alarmed over the upsurge of the struggle, began more frequently than in the past to use the force of arms against the popular masses. The French government repeatedly resorted to armed suppression of actions by the workers. Thus, in April 1905 troops were called into Limoges to carry out reprisals against strikers at porcelain factories; that summer striking steel workers clashed with army units in Longwy.² Altercations of this sort also occurred in 1906, during a strike of miners in the departments of Nord and Pas-de-Calais, during a May Day strike in Paris, and during a massive movement of peasants in southern France in which, as in the Montpellier grape-growers' demonstration on June 8, 1905, 500,000 persons took part. However, the soldiers sent to suppress the strikers began to sympathise with the peasants. The 17th Regiment went over to their side. Even the most trusted military units began to vacillate. The regiment

¹ For details see V. N. Vinogradov, *The Peasant Uprising of 1907 in Romania*, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1958, (in Russian).

² See *A History of France*, Vol. 2, Nauka, Moscow, 1973, pp. 540-41 (in Russian).

was disarmed through deceit.¹ In Belfast, Ireland, police were sent in against striking dock workers, but they actually joined the workers. Then the authorities moved in military units. Street fighting broke out on August 11, 1907, during which there were many killed and wounded. These events marked the start of the revolutionary upsurge in Ireland prior to the First World War.

The workers' struggle for democratic rights and better living and working conditions combined with actions against militarism and imperialist wars. The anti-war movement, which started in 1904 when the Russo-Japanese war broke out, gained momentum afterwards as well, engulfing almost all the capitalist countries. Thus, as early as 1904 numerous anti-war rallies were held in Japan, organised by the Socialist Association. Dodging the police, the Socialists held meetings and gave lectures all over the country, fitted out propaganda vans from which they delivered speeches and distributed socialist booklets during stops, etc. The worsening state of affairs among the popular masses during the war years was the reason behind the anti-government disturbances in Japan in September 1905, which continued for over two weeks and involved 1 million persons, chiefly workers. Extremists with militarist sentiments also took part in the movement. The meetings and demonstrations combined with actions against foreigners; the residence of the ministry of the interior was stormed, and police headquarters were being ravaged and burned.²

Of tremendous importance for the development of the anti-militarist line of the international working-class movement was the experience of the Bolshevik Party which skilfully tied in the struggle against the Russo-Japanese War with the preparations for the revolution. This experience was all the more crucial since militarism was on the rise; by 1907, the two rivalling military and political blocs of the imperialist powers in Europe—the Triple Alliance and the Entente—had already been knocked together. The threat of a war fraught with devastating consequences for the popular masses was becoming more and more real. Meanwhile even the highly prestigious Socialists, the leaders of the Second International, frequently lacked the consistency and resolve needed to wage the anti-militarist struggle.

In Germany, the danger of war against France and Britain over Morocco caused a protest on the part of the workers in 1905. Tens of thousands of working people took part in anti-war meetings which were addressed not only by SPD representatives but also by Socialists from Sweden, Austria, Italy and Switzerland. The Social-Demo-

¹ J. Vidal, *Le mouvement ouvrier français de la Commune à la guerre mondiale*, Bureau d'éditions, Paris, 1934, pp. 98-101.

² See *Essays on the History of the Working-Class Movement in Japan*, pp. 37 et seq.; D. I. Goldberg, op. cit., pp. 120-24, 132-33, 146-68.

cratic press explained that "German policy in Morocco has never had anything to do with Germany's national interests".¹ At a mass meeting in Berlin which drew 18,000 persons a resolution was adopted which declared that the German working-class movement would do everything to preserve international peace as a necessary prerequisite for the liberation of the working class.² However, the party leadership did not use to full advantage this opportunity to launch the anti-war struggle.

At the Jena Congress of the SPD held in September 1905 Karl Liebknecht countered the opportunists and demanded that special anti-militarist agitation and propaganda be conducted energetically, with all the means available to the Social-Democrats and permissible in German conditions, and that a struggle be waged against militarism until it was uprooted.³ The Congress advocated the preservation of peace, cooperation between the workers of Germany and Britain in the struggle against chauvinism, and peaceful solution of all international conflicts. The proposal advanced by the revolutionary Social-Democrats was not adopted, however.⁴ The party leadership headed by August Bebel, who had taken part in the working-class movement for half a century and been a staunch opponent of Prussian militarism, was no longer in favour. It rejected this proposal, claiming that repressions could possibly be stepped up.

At the SPD Congress in Mannheim in September 1906 Karl Liebknecht and other left Social-Democrats, supported by a number of party organisations, criticised the Board for doing a poor job of running anti-militarist work and for the fact that the SPD was lagging behind the French and Belgian Socialists in this sphere. A proposal was tabled to form an ad hoc committee to engage in anti-militarist work. It would be carried out among the broadest strata of the population; anti-militarist leaflets for youths, recruits in particular, would be systematically printed up, anti-war meetings held, and articles featured in the Social-Democratic press. At the insistence of Bebel and SPD Board member Hermann Molkenbuhr, the majority of the Congress rejected the criticism and did not adopt the proposal. Bebel resolutely stated that the heightened interest in anti-militarism would change the nature of the SPD and force it to veer off its chosen course.⁵

Meanwhile, many German opportunists spoke out in an openly nationalistic spirit, defending the aggressive world policy of the

¹ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 1, Nr. 23, 1905/1906, S. 740.

² *Protokoll ... des Parteitages ... zu Jena ... 1905*, S. 36.

³ See Karl Liebknecht, *Ausgewählte Reden*, S. 87-89, 534-35.

⁴ *Protokoll ... des Parteitages ... zu Jena ... 1905*, S. 284-85.

⁵ *Protokoll ... des Parteitages ... zu Mannheim ... 1906*, S. 111, 112, 129, 383-87.

Junker-bourgeois imperialists and championing the "positive" colonial policy.¹ At a session of the Reichstag in April 1907, SPD deputy Gustav Noske called for the stepped up militarisation of the country, stating that in the event of war against Germany the Social-Democrats would not lag behind the bourgeois parties and would take up arms. Noske's speech won the plaudits of the war minister and the enthusiastic approval of the revisionists. Declaring the SPD's loyalty to the class interests of the proletariat, *Vorwärts* wrote on this score that in the event of war the Social-Democrats should strive to "bring closer the attainment of their aim—the winning of political power".²

Karl Liebknecht severely criticised the pro-imperialist stand of the opportunists. Neither did he accept the abstention of the SPD leadership from extensive anti-imperialist work, especially among young people. With the support of other revolutionary Social-Democrats he established close ties with youth labour organisations.

In 1906, Karl Liebknecht delivered a report on militarism and anti-militarism at a conference of unions of young workers. On its basis a booklet was published in 1907 entitled *Militarism and Anti-militarism in Connection with an Examination of the International Young Workers' Movement*. The booklet was a politically poignant Marxist study of the sources and various facets of militarism. Liebknecht tied in anti-militarist propaganda with preparations for a proletarian revolution. Despite certain shortcomings, the booklet largely helped the anti-war proletarian movement to develop. At the chief prosecutor's orders, Liebknecht's book was confiscated and he himself was charged with preparing to undertake actions of a seditious nature. He used the trial as a rostrum for revolutionary propaganda against war. He was sentenced to one and a half years in prison, but the trial only served to intensify revolutionary, anti-militarist agitation.³

In France, there was a vigorous anti-militarist drive, with anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists as well as Socialists taking part. The anti-militarist propaganda yielded fruit: during a strike in Limoges in 1905, soldiers refused to take action against the workers, and in Longwy, they did not act as strike-breakers. However, the revolutionary trend in the socialist movement, which was headed by Jules Guesde, did not accord anti-militarist work the importance it deserved. Guesde, who even before frequently lapsed into dogmatism in theory and sectarianism in practice, believed that since wars are

¹ See, for example, *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, H. 2, Bd. 1., 1906, S. 124-28.

² *Vorwärts*, May 8, 1907.

³ For details see Heinz Wohlgemuth, *Karl Liebknecht. Eine Biographie*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1973, S. 119-26; B. A. Aizin, *Revolutionary German Social-Democrats Against Imperialism and War (1907-1914)*, Nauka, Moscow, 1974, pp. 56-68, 95-98, 107-09, 119-27 (in Russian).

engendered by capitalism one should struggle not against wars but merely against capitalism in general. This reflected his lack of understanding of the connection between anti-militarist struggle and the preparations for revolution. Actions by workers against militarism and the threat of war were in effect organised by Jean Jaurès and his supporters, as well as by the leadership of the General Confederation of Labour. Jaurès, who was subjectively dedicated to socialist ideals, but defended the ideas of reformism no less passionately, fought tirelessly for many years against militarism and war. Herein lies his great service to the French and international working-class movement. He harboured pacifist illusions, believing that war could be averted through various agreements between the great powers. He was blind to the imperialist essence of such treaties and alliances, hoping that they would bring world peace.

The issue of militarism and international conflicts was discussed at the Congress of the French Socialist Party in Limoges in 1906. A Congress resolution exposed the class essence of militarism as a weapon of the bourgeoisie, stressing that the fight for national sovereignty and independent class action is the duty of the working class. The Congress advanced the demand that the bourgeoisie be disarmed and the proletariat armed.¹ The resolution, however, made no mention of the question of imperialist wars between the great powers, nor did it set forth concrete objectives of anti-militarist work.

As to the GCL, the anarcho-syndicalist line predominated there. It was based on the premise that in a war, be it a European, colonial or world war, the interests of the proletariat are sacrificed to those of the bourgeoisie and other exploiters, while in strikes the workers have to clash with the army defending the owners. Accordingly, the decisions of the GCL congresses underlined the necessity to step up and embolden anti-militarist propaganda. In the event of war the anarcho-syndicalists considered it imperative to respond to it with a general economic strike.² The anti-war struggle was not tied in with the preparations for revolution.

In Britain, anti-war rallies and meetings of workers were held. The ILP established ties with the ISB, the SPD and the French Socialists, and took part in organising international peace rallies. Its leaders surmised, however, that wars could be done away with through international arbitration and other similar measures. Even

¹ *Parti Socialiste (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière). 3^e Congrès National tenu à Limoges les 1^{er}, 2^e, 3^e et 4^e novembre 1906. Compte rendu analytique, Au Siège du Conseil National, Paris, s.a., pp. 260-62.*

² See Paul Louis, *Histoire du Mouvement syndical en France*, t. I, De 1789 à 1918, Librairie Valois, Paris, 1947, p. 264; Jean Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France*, t. I, *Dès origines à 1914*, François Maspero, Paris, 1975, pp. 370-74.

though the resolution of the Labour Party Conference in 1906 denounced attempts to use the Anglo-French alliance as a threat against Germany and its people, and expressed a readiness to come out against any attempts to instigate war with Germany, this imperialist bloc was generally approved of.¹ Other working-class organisations in Britain conducted practically no anti-militarist work at all, and the Fabians leaned towards chauvinism. Henry Mayers Hyndman, one of the leaders of the Social Democratic Federation, tried to scare the British with the German danger, and called for the formation of an anti-German coalition and for war with Germany.

In Italy, the Socialists, particularly their youth organisations, conducted anti-militarist propaganda, distributing leaflets and organising demonstrations of reservists.² In Austria-Hungary, Austrian, Czech, Hungarian and Polish Socialists came out in their respective parliaments against military conflicts and the growth of armaments, and waged anti-war propaganda in the press. In Bohemia alone, numerous anti-war meetings were held on the initiative of socialist youth organisations, and 100,000 leaflets were distributed in the spring of 1907.³ In Serbia, the Socialists published a special anti-militarist periodical and protested against increases in military expenditures.

The anti-war work of the Social-Democrats was organised better in Belgium than in other countries. Lenin held it up as an example, pointing out that such activity "is not only specially necessary but practically expedient and fruitful".⁴ The socialist youth organisation under the Belgian Labour Party was particularly active. Its newspapers, intended for soldiers and recruits, had a circulation of tens of thousands of copies. During recruitment months, the Socialists held meetings for recruits in which they explained to them the essence of militarism. Through the efforts of socialist soldiers, intensive propaganda was carried on within the army. Workers in the Scandinavian countries made a certain amount of headway in the struggle against militarism; socialist youth leagues likewise waged an energetic propaganda campaign. In 1905, the working class of Sweden, threatening the government with a strike, prevented the country's leaders from organising armed intervention against the Norwegian people in their struggle for freedom.

¹ *Report of the Sixth Annual Conference of the Labour Party*, p. 62.

² *L'Internationale Ouvrière et Socialiste. Rapports Soumis au Congrès Socialiste International de Stuttgart (18-24 août 1907)*, vol. II, Bureau Socialiste International, Bruxelles, 1907, pp. 35-36.

³ Robert Danneberg, *Die Jugendbewegung der Sozialistischen Internationale*, Wiener Volksbuchhandlung Ignaz Brand und Co., Wien, 1910, S. 21.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Bellicose Militarism and the Anti-Militarist Tactics of Social-Democracy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 198.

In view of the Franco-German conflict over Morocco, the International Socialist Bureau distributed between June and September 1905 proposals received from national sections about measures to forestall the outbreak of war. A decision was unanimously taken at the Bureau's session of March 4-5, 1906, that in the event "war becomes possible and probable", the Socialists of countries whose governments were able to start war would have to establish direct contact with one another in order to "avert and prevent war" through joint proletarian actions in the socialist spirit. The socialist parties of other countries were also supposed, through ISB mediation, to coordinate the most advisable actions to be taken by the entire organised proletariat and international socialist movement to avert war.¹ In its 1906 May Day appeal, the ISB called upon the workers of every country to use "all the means in their power" to "preserve peace among nations and to defeat the warlike schemes of the capitalistic governments".² From July 16 to 19, 1906, the war danger was again discussed at an ISB session in which Socialist parliamentarians took part. It was decided that in the event of an outright threat of war a joint session of the ISB and socialist deputies of the parliaments of all countries would be convened.

On the whole, the anti-militarist movement gained unprecedented scope and forcefulness compared to the preceding period. Yet, it was encountering many obstacles, which were being erected by the leaders and pro-imperialist policies of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties. The mistakes and miscalculations of the Social-Democratic and trade union leadership, the right-opportunist and left-anarchist stands on militarism and the threat of war, the underestimation of the new conditions for the movement of the masses and the disregard of the special anti-war tasks of the proletarian organisations took their toll as well. All these strong points, difficulties and negative elements manifested themselves in the debate on militarism and international conflicts at the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International in June 1907. Lenin was the foremost proponent of the line pursued by the revolutionary Social-Democrats, which embodied Marxist tenets on militarism and war. Rosa Luxemburg, prominent in the Polish and German working-class movement, also took part in the elaboration of the resolution's most important provisions. The ideas of other revolutionary Social-Democrats, Karl Liebknecht in particular, were used as well. Lenin noted that as a result, there was "the clear realisation that the social revolution is inevitable,

¹ *Bureau Socialiste International. Comptes rendus des réunions...*, vol. I, p. 198.

² *The International Demonstration of the 1st of May Proclamation of the I.S.B. for the Year 1906*, Imprimerie Brimée, Bruxelles, p. 64.

the firm determination to fight to the end, the readiness to adopt the most revolutionary methods of struggle".¹

An important sphere of the activity of the working-class parties was the struggle waged during the elections. Its results in a number of countries during the 1905-1907 period mirrored the definite successes scored by the working-class movement, on the one hand, and the intensification of confrontation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, on the other. In 12 countries, the number of votes at elections cast in favour of Socialist candidates had reached approximately 6,790,000 by summer 1907—a 554,000-vote increase over the previous year. The number of Socialist deputies grew by almost 50 per cent over this span.

The elections to the Austrian Reichsrat in 1907, which were held on the basis of a new voting law won after a hard massive struggle by the working class, were a great success for the Social-Democrats, who obtained over 1 million votes and 81 mandates. However, the import of this success, as well as the Socialists' role in the Reichsrat, was weakened by negative tendencies in their ranks. Representatives of the national Social-Democratic parties formed separate groups in parliament, while the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of Austria openly espoused the opportunist way—"alliance of the working class with the Crown".

The number of voters who cast their votes in 1906 for the Social-Democratic Party of Denmark increased by approximately 40 per cent over the 1903 figure, and the party won 24 deputies' seats, as opposed to 16 in 1903. Its representatives occupied 850 seats in urban and rural government bodies. In 1905 the number of votes cast for the Social-Democratic Party of the Netherlands was over 65 per cent higher than the 1901 figure. The Labour Party of Norway gathered 45,000 votes in the 1906 elections, putting 10 deputies into the Storting. The Socialists' influence heightened in France, too. At the elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 1906, the SFIO received 970,000 votes—12 per cent more than in the preceding elections. The party won 52 deputy mandates instead of the previous 48. In addition, it was represented in local bodies of power by 60 general councillors, 149 mayors of communities, and 2,160 members of urban councils.²

The 1907 German Reichstag elections caught the attention of the world public.³ They were preceded by a conflict between Parliament

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 93.

² *Die sozialistische Arbeiter-Internationale. Berichte der sozialdemokratischen Organisationen ... an den Internationalen Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart ...*, S. 53.

³ For details see Karl Obermann, "The Hottentot Elections, 1907", *German Imperialism and Militarism*, Nauka, Moscow, 1965, pp. 32-63 (in Russian).

and the government. In late 1906, the Social-Democratic deputies, as well as representatives of the bourgeois party of the centre, jointly voted, albeit for different reasons, against allocations for the suppression of uprisings by the Gerrero and Hottentot tribes in Germany's African colonies. The Kaiser government dissolved the Reichstag and appointed a day for new elections. During the preparations for them, the Social-Democrats were fiercely persecuted by chauvinists as an anti-national, anti-patriotic force. Pre-election SPD meetings were prohibited and disbanded, and its activists persecuted, fired from their jobs, etc. In spite of this, the SPD received over 3,000,000 votes—more than any other party did and almost 300,000 more votes than it did in 1903. Nevertheless, the parties which supported the government (the so-called Hottentot bloc) got 141 deputies' mandates, while the Social-Democrats received only 43 (as against 81 in the previous composition of the Reichstag). The need for change in the undemocratic voting system had become crucial.

However, the right opportunists viewed the reason for the loss of deputies' seats to lie in the supposedly extreme anti-militarist stand of the Social-Democrats, and they demanded that it be changed so as to avert fresh losses at the polls. Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring and other activists who exposed the reactionary essence and mounting danger of German militarism were subjected to particularly sharp attacks by the rightists.

In Britain, the 1906 parliamentary elections not only ended in a complete victory for the Liberals, they were also a big success for the Committee of Labour Representation, which was henceforth called the Labour Party. The number of this party's MPs grew from 4 to 29. Ten of them belonged to the CLR. In addition, 24 seats went to trade union representatives elected on the Liberal ballot. This result was to a great extent a consequence of the upsurge of the working-class movement. Typically, Conservative Party leader Arthur J. Balfour assessed the results of the election campaign as the echo of the same movement which has produced massacres in St. Petersburg, riots in Vienna and Socialist processions in Berlin.¹ The Independent Labour Party and Social Democratic Federation were successful to a certain extent at municipal elections as well. Forced to reckon with this, Britain's ruling circles once again demonstrated the flexibility peculiar to the British bourgeoisie. A series of social reforms was enacted: the court decision on the Taff Vale judgement of 1901 was abolished, which in effect signified the judicial lifting of the existing strike ban; an eight-hour working-day was introduced for miners; old-age pensions were instituted (5 shillings per week from

¹ See A. L. Morton and George Tate, *The British Labour Movement. 1770-1920. A History*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1956, p. 223.

state funds for workers over 70 years of age); various forms of insurance for workers were introduced, etc.

The upsurge of the struggle of the working class furthered the spread of socialist ideas and the consolidation of socialist organisations and an upswing in their activity.

The growing influence and strength of the socialist parties were signs of the times. In 1907, 18 labour parties in 14 countries numbered 2,414,000 members.¹ SPD membership grew from 380,000 to 550,000 in one year (summer 1906-summer 1907); the ranks of the French Socialists swelled from 34,688 to 48,237 between 1905 and 1907. There were now 150,000 members in the BLP. By the summer of 1907, the SPD had 77 newspapers with over 800,000 subscribers. Forty-seven socialist newspapers were published in France, and 50 in the United States. A total of 130 new branches of the ILP were formed in Britain in 1906. Eighty-six more SDF branches were set up in 1905 and 1906. The socialist societies of Bristol and Newcastle joined the SDF. The circulation of *Justice* and *The Labour Leader* were increased. Several groups of a socialist nature made the newspaper *The Clarion* their mouthpiece.

In France, the Parti socialiste de France (guesdistes) and the Parti socialiste français (jaurèsistes) merged into one organisation—the Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière—SFIO—in April 1905. The ideological and organisational principles of the PSF were the underpinnings of this party. A charter of unification was adopted, which stated the French Socialists' desire to form a party which would be "not a party of reform, but a party of class struggle and revolution".² However, the SFIO did not elaborate a fundamental and detailed programme prior to World War I.

In Japan, the People's Party of Japan (Nihon Heiminto) and the Socialist Party of Japan (Nihon Shakaito), which were founded in early 1906, merged on a common political programme to form the new Socialist Party of Japan (SPJ). It had a membership of some 200 persons. The party declared as its goal the building of socialism within the framework of state laws. This was soon followed by the publication of the party's periodical, *Shakai Shugi Kenkyu* (Study of Socialism), which was one of the foremost theoretical journals of the Japanese Socialists. During its brief existence (less than half a year), the journal did much to propagate Marxism; among other things, it published a complete translation of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. The SPJ strove to become part

¹ De 1907 à 1910. *Rapports sur le mouvement ouvrier et socialiste soumis par les partis affiliés au Congrès Socialiste International de Copenhague (28 août au 3 septembre 1910)*, Bruxelles, s. a., pp. 3-4.

² See Paul Louis, *Histoire du Parti Socialiste en France (1871-1914)*, Librairie de l'Humanité, Paris, 1922, pp. 35-38.

of the movement of the popular masses and to support their demands.¹

In Australia, socialist organisations, disgruntled over the policies of the local Labour Party, held a conference in 1907 in Melbourne at which they merged into the Socialists' Federation of Australia (subsequently renamed the Socialist Party of Australia).²

The positions of the trade unions consolidated amidst the overall growth of the working-class movement. From 1905 to 1907 their total membership in 12 capitalist countries grew by approximately one-third, exceeding 10 million. The one-million mark was reached not only by the British trade unions and the AFL in the United States, but also by the free trade unions in Germany; 500,000 workers in Austria-Hungary were unionised. The trade unions of Norway, Sweden and Hungary grew by leaps and bounds (100-150 per cent). Recently emergent organisations consolidated rapidly: the General Labour Syndicalist Union in Bulgaria (1904) headed by the BLSDP (Tesnyaks); the Central Labour Union in Serbia, which was connected with the Social-Democratic Party of Serbia (1903); the Comisia Generală a Sindicatelor din Romania (1906); and the IWW in the United States (1905).

Everywhere, this period witnessed the intensification of a struggle within the trade unions between three forces: opportunist leaders who aimed to achieve labour reforms which would not impinge upon the underpinnings of the capitalist system, revolutionary Social-Democrats—proponents of a resolute class proletarian line, and anarcho-syndicalists, who shunned political activity.

The movement of young workers broadened in the 1905-1907 period. New socialist youth organisations formed and previously existing ones merged in Denmark (1905), Finland (1906), Switzerland (1906), the United States (1907), Hungary (1905), Germany (1906), and Spain (1906). The total membership of such organisations in 1907 topped 59,000.³

During the upsurge of the working-class movement between 1905 and 1907, the most massive and organised actions, apart from Russia which was going through a revolution, were those of the proletariat of Germany and Austria-Hungary, where both the democratisation of the political system and better economic conditions for the working people were the goals of the struggle. The workers of Britain, the United States, and France, who had already won many democrat-

¹ D. I. Goldberg, op. cit., pp. 173-77.

² Robin Gollan, *Radical and Working Class Politics. A Study of Eastern Australia, 1850-1910*, Melbourne University Press, 1970, pp. 211-12.

³ See *The First International Conference of Socialist Youth*, Molodaya Gvardiya, Moscow, 1928, p. 211 (in Russian); W. Münzenberg, *Die sozialistischen Jugendorganisationen vor und während des Krieges*, Verlag Junge Garde, Berlin, 1919, S. 9, 13, 35, 41, 42, 43, 98.

ic rights, more frequently set forth economic and social demands, although they were often of a political nature. In Britain, for example, one-third of all those involved in labour conflicts came out in defence of the rights of their trade unions. The struggle waged by workers in Italy, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia was mass-scale and at times very acute, but less organised. In Spain, the trade unions played a particularly prominent role in staging strikes (e.g., the general strike in the northern industrial district in 1906). Following the class battles of 1905, major successes were scored by the trade union movement in Sweden. In Denmark, the number of participants in May Day mass meetings and demonstrations held during working hours almost doubled between 1904 and 1906.¹

Generally speaking, the proletarian movement was on the ascendant. The revolution in Russia and the exacerbation of social and political contradictions and conflicts in other countries resulted in contemporaries perceiving this time as unprecedented in the "reborn energy of the international working class movement".² Its upsurge convincingly proved that forces were maturing everywhere which were capable of standing up to the imperialists. "The army of the proletariat," Lenin wrote, "is gaining strength in all countries. Its class-consciousness, unity, and determination are growing by leaps and bounds."³

Yet, in many countries the Social-Democratic parties were unable to rise to the demands conditioned by the new historical situation. The revolutionary Social-Democrats took great pains to elaborate a political line corresponding to the new conditions and tasks of the proletariat's struggle; however, the greater part of the Social-Democratic leaders did not see any prospects for a massive working-class movement. They held back its development or, in any event, were late in elaborating the requisite political course. The parliamentary successes of a number of socialist parties turned the heads of certain groups of socialists and facilitated the development of opportunist policies and theories.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT

The overall upsurge of the working-class movement, especially the 1905-1907 revolution in Russia, posed an urgent task to international Social-Democracy, that of elaborating a political line and tactics

¹ *Vierter internationaler Bericht über die Gewerkschaftsbewegung. 1906*, Berlin, 1908, S. 61, 72-73; *Justice*, January 6, April 28, 1906; *Report on Strikes ... in 1907*, p. 16.

² *Justice*, January 6, 1906.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 93.

of the proletarian movement which would accord with the new conditions of struggle. The overriding necessity was preparations for proletarian revolutions. The experience of the Russian proletariat, and of the Bolsheviks in particular, which was tried and tested in the crucible of the recent revolution, became especially important for the further development of the world revolutionary movement. Attitudes to the "Russian experience" became the touchstone of the positions of various ideological and political currents, and an object of acute theoretical and political clashes, especially between revolutionary Social-Democrats and opportunists. Lenin wrote later: "While such outstanding representatives of the revolutionary proletariat and of unfalsified Marxism as Rosa Luxemburg, immediately realised the significance of this practical experience and made a critical analysis of it at meetings and in the press, the vast majority of the official representatives of the official Social-Democratic and socialist parties—including both the reformists and people of the type of the future 'Kautskyites' ... etc.—proved absolutely incapable of grasping the significance of this experience and of performing their duty as *revolutionaries*, i.e., of setting to work to study and propagate the lessons of this experience."¹

Revisionists and their supporters viewed the Russian revolution as proof of Russia's backwardness, a mere repetition of the revolutionary path traversed by Western Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. They shut their eyes to the leading role of the proletariat and the uniqueness of the objective conditions in which the revolution unfolded and to the fresh prospects which were opening up, and they denied the international significance of the "Russian experience". Eduard Bernstein, for example, was persuading the German workers not to use means of struggle which had become widespread among the Russian proletariat. He believed that Russia's "backwardness" and the supposedly anarchistic nature of its revolutionary movement rendered the "Russian experience" useless and unacceptable for Germany and the German proletariat.² Many statements in *Avanti!*, the organ of the Italian Socialist Party, likewise initially exhibited a lack of understanding of the import of the Russian revolution and a desire to identify it with events of the past.³ Most of the leaders of the British Independent Labour Party interpreted the Russian revolution in the reformist spirit. Its mouthpiece propounded the idea of the Russian people's lack of preparedness for social change, as a consequence of which "counter-revolution, soon or late, sternly sets back events to their proper stage in the development of a peo-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "A Contribution to the History of the Question of the Dictatorship", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 342.

² *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, H. 1, 1906, S. 12-20

³ See Gastone Manacorda, op. cit., pp. 210-19.

ple".¹ The ILP Conference of 1905 assessed the events in Russia as a movement for "reforms". Even decisions, which were permeated with sympathy for the Russian revolution, were often phrased in a compromising tone. Thus, the Congress of British Trade Unions (September 1906) expressed the "sincere hope" that the tsar would respond to the demands of his people and grant them a parliament. This resolution, as the newspaper *Justice* rightly pointed out, "might have come from a conference of the crowned heads of Europe rather than from a Congress representative of the working class".²

Revolutionary Marxists in the West took a fundamentally different stand, despite the fact that they, too, were unable to appreciate fully the historical importance of Lenin's concept of revolution and the basic strategy and tactics of the revolutionary proletariat Lenin developed on the strength of the 1905-1907 experience. In an article published immediately after Bloody Sunday, Rosa Luxemburg wrote that a new type of revolution was beginning in Russia, a revolution with an unprecedented socio-political content and historical prospects. At the SPD Congress in Jena she drew a connection between the revolution in Russia and the upsurge of the working-class movement in other countries: "The time has come", she stated, "when evolution is turning into a revolution." Hence her impassioned appeal: "Learn from the Russian revolution!" Karl Liebknecht and Clara Zetkin addressed the Congress from the same positions.³ Karl Kautsky wrote at the time that this revolution, while being a bourgeois one, was ushering in an era of proletarian revolutions.⁴

Of paramount importance was the discussion by Social-Democrats around the world of fundamental problems of a strategy for the working-class movement—the role of the proletariat, among other things, in a democratic revolution, its potential allies, the peasantry in particular, the stand of the bourgeoisie, attitudes to bourgeois parties, etc. The revolutionary Social-Democrats were closest to Lenin's conception of the proletariat's role in a revolution. Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring and *Die Gleichheit*, the Social-Democratic journal of German working women, edited by Clara Zetkin, advocated the leadership of the proletariat in a democratic revolution.⁵ Paul Lafargue and Jules Guesde endorsed Lenin's formulation of the

¹ *Labour Leader*, January 27, 1905, p. 514.

² *Justice*, September 8, 1906.

³ *Protokoll ... des Parteitages ... zu Jena, 1906*, Berlin, 1906, S. 320, 321, 323-25, 326-27.

⁴ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 2, Nr. 50, 1904/1905, S. 758.

⁵ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 1, Nr. 22, 1904/1905, S. 711; *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 1, Nr. 6, 1905/1906, S. 169; *Die Gleichheit*, Nr. 15, 1905; for details see Annelies Laschitzka, "Zur vergleichenden Revolutionsgeschichte in den Arbeiten von

issue of the leadership of the proletariat and a provisional revolutionary government.¹

In the Italian Socialist Party, left-wingers viewed the proletariat as the principal inspiring force of the revolutionary struggle in Russia and pointed to the socialist tendency of the revolution. At the height of the events in Russia, *Avanti!* wrote that "the Russian proletariat is creating ... its own revolution", which "is veering from its former course and raising its own banner aloft".² However, even the Italian Socialists, who admitted that the proletariat was the "main creator" and "leader of the movement" of the Russian revolution, became enmeshed in a false dilemma: either the revolution was a bourgeois one, but then the proletariat could not be its motive force, let alone its leader, or the proletariat was the motive force of the revolution and its direct leader, but then what was at issue was the proletarian revolution.³ Typically, even Kautsky, who wrote about the possibility of the accession to power in Russia of the proletariat led by the Social-Democrats as a result of a revolution, sidestepped entirely the issue of the leadership of the proletariat—one of the chief points of contention between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. He believed that their disputes over a provisional revolutionary government were like dividing up the hide of a bear not killed yet.⁴

On the whole, a correct conception of the entire problem of the leadership of the proletariat in a bourgeois-democratic revolution presented serious difficulties for the revolutionary Marxists as well. For example, as Georgi Dimitrov pointed out later, Bulgarian Marxists did not fully comprehend at that time the importance of the leading role of the working class in the bourgeois-democratic revolution.⁵

The problem of the leadership of the proletariat in the ranks of international Social-Democracy gave rise to the critical question of possible allies. The peasant movement during the Russian revolution heightened interest in this problem. The revisionists, holding firm to their former stands on the agrarian issue and ignoring the experience of the revolution, refused to reckon with the strength and potential of the peasant movement. They proposed solving the agrarian issue through reforms and partial concessions by the ruling class.

W. I. Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg und Franz Mehring während der Revolution von 1905 bis 1907 in Russland", *125 Jahre Kommunistisches Manifest und bürgerlich-demokratischen Revolution 1848/49*, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1975, S. 245-56.

¹ See *Proletary*, November 12 (25), 1905.

² Gastone Manacorda, op. cit., pp. 218, 219.

³ Ibid., p. 218.

⁴ See *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, June 15, 1905.

⁵ Георги Димитров, *Политически отчет на ЦК на БРП(к) пред V Конгрес на партията (19 декември 1948 г.)*, Издателство на Българската комунистическа партия, София, 1952, стр. 14.

This recipe ensured neither a fundamental settlement of the agrarian issue nor the employment of all the possibilities of the peasantry in the interests of the revolution, but would only serve to isolate it from the proletariat. In their opposition to these principles, the revolutionary Social-Democrats proceeded from the assumption that during a revolution the peasantry could march together with the working class, and that the proletariat was obliged to support the peasantry in the struggle for land. Rosa Luxemburg decisively advocated Lenin's assessment of the revolutionary potentialities of the peasantry in Russia, and believed that leading the peasantry was a natural historical task of the proletariat.¹ Kautsky analysed important elements of the alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry in his works "The Driving Forces and Perspectives of the Russian Revolution" (a translation was published in Russia under the editorship of, and with a preface by, Lenin), "The Prospects of the Russian Revolution", and "The Agrarian Issue in Russia". However, Kautsky was against the workers becoming engaged in the peasant movement and providing the leadership for it. Soon after the defeat of the Russian revolution, he lost faith in the revolutionary potential of the peasantry.

The disputes between the Marxists and the revisionists also became more intense over the Social-Democrats' stance vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie and its parties. At the Chalon Congress of the French Socialists in 1905, Marcel Cachin and his supporters defended the Marxist tactics of not seeking votes by sacrificing principles and yet using elections in order to mobilise the proletariat politically.² Although this principled position was supported by most delegates, the Congress, making a concession to the reformists, admitted the possibility of concluding agreements with liberals during parliamentary elections.³ Although the Belgian Labour Party Congress of 1905 left the issue of parliamentary agreement with the liberals unresolved, it did confirm the right of local party organisations independently to tackle the question of the possibility of election alliances. BLP leader Emile Vandervelde declared that the party should demand that the liberals carry out their own programme.⁴

In the Netherlands, the right wing of the Social-Democratic Party pursued a line for extending unconditional support to the liberals as a means of receiving a number of concessions from them in the social sphere. At the 1906 SPI Congress in Italy, the "Integralists",

¹ See R. Ya. Yevzerov, I. S. Yazhborovskaya, op. cit., pp. 175-76.

² From 1900 to 1904, Marcel Cachin was secretary of the Guesdist section and editor of a Guesdist newspaper in Bordeaux, and later secretary of their organisation in the Department of Gironde.

³ See A. Z. Manfred, op. cit., pp. 471-73.

⁴ *Le Mouvement Socialiste*, No. 156, 1905, p. 182.

who sought to attain party unity at the cost of concessions to the social-reformists, carried through a resolution, which, while verbally condemning the policy of collaborating with bourgeois parties and the government in principle, permitted agreements with them in "exceptional cases".¹ In Denmark the Social-Democrats cooperated with the bourgeois-radical party Venstre, and the Swedish Social-Democrats formed a bloc with the liberals at the 1905 elections. Pressured by reformists, the Norwegian Social-Democratic group voted along with the bourgeois parties in the Storting in favour of the country being proclaimed a monarchy. In Germany, in July 1907 the Social-Democratic group in the Württemberg landtag voted along with the bourgeois deputies in favour of the budget, thereby violating a decision of the Lübeck Party Congress of 1901.

The stand of the reformist wing of international Social-Democracy on the role played by the proletariat and bourgeoisie in the Russian revolution coincided, on the whole, with that of the Mensheviks. In a bid to prove, despite the actual course of events, the need for an alliance between the proletariat and the liberals, the opportunists in effect strove to secure in the international working-class movement a uniform conciliatory line for support of the liberal bourgeoisie by the proletariat.² The pseudo-theoretical judgements set forth in the journal *Sozialistische Monatshefte*—the mouthpiece of the revisionists—were supplemented by coarse jabs at Lenin and other Bolsheviks. The chief premise was that the revolution in Russia was a repetition of European revolutions, for which reason nothing changed the proposition on the leading role of the bourgeoisie. In the same vein, it was believed that since the proletariat could not do without an ally, its choice should rest with the bourgeoisie, which was more progressive than the peasantry.³

Even Jean Jaurès, who was of the opinion that the proletariat should fulfil its mission of liberation "over the head of the bourgeoisie",⁴ which was incapable of this, believed that power should be won by the Socialists and liberals. He contended that the working class should be allied with the bourgeoisie rather than with the peasantry, establishing not the revolutionary-democratic power of the proletariat and peasantry, but the power of the bourgeoisie and representatives of the proletariat. This contradictory nature of Jaurès's stand also came to the fore in *l'Humanité*, of which he was editor.⁵

¹ *Il Partito Socialista Italiano nei suoi Congressi*, Vol. II, Edizioni Avanti!, Milano, 1961, p. 74.

² *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, Bd. II., H. 10, 1906, S. 862-69.

³ *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, H. 10, 1906, S. 864; H. 12, 1906, S. 1003.

⁴ *L'Humanité*, January 31, 1905.

⁵ *L'Humanité*, June 8, 1905.

Like the Bolsheviks, the revolutionary Social-Democrats of a number of countries resolutely spoke out against complicity in establishing the leadership of the bourgeoisie in the Russian democratic revolution, against viewing the bourgeoisie as a natural and reliable ally of the proletariat. They unmasked the bourgeoisie's desire to thwart the development of the Russian revolution by reaching a compromise with counter-revolutionary forces under terms advantageous to itself.¹ Disdainfully castigating the bourgeoisie for its cowardice, Rosa Luxemburg warned that it would inevitably turn traitor.² Sharing the viewpoint of the Bolsheviks on the role of the liberal bourgeoisie and the "Cadets in the Russian revolutionary movement", the German Marxists criticised the Mensheviks' attempts to form a bloc with the Cadets in order to legislate in the Duma.³ A number of American Socialists also pointed to the inability of the Russian bourgeoisie to tackle revolutionary tasks.⁴

The revolutionary Social-Democrats came out against the workers becoming appendages of the liberal bourgeoisie in their respective countries as well. Franz Mehring gave a scathing assessment of the German liberals, comparing them to their Russian counterparts, a fact which drew Lenin's attention.⁵ The struggle against conciliation with the liberal bourgeoisie was particularly difficult in Britain, where workers traditionally cast their votes for it. In exposing the Liberals, the newspaper *Justice* wrote that they were the most dangerous enemies of the proletariat, pretending to be its friends. Supporting the energetic actions of ILP leader James Keir Hardie, the popular representative of the workers in Parliament, the newspaper stressed the necessity to wage a consistent struggle to the end against them, a struggle based on the irreconcilability of the interests of the proletariat and bourgeoisie.⁶

Thus, from 1905 to 1907, the differences between the revolutionary Social-Democrats and the opportunists on fundamental problems of the strategy of the working-class movement deepened considerably. The opportunists denied not only the leadership of the working class in the Russian revolution, but also its leading role in the democratic movement abroad. Not only did they refute the alliance with the peasantry and oriented the proletariat to an alliance with the bourgeoisie in Russia, they adhered to the same line in their own coun-

¹ See, for example, *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, October 27, 1905.

² *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 1, Nr. 22, 1904/1905, S. 711-12.

³ *Vorwärts*, April 20, May 31, June 1, 1906.

⁴ *The International Socialist Review*, Vol. VI, No. 7, 1906, pp. 430-31.

⁵ Franz Mehring, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. 15, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1966, S. 236-40; see also V. I. Lenin, "Franz Mehring on the Second Duma", *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, pp. 383-89.

⁶ *Justice*, January 20, September 8, 1906.

tries as well, attempting to impose this course on Social-Democracy worldwide. On the other hand, the assessments made by the revolutionary Social-Democrats in Western countries of the role of the proletariat and bourgeoisie in the democratic revolution, and their attitude to bourgeois parties were shaped basically the same way as Lenin's ones, even though the former were much less clear-cut. The revolutionary Social-Democrats persistently tried to reach a Marxist solution of the fundamental issues pertaining to the strategy of the working-class movement in their respective countries. Yet, some revolutionary Social-Democrats in the West held views which diminished or even denied outright the revolutionary potential of the peasantry.

The Russian revolution of 1905-1907 brought forth an animated discussion among Social-Democrats across the world of the tactics of the working class's struggle. Acute clashes between the revolutionary Marxists and the revisionists broke out over the issue of new ways and means of waging the struggle used by the Russian proletariat, and on the question of armed uprising. Lenin wrote: "The December struggle of the proletariat left the people a legacy that can serve as an ideological and political beacon for the work of several generations."¹

In the early 20th century, many Social-Democrats believed that armed uprising had lost its former significance. "Today an armed uprising by the people against the military would be madness," wrote Karl Kautsky.² He was of the opinion that the working class had only one decisive means left to it—the political strike. While admitting that the bourgeoisie's attempts to eliminate bourgeois democracy and establish a reactionary regime should be resolutely rebuffed by the proletariat, Kautsky nonetheless stressed: "Where the masses think in terms of Social-Democracy, such a regime cannot lead to an armed uprising."³ The Russian revolution had posited the question in a new way. The world proletariat and socialists in every country intensely followed the December clashes in Moscow. As Clara Zetkin pointed out, "the electric spark of the revolutionary mass uprising has been transmitted beyond the bounds of Russia"⁴ and gave the socialist leaders food for thought about the experience of the armed uprising and its place in the coming battles of the proletariat.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "What to Fight For?", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 168.

² Karl Kautsky, *Der politische Massenstreik*, Buchhandlung Vorwärts Paul Singer G.m.b.H., Berlin, 1914, S. 82.

³ *Ibid.*, S. 83.

⁴ Quoted from: *The Revolution of 1905-1907, Documents and Materials*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1975, p. 337 (in Russian).

Giving due credit to the courage of the Russian workers, August Bebel spoke of the clashes at the barricades as the loftiest event in world history, as an example of courage and selflessness for the sake of a great ideal, and viewed them as a typical manifestation of the revolutionary battles of the future.¹ Partially re-examining his views, Karl Kautsky called attention to the triumph of the new barricade tactics,² and Rosa Luxemburg, who was in revolutionary Warsaw in December 1905, saw the insufficiency of the general strike alone, and stressed the need for direct mass street fighting.³

The revolutionary Marxists were not discouraged by the defeat of the December uprising. They expressed confidence that the storm begun in Russia would culminate in success, furthering the upsurge of the struggle waged by the class-conscious proletariat the world over.⁴ Karl Liebknecht urged the German workers to follow the example of the Russian proletariat, and it was a secret to no one that he meant an uprising as well.⁵ Franz Mehring believed that the international proletariat had to be prepared to fight for its liberation with arms in hand.⁶ Budapest workers who had gathered for a mass meeting in January 1906 pointed out: "In terms of its huge scope and purposeful leadership which is effected by the Russian revolutionary Social-Democrats, this struggle figures most prominently in the history of revolutions; it is showing all the oppressed workers of the world what means of struggle they should resort to in extreme situations in order to safeguard their rights."⁷ Left-wing American Socialists viewed the December uprising not as a desperate outburst, but as the culmination of the revolution. They called attention to the organic link between various forms of struggle and the highest form—an uprising.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats noted that the word "barricade", which has a connotation of naiveté in the recent past, now took on a completely different meaning, and pointed to the high effectiveness of guerrilla warfare.⁸ Upon her return from Russia, Rosa Luxemburg wrote that the clashes in Moscow "show in miniature the logical development and future of the revolutionary movement as a whole—

¹ *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags. XI. Legislaturperiode. II. Session. 1905/1906*, Bd. 2, Berlin, 1906, S. 996.

² *Vorwärts*, January 28, 1906.

³ Rosa Luxemburg, *Briefe an Karl und Luise Kautsky (1896-1918)*, E. Laub'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung GmbH, Berlin, 1923, S. 91.

⁴ *Die Gleichheit*, December 29, 1905.

⁵ *Vorwärts*, January 22, 1906.

⁶ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 1, Nr. 14, 1905/1906, S. 443; Bd. 1, Nr. 15, 1905/1906, S. 475-76.

⁷ *A History of the Hungarian Revolutionary Working-Class Movement*, Vol. 1, p. 62.

⁸ *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, January 4, 1906.

its inevitable culmination in an outright uprising".¹ This was an assessment of uprising not as an episode of the revolution, but as the conduct of a definite policy.

Whereas the revolutionary Social-Democrats, despite the defeat of the December uprising, viewed it as a sign of the new times, the opportunists believed that the Marxist concept of the forcible destruction of capitalism had been "buried" forever under the debris of the Moscow barricades. Bernstein claimed that the street fighting in Moscow only served to strengthen the autocracy, and advocated the use of bourgeois political institutions by Social-Democracy as contrast to the armed struggle.²

The struggle waged by the Russian proletariat from 1905 to 1907 enriched the historical experience of the use of mass political strikes and demonstrated their tremendous role in the fundamental restructuring of society. The revolutionary Social-Democrats stressed that the workers of Russia had done an inestimable service to the international proletariat by discovering for it a powerful instrument of struggle in a general political strike. Marxists in many countries sought to comprehend the significance of the mass revolutionary strike. In their efforts to use the Russian experience of staging strikes they opposed both the anarcho-syndicalists with their interpretation of the general strike and the opportunists, who attempted with references to anarcho-syndicalism to compromise the very idea of the mass political strike.³ The left wing of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party demanded that the "Russian means" of class struggle, including the general political strike, be used.⁴ Gyula Alpári, the young editor of *Népszava*, the organ of the Social-Democratic Party of Hungary, and other leaders of the party's revolutionary wing urged workers to learn from the Russian experience.⁵ They worked for the recognition of the need for mass political strikes in the struggle for universal suffrage. The "Russian experience" was resolutely supported in the Bulgarian Labour Social-Democratic Party (Tesnyaks). The leaders of the SDKPL pointed to the need

¹ Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 2, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1972, S. 123.

² *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, H. 1, 1906, S. 20; H. 3, 1906, S. 211.

³ See, for example, Rosa Luxemburg, *Massenstreik, Partei und Gewerkschaften*, Dubber, Hamburg, 1906; Henriette Roland-Holst, *Generalstreik und Sozialdemokratie*, mit einem Vorwort von Karl Kautsky, Kaden und Co., Dresden, 1905; Karl Liebknecht, "Der Massenstreik—das spezifisch proletarische Kampfmittel!", "Der politische Massenstreik—eine neue Waffe des Proletariats", *Gesammelte Reden und Schriften*, Bd. I, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1958, S. 159-60, 162-65; Clara Zetkin, "Die russische Revolution und die deutschen Sozialdemokratie", *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, August 17, 1905; *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, February 15, October 25, 1905.

⁴ See S. V. Ovnanyan, op. cit., pp. 89, 125.

⁵ See T. M. Islamov, op. cit., p. 263.

for the Polish workers—one of the vanguard contingents of the 1905-1907 revolution—to use a mass political strike. Extensive ideological and political work was done in this sphere by Rosa Luxemburg, and also by Leon Jogiches (Jan Tyszka). Rosa Luxemburg elaborated on the experience of the mass political strikes in a series of articles entitled “What Is to Come?” and the booklet *The Mass Strike, the Party and the Trade Unions*, which was given a high assessment by Lenin. Julian Marchlewski (Karski) came out in the press in defence of the mass political strike. Of tremendous importance was the organisational and political activity of Felix Dzerzhinsky, who headed the mass actions of the Polish proletariat during the revolution.¹

Yet, although *Le Socialiste*, the organ of the Guesdists, repeatedly made mention of the positive experience of the general strike in Russia, on the whole Marxist forces in the French socialist movement did not pay sufficient attention to the mass political strike. This was apparently due to the negative attitude towards anarcho-syndicalist agitation for a general strike which was widespread in France. The Guesdists stressed that the revisionists and the anarcho-syndicalists took a common stand on this issue: the general strike was viewed outside the framework of other tactical forms of struggle. However, Jules Guesde and his supporters displayed indifference towards the tasks of organising the mass political strike, which was characteristic of them when the matter concerned practical issues.²

The opportunists denied the advisability and necessity of mass political strikes in West European countries, and were frequently sceptical about its use even in Russian conditions.³ When, under pressure from grass-roots trade union organisations, this question became a subject of debate at the Congress of German Free Trade Unions held in 1905 in Cologne, reformist leaders tried to get a resolution adopted condemning any and all propaganda of the mass political strike, counterposing to it concern for the consolidation of the working-class organisations.⁴ These and other decisions taken at the Congress, specifically those directed against work stoppage on May 1, attested, as *Die Neue Zeit*, the SPD organ, pointed out, to the development of anti-socialist and trade-unionistic trends in the Social-Democratic trade unions.⁵

¹ For details see *Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky, A Biography*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1977, pp. 63-86 (in Russian).

² See *Le Socialiste*, September 24-October 1, October 14-21, November 18-25, 1905; A. Z. Manfred, op. cit., pp. 470-71.

³ See, for example, *Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands*, No. 6, February 11, 1905, p. 93.

⁴ *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des fünften Kongresses der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands abgehalten zu Köln a. Rh. vom 22. bis 27. Mai 1905*, Verlag der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands, Berlin, o. J., S. 30.

⁵ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 2, Nr. 44, 1904/1905, S. 563.

The decisions taken in Cologne caused dissatisfaction on the part of many Social-Democratic and trade union organisations.¹ Letters of protest by workers were printed in the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, *Hamburger Echo*, *Sächsische Arbeiter-Zeitung*, and *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*.

Mass political strike was the centre-piece of the Jena Congress of the SPD in September 1905. August Bebel, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht and Clara Zetkin sought to prove the possibility of a general political strike in Germany and the need to prepare for it. "If reaction wants to talk with us in Russian," Clara Zetkin stated, "the proletariat will respond in Russian."² Bebel spoke optimistically about the might of organised Social-Democracy and called upon it to groom the working class for the revolutionary battles that were to come.³ The revolutionary Social-Democrats unmasked the fear the revisionists had of mass movements. Responding to apprehensions as to whether the Marxists would be able to "keep the masses in check", Rosa Luxemburg said: "During a revolutionary situation one has to keep in check not the masses, but parliamentary lawyers, to prevent them from betraying the masses and the revolution."⁴ The Congress adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes Bebel's resolution recognising general political strike as one of the most important means of the proletariat's struggle (even though it was viewed chiefly as an instrument for rebuffing reaction), and which recommended to party and trade union organisations to conduct propaganda among workers in this spirit.⁵ Lenin wrote in this connection that the issue of the mass political strike had been prompted of late by events in a number of countries, Russia in particular. And the decision of the German Social-Democrats would "undoubtedly exercise considerable influence on the entire international labour movement by giving support and strength to the revolutionary spirit of militant workers".⁶

Yet, Bebel's speech contained several alarming elements. When Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin and others called attention to the revolutionary strike, Bebel termed their statements "somewhat strange". He said in his concluding speech: "I have yet to hear debates in which so much is said about blood and revolution as has been today. While listening to all of this I involuntarily looked down at the tips of my shoes to see whether they were already stained with

¹ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 2, S. 98.

² *Protokoll... des Parteitages ... zu Jena ... 1905*, S. 325.

³ *Ibid.*, S. 297.

⁴ *Ibid.*, S. 320.

⁵ *Ibid.*, S. 142-43, 342.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, "The Jena Congress of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 290.

blood.”¹ Several months later the SPD Board agreed to major concessions to the opportunists on the mass strike issue.

Overcoming the opposition of the opportunists, the revolutionary German Social-Democrats attempted to provide assistance to the mass movement spreading in the country. The idea of a mass political strike endorsed at the Jena Congress was the leitmotif of their campaign. Following the political strike in Hamburg, Rosa Luxemburg wrote Karl Kautsky: “Bravo, Hamburg! I was pleased and gratified when I found out about it. I just hope it does not end here. Probably the city fathers have already taken measures to ‘extinguish’ it!”² The opportunists from the SPD, particularly the trade union officials, indeed did everything in their power to stamp out the mounting proletarian movement. Despite the decision of the Jena Congress, which in effect repudiated the Cologne resolution, they acted as fierce opponents of mass political strike.

Following the defeat of the December armed uprising in Moscow, outright opportunists, taking advantage of the confusion of some prominent SPD leaders, took revenge. In February 1906, at a closed conference of representatives of the SPD Board and the General Commission of Free Trade Unions a joint decision was taken to forestall “dangerous” actions by the proletariat and to lead it along the path of “reason and healthy realism”. The agreement adopted at the conference stated that the SPD Board had no intention to propagandise mass political strike and would oppose such a strike if need be. At the Mannheim Congress of the SPD in September 1906, Bebel said that the situation in Germany was incomparable to the one in Russia, and for that reason mass political strike should not be used by the German proletariat. Carl Legien tried to besmirch political strike in general.³ He and the revisionist Eduard David, a Reichstag deputy, refused to acknowledge the experience of the revolution, which was retreating under the heavy blows of the autocracy.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats upheld in Mannheim the decisions of the Jena Congress. Rosa Luxemburg exposed those who were unable to “learn anything from the experience of the Russian revolution” which “for decades will be the instructor of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat”.⁴ However, as a result the Congress adopted, following Bebel’s report, a dual, casuistic resolu-

¹ *Protokoll ... des Parteitages ... zu Jena ... 1905*, S. 336.

² Rosa Luxemburg, *Briefe an Karl und Luise Kautsky* (1896-1918), S. 100.

³ *Protokoll ... des Parteitages ... zu Mannheim ... 1906*, S. 232, 251.

⁴ Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 2, S. 172.

tion: on the one hand, it confirmed the Jena decision and, on the other, it stated that the latter did not contradict the resolution of the Cologne trade union congress.¹ It was also envisaged that the question of staging a mass political strike could be posited by the SPD Board only with the consent of the General Commission of Free Trade Unions. Meanwhile the latter, as was known beforehand, had in essence rejected this method of proletarian struggle. The decisions of the Jena Congress, which largely accorded with Marxist principles, were thus cancelled out. Moreover, the Mannheim Congress showed that, alongside the right, openly opportunist, and left, revolutionary, trends in the SPD, there appeared a covertly opportunist current—centrism. Beginning with individual concessions to the revisionists, the centrists subsequently followed the opportunist ideological and political line on all fundamental issues. The struggle in Germany over problems of mass political strike, and the dissatisfaction of the masses over the opportunist course forced opponents of the use of the "Russian experience" to manoeuvre in other countries, too. Thus, while not refusing to recognise mass political strike as a proletarian means of struggle, Victor Adler, leader of the Austrian Socialists, warned at the same time that propaganda in its favour would exacerbate contradictions within the party and provoke opposition in the trade unions.² In the autumn of 1906, he expressed apprehensions that the debates in the SPD over mass strike would have a negative effect on the struggle for suffrage reforms in Austria-Hungary. However, the rapid growth of revolutionary sentiment in the country forced the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party of Austria to include general strike issue on the agenda of the next party congress.

In a number of countries the opportunists' rejection of mass strike generated opposition expressed predominantly in an anarcho-syndicalist form. A fierce struggle of this type broke out in the Italian Socialist Party, whose membership included both reformists and anarcho-syndicalists. The polemics focussed on issues connected both with the revolution in Russia and their own experience—particularly with the 1904 general strike³ and actions of subsequent years. As in France, Spain and a number of other countries, the anarcho-syndicalists countered the reformists' denial of the significance of the mass strike movement and the general strike with a call for a general economic strike as the decisive revolutionary instrument. At the

¹ *Protokoll ... des Parteitages ... zu Mannheim ... 1906*, S. 305.

² *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, June 11, 1905.

³ See K. F. Miziano, *The Italian Working-Class Movement at the Turn of the 20th Century*, Nauka, Moscow, 1976, pp. 222, 253 (in Russian).

ISP Congress in October 1906, the anarcho-syndicalists proposed considering that "the revolutionary activity of the party is carried out ... through the general strike", for the purpose of establishing the power of trade union bodies, of the direct producers.¹ A vivid embodiment of the anarcho-syndicalists' worship of the general strike was the Amiens Charter adopted at that time by the Congress of the French General Confederation of Labour.²

In general, the anarcho-syndicalists interpreted the experience of the Russian proletariat as a confirmation of their own positions. They completely ignored the political nature of the strikes in Russia, and in their own activity divorced the economic struggle from the political one, believing the former to be a sphere of the trade unions, and the latter, that of the party. The SFIO also agreed to this division of spheres of activity. The SFIO Congress in Limoges in November 1906 rejected a resolution proposing to coordinate workers' trade union and political activity in accordance with the circumstances. While pointing to the importance of united action by political and trade union organisations, the Congress nonetheless stressed the need for "their complete autonomy".³

The opposition to the right opportunists' denial of mass strike partly acquired anarcho-syndicalist forms in the working-class movement in the United States as well. At its founding convention the Industrial Workers of the World came out with the slogan of general strike as a manifestation of the highest spirit of solidarity and with words of greeting to the working class in distant Russia in their great struggle.

Directly tied in with the experience of the Russian Revolution were the issues of improving the parliamentary activity of the socialists and of correlating it with the mass extra-parliamentary struggle of the working class. Former aspects of parliamentary tactics, around which fierce clashes between the revolutionary Social-Democrats and the revisionists had just recently taken place, were supplemented by a new aspect, one prompted by the events of 1905-1907 in Russia—parliamentary tactics during the revolution.

Meanwhile the revisionists, who comprised a hefty percentage of the parliamentary groups of the labour parties, were falling out of their control; they did not concern themselves with maintaining ties with the electorate and did everything in their power to employ

¹ *Il Partito Socialista Italiano nei suoi Congressi*, Vol. II, p. 75.

² For details see Chapter 5.

³ *Parti Socialiste (Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière). 3^e Congrès National...*, pp. 201-02.

other than parliamentary forms of struggle. Pretending to discuss the lessons of the revolution in Russia, Bernstein and his supporters in effect ignored their essence in every way, contending that in the "economically developed society extant today" "the struggle for parliament and in parliament is ... an organic revolution constantly in motion".¹ Illusions about parliamentarianism were also typical of the Social-Democrats in Austria-Hungary; they became even more intensified after the workers in the Austrian part of the empire won universal suffrage.² Jean Jaurès energetically came out in defence of freedom of action for the socialist parliamentarians. British reformists were highly understanding and sympathetic towards these statements.³

Criticising opportunism and cautioning about the danger of illusions vis-à-vis parliamentarianism and the absolutisation of the parliamentary activity of labour parties, the revolutionary Social-Democrats viewed it as just one of the various kinds of tactics whose significance changes depending upon the situation. Sharing the viewpoint of the Bolsheviks on the decisive role of the mass movement, and not of conciliation in parliamentary lobbies, the revolutionary Social-Democrats sought in their struggle against the reformists and anarcho-syndicalists to inject revolutionary content into parliamentary and non-parliamentary forms of activity. Subjected to criticism were both the underestimation of non-parliamentary forms of struggle and the desire of parliamentary groups of labour parties to remove themselves from party control. Clara Zetkin pointed out that "parliamentary cretinism has entrenched itself and become widespread" in the SPD, and that a number of leaders "have completely stagnated in parliamentarianism".⁴ Rosa Luxemburg gave a rebuff to the established tendency among "old authorities ... and to an even greater degree among top strata of opportunist editors, deputies and trade union leaders" to view parliamentary activity as the only acceptable form of class struggle.⁵ The Marxists' task, as Clara Zetkin correctly pointed out, was to "debunk the superstition that the proletariat's road to victory lies directly through parliamentarianism and that parliamentary struggle is the only, panacean, means of waging the

¹ *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, H. 1, 1906, S. 20.

² T. Erényi, "Die Frage der Revolution und der Reform in der Arbeiterbewegung Österreich—Ungarns um die Jahrhundertwende", *Études historiques hongroises 1975 publiées à l'occasion du XIV^e Congrès International des Sciences Historiques par la Commission Nationale des Historiens Hongrois*, Vol. II, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1975, S. 49.

³ *Labour Leader*, January 31, 1908.

⁴ Quoted from: *Lenin in the Struggle for the Revolutionary International*, Nauka, Moscow, 1970, p. 128 (in Russian).

⁵ *Ibid.*

class struggle".¹ Examining the problems of developing tactics, the *International Socialist Review*, the journal of American Socialists, noted manifestations of a tendency "to overestimate the ballot and parliamentarianism".²

What with the upsurge of the world working-class movement, and particularly owing to the revolution in Russia, the struggle between the Marxists and opportunists on fundamental issues of the strategy and tactics to be employed by the proletariat exacerbated sharply. Drawing on the advanced experience of the Russian workers, and following the Bolsheviks, the revolutionary Social-Democrats took an important step forward in the development of socialist policy pertaining to the new conditions of the struggle and the political tasks at hand. Yet, proponents of Marxism in the West were insufficiently consistent in positing and tackling a number of topical problems of strategy and tactics, and were frequently unable to map out the paths necessary for this. The Marxist solution of the political tasks facing the working-class movement was in turn vigorously opposed by the opportunists who tried to besmirch the revolutionary experience of the Russian proletariat and the Bolshevik line, and to prevent working-class organisations from using them. In defending outmoded political principles, they tried to impose on the working-class movement a reformist course, and played heavily on the defeat of the Russian revolution for the purpose.

The anarcho-syndicalists took advantage of the upsurge of the international working-class movement and the 1905-1907 revolution to step up propaganda of the pseudo-revolutionary tactics of "direct action". Discarding, in essence, the experience of the organised revolutionary movement in Russia, they searched in it for an excuse to "push" the proletariat into ventures which actually led to a weakening of its positions.

The defeat of the revolution in Russia also resulted in greater wavering among a number of Social-Democrats who still adhered to Marxism in theory but who, like Karl Kautsky, in actuality proved to be unstable supporters of revolutionary policies and inconsistent adversaries of revisionism in politics and ideology. This dangerous tendency continued to intensify, leading to the formation of a new opportunist current—centrism.

The 1905-1907 revolution in Russia, the exacerbation of the class struggle in many countries, and the stepped up activities of the revolutionary Marxists in the ranks of Social-Democracy worldwide were heralds of sorts of a new, higher stage of the international

¹ Ibid.

² *The International Socialist Review*, Vol. VI, No. 7, 1906, p. 431.

working-class movement and the continued delimitation of its various trends. This movement entered the mainstream of the fierce class battles with imperialism.



Additional sources on the subject: S. V. Ovnanyan, *The Upsurge of the Working-Class Movement in Austria (1905-1906)*, Moscow, 1957; *The First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 and the International Revolutionary Movement*, Moscow, 1955; S. N. Gurvich, *The Radical Socialists and the Working-Class Movement in France in the Early 20th Century*, Moscow, 1976; K. F. Miziano, "Russo-Italian Relations in the Early 20th Century", *Russia and Italy*, Moscow, 1972 (all in Russian); G. Manacorda, *Rivoluzione borghese e socialismo. Studi e saggi*, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1975; B. N. Krylov, "Labour Movement in the USA on the Eve and During the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907", *The First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 and the International Revolutionary Movement*, Part 2, Moscow, 1955 (in Russian); K. Bäckström, *Arbetarrörelsen i Sverige*, Stockholm, 1963; K. A. Vishnyakov-Vishnevetsky, *V. I. Lenin and the Revolutionary Ties Between the Russian and German Proletariat (1903-1910)*, Leningrad, 1974; *A History of Italy*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1970; *A History of the Second International*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1966; Yu. A. Pisarev, *The Liberation Movement of Southern Slav Peoples of Austria-Hungary, 1905-1914*, Moscow, 1962; D. I. Goldberg, *An Essay on the History of the Working-Class and Socialist Movement in Japan (1868-1908)*, Moscow, 1976; T. M. Islamov, *The Political Struggle in Hungary in the Early 20th Century*, Moscow, 1959; *A History of the Hungarian Revolutionary Working-Class Movement*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1970 (all in Russian); F. Mucsi, *A Kristóffy-Garami-Paktum*, Budapest, 1970; B. A. Aizin, *The Upsurge of the Working-Class Movement in Germany in the Early 20th Century*, Moscow, 1954; A. Z. Manfred, *Essays on the History of 18th-20th-Century France*, Moscow, 1961; G. N. Yefimova, "Strike Actions by the French Proletariat in 1906", *French Yearbook 1964*, Moscow, 1965 (all in Russian); *История на профсъюзното движение в България*, София, 1973; В. Хаджиниколов и др., *Стачните борби на работническата класа в България*, София, 1960; L. I. Zubok, *Essays on the History of the Working-Class Movement in the United States, 1865-1918*, Moscow, 1962; Ye. I. Spivakovsky, *An Upsurge in the Labour Movement in Romania in the Early 20th Century*, Moscow, 1958; A. K. Moshanu, *The Working-Class and Socialist Movement in Romania, 1907-1914*, Kishinev, 1974 (all in Russian); *Синдикални покрет у Србију (1903-1919)*, Београд, 1958; *Essays on the History of the Working-Class Movement in Japan*, Moscow,

1955; V. N. Vinogradov, *The Peasant Uprising of 1907 in Romania*, Moscow, 1958; *A History of France*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1973 (all in Russian); H. Wohlgemuth, *Karl Liebknecht. Eine Biographie*, Berlin, 1973; B. A. Aizin, *Revolutionary German Social-Democrats Against Imperialism and War (1907-1914)*, Moscow, 1974 (in Russian); P. Louis, *Histoire du mouvement syndical en France*, t. 1, Paris, 1947; J. Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France*, t. 1, Paris, 1975; R. Luxemburg, *Massenstreik, Partei und Gewerkschaften*, Hamburg, 1906; K. Liebknecht, *Gesammelte Reden und Schriften*, Bd. 1, Berlin, 1958; I. M. Krivoguz, *The Second International, 1889-1914*, Moscow, 1964 (in Russian).

Part Two

**THE NEW STAGE
IN THE PROLETARIAN STRUGGLE
(1908-1914)**

Chapter 3

LENIN DEVELOPS MARXIST THEORY

The 1905-1907 revolution and the upsurge of the world working-class and national liberation movements showed that the so-called peaceful period of capitalist development had come to an end. The time of major social upheavals and a sharp change in former relations was fast approaching. The working class had reached a decisive historical frontier—the beginning of the struggle for political power and the creation of a new society. All this objectively posed before labour parties the task of theoretically interpreting the latest phenomena in the evolution of bourgeois society and the class struggle, and made it imperative to further develop the Marxist theory of socialist revolution. The defeat of the revolution in Russia rendered even more crucial the defence of Marxism and its creative development based on the experience of the revolution, which was now disavowed not only by shaky petty-bourgeois elements but also by unsteady proletarian ones. The fresh experience of the “inter-revolutionary period” was being amassed, which also had to be analysed and correlated with the previous one in order to “cast the steel of the Marxist world outlook and of the superstructures corresponding to this world outlook”.¹

The theoretical work done by Lenin was of vital importance for the implementation of this task.

ANALYSIS OF WAYS OF REALISING THE EPOCH-MAKING ROLE OF THE PROLETARIAT

There was no unity of views in the international socialist and working-class movement on the ways of transition from capitalism to socialism. The revolution in Russia and the upsurge of the inter-

¹ V. I. Lenin, “Heroes of ‘Reservation’”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 373.

national working-class and national liberation movements imparted a special topicality to the clash of revolutionary and opportunistic concepts; the defeat of the Russian revolution exacerbated even more the struggle between these two trends in international Social-Democracy.

"Evolution—against the revolution of the proletariat!" was the essence of the social-reformist concept of development, a revision of scientific socialism by the opportunists in the working-class movement, and various bourgeois-liberal interpreters of Marx. They were united by the unequivocal propagation of reformism, nationalism and social-imperialism. They interpreted the trend towards the exacerbation of the revolutionary class struggle of the proletariat as an "anomaly" of social development. They also pointed to the defeat of the first Russian revolution as an argument allegedly supporting this view.

Although swaying towards veiled opportunism—centrism, Kautsky also came out against the revisionists in the years following the Russian revolution. Thus, in a booklet entitled "The Road to Power (Political Essays on Growing into Revolution)" published in 1909, he examined concrete conditions prompting the conclusion that an "era of revolutions" was at hand. "That which seems to 'reformists' to be peaceful growing into socialism," the author states, "is only the growth of the strength of both antagonistic classes which confront one another in irreconcilable enmity.... Growth into socialism means growth into great battles which will shake all the foundations of the state, will intensify ever more and can end only with the overthrow and expropriation of the capitalist class."¹ Yet, at the same time, in this work too Kautsky completely skirted the question of the state, which is of paramount importance for the theory of revolution. Later on, recognition of the coming "era of revolutions" stood side by side in Kautsky's centrist theories with his denial of any need for the proletariat to prepare for the revolution, with his glorification of bourgeois parliamentarianism and disregard for "Russian" methods of struggle.

In Russia, where from 1905 to 1907 the revolutionary tendencies of the liberation movement became most manifest, during the period of reaction which set in after the defeat of the revolution, sentiments of despondency, repentance and renegacy took hold of particularly wide sections of the bourgeois-liberal and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia, becoming concentrated in "Vekhi-ism" as an ideology of the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie and in liquidationism as a manifestation of the same bourgeois influences in the working-class movement.

¹ Karl Kautsky, *Der Weg zur Macht. Politische Betrachtungen über das Hineinwachsen in die Revolution*, Buchhandlung Vorwärts, Berlin, 1920, S. 40, 98.

A Constitutional-Democratic (Cadets) collection of essays entitled *Vekhi* (1909), this, in Lenin's words, "*encyclopaedia of liberal renegacy*,"¹ was aimed primarily against the ideological foundations of the entire world outlook of Social-Democracy. From the defeat of the 1905-1907 revolution, the *Vekhi* followers drew the conclusion that revolutions were unnecessary and "sinful" in general. Their diagnosis of the "illness" reads as follows: "...A legion of demons has entered Russia's giant body"; she had to be treated by religion and mysticism. The *Vekhi* followers proposed replacing the "historical impatience" of the revolutionaries with the "discipline of obedience", and heroism with "salutary repentance" and "healthy Christian humility". At a time when autocratic police despotism was stifling everything that was alive in the country, the *Vekhi* followers urged refrainment from "explaining evil by the external structure of human society", from surmounting "external disorder also through external reforms". At a time when millions of workers and peasants in Russia were deprived of the elementary conditions of human existence, the *Vekhi* followers proclaimed the "inner perfection, self-knowledge, and self-absorption of each separate individual" as the foundation of progress. The *Vekhi* followers shifted the blame for repression and executions on the revolutionaries themselves, on the "irresponsibility", "maximalism" and "nihilism" of the youth, "who had in vain set about serious social experiments fraught with dangerous consequences and, of course, only intensified reaction by their activity". The authors of the *Vekhi* proclaimed the necessity to do away with the oppressive sway of "love of the people and love of the proletariat", with "worship of man". At the same time, they admitted in a moment of frankness rare even for bourgeois liberals: "Whatever we are, we should not only refrain from dreaming of merging with the people, we should fear it more than all the executions by the regime, and should bless this regime which alone still protects us from the wrath of the people with its bayonets and prisons."²

Vekhi sentiments of despondency and disavowal also affected the petty-bourgeois fellow-travellers of the proletariat and its unstable sections. A typical manifestation of this was the revisionist anti-Party trend of liquidationism in the ranks of the Russian Social-Democrats. "Liquidationism," Lenin wrote, "is a deep-seated social phenomenon, indissolubly connected with the counter-revolutionary mood of the liberal bourgeoisie, with disintegration and break-up in the democratic petty bourgeoisie."³

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Concerning *Vekhi*", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 124.

² *Vekhi. A Collection of Articles on the Russian Intelligentsia*, Moscow, 1909, pp. 2, 8, 9, 36, 39, 53, 55, 68, 75, 89, 95 et seq. (in Russian).

³ V. I. Lenin, "Methods of the Liquidators and Party Tasks of the Bolsheviks", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 100.

The leaders of this opportunist trend were Menshevik writers who wanted to liquidate the illegal workers' party. They started a campaign against the party's underground activity, against the "hierarchy" (i.e., its central organs) and the posing of revolutionary tasks in the struggle, trying to steer Marxist theory and practice along a course of "moderation" and "neatness". Grounding their renegacy on a "theoretical basis", the Menshevik liquidators published a many-volume work entitled *The Social Movement in Russia in the Early 20th Century* under the editorship of A. N. Potresov, L. Martov and P. P. Maslov. In it they rewrote the entire history of Russian Social-Democracy and the revolutionary working-class movement in the spirit of the *Vekhi* collection with its liberalism and renegacy. The liquidators called the revolutionary actions of the workers, soldiers and peasants during the revolution spontaneous revolts; they rejected the leading role of the proletariat and claimed that the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry would run counter to the entire course of economic development. They spread liberal bourgeois ideas about the "constitutional" nature of the coming crisis. The liquidators acted as successors and continuers of the former revisionist line of the "Economists" and Mensheviks.

The danger of liquidationism was redoubled by the fact that the further step taken by the Russian autocracy after the defeat of the revolution towards developing the political system into a bourgeois monarchy and towards enacting bourgeois agrarian reforms provided objective grounds for the liberal labour platform of the liquidators.¹

So-called otzovism was a unique non-Marxist, petty-bourgeois trend in Russian Social-Democracy. It was joined by a small section of the Bolsheviks, who formed the *Vperyod* group. Ignoring the new conditions in which the working-class movement in Russia was developing, they engaged in empty but revolutionary-sounding phrasemongering and continued to advance their chief slogan—boycott of the State Duma—and worked to have the Social-Democratic deputies recalled from it. Lenin repeatedly referred to otzovism as a peculiar form of liquidationism, the germ of ideological liquidationism on the left, and as "*Menshevism turned inside out*".²

A certain danger to the working-class movement was also posed by other leftist concepts, including Trotskyite, anarchist and Socialist-Revolutionary ones, which distorted the tasks of the proletariat and the paths of the development and the prospects of its struggle. The

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Social Structure of State Power, the Prospects and Liquidationism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1968, pp. 144-45, 160-61, 163.

² V. I. Lenin, "On the Article 'Questions of the Day'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 357; "The Liquidation of Liquidationism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 457-60.

authors of these concepts ignored the content and specifics of the new historical period, and glossed over the characteristic features and multiformity of the world liberation movement and the interconnection of its various currents. Propagating "vigorous action by an energetic minority", they refused to engage in painstaking preparatory work among the broadest popular masses.

Many prominent figures in the left wing of the international working-class movement took an active part in the ideological and political struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories and against revisionism from the right and from the "left". Lenin played the leading role here. In his work *Marxism and Revisionism* (1908), Lenin revealed the connection between this ideological struggle and the coming great battles to be waged by the proletariat, when the revolution would exacerbate all contentious issues and would concentrate all differences on points of direct importance for determining the behaviour of the masses; he laid bare the roots of revisionism, its class nature, and the fundamental homogeneity of its intricate manifestations in various countries.¹ Lenin did more than defend Marxism; he made a decisive contribution to its development, further elaborated the theory of socialist revolution in the imperialist period. This was furthered by Lenin's profound and systematic analysis of all latest trends in the international working-class movement and of all the most important changes in the objective situation in which it was developing, by Lenin's direct acquaintance with the activity of socialists and labour organisations of different countries during the years of his forced emigration, and by his participation in the work of the congresses of the Second International and the International Socialist Bureau.²

Other revolutionary Social-Democrats worked in the same vein. Julian Marchlewski (Karski) wrote: "...Never have we been swamped

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Marxism and Revisionism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 38-39.

² See, for example, R. A. Yermolayeva, A. Ya. Manusevich, *Lenin and the Polish Working-Class Movement*, Mysl, Moscow, 1971; R. Yu. Kaganova, *Lenin in France: December 1908-June 1912. Revolutionary, Theoretician, Organiser*, Mysl, Moscow, 1977; V. I. Lenin and the Formation of Communist Parties in the Countries of Central and South-East Europe, Nauka, Moscow, 1973; E. Rothstein, *V. I. Lenin and the Socialist Movement in Great Britain*, Moscow, 1970; P. V. Moskovsky, V. G. Semyonov, *Lenin in Sweden*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1972; A. Jensen, "V. I. Lenin and Denmark", *The Scandinavian Collection*, Vol. 16, Estgosizdat, Tallinn, 1971; *Lenin in the Struggle for a Revolutionary International*, Moscow, 1970; *A History of the Second International*, Vol. 2, Nauka, Moscow, 1966; L. Reti, *Lenin and the Hungarian Working-Class Movement*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972; M. M. Koronen, *V. I. Lenin and Finland*, Lenizdat, Leningrad, 1977; A. M. Shnitman, *From the History of V. I. Lenin's International Ties with the Revolutionary Working-Class Movement in Bulgaria (1896-1923)*, Murmansk State Institute of Education, Murmansk, 1967; A. G. Chernykh,

with such an abundance of crucial theoretical and tactical tasks."¹ He stressed the necessity to study emergent problems not by oft-used banal methods, but on the basis of the continued application of the tried and tested Marxist method. Marxist thinkers believed that all the more important was its analysis of the "truly revolutionary period", the "imperialist period" which faced Social-Democracy "with a new situation and tasks".² The works of Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Felix Dzerzhinsky, Julian Marchlewski, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Anton Pannekoek, David Wijnkoop, Dimitar Blagoev and other revolutionary Social-Democrats contained many new and valuable ideas for the international working-class movement on issues pertaining to the analysis of imperialism, the new period in the revolutionary struggle, the leading and decisive role of the proletariat in the coming revolutionary movements in different countries, the combination of the democratic and socialist tasks of the proletariat, and in the assessment of militarism and wars, as well as the essence of the national-colonial question.³

A characteristic feature of the theoretical work of the revolutionary representatives of the working-class movement was its organic link with the everyday struggle of the proletariat. They stressed that even seemingly purely "practical questions" required clarity, which is reached through their theoretical interpretation.⁴

Lenin's works absorbed all the finest elements of the theory and practice of international Social-Democracy and revolutionary democracy, of the experience of the class struggle of different contingents of the proletariat, bourgeois-democratic revolutions and national-democratic movements, and summarised them in an entirely new way. Lenin's development of the Marxist theory of revolution,

G. V. Khruslov, *Lenin and Japan*, Far-Eastern Publishing House, Vladivostok, 1974 (all in Russian); Maurice Pianzola, *Lénine en Suisse*, Éditions librairie Rousseau, Genève, 1965; Arnold Reisberg, *Lenins Beziehungen zur deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1970, etc.

¹ *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, October 4, 1913.

² Ibid.; Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 3, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1973, S. 351.

³ For details see *Dimitar Blagoev—Outstanding Theoretician and Revolutionary*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1977; *Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky. A Biography*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1977; R. Ya. Yevzerov, I. S. Yazhborovskaya, *Rosa Luxemburg. A Biographical Essay*, Mysl, Moscow, 1974 (all in Russian); Annelies Laschitzka, *Deutsche Linke im Kampf für eine demokratische Republik*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1969; Gunter Radczun, Vorwort in: Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 2-3; Horst Schumacher, *Sie nannten ihn Karski. Das revolutionäre Wirken Julian Marchlewskis in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 1896 bis 1919*, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1964; Josef Schleifstein, *Franz Mehring. Sein marxistisches Schaffen. 1891-1919*, Rütten und Loening, Berlin, 1959; Heinz Wohlgemuth, *Karl Liebknecht. Eine Biographie*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1973, etc.

⁴ *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, November 23, 1910.

which reflected the requirements for the transition from capitalism to socialism in all their complexity and contradictoriness, immediately acquired not a local or regional, but universal, world historic significance.¹

The outlook for further world development and for the fulfilment of the epoch-making mission of the working class figured prominently in Lenin's theoretical work. Research into new phenomena of the imperialist stage of capitalist development was an organic component in positing and tackling the revolutionary tasks of the proletariat.

Lenin's approach to the problem was fundamentally and decisively opposed to the anti-Marxist concepts of imperialism. As it developed and the class struggle intensified, as inter-imperialist contradictions grew more acute and the world war approached, such concepts spread more and more, also gaining currency among certain sections of Social-Democrats.

Bourgeois ideologists and politicians strove to prove that the new facts in the life of capitalist society defied the laws of its emergence, development and downfall which were discovered by Marx. The exploitative role of the financial oligarchy was simply glossed over, or, to offset it, liberal reformist transformations were upheld which did not affect the deep roots of monopoly rule.

Petty-bourgeois opposition to imperialism, which advocated a return to the pre-monopoly past, was also fundamentally untenable from theoretical and political standpoints, since it was based on the rejection of the objective nature of historical development which led to monopoly capitalism.

The right-wing opportunists in the ranks of the working-class movement in effect professed bourgeois-reformist concepts which frequently smacked of an apology of imperialism. They went as far as vindicating their "own" brand of imperialism and its policy of plunder; they interpreted colonialism as a "civilising" factor, and supported the growth of militarism. Many outspoken opportunists shifted to positions of social-imperialism. On the other hand, Kautsky and a number of other Social-Democrats who considered themselves Marxists underestimated the depth and seriousness of the contradictions of the new phase of capitalism. They did not comprehend the organic link between the new political and social phenomena and their economic foundation; they were believing in the possibility of a non-imperialist policy under monopoly rule, remaining blind to the aggravation of basic capitalist contradictions. In their criticism of capitalism they virtually sided with petty-bourgeois opposition to it.

¹ See Yu. A. Krasin, *The Theory of Socialist Revolution: Lenin's Legacy and Today*, Mysl, Moscow, 1977 (in Russian).

The final transition of Kautsky and his followers to centrist positions is inseparable from their views on imperialism.¹

Lenin further extended Marx's analysis of the imperialist stage of capitalism. From his study of monopolies he wrote in 1908: "That capitalism is heading for a break-down—in the sense both of individual political and economic crises and of the complete collapse of the entire capitalist system—has been made particularly clear, and on a particularly large scale, precisely by the new giant trusts."² He also noted that the aggravation of the entire gamut of the political and social contradictions of capitalism was making the international situation more and more revolutionary.³

Lenin paid a great deal of attention to the economic and social processes, as well as to imperialism's politics and ideology. In examining the questions of the concentration of production and the development of monopolies, he did more and more research into finance capital and its coalescence with the state, pointing to the inseparable connection existing between economic rule and political rule.⁴ Analysing the struggle being waged by the peoples of colonies and dependent countries, Lenin gave a comprehensive characterisation of the colonial system of imperialism as a "system of enslavement, plunder and violence".⁵ He showed the intensification of parasitism and the stagnation of capitalism at the imperialist stage.⁶ Lenin exposed the growing unevenness in capitalism's economic and political development; in analysing a number of acute crises in the international relations and politics, he viewed them as the result of the latest stage of capitalism and the harbinger of an even greater general crisis of the entire capitalist system. Even prior to World War I Lenin drew the general outlines of the new period in the development of capitalism and the international class struggle of

¹ See *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 2, Nr. 21, 1913-1914, S. 908-22; for details see *A History of Economic Thought*, Part III, Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1970, pp. 195-204 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, "Marxism and Revisionism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 35-36.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Concerning Certain Speeches by Workers' Deputies", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 414.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Briand Cabinet", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 491; V. I. Lenin, "Bourgeois Financial Magnates and Politicians", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 241-42.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, "Inflammable Material in World Politics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 182.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, "In America", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971, pp. 214-15; "Who Stands to Gain?", "A Great Technical Achievement", "The Bourgeoisie and Peace", "Armaments and Capitalism", "The Growth of Capitalist Wealth", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 53-54, 62, 84, 106-07, 205, respectively.

the proletariat, which "may be called the eve of capitalism's downfall".¹

With the start of World War I, which signified the most severe capitalist crisis, Lenin's research into imperialism entered a decisive period. His comprehensive analysis of imperialism appeared in the work *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* and a number of related works written between 1915 and 1917.²

In ascertaining the general laws and main tendencies in world development as a whole, Lenin always viewed the general in dialectical unity with the particular and the specific. The general served as a starting point for a concrete analysis of a situation in a particular country. The findings of this analysis enriched one's knowledge of the development of the leading trends in the world liberation movement, and found reflection in the general.

Of particular interest is Lenin's description of the "main periods" of world history, which he gives in the work "The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx" (1913) and subsequently clarifies and substantiates more exhaustively in the article "Under a False Flag" (1915).

Lenin's principle in analysing the stages of world development, "important historical epochs" is based on the fact that "in each of them there are and will always be individual and partial movements, now forward now backward; there are and will always be various deviations from the average type and mean tempo of the movement. We cannot know how rapidly and how successfully the various historical movements in a given epoch will develop, but we can and do know *which class* stands at the hub of one epoch or another, determining its main content, the main direction of its development, the main characteristics of the historical situation in that epoch, etc."³ This prompted Lenin's conclusion on practice, the conclusion which provides a key to understanding the sophisms and mistakes leading to a rejection of Marxist positions. He wrote: "Only on that basis, i.e., by taking into account, in the first place, the fundamental distinctive features of the various 'epochs' (and not single episodes in the history of individual countries), can we correctly evolve our tactics; only a knowledge of the basic features of a given epoch can serve as the foundation for an understanding of the specific features of one country or another."⁴

In the centre of the first of the historical epochs which Lenin

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 401.

² For an analysis of imperialism by Lenin and other Marxists see Chapter 10.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Under a False Flag", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 145.

⁴ Ibid.

examined (the period from 1789 to 1871) was, in his opinion, the arising bourgeois class. However, even during this era of bourgeois-democratic movements the 1848 revolution, showing the various social classes in action, "revealed that the proletariat *alone* was socialist by nature." Scientific proletarian socialism emerged and grew strong at this time; "independent *proletarian* parties came into being: the First International (1864-72) and the German Social-Democratic Party". The Paris Commune—the heroic struggle of the proletariat—concluded the "development of bourgeois changes"; it was to the Paris Commune that the bourgeois republic owes its consolidation.¹

Lenin described the second historical epoch, which in effect lasted until 1917, as the epoch of the "full domination and decline of the bourgeoisie", the era of the "transition from its progressive character towards reactionary and even ultra-reactionary finance capital". At the same time the proletariat was mustering its forces, mass socialist parties and other labour organisations were growing, and the proletariat was preparing in different spheres for the great battles to come. This was a time when "the class contradictions were growing ever more acute; the employers' associations were exercising ever greater pressure on the workers' unions", when "sharper and more bitter forms of struggle were arising, as ... mass strikes". It was a time when the first Russian revolution of 1905-1907 revealed a "new source of great world storms".² Neither did Lenin lose track of the difficulties and impediments which the proletarian movement faced in the form of "bourgeois labour policy". He noted the definite connection between the high level of capitalist development and bourgeois democracy, on the one hand, and the spread of ideas of bourgeois reformism among the working class so as to split and weaken this class and maintain the power of the bourgeoisie on the other.³ Lenin pointed to the appearance and evolution, precisely during the second historical epoch, of persistent "socialist opportunism" with its "dogmas" and "cadres".

In characterising the historical role played by the proletariat, Lenin singled out the paramount importance of the revolutionary trend in the working-class movement; subsequently he underscored the profound internal contradictions in international Social-Democracy during the epoch under study, and the struggle between the two opposed currents in it.⁴

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 583.

² Ibid., pp. 583-84; V. I. Lenin, "August Bebel", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 295-96; "Under a False Flag", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 146, 151.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Reformism in the Russian Social-Democratic Movement", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 229; "In America", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 215.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Under a False Flag", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 151.

Lenin pointed out in the pre-war years that the period when the proletariat was mustering its forces and preparing "for the fulfilment of its great historic mission" was giving way to a time when "the forces that have been prepared will achieve their goal in a series of crises".¹ "The third epoch, which has just set in," as Lenin wrote in 1915, "places the bourgeoisie in the same 'position' as that in which the feudal lords found themselves during the first epoch.... From a rising and progressive class the bourgeoisie has turned into a declining, decadent, and reactionary class. It is quite another class that is now on the upgrade on a broad historical scale."²

Lenin's examination of the imminent beginning of the transition from capitalism to socialism is inseparable from his close attention to the aggravation of the class struggle in the industrialised capitalist countries. On the one hand, he singled out this general tendency, which manifested itself specifically in different countries, and, on the other, concretely ascertained the dependence of its versions on differences in historical conditions, political systems and forms of the working-class movement.

From his analysis of the manifestation of the chief tendency at one and the same time but in different conditions, Lenin shaped the principles for the typology of the development of the international working-class movement, which exhibited a similarity in the United States, Britain, Austria-Hungary, Germany and partially in the Scandinavian countries, as well as in countries where Romance languages are spoken. In pointing in general to the "tremendous step forward of international socialism, the rallying of million-strong armies of the proletariat in the course of a series of practical clashes with the enemy, and the approach of a decisive struggle with the bourgeoisie—a struggle for which the working class is far better prepared than in the days of the Commune",³ Lenin revealed the general and specific elements in the international proletarian movement. At the same time, he pointed out that the international revolutionary movement of the proletariat "does not and cannot develop evenly and in identical forms in different countries". Lenin also called attention to the definite national one-sidedness of the working-class movement in individual countries, which is being surmounted in the joint struggle of their proletarians.

"The full and all-round utilisation of every opportunity in every field of activity comes only as the result of the class struggle of the workers in the various countries. Every country contributes its own

¹ V. I. Lenin, "August Bebel", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 296.

² V. I. Lenin, "Under a False Flag", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 146, 149.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Inflammable Material in World Politics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 187.

valuable and specific features to the common stream; but in each particular country the movement suffers from its own one-sidedness, its own theoretical and practical shortcomings of the individual socialist parties."¹

Lenin believed that the movements of the real and potential allies of the proletariat figured prominently in the dynamics of world development. One sign of the approach of the new epoch was the appearance of a powerful revolutionary ally of the proletariat: in Asia, "native slaves"² had begun rising to the struggle against medieval practices and capitalist colonialists.

Yet, the tremendous expansion of the sphere of action of the revolutionary forces and their growing cohesion in the international arena engendered, reciprocally, cohesion on the part of reactionary forces throughout the world, which created rather difficult conditions for any national revolution. Lenin stressed that reaction against the mounting struggle of the proletariat "is uniting the bourgeois governments of the whole world against every popular movement, against every revolution both in Asia and, particularly, in Europe".³ These complications, however, did not prevent Lenin from focussing on the further growth of the world revolutionary movement. The school of civil war, he wrote, does not leave people unchanged. "It is a hard school, and its complete course *necessarily* includes victories for the counter-revolution, the unbridled licence of the infuriated reactionaries, the savage reprisals of the old government against the rebels, etc. But only incurable pedants and doddering mummies can moan over the fact that the nations have entered this very painful school. For it is one that teaches the oppressed classes how to wage civil war and how to carry the revolution to victory."⁴

Carefully examining the growth of the liberation movement, in all its various forms and in all parts of the world, Lenin analysed the social and national movements in their totality. Establishing the differences and interconnection between them, he ascertained the role played by the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat in these movements. He reasoned that the world socialist revolution was a drawn-out, complicated and conflict-ridden process. Despite the differences in the objective tasks facing the principal revolutionary forces, their struggle inevitably could and was bound to merge into a single revolutionary current aimed at achieving democracy, national liberation and socialism.

He upheld and further developed Marxist teaching on the historical role of the proletariat. In the years following the defeat of the

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid. p. 183.

³ Ibid., p. 188.

⁴ Ibid., p. 183.

first Russian revolution attacks were intensified on the Marxist conception of the historical mission of the working class. It is not fortuitous that in this period the idea of a "growing middle class" pitted against the allegedly dwindling proletariat was reproduced in a revamped version. In Russia, counter-revolutionary liberals, mouthing "Marxist" phrases, intensively propagated the Katheder-socialism of Brentano and Sombart (typical ideologues of social liberalism with a slight Marxist tinge), which recognised the "school of capitalism" but rejected the school of revolutionary class struggle. They were mostly scared by the mass democratic movement of workers and peasants who had proved themselves so forcefully in the revolution. The Mensheviks cautioned against overestimating the proletariat's ability to engage in revolutionary activity. The liquidationist rejection of the leadership of the proletariat was impeding its further consolidation as a revolutionary class and pushing it back from the level it had reached in the course of the revolution by wresting leadership of the popular masses from the liberals.

Whereas the revisionists viewed the Marxist doctrine on the historical role of the working class only as an individual conclusion they could discard and still keep calling themselves Marxists, Lenin wrote: "The chief thing in the doctrine of Marx is that it brings out the historic role of the proletariat as the builder of socialist society."¹ This role proceeds from the nature and development of the working class and is intensified as capitalism passes over to its highest stage. Lenin pointed out that socialism could be effected only by a class which is the principal productive force of capitalist society; the poor, but not employed (lumpens, vagabonds) are incapable of toppling the exploiters. "Only the proletarian class, which maintains the whole of society, can bring about the social revolution."² Lenin deepened the conception of the social nature of the working class and, examining its structure, developed the Marxist concept of the working class as applied to the new conditions. In the conditions of imperialism, he asserted, the revolutionary spirit of the working class grows and so does its resolve fundamentally to transform society.

In ascertaining the revolutionary role of the proletariat, Lenin attacked the revisionist theory of palliation of class contradictions and class struggle in the period of imperialism.

Imperialism, intensifying the concentration of production, contributes to the cohesion of the proletariat, and, aggravating all the contradictions of social development, also furthers the revolutionisa-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 582.

² V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 77.

tion of the proletariat. However, under the influence of bourgeois economic processes, politics and ideology, the tendency towards a split in the working class intensifies as well. The heterogeneity of the working class itself, specifically elements newly emergent from the petty-bourgeois milieu and the so-called labour aristocracy present in it, create the objective underpinnings for this tendency. For this reason, Lenin attached particular importance to the efforts by Marxist parties in organising the working class, for they alone are capable of most fully putting to practice the ability of the proletariat for unity and revolutionary action despite certain tendencies of imperialism and opportunism. Their theoretical work helps the proletariat, drawing on the experience of revolution in its own country, to understand the nature of both the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, without which a principled proletarian line is impossible.

Exploring the historical role of the working class, Lenin further developed the doctrine of its leadership in the democratic revolution, in preparing a socialist revolution and in course of the revolution. He proved that the new conditions were increasing the revolutionary potential of the working class and the objective necessity to make the most of it. The working class is the leading force in effecting social progress and general democratic transformations, and the gravitation centre for all democratic forces, whose genuine social liberation is closely connected with the social revolution of the proletariat. As the working class emerges as the leader of the liberation movement it further develops as a revolutionary class, and in this development it inevitably fights not only for its own class interests but also for the interests of all working people, furthering social development in general.

In elaborating his doctrine of the leadership of the proletariat, Lenin drew on the vast experience of Russia, where between 1905 and 1907 "the proletariat actually took the lead in the revolution all the time. The Social-Democrats actually proved to be the ideological vanguard of the proletariat. The struggle of the masses developed under the leadership of the proletariat with remarkable speed."¹ Lenin singled out the vanguard of the workers, which was faced with the task of readying the broad masses for the revolution. "It was necessary," Lenin wrote, referring to the 1905 experience, "for the vanguard of the workers not to regard the class struggle as a struggle in the interests of a thin upper stratum—a conception the reformists all too often try to instil—but for the proletariat to come forward as the real vanguard of the majority of the exploited and draw that majority into the struggle, as was the case in Russia in 1905, and

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 115.

as must be, and certainly will be, the case in the impending proletarian revolution in Europe.”¹ Counterposing the Marxist conception of the class struggle to the liberal and opportunistic one, and, like Marx, establishing close links between the main problems of the theory of revolution and the concept of the state, Lenin stressed: “Marxism recognises a class struggle as fully developed, ‘nation-wide’, *only* if it does not merely embrace politics but takes in the most significant thing in politics—the organisation of state power.”² Thus, his doctrine of the leadership of the proletariat was logically complemented with the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Developing his idea of the leadership of the proletariat, Lenin noted that the proletariat was becoming “the mainspring responsible for the general direction taken by events. The movements of the other classes are grouped around this centre; they follow it, their direction is determined (in a favourable or unfavourable way) by it, they depend on it.”³ In this connection he carefully analysed the totality of social movements of both real and potential allies of the working class, and of its overt and covert enemies. While systematically unmasking the counter-revolutionary nature of the Russian liberal bourgeoisie, Lenin resolutely demanded that the differences and contradictions between the liberals and the rightist government camp be taken into account, and urged that any divergence between the liberals and the rightists, as well as within these groups be used in the interests of democracy. He stressed: “We can (and should) ‘appeal’ from the bourgeois landlord to the bourgeois peasant, from the bourgeois liberal to the bourgeois democrat, from bourgeois half freedom to bourgeois full freedom.”⁴

He was aware that the struggle would be protracted and the interaction between the proletariat and other classes, social strata and groups would be a complex process, and he saw the wave-like nature of revolutionary development in this context. Lenin accordingly differentiated between a narrow and broad understanding of the term “consummation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution”. According to Lenin, the use of the term in its narrow sense denotes a single bourgeois revolution, one of the “waves” which, while not toppling the old regime, preserves the ground for successive “waves”. The term in its broad meaning denotes “the fulfilment of the objective historical tasks of the bourgeois revolution, its ‘consummation’,”

¹ V. I. Lenin, “Lecture on the 1905 Revolution”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p. 242.

² V. I. Lenin, “Liberal and Marxist Conceptions of the Class Struggle”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 122.

³ V. I. Lenin, “Strike Statistics in Russia”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 410.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, “The Nature and Significance of Our Polemics Against the Liberals”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 125-26.

i.e., the removal of the very soil capable of engendering a bourgeois revolution, the consummation of the *entire cycle* of bourgeois revolutions".¹

The situation in Russia after the 1905-1907 period was marked by a decline in the first wave of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the narrow sense. Its consummation in the broad sense was still to come, serving as the basis for the growth of a new revolutionary "wave". The decisive role in the forthcoming revolution was to be played by the proletariat, which would be capable of leading the masses further than the implementation of immediate bourgeois tasks and goals.

Lenin viewed tsarist policy directed against this process after the June 3 coup as Bonapartist in essence, as a stratagem of a monarchy which had lost its former patriarchal or feudal class foundation and was looking for a new class ally among bourgeois elements in town or country. For Lenin, it was an indisputable fact that the Russian autocracy, turning into a bourgeois monarchy, determined in its own way the general laws governing the development of political forms which had made their appearance in industrialised European countries somewhat earlier: "Bonapartism is the objectively necessary evolution of the monarchy in any bourgeois country, traced by Marx and Engels through a number of facts in the modern history of Europe." He clearly understood (and this was corroborated by the experience of other European countries) the incongruity between the new phase of the autocratic government's policy on the one hand, and the tasks of the country's bourgeois transformation in a truly radical manner and the requirements of its economic and political development on the other.² This is what predetermined the inevitability of a new revolution in Russia.

The aim of the autocratic government and the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie supporting it was to forestall the impending revolution. The aim of the Russian proletariat and its vanguard, the Bolsheviks, was to prepare for it and assume leadership of it.

Due to a variety of objective conditions, historical development may either proceed along a straight road or take a roundabout path. Lenin wrote: "The direct overthrow or, at the worst, the weakening and undermining of the old regime, the direct establishment of new government agencies by the people—all this, undoubtedly, is the most *direct* path, the most advantageous as far as the people are concerned, but one that requires the maximum force. Given an overwhelming preponderance of force it is possible to win by a direct

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Notes of a Publicist", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 202.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Assessment of the Present Situation", *Collected Works* Vol. 15, pp. 269, 278-79.

frontal attack. Lacking this, one may have to resort to roundabout ways, to marking time, to zigzags, retreats, etc., etc."¹

In analysing the possible paths of historical development, Lenin also focussed on the problem of compromise, since the roundabout road is, by its historical content, nothing more than the road of compromise. Lenin upheld the Marxist tradition of resorting, when necessary, to compromise in tackling problems while at the same time fighting unscrupulous compromises which weaken the working class and jeopardise the independence of the proletarian party. He wrote: "The need for reckoning with the zigzag path does not in the least do away with the fact that Marxists should be able to explain to the masses during the decisive moments of their history that the direct path is preferable, should be able to help the masses in the struggle for the choice of the direct path, to advance slogans for that struggle, and so on."² What was thus at issue was not only the intertwining of two possible ways of development, but also the need to actively and consciously influence its process and safeguard the proletariat's class interests. Lenin stressed: "In upholding, at all points, the *whole* of our programme and *all* our revolutionary views, we must bring our direct appeals into line with the objective state of affairs at the given moment."³

Of particular importance in this connection is Lenin's further research into the correlation between reform and revolution in the liberation struggle. At the turn of the century, Lenin, drawing on the Russian experience, already viewed this issue from the vantage point of the leading role of the working class in the general democratic movement. Calling to mind the fact that the revolutionary Social-Democrats always regarded the struggle for reforms as one of their tasks, he considered it necessary to subordinate "the struggle for reforms, as the part to the whole, to the revolutionary struggle for freedom and for socialism".⁴ For him, the opposition of reform and revolution was not something absolute, a line between them "not something dead, but alive and changing, and one must be able to define it in each particular case". The choice between a revolutionary or reformist path of solving concrete tasks, he pointed out, depends on the strength, consciousness and level of organisation of those social elements in whose interests transformations are to be implemented.⁵

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Against Boycott", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 22.

² Ibid., pp. 22-23.

³ Ibid., p. 34.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?", *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 406.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, "Apropos of an Anniversary", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 116.

Lenin's prewar studies of the question of the revolutionary situation represented a strictly scientific, Marxist approach to the objective situation at the onset of a revolutionary crisis. He exhaustively explored the categories characterising it: "It is not enough for revolution that *the lower classes should not want* to live in the old way. It is also necessary that *the upper classes should be unable* to rule and govern in the old way." It is also essential to have "an active state of revolt and insurrection", without which "neither the oppression of the lower classes nor a crisis among the upper classes can cause a revolution; they can only cause the decay of a country".¹

That "the lower classes should not want to live in the old way" means, according to Lenin, that the plight of the working masses, which comprise the overwhelming majority of the population has been aggravated to the maximum and is in glaring incongruity with both the level of the country's productive forces, the self-awareness of the masses and their demands, and with the situation in other countries. The rejection of the old way by the lower classes is manifest not only in the tremendous intensification of the oppression of most of the population, but also in the growing indignation and independent action by the masses.²

The impossibility for the upper classes to "rule and govern in the old way" consists not only in a government crisis, but also in a critical situation in the entire policy of the ruling class, when it can no longer tackle historical tasks at hand with the means available to it. This is a component of a political crisis of countrywide proportions which touches upon the very foundation of the state system.³ Lenin differentiated between the constitutional crisis and the revolutionary crisis; the former could be solved on the basis of the given fundamental laws and patterns, the latter required destruction of these same laws and patterns.⁴ This does not signify an upright wall between them, however. The constitutional crisis could prove to be a step in the development of a revolutionary crisis; it could become a critical situation for the entire state system. But it could also prove to be a last-resort safety-valve against the emergence of a revolutionary crisis.

Lenin's description of the conditions for the onset of revolution thereby included many political, economic, social and psychological factors which allowed to make judgements about both the necessity for revolution and its immediate chances; it also took international

¹ V. I. Lenin, "May Day Action by the Revolutionary Proletariat", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 222, 223.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 222.

⁴ See V. I. Lenin, "The Platform of Revolutionary Social-Democracy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 216.

conditions for revolution into account. This analysis of the revolutionary situation was directed against both the opportunistic disregard of it and the ultra-leftists "playing revolution", mindless of the extent to which objective socio-political conditions for it had matured.

In analysing the process of the maturing of the revolution, Lenin singled out various milestones in the development of this process. Referring to pre-war Germany, he wrote about a "peculiar pre-revolutionary situation", when the sentiments of the proletariat and the mass of the petty bourgeoisie change, and "*all the props of the 'peaceful' rule of the aristocratic Prussian sabre have been undermined*. Whether the bourgeoisie likes it or not, *events are sweeping it towards a profound political crisis*."¹ In early February 1913 Lenin noted that "a nation-wide political crisis is slowly but steadily maturing in Russia".² In June 1913, pointing to the "*special conditions in present-day Russia*", which was facing the onset of a revolution, he emphasised that "a nation-wide political crisis is in evidence", "a directly revolutionary crisis" was under way.³

Consequently, if a "nation-wide political crisis" had taken shape, a revolutionary situation was at hand. In its further development there arises "a directly revolutionary crisis" and the revolution begins. Revolutions, Lenin was to sum up later, "are always preceded by a process of unrest, crises, movements, revolts, the *beginnings of revolution*, the latter *not always* developing to the very end (if, for instance, the revolutionary class is not strong enough)".⁴

Lenin thus took into account subjective as well as objective changes, without which a revolutionary situation cannot develop into an actual revolution.

Among the factors which contribute to the development of a revolutionary situation into a revolution, Lenin focussed particular attention on the proletariat's parties leading the masses into a consistent struggle against the outmoded social system.

"The philistine is satisfied with the undoubted, holy and *empty* truth that it is impossible to say in advance whether there will be a revolution or not. A Marxist is not satisfied with that; he says: our propaganda and the propaganda of all worker Social-Democrats

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Zabern", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 515; "Two Worlds", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 310; "Deputy Frank Favours the Mass Strike", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 257.

² V. I. Lenin, "Notification and Resolutions of the Cracow Meeting of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party Functionaries", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 455.

³ V. I. Lenin, "May Day Action by the Revolutionary Proletariat", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 221, 222.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Opportunism, and the Collapse of the Second International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 451.

is *one of the factors determining* whether there will be a revolution or not.... Whether or not there will be a revolution does *not* depend on us *alone*. But we shall do *our* work, and this work will never be in vain. It will sow the seeds of democracy and proletarian independence deep among the masses, and these seeds will *certainly* sprout and produce either a democratic revolution tomorrow, or a socialist revolution the day after."¹

In analysing the outlook for a new mass upsurge, Lenin proceeded from the premise that a political crisis nationwide develops unevenly. This is due both to the differences in conditions in various parts of the country and to the fact that periods of onslaught can give way to "intervals of counter-revolutionary convulsions of the bourgeois system".² However, even amidst the wildest rampage of reaction it is essential to teach the masses to fight in a revolutionary manner to achieve maximum results in concrete conditions.

The proletariat would have to effect leadership in the liberation movement at all its stages and turns. Lenin explained the untenability of a simplistic understanding of the leadership (the hegemony) of the proletariat, whereby that leadership is declared impossible if the proletariat has sustained a defeat, if its revolutionary vanguard has been elbowed out and chased underground. In any conditions the proletariat must, and does, execute the role of vanguard of the broad masses. Lenin stressed: "The hegemony of the working class is the political influence which that class (and its representatives) exercises upon other sections of the population by helping them to purge their democracy (where there is democracy) of undemocratic admixtures, by criticising the narrowness and short-sightedness of all bourgeois democracy."³

The consistent pursuit of this line necessarily required a special clarification of the available opportunities for an alliance between the proletariat and various other classes and sections of the population, initially in the struggle for democracy and subsequently at the stage of the proletarian revolution.

FRESH RESEARCH INTO THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

An important part of Lenin's further elaboration of the theory of revolution was his research into the agrarian question, which affected the destiny of millions of peasants comprising a formidable

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Platform of the Reformists and the Platform of the Revolutionary Social-Democrats", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 383, 384.

² V. I. Lenin, "Kautsky, Axelrod, and Martov—True Internationalists", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 399; see also V. I. Lenin, "Strike Statistics in Russia", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, pp. 399-400.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Those Who Would Liquidate Us", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 79.

section of the population in many countries. For Lenin, the dimension, results and nature of 20th-century bourgeois-democratic revolutions and their socialist prospects hinged directly on the ability of the proletariat at this stage of the struggle to lead the broad popular masses and non-proletarian classes and strata. Lenin refuted dogmatic notions of a "pure" proletarian revolution. A socialist revolution affects the interests of all the working people of a country, and the attitude of the various segments and their readiness to support and defend it are fundamental in the revolutionary policy of a proletarian party. For this reason the problem of political alliances figures prominently in Lenin's theory. Of tremendous importance in this connection was his substantiation of the role of the working peasantry as an ally of the proletariat in its revolutionary struggle.

The revisionists followed the liberal bourgeois economists in a bid to prove the inapplicability of Marx's economic doctrine to agriculture. By way of superficial and biased correlation of facts regarding the relative stability of small and medium-sized farms, they glossed over the class differentiation and growth of social contradictions in the countryside, and presented a distorted interpretation of the major trends in agricultural development. Indicative in this respect is Eduard David's book *Socialism and Agriculture*. Lenin wrote about it in 1908 that it "is undoubtedly at the present time the principal work of revisionism on the agrarian question".¹ David isolated the capitalist development in agriculture from the evolution of the bourgeois system on the whole and did not see the specifics of capitalist progress in agriculture. Trying to prove his fundamental proposition of the viability of small-scale tillage and its superiority over large-scale economy, he persistently ignored statistics on hired labour on small farms indicating that what was frequently at issue was capitalist farms on the one hand, and the small-scale farmers becoming hired hands on the other. The chief points of David's agrarian programme were cooperation and socialisation (nationalisation) in agriculture, which he did not tie in with the transition of political power into the hands of the working class during the revolution.

The debate on agrarian programmes in the parties of the Second International at the turn of the century did not yield a fundamental Marxist solution to vital theoretical and political issues—their attitude to capitalist development in agriculture, party work in the countryside, and allies of the working class. The view continued to be spread that all non-proletarian sections of the working people

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "The Agrarian Question and the 'Critics of Marx'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 171.

were a "reactionary mass", that it was only through proletarianisation that the peasantry would become an ally of the proletariat.¹ This became the basis of revisionist and sectarian attitudes to the peasant masses.

An urgent need was felt in the Second International and its national sections for a discussion and a Marxist solution, of the agrarian issue and working out a Marxist approach to it. It was not placed on the agenda of the congresses of the Second International, however. At best, the matter amounted to propaganda among rural workers and small peasants or to occasional debates in parliaments on drafts of partial agrarian reforms.

In Russia, where the agrarian question was particularly acute, disputes over it figured prominently in the ideological and political struggle. This was also due to the necessity to combat various anti-Marxian concepts and distortions of Marxist agrarian theory.

Menshevik ideologists and politicians repeated revisionist ideas. They underestimated the importance of transforming the peasantry into an ally of the working class and bringing the bourgeois-democratic agrarian revolution to a decisive conclusion. They denied the substantial connection between a radical solution of the agrarian issue and the overall democratisation of Russia's political system, and fought against Lenin's idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. Trotsky viewed the peasantry as a conservative and, in a number of instances, reactionary mass. Discarding the stage of democratic revolution, he would doom the proletariat to isolation from potentially revolutionary forces, classes and social strata and came out above all against an alliance between the working class and the peasantry. The agrarian programmes of the petty-bourgeois parties (SRs, Popular Socialists and Trudoviks) advanced revolutionary and democratic demands for the abolition of large landed estates and expressed the peasants' desire "*to completely sweep away all the vestiges of medievalism*".² However, these programmes were not substantiated scientifically and were theoretically untenable; they were limited by the narrow horizons of the petty proprietor. They viewed the turning over of landlords' holdings to the peasants and the peasants' "right to land" not as the first step of essentially bourgeois transformations, but as the establishment of a sort of egalitarian socialism.

Lenin analysed the development of the latest trends in the economic structure of agriculture; he clarified the agrarian issue and created a solid scientific theory and programme on the peasant question.

¹ See, for example, Karl Kautsky, *Der Weg Zur Macht*, S. 112.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 396.

Most typical of the way Lenin posited the agrarian issue under imperialism was the establishment of certain general, deep-rooted patterns of the genesis of capitalism in the agrarian structure, which are inevitably manifested in the development of absolutely all the countries that have been or are being drawn into the orbit of the world market. At the same time, Lenin insisted that these general patterns be carefully interpreted in the concrete conditions of each of the countries, and that the specifics and level of maturity of a particular trend be ascertained.

Systematically coming out against anti-Marxian interpretations of the agrarian question, which revealed an inability and reluctance to study capitalist progress in all its forms, frequently complex and confused, Lenin wrote: "On this question the revisionists sinned, in the scientific sense, by superficial generalisations based on facts selected one-sidedly and without reference to the system of capitalism as a whole. From the political point of view, they sinned by the fact that they inevitably, whether they wanted to or not, invited or urged the peasant to adopt the attitude of a small proprietor (i.e., the attitude of the bourgeoisie) instead of urging him to adopt the point of view of the revolutionary proletariat."¹

Analysing fresh data on capitalist development in the United States, Germany, Russia and other countries, Lenin scientifically proved that the economic laws of capitalist development discovered by Marx functioned in agriculture as well. Lenin's generalisation of a huge amount of statistics² enabled him to formulate a general law governing capitalist development in agriculture, a law which manifested itself differently depending on the country: "The decline of small-scale production assumes different forms in agriculture, but the decline itself is an indisputable fact."³ He revealed the specifics of the concentration of production in agriculture in the context of imperialist development; among other things, he called attention to lack of research into new forms of the dependence of the peasantry associated with the domination of finance capital.⁴

Lenin gave a scientific outline of the differentiation of the peasantry and revealed its revolutionary potential as an ally of the proletariat both in the struggle for democracy and for socialism. He developed the question of the nationalisation of land in the context of the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolution, sub-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Marxism and Revisionism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 35.

² See V. I. Lenin, *Notes on the Agrarian Issue. 1900-1916*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 373-607 (in Russian).

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 26.

⁴ See V. I. Lenin, "New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 17, 92, 99.

stantiated the need to organise the rural proletariat and semi-proletariat into an independent class force, and pointed out the role played by revolutionary bodies of peasant autonomy.

Surveying the experience of the mass, country-wide peasant movement, particularly in Russia during the first revolution, Lenin elaborated an agrarian programme and shaped the Social-Democratic policy on the agrarian issue, i.e., the attitude to agriculture and to the various classes, strata and groups of the rural population. The latest data on landownership in Russia enabled Lenin to ascertain the economic basis of the actual struggle in the agrarian issue, and to compare with it the programmes, statements, demands and theories of representatives of the various classes, i.e., the ideological and political reflection of this struggle.¹ He tied the idea of an agrarian revolution in with that of a popular bourgeois-democratic revolution which would grow into a socialist revolution.

Lenin showed that the bulk of small-scale peasant farms had no prospects amidst progressing capitalist relations in the countryside and drew the conclusion that a socialist programme of agricultural reform alone could offer the majority of peasants a genuine way out. However, by virtue of the whole system of commodity-based economy, the peasantry, the small-scale peasantry included, was becoming permeated with a capitalist psychology, which was in turn supported by bourgeois ideologists followed by the revisionists. The Marxists, for their part, drawing on their analysis of agricultural development, explained to the small peasants the necessity to join wage earners.

Lenin emphasised that in order to posit and solve the agrarian issue correctly it was imperative to take into account the degree of capitalist development in agriculture, reckon with the existence of different kinds of capitalism: landlordist, semi-feudal, with vestiges of feudalism and various privileges for landlords turned bourgeois, the brand particularly reactionary and oppressive for the masses, and the capitalism of free farmers, more progressive and less oppressive, virtually devoid of the vestiges of old privileges. Hence the differences in the agrarian question in different countries and the necessity to study the specifics of agrarian relations in a particular country and to define the type of capitalism in the countryside which the proletariat and peasantry have to deal with.

In Russia, the landlordist and peasant economy evolved unswervingly along the capitalist path. The peasantry was becoming stratified, a small but economically strong rural bourgeoisie had emerged, and a large rural proletariat was growing. However, capitalist relations were still entangled in a multitude of vestiges of feudal

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, pp. 219-20.

relations. For this reason, Lenin stressed that "in Russia ... there exists, *alongside* the general capitalist agrarian problem, *another*, 'truly Russian' agrarian problem". According to Lenin, the struggle of the masses, the peasantry in particular, against the feudal relations comprised the "distinctive character of the Russian agrarian problem".¹

The intertwining of the Russian peasants' struggle against the latifundist landlords and vestiges of feudalism with the struggle of the incipient rural proletariat and the rural poor against the bourgeoisie in the countryside was giving rise to a rather unique situation—two concurrent social wars. Lenin believed that capitalist agriculture could continue to develop in Russia provided that large manorial holdings increasingly undergo embourgeoisement. This development, however, could also proceed in another fashion, with small farmers leading the way, eliminating, through revolution, the tumour of feudal latifundia from the social organism and subsequently developing freely without them along the path of capitalist farming.² Lenin stressed the objective possibility of a capitalist agrarian development for Russia not by the "Prussian", landlordist-bourgeois, but the "American", peasant-bourgeois road. During the 1905-1907 revolution and afterwards these two currents in Russia's economic development were openly reflected in the struggle of the hostile classes.

Lenin called attention to the fact that the state of affairs in Russia following the 1905-1907 revolution was somewhat reminiscent of the situation in Germany after the 1848-1849 revolution and that it was at the same time substantially different from it. He characterised the similarities and differences as follows: "Bismarck represented the counter-revolutionary landowners of Germany. He realised he could save them (for a few decades) *only* by a sound alliance with the counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie. He succeeded in forming this alliance because the resistance of the proletariat was weak and lucky wars helped solve the *current* problem—that of the national unification of Germany. We have our counter-revolutionary landowners. And we have our counter-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie.... This, however, is not enough for the 'marriage' to be a success. The current historical task must be fulfilled, and ours is not national unification ... but *the agrarian problem* ... at a time when the resistance of the proletariat is stronger."³

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Essence of 'the Agrarian Problem in Russia'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 73, 74.

² See V. I. Lenin, "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 239.

³ V. I. Lenin, "An Incorrect Appraisal (*Luch* on Maklakov)", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 133-34.

Summing up the experience of the revolutionary years, Lenin stressed that the peasant masses saw that "revolutionary struggle was necessary to abolish all medievalism in general and all medieval property in land in particular". Consequently, "all the propaganda and agitation of the Social-Democrats should be based on bringing these results home to the masses, on preparing the masses to make use of this experience ... during the *second* campaign of the revolution".¹

Advocating the revolutionary approach to the agrarian question, Lenin criticised opportunist concepts already during the first Russian revolution. Of these, the Menshevik programme of land municipalisation was foremost.

Analysing the agrarian issues in the Russian revolution, Lenin showed that the economic necessity to cleanse all land of medieval garbage called for the nationalisation of all land. In that connection, he stressed the distinctive features of Russia as compared to, say, Germany in the early 20th century which lacked a popular movement for land nationalisation; he called for Marx's theory to be applied to Russia's distinctive conditions, and insisted that people should be able to "think of the tasks each Social-Democratic party has to perform in special periods of its historical development".² At the same time, he criticised the Narodnik parties which interpreted nationalisation and "equal" distribution of land, which would have created the most favourable conditions for capitalist development in agriculture, as a socialist way of development.

Exposing the quasi-socialist nature of these concepts, Lenin proceeded from the remarkable formula drawn up by Engels in relation to utopian socialism in general: "...What formally may be economically incorrect, may all the same be correct from the point of view of world history."³ Lenin considered it necessary to distinguish, in Narodnik programmes, what was fallacious in the formal economic sense of their socialist utopia from what was correct in the historical sense of their democratic spirit, aimed at destroying all vestiges of serfdom in the village. He wrote "*This* democracy, while fallacious as a socialist utopia, is *correct* in terms of the peculiar, historically conditioned democratic struggle of the peasant masses which is an inseparable element of the bourgeois transformation and a condition for its complete victory."⁴ Criticising quasi-socialist utopias and fully supporting democratic aspirations, and the resolve to get rid of the old, feudal exploiters—such was Lenin's

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the Russian Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 179.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, pp. 424, 428.

³ Frederick Engels, Preface to the First German Edition of Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 9).

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Two Utopias", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 358.

position vis-à-vis petty-bourgeois agrarian programmes in the Russian revolution.

Lenin displayed a similar approach while analysing bourgeois-democratic movements in several Asian countries—for example, Sun Yat-sen's movement. "The dialectics of the social relations in China reveals itself precisely in the fact that, while sincerely sympathising with socialism in Europe, the Chinese democrats have transformed it into a reactionary theory, and *on the basis* of this reactionary theory of preventing' capitalism are championing a *purely capitalist*, a maximum capitalist, agrarian programme!"¹

It is not that Lenin thought it impossible for the demand to nationalise land to lead to socialism. The point was that it could lead to socialism not directly but through the complex process of a bourgeois-democratic revolution evolving into a socialist revolution. This called for the leadership of the proletariat in the liberation movement, for a union of the proletariat with the peasants, a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants. This approach to the problem, advanced by Lenin, opposed the Narodnik, pseudo-socialist approach. But the Mensheviks were against the establishment of the power of the proletariat and the peasants, claiming that it would mean a return to Narodism.

At the same time, nationalisation of land, while a radical-bourgeois measure, would make it possible, Lenin argued, "to strike a blow at 'one form of private property' which must invariably have its repercussions all over the world", and would simultaneously create not only the basis for a rapid development of the capitalist productive forces but also prerequisites for a future development of socialist economic forms.² Ten years later, in September 1917, Lenin wrote in his afterword to *The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907* that "nationalisation of the land is not only 'the last word' of the bourgeois revolution, but also *a step towards socialism*".³

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARXIST DOCTRINE ON THE NATIONAL AND NATIONAL-COLONIAL QUESTIONS

Another decisive factor shaping the outcome of the historical confrontation of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie under imperialism was the proletariat's ability to make the anti-imperialist,

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Democracy and Narodism in China", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 167.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 325.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Postscript", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 430.

national liberation movements its ally. In the new historical conditions, Lenin provided a profound and comprehensive analysis of the national question and problems of the national liberation movements and their significance from the standpoint of the historical mission of the working class. Lenin's ideas on the national and national-colonial questions were a development of the revolutionary Marxist theory and became an integral part of the treasury of Marxist thought.

Under imperialism, the national question turned from a domestic issue or one involving two or more governments into a global problem. The handful of "great powers" had divided the world among themselves and made most of its population their slaves or vassals. The exploitation of colonies and dependent countries emerged as an essential element of the imperialist system. Amid the mounting imperialist rivalry, the growth of militarism and the upsurge of the working-class and national liberation movements, great-power nationalist, chauvinist ideology and policy became a *sine qua non* of the sway of the imperialist bourgeoisie and reactionary forces in all leading capitalist countries (both semi-absolutist, like Germany and Austria-Hungary, and democratic, like Britain, France and the United States). At the same time, bourgeois nationalism was growing in many oppressed nations.

Nationalist deviations also surfaced in international Social-Democracy. Some theorists of the Second International revised the fundamentals of the Marxist approach to the national question and the principles of proletarian internationalism.

The opportunist ideas advanced by the so-called Austro-Marxists in the early 20th century were among the foremost sources of nationalist concepts and slogans in the socialist movement of several countries.

The leaders of Austro-Marxism, who preached the psychological theory in the national question, ignored both the class antagonisms within nations and the capitalist-related historical trend of transition from nationally heterogeneous states to one-nation states. They also dismissed the need for a proletarian-led democratic struggle to solve the national question. Rudolf Springer (Karl Renner) argued that "a nation is a union of persons thinking and speaking similarly", and since in the Austrian Empire "these nations *have* to coexist", the entire question is reduced to "*what legal forms would enable them to coexist in the best possible way*".¹ Otto Bauer, the chief Austro-Marxist theorist on the national question, maintained that a nation "is always a cultural entity too" and that "the Austrian nations

¹ R. Springer, *The National Question*, St. Petersburg, 1909, pp. 14, 43 (in Russian).

will remain in the state union they coexist in now". Therefore he raised the question of measures which would ensure national peace within the country.¹ Ignoring the class antagonisms within nations and misrepresenting the prospects of the democratic liberation movement, Bauer advocated the need for rallying "all members of the nation into a national-cultural commonwealth"². He opposed the "conservative-national" policy of the Austro-Hungarian ruling classes with the "evolutionary-national" policy of the working class and its party. Their foremost political task, he alleged, was making the entire people develop into a nation. This was to be achieved by disseminating "national culture" and establishing not a territorial but a "cultural-national autonomy" which, while envisaging separate parliaments and ministries for the artificially shaped nations, would in fact merely divide the country's schools by national affiliation. In this connection, Lenin wrote about "the utopia of the Austrian petty bourgeoisie, who have despaired of achieving consistent democracy or of putting an end to national bickering.... In Austria the idea of cultural-national autonomy has remained largely a flight of literary fancy, which the Austrian Social-Democrats themselves have not taken seriously."³

Meanwhile, opportunists in various countries seized on the Austro-Marxist thesis of "national culture", of the supra-class "community of national interests" of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and the "cultural-national autonomy" programme. Under the slogan of renouncing the nations' right to self-determination, they were used to introduce nationalism into the working-class movement.

Opportunists in the Second International even openly justified imperialist colonial policy, linking colonial rule to the interests and prosperity of the proletariat. They saw future liberation of the oppressed peoples as a gradual capitalist development of the colonial countries, as a legal systematisation of imperialist domination. At the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International the Dutch social-reformist Henri van Kol urged a draft resolution saying that the Congress "does not condemn in principle and forever any colonial policy, which could, under a socialist regime, produce a civilising effect".⁴

The nationalist and chauvinist trend was immediately rebuffed by Social-Democrats. Already at the Stuttgart Congress of the

¹ O. Bauer, *The National Question and Social-Democracy*, St. Petersburg, 1909, pp. 118, 399, 401 (in Russian).

² Ibid., p. 553.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Critical Remarks on the National Question", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 37-38.

⁴ *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart. 18. bis 24. August 1907*, Vorwärts, Berlin, 1907, S. 24.

Second International the Polish Social-Democratic representative Julian Marchlewski denounced the attempts to extol a civilising mission of a "socialist colonial policy". "I believe," he said, "that for a socialist, other cultures also exist apart from capitalist and European culture. We have no reason to flaunt our so-called culture or impose it on the peoples of Asia who have their own ancient culture."¹ Rejecting the thesis on the inevitability of capitalist development for the colonies and opposing it with "selfless cultural assistance", Marchlewski offered a new theoretical approach to the national question.

In 1908, Karl Kautsky published his *Nationality and Internationality* in which he exposed, Lenin said, Bauer's confusion and extremely cautiously referred to the "national culture" concept as an "enormous exaggeration of the national aspect and complete neglect of the international aspect".² Kautsky countered the psychological theory in the national question with a historical-economic theory. He criticised Bauer for underrating the power of the drive towards a national state, although Kautsky himself was not fully consistent in criticising the cultural-national autonomy idea.

Anton Pannekoek published a critique of the Austro-Marxist "national opportunism" in 1912. Lenin called his pamphlet *The Class Struggle and the Nation* excellent, but it did contain flaws connected with the issue of cultural-national autonomy. Specifically, Pannekoek did not understand the importance of the general democratic demands.³ Lenin also valued highly Josef Strasser's *The Worker and the Nation*.⁴ In 1912-1913, Joseph Stalin wrote and published, with Lenin's support, *Marxism and the National Question*, a critique of Austro-Marxist concepts and the Russian opportunists' efforts to preach "cultural-national autonomy".⁵

At the same time, some of the revolutionary Social-Democrats who opposed the bourgeois-nationalist trend were inclined to underestimate the nations' right to self-determination as a principle in the programmes of the proletarian parties of oppressor nations. For

¹ Ibid., S. 33.

² Karl Kautsky, *Nationalität und Internationalität*, Verlag und Druck von Paul Singer, Stuttgart, 1908, S. 15, 35; V. I. Lenin, "The National Programme of the R.S.D.L.P.", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 541; V. I. Lenin, "Theses for a Lecture on the National Question", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 315-16; "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 398.

³ Anton Pannekoek, *Klassenkampf und Nation*, Reichenberg, 1912.

⁴ Josef Strasser, *Der Arbeiter und die Nation*, Verlag von Runge und Co., Reichenberg, 1912; V. I. Lenin to Maxim Gorky, between February 15 and 25, 1913, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 85.

⁵ See V. I. Lenin, "The National Programme of the R.S.D.L.P.", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 539; V. I. Lenin to Maxim Gorky, between February 15 and 25, 1913, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, pp. 84-85.

example, Rosa Luxemburg argued that Social-Democratic recognition of the right of nations to self-determination would be tantamount to supporting bourgeois nationalism among the oppressed nations, that the programme had no need of this provision because the latter offered no practical directives for the proletariat's day-to-day policy in relation to ethnic problems.¹

All this made the question of the relationship between the national and the international in the activities of the revolutionary working class especially acute. Besides, a debate began in the Social-Democratic movement over the thesis advanced by Marx and Engels in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*: that "the working men have no country" and that "the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the nation*".² The Marxist approach was opposed by the nationalist, rightist and reformist one, and by the national-nihilist, ultra-left approach. Advocates of the former—revisionists—claimed that the thesis "the working men have no country" was outdated and no longer suited the new situation. Eduard Bernstein wrote that the development of bourgeois democracy had turned the worker into a "citizen who enjoys equal rights and has a homeland whose independence and prosperity he should further according to the principle of the International: 'No Rights Without Duties'".³ Georg Vollmar, who took the nationalistic stand, tried to justify a "truly German" attitude of the proletariat to "the fatherland".

The French socialist and semi-anarchist Gustave Hervé was the foremost representative of the second, ultra-left approach. He replaced proletarian internationalism with national-nihilism, denying that the country or patriotism had any meaning for the worker. He wrote that patriotism and internationalism were as incompatible as "water and fire".⁴ This approach, which put an absolute construction on the thesis "the working men have no country", encouraged the proletariat to renounce participation in democratic and national movements. It was fraught with sectarianism and could isolate the revolutionary workers from the masses.

For Russia, which had become the centre of the world liberation movement, the national and the national-colonial questions were especially important. The defeat of the 1905-1907 revolution and the June 3 regime were accompanied by an onslaught of great-power

¹ Róża Luksemburg, *Wybór pism*, tom II, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa, 1959, s. 114-66.

² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party", Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, pp. 502-03.

³ *La Vie socialiste*, No. 15, June 1905, p. 898.

⁴ *La Vie socialiste*, No. 16, June 1905, p. 970.

chauvinism. The revolution was denounced as something brought about by "non-Russians". Great-power chauvinism, the efforts to foment hatred among different peoples were aimed at driving the working people apart, at preventing them from fighting together for liberation. "The persecution of non-Russians, the sowing of mutual distrust between the Russian peasant, the Russian petty bourgeois and the Russian artisan on the one hand," Lenin wrote, "and the Jewish, Finnish, Polish, Georgian and Ukrainian peasants, petty bourgeois and artisans on the other, is meat and drink to the whole of this Black-Hundred gang."¹

At the same time, bourgeois nationalists abruptly stepped up their activity. They wanted to secure leadership over the liberation movement of the working people, to dominate the workers of their nation. They claimed that the interests of "national unity", of "solidarity irrespective of the differences in the social status" were all-important. These ideas were often combined with sermons on the distinctive role or primacy of this or that nationality or religion. This led, quite logically, to declarations of hegemony, of a worldwide union among people of the same religious or national affiliation. Graphic examples were provided by the nationalist theories of Jewish Zionism, Turkic Mussavatism, Central Asian Pan-Islamism, etc. These were joined by the petty-bourgeois trends which tried to add a socialist colouring to nationalism (for example, the "Zionist socialism" of the Poale Zion Party or the fallacious concepts of the Armenian Dashnakzoutioun Party).² During the period of Russian reaction, petty-bourgeois socialist influence strengthened those trends in the working-class movement which were aimed against the proletariat's international unity, at isolating different proletarians by nationality and driving them into an alliance with the bourgeoisie.

Previously, nationalist programmes had been advanced by the Jewish Socialist Labour Party, the Polish Socialist Party, the Byelorussian Socialist Union, the Latvian Social-Democratic Union, the Georgian Party of Social-Federalists, and the Armenian Dashnaks. A conference of ethnic socialist parties recognised the implementation of the "cultural-national autonomy" programme as a necessary prerequisite for the solution of the national question in Russia.³

The Bund, too, advocated the notion of supra-class national culture. It tried to resist the objective process of assimilation of

¹ V. I. Lenin, "National Equality", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 237.

² T. Yu. Burmistrova, *The National Question and the Labour Movement in Russia*, Mysl, Moscow, 1969, pp. 43-57 (in Russian).

³ *Protocols of the Conference of Russian Ethnic Socialist Parties*, April 16-20, 1907, Sejm, St. Petersburg, 1908, pp. 143-44 (in Russian).

the Jewish working people, preached cultural-national autonomy and fought against the principle of uniting the workers of all nationalities within a given country in nationwide working-class organisations.

In 1913, Lenin noted that "the national question has now become prominent among the problems of Russian public life".¹ He waged a consistent struggle against the great-power chauvinist, bourgeois-nationalist ideology and policy, as well as their manifestations in the working-class movement, against vacillations in the national and national-colonial questions which surfaced in the Russian and international Social-Democracy. Lenin upheld and developed the principles of proletarian policy in the national question, revealed the connection between the national liberation movement under imperialism and the revolutionary struggle of the working class, and demonstrated the inevitability of the liberation movement in general developing in the direction of a union between socialist and anti-imperialist revolutions.

Lenin's programme on the national question proceeded from the precept that its solution was among the foremost tasks of the proletariat, a class fighting against all forms of oppression and exploitation. Revolutionary workers can and must become the most consistent champions of the most democratic solution of the national question already within the capitalist system, for the struggle for democracy is an integral part of the struggle for socialism. A socialist transformation of society opens the way to a final solution of the national question, to the free development of nations on the basis of a complete elimination of all exploitation and oppression, on the basis of comprehensive democracy. The national question is subordinate to the social one in the revolutionary struggle of the working class; specific, national interests should not obscure the overall, global interests of the international proletariat.

Viewing the national question as a decisive factor of the world revolutionary movement and never losing sight of it while elaborating the course of the working-class struggle, Lenin also resolutely rebuffed the attempts by the ideologists of nationalism and national-opportunism to exaggerate the importance of that question in history by placing it above the social contradictions of the time and to present it as the key issue of the day. As contrast to nationalist doctrines, Leninism regards the national question in close connection with the specific historical conditions, the level of economic development and the local distinctive features of each country. The struggle of the working people for their social liberation is seen

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Critical Remarks on the National Question", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 19.

as the foremost task. "The bourgeoisie always places its national demands in the forefront...", Lenin wrote. "With the proletariat, however, these demands are subordinated to the interests of the class struggle."¹

Lenin's programme on the national question reflected the goal of consistent democratisation in specific demands to establish a republic, introduce legislation to protect the rights of national minorities, and abolish all national privileges. The Bolsheviks defended the oppressed nations' rights to self-determination, secession and formation of independent states. But at the same time they were against confusing the question of the nations' right to self-determination with the issue of whether this or that nation should secede. Lenin wrote: "The Social-Democratic Party must decide the latter question exclusively on its merits in each particular case in conformity with the interests of social development as a whole and with the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism."²

Lenin's definition of the essence of the Bolshevik programme and policy on the national question stressed: "...No privileges for any one nation, complete equality of nations and the unity, amalgamation of the workers of *all nations*."³

The proletariat, Lenin specified, cannot hold a position of metaphysical pragmatism. "While recognising equality and equal rights to a national state, it values above all and places foremost the alliance of the proletarians of all nations, and assesses any national demand, any national separation, *from the angle* of the workers' class struggle", it appraises each concrete case of secession "from the point of view of removing all inequality, all privileges, and all exclusiveness.... It is the only policy in the national question that is practical, based on principles, and really promotes democracy, liberty and proletarian unity."⁴

He stressed the indelible link between bringing about a revolution and solving the national question. Referring to the bourgeois-democratic revolution remaining incomplete in several countries, he noted that it "is *impossible* without a national movement and the urge to set up *national* states".⁵ At the same time,

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 410.

² V. I. Lenin, "Resolutions of the Summer, 1913, Joint Conference of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and Party Officials", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 429.

³ V. I. Lenin, "On the Question of National Policy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 223.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 409-10, 411-12.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, "Theses for a Lecture on the National Question", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, p. 317.

he pointed out the special significance of upholding internationalist principles in the new conditions of imperialism and the proletarian struggle for socialism.¹

In the final analysis, Lenin argued, only the socialist revolution ensures close unity of the working masses led by the working class in the drive to eliminate the system of capitalist exploitation and national oppression together with it. Lenin's approach to the national question linked the proletariat's class demands to vital national interests and determined the only possible ways and conditions for fully solving ethnic problems.

Lenin paid great attention to the distinctive features of the national liberation movement in the period of imperialism and studied the question of liberation of the colonial peoples from imperialist oppression and the role and place of the struggle for national independence in the world revolutionary movement. Lenin discovered two historical tendencies in the national question under capitalism. The first is the awakening of national movements, the struggle going on against all oppression, and national states emerging. The second concerns the development of international relations, the breakdown of national barriers, the internationalisation of socio-economic life. He wrote: "Both tendencies are a universal law of capitalism. The former predominates in the beginning of its development, the latter characterises a mature capitalism that is moving towards its transformation into socialist society."² The tendency towards the internationalisation of socio-economic life develops under capitalism, and especially under imperialism, in its colonial system, through coercion. At the same time, the development of imperialism, which intensified the exploitation and oppression of colonial and dependent countries, accelerated the emergence of capitalism there, expanded the scope of national movements and exacerbated the struggle against national oppression. In the new situation, the national question became one of the decisive factors of anti-imperialist struggle. Its solution is above all in the elimination of the global system which imperialism produced and which divided nations into the oppressed and the oppressors, into imperial powers and colonies.

Studying problems of ethnic relations under imperialism, Lenin closely followed the awakening of the mass struggle against the capitalist colonial system, the development of national-democratic revolutions in Iran (1905-1911), Turkey (1908-1909), China (1911), and the growth of the liberation movements of other colonial and oppressed peoples. Summing up the revolutionary developments

¹ Ibid., p. 316.

² V. I. Lenin, "Critical Remarks on the National Question", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 27.

in the colonial world, where "hundreds of millions of the downtrodden and benighted have awakened from medieval stagnation to a new life and are rising to fight for elementary human rights and democracy", Lenin described them as "a symbol of the new phase in world history that began early this century".¹

The anti-imperialist thrust of the national movements, their diverse social content, the specific features in the interconnection between general national tasks and those of the class struggle gave rise to the complex problem of unity between the proletariat in the colonies and dependent countries and other forces of the national liberation movement. Analysing this problem, Lenin paid special attention to the role of the peasants and the national bourgeoisie. He observed that "in Asia there is *still* a bourgeoisie capable of championing sincere, militant, consistent democracy, a worthy comrade of France's great men of the Enlightenment and great leaders of the close of the eighteenth century".²

But he also pointed to the dual nature of the national bourgeoisie which on the one hand strives for national independence, but on the other hand tends to compromise with the imperialists, especially when faced by a culminating revolutionary struggle. Lenin put forward and thus formulated the principle of flexible tactics to be followed by the socialists in their relations with the bourgeoisie: "*Insofar as the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation fights the oppressor, we are always, in every case, and more strongly than anyone else, in favour, for we are the staunchest and the most consistent enemies of oppression. But insofar as the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation stands for its own bourgeois nationalism, we stand against.*"³

While having exceptionally high regard for the national liberation movement, he emphasised that the principal and guiding force in the revolutionary transformation of the world is the international proletariat whose struggle determines both the social liberation of the people in capitalist countries and the national liberation of the colonial nations.⁴

Lenin's strategy with regard to the national-colonial question called for direct support of national liberation movements, "the struggle of Social-Democrats against colonial policy, their agitation among the masses against colonial robbery, the awakening of a spir-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Awakening of Asia", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 86.

² V. I. Lenin, "Democracy and Narodism in China", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 165.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 411-12.

⁴ See V. I. Lenin, "Civilised Europeans and Savage Asians", Vol. 19, pp. 57-58.

it of resistance and opposition among the oppressed masses in the colonies".¹ Lenin pointed out that in some countries there is a "material and economic basis for infecting the proletariat with colonial chauvinism" and stressed that "the evil must ... be clearly realised and its causes understood in order to be able to rally the proletariat of all countries for the struggle against such opportunism".²

He showed that only a class and internationalistic approach to the problem of independence of nations enables the proletariat to uphold its own policy and solidarity with workers of other countries in the face of bourgeois policy, and establish and consolidate an alliance with democratic forces fighting against national oppression.

The consistently class approach to this problem and profound studies of the trends of world development, which indicated that the entire economic, political and spiritual life of mankind was increasingly internationalised already under capitalism, allowed Lenin to make an important contribution to Marxism by formulating the concept of two cultures in every national culture, exposing the bourgeois nature of the shallow supra-class notion of "national culture", and opposing it with the socialist slogan of international, democratic and proletarian culture. He underlined that along with the "*dominant* culture" of the exploiter classes, "the *elements* of democratic and socialist culture are present, if only in rudimentary form, in *every* national culture". "In advancing the slogan of 'the international culture of democracy and of the world working-class movement'," he went on, "we take *from each* national culture *only* its democratic and socialist elements; we take them *only* and *absolutely* in opposition to the bourgeois culture and the bourgeois nationalism of *each* nation."³ The slogan of international, democratic and proletarian culture was fully in keeping with the trends of world development, the specific features of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, and the prospects of the approaching proletarian revolution which was to pave the way to a voluntary union and merger of nations and put an end to the forcible elimination of national differences and coerced assimilation of nations typical of capitalism. Lenin wrote in this connection: "In place of all forms of nationalism Marxism advances internationalism, the amalgamation of all nations in the higher unity, a unity that is growing before our eyes with every mile of railway line that is built, with every international trust, and every workers' associa-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau", Vol. 15, p. 244.

² V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 77.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Critical Remarks on the National Question", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 24.

tion that is formed (an association that is international in its economic activities as well as in its ideas and aims."¹

Thus, the subordination of the national question to the social and consistent internationalism have nothing in common with national nihilism. Lenin laid bare the theoretical untenability and political absurdity of national nihilism and pointed out that although "Marx had no doubt as to the subordinate position of the national question as compared with the 'labour question', ... his theory is as far from ignoring national movements as heaven is from earth".² He also pointed out that "in any really serious and profound political issue sides are taken according to classes, not nations" and that in its struggle against bourgeois nationalism the proletariat supports everything that is progressive, that helps to remove national barriers and eventually tends to merge nations.³ These principles underlay the practical policy of the Bolsheviks, helping them attain the revolutionary goals of the working class and unite all anti-imperialist forces; they also became a powerful weapon in the ideological struggle waged by the Bolsheviks, because they exposed the class nature of nationalism and showed its incompatibility with the interests of the masses of working people. "Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism," Lenin wrote, "these are the two irreconcilably hostile slogans that correspond to the two great class camps throughout the capitalist world, and express the *two* policies (nay, the two world outlooks) in the national question."⁴ He noted that disregard for the principles of proletarian internationalism and concessions to bourgeois nationalism weaken the proletariat and toughen the capitalist domination.

He always repudiated the dogmatic and doctrinaire attitude towards the problems of internationalism, and the distorted views of these problems among both ultra-leftists and opportunists. He regarded the international unity of the proletariat as an indispensable condition of a successful international and national struggle of workers for socialism, and condemned the national-opportunists who substituted "common national" goals for class goals. He criticised Bauer for his "idealistic theory of nation", "national (= bourgeois) culture slogan" and "internationalism completely forgotten". "Bauer's basic mistake," he wrote, "is refined nationalism, a nationalism which is clean, without exploitation and without fighting."⁵ Lenin's

¹ Ibid., p. 34.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 436.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Critical Remarks on the National Question", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 35, 36.

⁴ Ibid., p. 26.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, "Theses for a Lecture on the National Question", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, p. 315.

criticism was also levelled at the extreme left who ignored national interests and brushed aside patriotism. "The fatherland," he pointed out, "i.e., the given political, cultural and social environment, is a most powerful factor in the class struggle of the proletariat; and if Vollmar is wrong when he lays down some kind of 'truly German' attitude of the proletariat to 'the fatherland', Hervé is just as wrong when he takes up an unforgivably uncritical attitude on such an important factor in the struggle of the proletariat for emancipation."¹

The consistent upholding by Lenin of the principles of proletarian internationalism on the eve of the decisive class battles of the imperialist era, when the national question had become a crucial factor in both the broad democratic movement and the struggle for socialism, was of tremendous importance for the international labour movement and its policy. Lenin considered the proper correlation of the national and the international in the activities of the proletarian parties, of all detachments of the revolutionary movement, to be the key issue of internationalist policy."²

Lenin maintained that the key to a well-balanced relationship between the national and the international in the revolutionary labour struggle was a fusion of the class goals of the proletariat, which are inherently international, and the goals of all the people, which are an expression of the basic interests of the nation. The national responsibility and the internationalist duty of the working class are indivisible by the very nature of proletarian internationalism. Lenin formulated the fundamental principle of combining the national and the international in the revolutionary labour movement and charted for many decades ahead the course of the struggle to be waged by the proletariat for its national and international unity.

DEFENDING AND ADVANCING THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY THEORY

Lenin's development of Marxism and, above all, of the problems of revolution, made it imperative that Marxist philosophy, dialectical and historical materialism, materialistic dialectics, which is the heart of the revolutionary Marxist theory, be unassailable to attacks by bourgeois ideologists and distortions by opportunists. What is more, the general upsurge of the liberation movement at the beginning of the 20th century had sharply intensified the controversy with regard to the laws of social development, and the relation-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Bellicose Militarism and the Anti-Militarist Tactics of Social-Democracy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 194-95.

² *On the Centenary of the Birth of V. I. Lenin. Theses of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1970, p. 48.

ship between the objective and subjective in social development in general and in the revolutionary movement in particular. In essence, the controversy had sprung from differences in the methodological approach and the world outlook.

More and more bourgeois authors used anti-materialism as a smoke-screen for spreading all kinds of mystic teachings and disproving the laws of social development. A good deal of idealistic speculations were brought forth by new discoveries in natural sciences. The crusade against Marxist philosophy was accompanied by a confusion of philosophical thought among Social-Democrats themselves, and especially among revisionists. Lenin wrote in 1908: "In the sphere of philosophy revisionism followed in the wake of bourgeois professorial 'science'. The professors went 'back to Kant'—and revisionism dragged along after the neo-Kantians. The professors repeated the platitudes that priests have uttered a thousand times against philosophical materialism—and the revisionists, smiling indulgently, mumbled (word for word after the latest *Handbuch*) that materialism had been 'refuted' long ago. The professors treated Hegel as a 'dead dog', and while themselves preaching idealism, only an idealism a thousand times more petty and banal than Hegel's, contemptuously shrugged their shoulders at dialectics—and the revisionists floundered after them into the swamp of philosophical vulgarisation of science, replacing 'artful' (and revolutionary) dialectics by 'simple' (and tranquil) 'evolution'. The professors earned their official salaries by adjusting both their idealist and their 'critical' systems to the dominant medieval 'philosophy' (i.e., to theology)—and the revisionists drew close to them, trying to make religion a 'private affair', not in relation to the modern state, but in relation to the party of the advanced class."¹

The varying conditions under which the international proletariat waged its struggle focussed the attention of philosophers on different aspects of Marxism and shifted the centre of theoretical disputes to different countries. Franz Mehring, Dimitar Blagoev, Harry Quelch and other European Marxists disseminated Marxist philosophy and opposed philosophical revisionism, especially attempts to distort the principles of historical materialism and the theory of cognition of dialectical materialism. However, the importance of problems related to world outlook was underrated by theoreticians of most parties incorporated in the Second International. In February 1908, Lenin wrote to Maxim Gorky: "Materialism, as a philosophy, was *everywhere pushed into the background* by them."² In Russia,

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Marxism and Revisionism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 33.

² V. I. Lenin to Maxim Gorky, *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 386.

however, the problems of theory and the world outlook had rapidly gained in importance after the revolution of 1905-1907. This was due to the keen interest of broad masses of the population drawn into the revolution in philosophy and general theoretical problems, an interest quite natural at a time of reaction, a time when the rich experience of the revolution was being analysed and comprehended. Lenin wrote: "It was no mere chance that since the failure of the revolution, *all* classes of society, the widest sections of the popular masses, have displayed a fresh interest in the very fundamentals of the world outlook, including the questions of religion and philosophy, and the *principles* of our Marxist doctrine *as a whole*; that was inevitable. It is no mere chance that the masses, whom the revolution drew into the sharp struggle over questions of tactics, have subsequently, in the period characterised by the absence of open struggle, shown a desire for *general theoretical* knowledge; that was inevitable. We must again explain *the fundamentals of Marxism* to these masses; the defence of Marxist theory is again on the order of the day."¹ The necessity of explaining the fundamentals of Marxism to broad masses was dictated by yet another factor thus described by Lenin: "The progressive trends of Russian thought cannot fall back upon a great philosophical tradition, such as that connected with the Encyclopaedists of the eighteenth century in France, or with the epoch of classical philosophy from Kant to Hegel and Feuerbach in Germany."²

The situation in post-revolutionary Russia was further aggravated by a massive attack launched on Marxism by bourgeois ideologists and petty-bourgeois elements who had fallen under their influence. The trend of thought which then had the general vogue was bourgeois scepticism with its "despair of ever being able to give a scientific analysis of the present, a denial of science, a tendency to despise all generalisations, to hide from all the 'laws' of historical development, and make the trees screen the wood".³ The denial of the laws of science meant, in fact, the acceptance of the laws of religion. P. B. Struve, N. A. Berdyayev and some other philosophers fervently preached idealism, mysticism and religion. The appearance of the above-mentioned publication *Vekhi* with its renunciation of revolution and democracy combined with a denial of materialism and scientific knowledge was a sign of the times.

The onset of reaction in all spheres of social life, including the sphere of ideology, led to a spread of decadence and reactionary

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The State of Affairs in the Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 35.

² V. I. Lenin, "Those Who Would Liquidate Us", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 76.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Socialism Demolished Again", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 199.

philosophical theories even among Social-Democrats. The prevailing theory was Machism, also known as empirio-criticism. This philosophical school had come into being in Europe after the fall of the Paris Commune. Recognised by a mere handful of philosophers in Western countries, Machism found fertile soil in Russia in the period of reaction. It was used as the main philosophical weapon in the struggle against Marxism and served as a theoretical foundation of revisionism. It was at that time that a number of works by the founders of Machism, dating back to the late 19th century, were published in Russian.

Viewed from the standpoint of the objective role played by this variety of idealism in the ideological struggle of the period, Machism was an attempt to undermine the philosophical foundation of Marxism and expose the ideological sphere to reactionary influence.

Machism rapidly spread in the Menshevik faction of the RSDLP where only a group of "Party Mensheviks" with Georgi Plekhanov at the head remained true to Marxist philosophy. It was also preached by some Bolsheviks, including A. A. Bogdanov, V. A. Bazarov, A. V. Lunacharsky and some others. The denial of Marxist philosophy logically opened the gate to religion. Religious sentiments in the form of "God-seeking" and "God-building" got hold of some Social-Democratic intellectuals, including Lunacharsky and Bazarov.

One of the high points of the philosophical controversy of that period was the polemics between Plekhanov and the Machists and, in particular, Plekhanov's open letters to Bogdanov under the general title *Materialismus Militans*. Plekhanov exposed the epistemological roots of Machism, but shunned the problem of its social content. Playing on idealistic deviations of some Bolsheviks, he used the struggle against Machism to attack Bolshevism.

Lenin waged a consistent struggle against the reactionary philosophy of Machism and its Russian varieties, such as empirio-monism, empirio-symbolism and wanderings in the domain of religion. He saw his task in defending the philosophical foundations of scientific communism and providing a theoretical reinforcement for the revolutionary party of the proletariat.

Sprung from the specific conditions of the post-revolutionary situation, the philosophical controversy in Russia had a significance which extended far beyond the bounds of one country. The controversy was directly linked with the latest developments in science and philosophy in many other countries. Lenin realised that the defence of the foundations of dialectical materialism under the existing conditions called for a profound analysis of the new theoretical material produced after the death of Marx and Engels. "This philosophic 'sorting-out'," he wrote, "had been ripening for a long time in other countries as well, because modern physics, for

instance, had posed a number of new questions which dialectical materialism had to 'cope with'. In this respect, 'our'... philosophical controversy is of more than just a certain, i.e., Russian, significance. Europe provided material for a 'freshening' of philosophical thought; and Russia, which was lagging behind, seized upon this material with particular 'eagerness' during the period of enforced lull in 1908-10."¹

The name of Lenin became associated with a new stage in the development of Marxist philosophy. In his work *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1908-1909) he elaborated the basic philosophical categories, presented a well-grounded critical analysis of bourgeois philosophy and philosophical revisionism, and exposed the new ploys used by idealists in defending their views.

The struggle against bourgeois philosophy and the revisionists who followed in its wake centred on all the principal problems of philosophical science and, above all, on the concept of matter which is the cornerstone of Marxist philosophy. The opponents of Marxism played on difficulties encountered by natural sciences and on yet unsolved epistemological problems in their attempts to prove that materialism had become obsolete, that the concept of matter had been invalidated by modern science and thus had to be rejected.

Lenin was the first who viewed the latest achievements of contemporary natural sciences as the starting point of a great scientific revolution, and presented a philosophical interpretation of them. He generalised the available scientific material and showed beyond doubt that each new discovery was a corroboration of materialism, whereas idealism could only lead a parasitic existence on the periphery of human knowledge living on the difficulties it encountered in its development. The philosophical concept of matter formulated by Lenin was broad enough to embrace new properties and new forms of matter discovered by 20th-century science. This concept was directed against idealistic interpretations of "incredible" forms of matter and hitherto unknown structures. Lenin also raised to the level of contemporary science such basic philosophical notions as time, space, causality, and governing law.

The development by Lenin of the Marxist concept of matter and its inexhaustibility in the process of cognition was of paramount importance for the exposure of agnosticism, relativism, irrationalism and other bourgeois doctrines which had been previously used to refute the Marxist, materialist theory of cognition and prove unknowability of the universe and impossibility of a revolutionary transformation of the world.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Those Who Would Liquidate Us", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 76.

As Lenin further developed the Marxist theory of cognition and worked on the problems of epistemology, his attention was focussed on the application of dialectics to the process of reflection of the external world in thinking. He creatively developed the concept of truth and showed the dialectically contradictory progress of thought from relative truths to the absolute truth, and the role of practice as the basis and criterion of the cognition of an objective truth and as the determinant of the direction of cognition.

He examined agnosticism from the standpoint of the Marxist theory of cognition and laid open its scientific invalidity and hostility to both scientific thinking and the movement of the proletariat. He showed that a theory tested and corroborated by practice provides authentic knowledge and objective truth. Marxism, practically tested in the international labour struggle, is precisely such a theory. The objectivity of truth presupposes an expansion, concretisation and development of human knowledge with expansion and development of the practical and theoretical activity of man. Materialist dialectics, as Lenin wrote, "recognises the relativity of all our knowledge, not in the sense of denying objective truth, but in the sense that the limits of approximation of our knowledge to the truth are historically conditional".¹

Lenin's philosophical work in the period of the post-revolutionary reaction was continued in 1914 and 1915 when he produced a series of works, including the well-known "Philosophical Notebooks". The main subject of the work is materialist dialectics. Lenin analyses the dialectical ideas of Heraclitus, Leibnitz and Hegel, and further develops Marxist dialectics.

He warns against reducing dialectics to a "sum of examples" and defines it as a method of cognition and revolutionary transformation of reality, which makes it possible to comprehend the process of development with all its infinitely complex and contradictory nature, and as a theoretical basis of the practical and cognitive activity of man. According to Lenin, dialectics is the general theory of development, the logic and theory of cognition.

In dialectics, he singles out the theory of contradictions as the "kernel" of the Marxist method: "The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts ... is the *essence* (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics."² He discloses the content of this feature and shows the relativity of the unity of opposites and con-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 137.

² V. I. Lenin, "On the Question of Dialectics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 359.

traditions as an internal, but transient, form of connection, and the absolute character of their conflict which is a source of self-induced motion and development of phenomena.

He sets forth the basic principles of his comprehensive concept of dialectical development in the well-known work "Karl Marx" written in 1914: "A development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis ('the negation of negation'), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line; a development by leaps, catastrophes, and revolutions; 'breaks in continuity'; the transformation of quantity into quality; inner impulses towards development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given society; the interdependence and the closest and indissoluble connection between *all* aspects of any phenomenon (history constantly revealing ever new aspects), a connection that provides a uniform, and universal process of motion, one that follows definite laws—these are some of the features of dialectics as a doctrine of development that is richer than the conventional one."¹

The elaboration by Lenin of the principles of Marxist dialectics was of tremendous methodological significance in analysing the contradictions of capitalism which had entered the stage of imperialism, in deciding the course of political action of the international labour movement in the new conditions, and in exposing the sophistry of the opportunists and their eclectic and metaphysical thinking. In Lenin's view, an especially important aspect of the dialectical approach is a concrete analysis of the situation, the ability to surmount the stumbling blocks of abstractions, reveal a governing law or regularity in its specific manifestations, and to perceive the unique nature of the current period.

While asserting the unity of general philosophical materialism and historical materialism, Lenin elaborated and concretised Marx's materialist interpretation of history. Emphasising the significance of the radical change produced by Marxism in the sphere of the cognition of social phenomena, where idealism had once reigned supreme, he wrote: "By examining the *totality* of opposing tendencies, by reducing them to precisely definable conditions of life and production of the various *classes* of society, by discarding subjectivism and arbitrariness in the choice of a particular 'dominant' idea or in its interpretation, and by revealing that, without exception, all ideas and all the various tendencies *stem* from the condition of

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Karl Marx", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 54-55.

the material forces of production, Marxism indicated the way to an all-embracing and comprehensive study of the process of the rise, development, and decline of socio-economic systems."¹

At the same time, Lenin laid special emphasis on the fact that socio-economic formations evolve under different conditions in different countries and thus acquire a number of specific features. It is not enough to know the general laws of the growth, functioning and decline of capitalism; the task, he pointed out, is to reveal the specific features of each stage of capitalist development, and the unique characteristics of capitalism in each country. His analysis of Russian capitalism and his analysis of imperialism were examples of this concrete-historical approach and made it possible to use the known objective laws of history in the practical revolutionary activity of broad popular masses.

Lenin repeatedly stressed the Marxist concept of laws which objectively govern the course of historical development, and regarded the masses, advanced classes and revolutionary parties as active factors which can influence the social processes. Considering that an historical law is brought to fulfilment in the course of the socio-historical activity of people, revolutionary practice may become, under certain objective conditions, a decisive factor in determining the character, form and rate of this fulfilment. Specifically, the active role of the working class and its party is not an external factor in relation to the historical laws. Rather, they stem from the historical laws and are factors bringing these laws to fulfilment.

An historical subject is active, but this activity is not equivalent to arbitrariness. People cannot choose the circumstances and conditions under which they act, because these circumstances and conditions have been shaped by the preceding generations. The objective conditions determine people's capabilities and the tasks they have to fulfil. However, the extent to which the tasks will be fulfilled depends on people themselves, on the course of their struggle, on their zeal and awareness, and on the energy of forces interacting in the historical arena.

Lenin developed the Marxist thesis on the transformation of the potential into the real by elucidating the decisive role the activity of the masses has to play in this process, especially under revolutionary conditions. He argued that "the organising abilities of the people ... are revealed a million times more strongly, fully and productively in periods of revolutionary whirlwind than in periods of so-called calm (dray-horse) historical progress".² The role of the revo-

¹ Ibid., p. 57.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 259.

lutionary party of the working class consists in concentrating the creative efforts of the masses, in lending them a constructive and purposeful character and multiplying the strength of the masses through organisation and scientific knowledge.

Lenin advanced and substantiated a most important concept of an inseparable link existing between philosophy and politics. He wrote: "Behind the epistemological scholasticism of empirio-criticism one must not fail to see the struggle of parties in philosophy, a struggle which in the last analysis reflects the tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society."¹ In exposing the attempts of bourgeois philosophers to prove that partisanship in philosophy had become a thing of the past and to place themselves above the battle between materialism and idealism, Lenin emphasised that "recent philosophy is as partisan as was philosophy two thousand years ago".² At the same time, he demonstrated how, in the sphere of ideology, the logic of the class struggle led to the supersedence of the direct negation of Marxism by its revision: "An ever subtler falsification of Marxism, an ever subtler presentation of anti-materialist doctrines under the guise of Marxism—this is the characteristic feature of modern revisionism in political economy, in questions of tactics and in philosophy generally, equally in epistemology and in sociology."³

The revisionists in Russia, following their colleagues in Western Europe, continued stubbornly to insist that Marxism was not an integral teaching but rather a concept made up of two separate aspects, the ideological, world-outlook aspect, ostensibly bearing no direct relation to the practical aspect embodied in the socio-political programme. Proceeding from this argument, the revisionists maintained that each Social-Democrat was free to choose his own world outlook, that both Kantian and Machist philosophic tendencies were compatible with the political findings of Marxism and that the philosophic controversy in Russia had no real connection with the Marxist trend in socio-political thought. In his criticism of such views, Lenin emphasised that "the political line of Marxism is inseparably bound up with its philosophical principles"; he also noted that "the controversy over the question as to what is philosophical materialism and why deviations from it are erroneous, dangerous and reactionary *always* has 'a real and living connection' with 'the Marxist social and political trend'—otherwise the latter would not be Marxist, would not be social and political, would not be a trend. Only narrow-minded 'realistic politicians' of

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 358.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 330.

reformism or anarchism can deny the 'reality' of this connection."¹

Lenin waged a consistent struggle against all attempts to advocate a lackadaisical attitude to philosophy on the part of the proletarian party, a party which cannot be indifferent to the world outlook of its members. A community of opinion on the questions of politics, strategy and tactics is impossible without unity in the domain of ideology. Lenin uncompromisingly opposed the demands of the Bernsteinians and Legal Marxists to combine the socio-economic theory of Marxism with Kant's philosophy and neo-Kantianism. He was equally opposed to A. A. Bogdanov's attempts to synthesise the Marxian social and political theory he had done much to distort with Machist epistemology.

The struggle Lenin waged against various forms of opportunism and revisionism in philosophy was crucial to the entire international working-class movement inasmuch as it served as a model of militant Bolshevik partisanship and the creative development of Marxism; it was of vital importance to the theoretical substantiation of the programme and policy of the party of the revolutionary proletariat which, proceeding from its knowledge of the objective laws of social existence, transforms the world.

On the basis of the integrity of Marxism, the existence of a direct link between its ideological foundation and political propositions, Lenin criticised as well the opportunist idea that the right to profess philosophical idealism in all its varied forms and a religion is a private concern of the individual vis-à-vis a Marxist party.

This notion, promulgated in Western Europe by revisionists à la Bernstein and fraught with the danger of ideologically disarming the working class, was especially perilous in the conditions obtaining in Russia upon the defeat of the revolution of 1905-1907, when "the Russian bourgeoisie for its counter-revolutionary purposes felt a need to revise religion, increase the demand for religion, invent religion, inoculate the people with religion or strengthen the hold of religion on them in new forms".²

All this lent immediate impact to the problem of the attitude of the working-class party towards religion and the church. For this reason, Lenin considered it "the absolute duty of Social-Democrats to make a public statement of their attitude towards religion".³

In developing the Marxist teaching on religion as a specific form

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Those Who Would Liquidate Us", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 75.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Faction of Supporters of Otzovism and God-Building", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 44.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 402.

of social consciousness, Lenin was concerned first and foremost with the ability of the working-class party to perform its leading role in the revolutionary transformation of the antagonistic society. He pointed out that, historically, the struggle against religion was the mission of the bourgeoisie. In a number of European countries, the bourgeoisie fulfilled this mission or at least tackled it in one way or another in the era of anti-feudal revolutions. In Western Europe, bourgeois anti-religious traditions found their specific, albeit distorted embodiment in anarchism, which advocated "revolutionary" war against God at all costs. At the same time, there emerged an opportunist tendency to deny the importance of anti-religious campaigns.

In Russia, where the bourgeoisie had never opposed religion, this mission fell "almost entirely on the shoulders of the working class"¹ which acted as the leader of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. That is why Lenin believed that the party of this class "must be the ideological leader in the struggle against all attributes of medievalism, including the old official religion and every attempt to refurbish it or make out a new or different case for it, etc."²

Marxism takes its political slant from the fact that religion and religious organisations in capitalist society are an instrument of bourgeois reaction, which is, however, a far cry from declaring war against them. Lenin recalled, in this connection, the example set by Engels who, in criticising the Blanquists, warned the Social-Democrats against the rash policy of declaring a political war against religion. He also spoke against Eugen Dühring and the latter's demands that religion be banned under socialism, emphasising that the Social-Democrats considered religion the private concern of the individual vis-à-vis the state.

Lenin observed that Marxism's consistent stance on religion did not derive from the existing state of affairs or the desire to conceal Marxism's goals so as not to frighten off the philistine. He wrote: "On the contrary, in this question, too, the political line of Marxism is inseparably bound up with its philosophical principles."³

He stressed that in class society religion is above all rooted in social factors. Under capitalism, they include social oppression of the labouring masses and their apparent helplessness in the face of spontaneous forces of capitalism. "Fear of the blind force of capital—blind because it cannot be foreseen by the masses of the people—a force which at every step in the life of the proletarian and the small proprietor threatens to inflict and does inflict 'sudden', 'unexpected', 'accidental' ruin, destruction, pauperism, prostitu-

¹ Ibid., p. 410.

² Ibid., p. 411.

³ Ibid., p. 405.

tion, death from starvation—such is *the root* of modern religion which the materialist must bear in mind first and foremost, if he does not want to remain an infant-school materialist.”¹

Since the false, including the religious, forms of reflecting reality are generated by the social conditions prevailing under capitalism, they can be overcome only by liquidating capitalism, replacing it with a social system free from exploitation.

Consequently, in order to overcome religion it is necessary to launch a revolutionary struggle for socialism. Education cannot in and of itself eliminate the social conditions which generate and maintain religion. The battle against religion, therefore, is not to be seen as some special task of the working class. It is subordinate to and coordinated with the latter's chief goal, that of effecting a proletarian revolution. The policy of the workers' party must be aimed at uniting all working people irrespective of their religious denomination; dividing the working people on religious lines can only profit the enemies of the working class. The main criterion in delineating the forces involved in the revolutionary struggle is class affiliation, which is not to be supplanted by “division according to belief in God”, as Lenin put it. The class, revolutionary struggle itself promotes the atheist education of the masses, while the participation of the latter in the building of socialism crowns the “remaking” of social conditions with the “remaking” of mankind.

While insisting that religion should be the private concern of the individual vis-à-vis the state, Lenin remarked that it should not by any means be considered private vis-à-vis the party of the working class which, proceeding from its ideological principles, rejects any and all non-scientific views. At the same time, he held that the question of whether a believer can or cannot be a party member must be resolved individually in each individual case. On the one hand, he argued, it was necessary to attract those workers who had yet to throw off the last influences of religion in order to facilitate their adherence to scientific socialism. On the other hand, if it is a question of retreating from a socialist to a religious stance, the party should and must disapprove. It was this approach that Lenin upheld in the case of the “God-builders”. Here, retreating ideologically from Marxism inevitably involved deviating from party tactics.

The aggravated ideological struggle lent particular urgency to the elaboration of problems related to the development of Marxism, its theoretical sources, the continuity of the revolutionary movement and the history of struggle between Marxism and various manifestations of reformism.

¹ Ibid., p. 406.

To judge from "The Draft Plan of Articles on the Thirtieth Anniversary of Karl Marx's Death", drawn up in late February 1913, Lenin planned to publish a series on the most urgent issues related to the theory of Marxism.

The plan was carried out in his works of 1913 and 1914: "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism", "Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Death of Joseph Dietzgen", "Liberal and Marxist Conceptions of the Class Struggle", "The Struggle for Marxism", "Marxism and Reformism", "The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx", and "Karl Marx". All of them are organically linked with Lenin's "Marxism and Revisionism" (1908) and related to articles written between 1910 and 1912: "Certain Features of the Historical Development of Marxism" and "In Memory of Herzen".

In contrast to the attempts of bourgeois ideologists to present Marxism as a chance occurrence in the development of philosophical and socio-political thought, with no foundation in world culture, Lenin proved that Marxism is, of necessity and in conformity to historical law, the synthesis of world culture. He traced the theoretical sources of Marxism as rooted in the intellectual and cultural development of mankind and in the highest achievements of philosophy, political economy and socialist doctrines. Marxism, he observed, was the lawful heir of the best of science. At the same time, Lenin noted that Marxism was a qualitatively new stage in the development of science. By the same token, Marxism is not a philosophy in the old sense of the word, but rather the result of revolutionary upheaval in this domain of human knowledge, the sum of all attained by the thinkers of history, the result of the critical reworking of both materialist and idealist systems from the standpoint of the new world outlook, offering the revolutionary class a tool with which to transform the world. Lenin wrote, "Marx's philosophical materialism alone has shown the proletariat the way out of the spiritual slavery in which all oppressed classes have hitherto languished."¹ Marxist philosophy signalled the beginning of a new stage in the world history of philosophy, that which surmounted its alienation from other forms of apprehending reality and social practice. This applies as well to Marxist political economy and socialism.

Lenin himself, in creatively developing all the components of Marxist theory on the basis of the experience gained by the world liberation movement of the early 20th century, revealed to the proletariat the path of struggle in its new context. The development of the theory of Marxism was, as always, crucial in elaborating

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 28.

a proper revolutionary political strategy for socialist parties, in consolidating the position of the revolutionary forces in the international working-class movement, and in preparing them for the battles ahead.

* * *

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Chapter 4

PROBLEMS OF THE POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF THE PROLETARIAT

The new stage in the development of the international revolutionary working-class movement made it an especially urgent task to consolidate and improve the proletariat's political organisations capable of preparing the ground for a social revolution. Along with ideological and political issues, party organisation emerged as an important matter in the struggle between the revolutionary and opportunist trends in the international working-class movement.

THE BOLSHEVIKS' STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN THE REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAN PARTY

The defeat of the 1905-1907 revolution was a severe trial for the Russian working class and its party. The reactionary regime, headed by Stolypin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, began its reign of wholesale terror. Thousands of freedom fighters were purged. Many trade unions and other legal agencies of the working-class movement, including newspapers, periodicals and the like, were crushed and banned. From June 1907 to 1910, there were 15 mass arrests of RSDLP activists in St. Petersburg; the party's membership in the capital fell from 7,300 to 600. The Moscow city organisation shrank from 7,500 to 270 members.¹ Repression was not the only thing that thinned party ranks; another factor was the defection of the wavering RSDLP members who succumbed to the renegade approach of the *Vekhists* or were broken by the onslaught of reaction.

The tsarist regime made wide use of agents provocateurs in its struggle against the revolutionary underground. Spying weakened party unity and sowed distrust among underground activists. Arrests

¹ See I. Ye. Gorelov, *The Bolsheviks in the Period of Reaction (1907-1910)*, Vysshaya Shkola, Moscow, 1975, pp. 36-37 (in Russian).

and police frame-ups were severing ties among party organisations and isolating them from their central bodies and from one another for long periods.

In such conditions it was especially important not to panic or plunge into reckless adventurism, but to resume a patient, steady effort to prepare party organisations and the masses for the revolution. The Bolsheviks were equal to this challenge. As Lenin noted, "Of all the defeated opposition and revolutionary parties, the Bolsheviks effected the most orderly retreat, with the least loss to their 'army', with its core best preserved, with the least significant splits (in point of depth and incurability), with the least demoralisation, and in the best condition to resume work on the broadest scale and in the most correct and energetic manner."¹

In spite of interruptions caused by arrests, the Central Committee and its Bureau in Russia were active throughout the period of reaction; publication of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the central organ of the party, and the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary* was resumed abroad; the Regional Bureau of the Central Industrial Region survived, as did party committees and groups in other key industrial areas of the country.

The Bolsheviks' protracted efforts to prepare revolutionary cadres from among the workers paid off: these forces led most of the party organisations during the period of reaction. The workers themselves did most of the party work: their greatest advantage was their organic ties with the proletarian masses, for all their inexperience in clandestine methods. In 1910 Lenin observed: "A new type of working-class member of the Social-Democratic Party is arising, independently carrying on *all* the activities of the Party and, compared with the previous type, capable of rallying, uniting and organising masses of the proletariat ten times and a hundred times as great as before."² Perfectly aware that a new bourgeois-democratic revolution was inevitable, the Bolsheviks wanted to preserve and strengthen the tried and tested underground party organisation, at the same time using all legal opportunities for its expansion and protection.

Having repulsed the first revolutionary onslaught, the autocratic regime was nevertheless unable to destroy all of its gains, including the workers' right to publish newspapers and periodicals, to organise trade unions, clubs, cooperatives, cultural and educational societies within a city or region, and to send deputies to the Duma from Russia's key industrial provinces. This facilitated a combination of clandestine and legitimate forms of party work, and that combination was imperative for preserving the party and its contacts with

¹ V. I. Lenin, "'Left-Wing' Communism—an Infantile Disorder", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 28.

² V. I. Lenin, "Announcement of the Publication of *Rabochaya Gazeta*", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 290-91.

the masses. Especially wide use was made of the press. From June 1907 to the end of 1910, the RSDLP published, at different times, about 40 legitimate and underground periodicals. In 1910-1914 alone, 790 different leaflets were put out. Clandestine party groups were formed within legitimate organisations to provide the latter with leadership; party committees guided the work of trade union central bureaus and interclub commissions. In 1910 the St. Petersburg department of the Secret Political Police admitted: "The entire everyday party work of the local RSDLP organisation is centred in clubs and educational societies.... Most members of subregional and regional committees are now also on the boards of clubs and educational societies; therefore all the conferences of the above committees are disguised as board meetings, and it is difficult to expose their criminal activities."¹

In their striving to preserve, develop and perfect the party's organisation, the Bolsheviks fought on two fronts: against the "liquidationists" and the "otzovists".

The Menshevik liquidationists maintained that the June 3 regime was bourgeois and that it therefore made a new bourgeois revolution unnecessary. They therefore denied the necessity of the revolutionary Social-Democratic ideas for the programme, tactics and organisation, and, furthermore, the need for a working-class party as it had taken shape during the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary years. The Mensheviks relied entirely on the scanty political rights conceded by tsarism, regarding them as the alternative to clandestine activities and organisation. They called for replacing the clandestine RSDLP with a legal "broad labour party" which would conform to what was allowed by Stolypin's regime. Liquidationism meant betrayal of and withdrawal from the RSDLP; it fought against the revolutionary party from reformist positions.

Conversely, the otzovists refused to use the legitimate means available even under reaction: specifically, they demanded that workers' deputies be recalled from the Duma and recognised only clandestine methods of work. The otzovists approached key party tasks from a position of petty-bourgeois adventurism, ignored the actual situation, called for "blowing up" the legitimate workers' organisations, and tried to replace them with "schools" to train fighting squads. The "militant" otzovist line often merged with the Socialist-Revolutionaries' terrorism and threatened to degenerate into plain thuggery.

The Fifth All-Russia Conference of the RSDLP (Paris, December 1908) denounced liquidationism as an attempt by a certain part of

¹ The October Revolution Central State Archive of the USSR (further referred to as TsGAOR), Moscow, Box 102, 00, 1910, file 5, section 57, sheet 16.

the party's intelligentsia "to eliminate the existing organisation of the RSDLP and replace it with an amorphous association within the legitimate framework at any cost, even that of obviously giving up the party's programme, tactics and traditions...."¹ The Conference decided to shift the emphasis of work among the masses to strengthening the clandestine organisation and stressed that all work among the masses, including its legal forms, could only be carried on correctly if guided by this organisation.² Still earlier, in August 1908, the plenary session of the RSDLP Central Committee repulsed the attempt by Menshevik liquidationists to replace the RSDLP Central Committee with some "information commission". The session endorsed the Central Committee structure which was largely preserved throughout the party's clandestine period. All powers of the Central Committee were vested in the plenary meeting of its members which elected the Russian and foreign-based bureaus of the Central Committee for directing everyday work, the editorial board of the central organ, and the working commissions.³ At the Fifth Conference, the RSDLP defined its position vis-à-vis otzovism. In June 1909, a conference of the enlarged editorial board of *Proletary*, the Bolshevik Centre, in which representatives of the Bolshevik organisations of St. Petersburg, the Central Industrial Region and the Urals participated, condemned otzovism and declared that the Bolsheviks had nothing to do with it. However, the Bolsheviks did not reject isolationist-minded workers, but aimed at re-educating them in the course of joint struggle.

In their struggle against liquidationism and otzovism the Bolsheviks sought to unite all forces of the party. When some of the Mensheviks, the so-called Party Mensheviks, including Georgi Plekhanov, opposed liquidationist attempts to destroy the party, the Bolsheviks entered into a political alliance with them.

Despite the contradictory position of the Party Mensheviks who tried to separate Menshevism from the liquidationist stage of its evolution and to use the criticism of otzovism and Machism against the Bolsheviks, despite the different concepts of unity, the Bolsheviks' alliance with the Party Mensheviks helped neutralise the liquidationists and otzovists. As a result, Menshevik supporters among workers at the grass roots level gravitated towards the Bolsheviks, and many of them subsequently accepted Bolshevism. Lenin later recalled that splits between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks "alternated with the semi-unity and unity of 1906 and 1907 followed by that of 1910 not only because of the vicissitudes of the struggle but also un-

¹ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1970, p. 249 (in Russian).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 255-56.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 242-44, 246.

der pressure from the rank and file, who demanded check tests through their own experience".¹

The Bolsheviks were striving to unite party forces on the basis of principle, viewing unity above all from the angle "of the entire programme, the entire tactics and the whole character of the Party..."² and resisting the centrist policy of compromise. The conciliators disguised their surrender to the rightist opportunists with pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric and hypocritical appeals for unity at any cost. Trotsky's course was typical of centrism in Russia. While approaching all essential problems from proliquidationist positions, he advertised himself as a man above all factionalism. Lenin said of this: "Trotsky behaves like a despicable careerist and factionalist.... He pays lip service to the Party and behaves worse than any other of the factionalists."³ Trotsky was mostly concerned with putting together an alliance of the liquidationists and otzovists against the Bolsheviks. In August 1912 his efforts led to the establishment of the so-called August Bloc at a conference of all groups hostile to the Bolsheviks. The bloc comprised some of the foreign-based Mensheviks, the liquidationists from the Caucasus, the Bund, Lettish Social-Democratic leaders and the Trotskyists. Opposing the party on all key questions, the liquidationists, otzovists and Trotskyists tried to deceive the rank and file of the party, asserting that the differences of opinion between them and the Bolsheviks were confined only to specific organisational issues.

The struggle against this course ran into difficulties because a conciliatory trend emerged among the Bolsheviks themselves. Its advocates, including some Central Committee members and leaders of local Party organisations, were against a resolute break with the opportunists. Although the January 1910 plenary session of the RSDLP Central Committee denounced liquidationism and otzovism as "cases of bourgeois influence on the proletariat", the conciliators managed to have the Bolshevik Centre disbanded and the publication of the Bolshevik newspaper *Proletary* stopped. The Bolsheviks' funds and printing house were handed over to the Central Committee on the condition that the Mensheviks observe the decisions agreed upon.

The Bolsheviks scrupulously obeyed the decisions of the January plenary session, but the Menshevik liquidationists and Trotskyists stepped up their efforts to split the party, refused to cooperate, and

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Remarks to the Theses of a United Front", *Collected Works*, Vol. 42, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p. 368.

² V. I. Lenin, "The New Faction of Conciliators, or the Virtuous", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1963, p. 260.

³ V. I. Lenin to G. Y. Zinoviev, August 24, 1909, *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, pp. 399-400.

continued publishing the factionalist *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata*, defying the session. A liquidationist centre was set up in Russia.

This situation in the party could not be tolerated, all the more so because the country was experiencing a resurgence of the revolutionary movement. Thus, a drive was launched to rally the Bolsheviks against the liquidationists and otzovists to re-establish an all-Russia party organisation on a Bolshevik basis. In late 1910 the Bolsheviks began publishing the underground *Rabochaya Gazeta* abroad, the legal newspaper *Zvezda* in St. Petersburg, and the legal journal *Mysl* in Moscow. In the summer of 1911, the first clandestine party school began functioning in the village of Longjumeau near Paris. Its students—workers and professional revolutionaries—were sent there by party organisations in Russia. In December 1911 a conference of foreign-based Bolshevik groups established the Foreign Branch of the RSDLP. The struggle within the party centred on the convening of a regular Party Conference. A meeting of RSDLP Central Committee members in June 1911 in Paris set up the Foreign-Based Organisational Committee to convene the conference and a Technical Committee charged with taking care of everyday work. Bolshevik graduates of the Party School were sent to Russia and, led by Sergo Orjonikidze, toured major proletarian regions and helped re-establish party committees there. In September 1911, representatives of the latter established the Russian Organisational Commission—an interim Party centre which as well as preparing for the conference directed all Party work in Russia. The difficulties of this effort can be seen from the fact that of the 10 people sent into the country at different times to help prepare for the conference, only 2 were not arrested and were able to attend it.

The situation in the ethnic organisations of the RSDLP was also complicated. Most of them were scenes of intense struggle over the same problems that were being debated in the Party as a whole, but its results were far from uniform. The Bund, the extreme right wing of Menshevism, shared the views of the liquidationists. And while Bund members officially claimed that they were working to reconcile the opposing sides, they were most active in the August Bloc of the anti-Party groups. Among the Lettish Social-Democrats, the gap was widening between their Central Committee, which increasingly leaned toward liquidationism since after the arrests of 1910 liquidationists got the upper hand there, and the many grass roots organisations, including the Riga organisations, the largest of them, which supported the Bolsheviks. The positions held by the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPL) were complex and contradictory. Since its accession to the RSDLP, the Executive Board of the SDKPL had shared the Bolshevik approach to all key issues, but from the latter half of

1911, it became increasingly conciliatory. At the June 1911 meeting of RSDLP Central Committee members, where it was decided to start preparing for the Party Conference, Felix Dzerzhinsky, spokesman of the SDKPL Executive Board, allied himself with Lenin concerning the purging of liquidationists from the party. But other SDKPL representatives, members of the Foreign Branch and the Technical Committee, allied themselves with the conciliators against the Bolsheviks. After several disagreements in the autumn of 1911, the SDKPL representative withdrew from the editorial board of the RSDLP central organ which was led by Lenin; at the same time, the Executive Board resolutely dissociated itself from the anti-party August Bloc. The leaders of these three organisations refused to send their delegates to the Prague Party Conference.

The 6th (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the RSDLP was held in January 1912 and acted as the supreme party body. Party organisations of St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region, the Volga Region, the South and the Caucasus were represented at the Conference.

The Conference confirmed the strategic course of the party which proceeded from the inevitability of a new bourgeois-democratic revolution, noted the reawakening of political activity in the country, and reaffirmed the tactics of combining clandestine and legal political work. A resolution was adopted on strengthening clandestine RSDLP committees in all cities, publicising the tested forms of underground mass party organisations, party meetings and "party exchanges" at factories, and boldly searching for new organisational forms. Special attention was paid to party work in legally functioning organisations, to creating clandestine party chapters within them, to leading the proletariat's strike movement and taking an active part in the forthcoming elections to the 4th Duma. It was decided to launch a legitimate mass circulation daily newspaper by the time the elections began.

The greatest accomplishment of the Prague Conference was that it restored the ideological and organisational unity of the RSDLP and cleansed the Party of petty-bourgeois opportunist groups. The Conference stated that the liquidationists' activities put them outside the party. It decided that all foreign-based groups were to submit to the leadership of the RSDLP Central Committee, and that those who tried to work in Russia without its sanction had no right to use the name of the RSDLP. Thus, the liquidationist, Trotskyist, Vperyodist and conciliatory groups who refused to recognise the decisions taken at the Conference and the leadership of the Central Committee elected there found themselves outside the party. A resolution drafted by Lenin was adopted recognising the extreme importance of strengthening the unity of the workers of all of Russia's

nationalities both centrally and locally and saying it was inadmissible for the ethnic executive bodies to impede the work of the RSDLP. The Conference entrusted the Central Committee with the task of ensuring unity with ethnic organisations affiliated with the RSDLP.¹

The Conference elected a new Central Committee led by Lenin. The Central Committee established a Russian Bureau for work in Russia proper and an editorial board of the central organ. It again appointed Lenin as the party's representative in the International Socialist Bureau.

Historically, the 6th (Prague) Conference of the RSDLP played the role of a congress. It consolidated the re-establishment of the single all-Russia party organisation on the basis of Leninist principles. Its resolutions considerably intensified the work in the key proletarian regions of the country. In June 1912, the Foreign-Based Bureau of the Central Committee led by Lenin moved from Paris to Cracow, closer to the Russian border, in order to strengthen its regular ties with Russia. Here the RSDLP Central Committee held its conferences with party activists. Of particular importance were the Cracow Conference held from December 26, 1912 to January 1, 1913, and the Poronin Conference held from September 23 to October 1, 1913.

Within a year after the 6th (Prague) Conference, which witnessed a new upsurge of the revolutionary movement, the Bolsheviks had for the most part restored the clandestine Party organisation which relied on a dense network of Party chapters at factories. The Central Committee was in direct contact with Party branches in about 100 places throughout the country. The Central Committee's Russian Bureau was active within the country, as were 28 party committees and 27 leading groups and commissions which, although not elected formally, acted as committees. RSDLP committees flexibly combined elections and cooptation. Beginning in late 1912, the system of using party agents emerged as a new way to direct the work of the clandestine organisations. These agents acted as contacts between local organisations and the Central Committee and among local organisations themselves. The party's numerical strength was relatively modest, largely due to the situation in the country. The struggle against the liquidationists had caused a change in the membership rules: only a person taking part in the work of a clandestine party organisation was recognised as a party member. Admission to the party entailed considerable caution: a new member was admitted only if unanimously approved at a meeting of a clandestine organisation or after a probationary period; new members were first regarded as "sympathisers" or "on probation".

¹ See *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, pp. 327-45.

In late 1912, Lenin observed that, paradoxical as it might sound in the current political situation in Russia, "the number of members of an organisation should not exceed a definite minimum, *if its influence on the masses is to be broad and stable*".¹ Yet he stressed that in a different situation (for example, Russia in the autumn of 1905 or Europe in general) it would have been a mistake to underrate either the spread of the party's influence on the masses or its numerical growth. In early 1914, Lenin wrote: "Our task is to adopt from the Germans *all* that is most valuable (the mass of newspapers, the large party membership, the mass membership of the trade unions, the systematic subscription to the newspapers, strict control over the parliamentarians ... and so on), adopt all this *without* playing up to the opportunists."²

Directing legally authorised activities was a very important aspect of the Central Committee's work. On May 5, 1912, *Pravda*, a legitimate daily newspaper, was launched, and its publication continues to this day (with the exception of the interval from the end of July 1914 to the beginning of March 1917). Lenin contributed almost daily to *Pravda* from Cracow; he published about 300 articles there in the course of a little more than two years. The legitimate newspaper and mass propaganda made it possible to inform the workers of the decisions of the clandestine party and organise comprehensive opinion polls. *Pravda's* editorial board became a centre linking clandestine and legal organisations; it directed the creation of a network of legitimate party periodicals, including the theoretical publication *Prosveshcheniye*, the journal *Voprosy Strakhovaniya*, trade union periodicals, a magazine for women workers, a number of locally published periodicals, and newspapers in the Estonian, Lithuanian, Polish and other languages. In many cities, groups to aid the labour press and editorial committees to link newspapers with the masses were established.

The legitimate *Pravda*-related press educated tens of thousands of progressive workers who were the cadres of clandestine party organisations and activists of legal labour associations.

In 1912, the Bolsheviks conducted an effective election campaign to the 4th Duma. For the first time, each of the six provinces which, under the election laws, could elect one Duma member nominated by the workers, sent a Bolshevik to the Duma. In these provinces, local party organisations actually achieved a legal status of sorts:

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Question of Party Affiliation Among Democratic-Minded Students", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971, p. 209.

² V. I. Lenin to Inessa Armand, April 1914, *Collected Works*, Vol. 43, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 397.

their leaders were elected as both those in charge of selecting electors from the largest enterprises, and as electors. This established legal contacts between the Central Committee and the key factories of the industrial provinces: from the CC through Duma members, electors and those charged with selecting electors to major party branches. Bolshevik Duma members were endorsed as Central Committee agents and they used the cover of contacts with their constituencies to channel Central Committee directives to local organisations and to tour the country's major proletarian areas periodically. At first there was the single Social-Democratic faction in the Duma (7 Mensheviks and 6 Bolsheviks), but then, in November 1913, the Bolshevik Duma members formed a faction of their own. The Bolshevik faction in the Duma became one of the most important legitimate party bodies. Its members replaced those members of the Central Committee's Russian Bureau who were arrested.

In the summer of 1913, the Bolsheviks, who wanted to strengthen the trade unions, launched a campaign to deprive the liquidationists of their posts. As a result, in 1914 liquidationist influence in the trade unions of St. Petersburg and Moscow was almost completely neutralised.

Despite tsarist legislation prohibiting the unification of trade unions, they established clandestine ties—via the Party committees' central trade union bureaus and through the editorial boards of periodicals. For example, the legitimate Bolshevik periodical *Voprosy Strakhovaniya* and clandestine Party chapters helped carry on mass work in insurance and hospital fund organisations where Bolshevik influence became dominant in 1912-1913.

The combination of clandestine and legitimate party work made it possible to raise a new crop of proletarian revolutionaries, protect clandestine organisations, reduce the risk of infiltration by police agents and exercise systematic influence over the masses of workers. In 1913, Lenin observed that the party, thirty to fifty thousand strong, relied on a "broad layer" of 300 to 500 thousand proletarians who followed the party, voted for it and linked the party with millions of workers.

Thus, on the eve of World War I, only the Bolsheviks possessed a unified underground all-Russia party organisation. They were gaining strength and preparing for a party congress. The consolidation of the Party helped neutralise the liquidationists, the otzovists and the Trotskyists. The August Bloc began to disintegrate at the very conference that formally established it. The International Socialist Bureau's attempts to force a compromise unification with the opportunists on the Bolsheviks at the July 1914 Brussels Conference also failed. "Unity is a great thing and a great slogan," Lenin wrote. "But what the workers' cause needs is the *unity of Marxists*, not unity

between Marxists, and opponents and distorters of Marxism.”¹

As the working-class movement grew, so did the influence of the Bolsheviks in non-Russian regional organisations. Left-wing members of the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, the “schismatics” actively collaborated with the RSDLP Central Committee and took part in the 1913 Cracow and Poronin Conferences of the Central Committee with party activists. In January 1914 the Lettish Bolsheviks invited Lenin to take part in the preparations for the 4th Congress of the Lettish Social-Democratic Party and in the Congress itself. He delivered an extensive report there, harshly criticising the proliquidationist course of the previous Central Committee. The Congress elected a Bolshevik Central Committee of the Lettish Social-Democratic Party which announced its withdrawal from the August Bloc. The Bolshevik press played an important role in uniting the workers in the country’s non-Russian outlying areas. By the time the imperialist world war began, the Bolsheviks had succeeded in uniting the workers of different nationalities at the grass roots level in the course of practical action and joint struggle.

* * *

In implementing Lenin’s doctrine on the new type of proletarian party the Bolsheviks had to reckon with a complicated situation. New forms of party organisation were evolved and improved in mass revolutionary struggle.

The militant proletarian party emerged as the vanguard force of the revolutionary proletariat rallied together on a Marxist theoretical, political and organisational basis; it developed and grew stronger in the struggle against right-wing and “leftist” opportunism, centrism and appeasement. The course that led the Bolsheviks to victory was unity from the ground up and reliance on the masses’ own political experience. But the Bolsheviks did not reject alliance and compromise with anyone who was ready to defend the interests of the revolutionary proletariat.

The Russian experience in building a party of a new type, which absorbed the organisational experience of the revolutionary proletarians in other countries, was of paramount importance for the working-class movement throughout the world.

¹ V. I. Lenin, “Unity”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 232.

THE CONFRONTATION OVER ORGANISATIONAL ISSUES BETWEEN
THE REVOLUTIONARY AND OPPORTUNIST TRENDS
IN OTHER LABOUR PARTIES

The need to make the proletariat's political organisation more efficient and militant, which became obvious in the course of intensified class struggle, and the experience of the new type of revolutionary party in Russia made issues of the role, character and structure of proletarian parties more pertinent.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats were aware of the need to upgrade the leading role of the labour parties. For example, Rosa Luxemburg wrote in *The Mass Strike, the Party and the Trade Unions*: "The Social-Democrats are the most educated, the most class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat. They cannot and must not wait fatalistically, with arms folded, for the arrival of the 'revolutionary situation', wait for this spontaneous popular movement to fall from Heaven. On the contrary, they must, as always, *anticipate* developments and try to *hasten* them."¹ Luxemburg argued for involving the proletarian masses in the political actions of the Social-Democrats, for ensuring their effective political leadership of the mass movement.

Subsequently, advocating and developing this approach, she attacked the immutability of the structure of the German Social-Democratic Party (SPD) which hampered the initiative of its members; she demanded that the party organisations work to ensure a revolutionary mobilisation of the masses for the assault on the ruling system.

The left-wing elements in several parties of the Second International raised and sometimes solved questions of restructuring the proletariat's political organisation. However, unlike the Bolsheviks, they lacked an integral, consistent concept of a revolutionary labour party like the one worked out by Lenin. Some of them, for example, the Bulgarian Tesnyaks, were working to firmly unite their party on a Marxist basis, but they were not yet able to define correctly the role of the labour party as the organiser of the union between the working class and the peasants. Others, like the revolutionary Socialists in France, Britain and Italy, withdrew from directing the workers' economic struggle. Most of the left-wing Social-Democrats in Germany and other countries did not demand that the party be cleansed of even obvious opportunists; they generally underrated the importance of strong party organisation. Some revolutionary Social-Democrats, including Rosa Luxemburg, argued with Lenin on issues of party structure and even accused him of excessive centralism. Generally, however, the revolutionary Social-Democrats in

¹ R. Luxemburg, "Massenstreik, Partei und Gewerkschaften", *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 2, Berlin, 1972, S. 146.

all countries increasingly saw the need comprehensively to strengthen the labour parties on a Marxist basis, and they gradually approached the Leninist concept of a new type of revolutionary labour party. Their arguments in favour of restructuring the old parties encountered growing resistance from opportunists who did their best to use the inconsistent approach of many revolutionary Social-Democrats, the disagreements among them and their underestimation of the Bolshevik experience in building a labour party.

All right-wing opportunists saw the proletarian party as a means of social reform, as an organisation operating within the framework of the existing political system and its institutions, which would "integrate into" the state body, as Bernstein put it. Since the question concerned the inner affairs of the party, these people essentially advocated autonomy and freedom of trends and opposed centralism and discipline. They either resisted the organisational restructuring of the party or, when this restructuring could not be avoided, tried to use it to their own advantage.

The typical right-wing opportunist approach to the role of the proletarian party was quite openly set forth in Bernstein's books written after the 1905-1907 revolution, first and foremost in *The Labour Movement* (1910) and *From Sect to Party* (1911). The underlying notion was that a political party is a child of the parliamentary system and can only exist where representative institutions exist.¹ Consequently, he defined the Social-Democratic party as "the political party of the working class operating through parliament".² As regards inner party affairs, Bernstein approved of everything which ensured the opportunists' freedom of action. Specifically, he maintained that the days of strict centralism were over for the SPD and argued that the party should represent an aggregation of units based on federal and free self-management principles. Bernstein thought it perfectly normal for the party to include reformist, radical and intermediate trends, and he used every opportunity to recommend tolerance toward those who violated party principles and discipline. There was nothing new about this approach. When the Bremen Congress of the SPD in 1904 merely chided the well-known opportunist Schippel for repeatedly opposing party policy, Bernstein expressed his profound satisfaction with the fact that the party had not passed "a political death sentence" on him.³ At the 1905 Jena Party Congress, the revisionist Vollmar said the SPD Rules should

¹ Eduard Bernstein, *Die Arbeiterbewegung*, Literarische Anstalt Rütten und Loening, Frankfurt am Main, 1910, S. 69.

² Eduard Bernstein, *Von der Sekte zur Partei*, Eugen Diederichs, Jena, 1911, S. 10.

³ Dieter Fricke, *Zur Organisation und Tätigkeit der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (1890-1914). Dokumente und Materialien*, VEB Verlag Enzyklopädie, Leipzig, 1962, S. 60.

not demand that its members participate in party work. This, he said, would close access to Social-Democratic membership to such categories as civil servants, employees of private enterprises, etc. He opposed the proposal to expel those violating congress or party organisation decisions from the party.

Other countries had their own distinctive traits in the reformist interpretation of the labour parties' organisational problems. For example, leaders of the Belgian Labour Party placed special emphasis on its activities in the cooperative movement and advocated a structure that would merge the party with the cooperatives and the trade unions. Naturally, this approach to the issue practically ignored the role and organisation of the party as the political vanguard of the proletariat in the struggle to win political power and transform capitalism into socialism through revolution.

The centrist trend also hampered a Marxist solution of the existing organisational problems. Under the cover of orthodox rhetoric, the Centrists followed an opportunist path in matters of organisation. For example, Karl Kautsky saw, on the one hand, the task of the Social-Democrats in "uniting all the different actions of the proletariat against exploitation into purposeful and concerted action which will find its peak in the great final battles for winning political power".¹ But on the other, he refused to acknowledge the need for a radical restructuring of party organisation. He tried to prove that it was acceptable for the party to comprise trends which violated the party programme and congress decisions. In upholding their distorted concept of party unity, ostensibly consolidating the "model" Social-Democratic organisation in Germany, Kautsky and his supporters strengthened the hand of the opportunists.

In some countries (Italy, France, Spain, etc.), resistance to making the socialist parties lead the mass labour movement came from anarchists and especially anarcho-syndicalists. True, usually, these attacks were made from outside the parties, from the trade unions, but in Italy, for example, anarcho-syndicalists were part of the Socialist Party for several years. In their criticism of the real or imaginary opportunist faults of Social-Democratic leaders, the anarcho-syndicalists usually attacked parliamentary activities, everyday political struggle, which was allegedly reduced to "unprincipled bargaining",² and the political party as such. They claimed that since the social revolution was to be brought off by the masses themselves, the latter did not need the services of a political party.³ There were

¹ Karl Kautsky, *Der Weg zur Macht*, S. 24.

² Giorgio Sorel, *Degenerazione capitalista e degenerazione socialista*, Remo Sandron-Editore, Milano-Palermo-Napoli, 1907, p. 341.

³ Hubert Lagardelle, *La grève générale et le Socialisme*, Edouard Cornély et Cie, Paris, 1905, p. 419.

also demands that the trade unions be made the centre of the proletariat's political and all other types of activities.¹ Parading their allegedly ultrarevolutionary approach, the syndicalists actually hampered the strengthening of the political organisations the proletariat needed.

Thus, the revolutionary Social-Democrats who wanted to restructure the labour parties had to fight the right-wing opportunists and centrists, and sometimes the anarcho-syndicalists, the "left"-wing opportunists.

In the meantime, as the international socialist movement developed, objective trends increasingly surfaced leading to the kinds of changes in party organisation which had already been laid down in Lenin's concept of the party and implemented by the Bolsheviks. As Lenin observed, "On the whole, this obviously shows that the growth of the Social-Democratic movement and of its revolutionary spirit necessarily and inevitably leads to the more consistent establishment of centralism ... the establishment of a stronger *organisation*."²

This found its especially obvious albeit conflicting expression in the SPD, the most influential party of the Second International which revised its Rules three times—in 1905, 1909 and 1912. The 1905 SPD Congress in Jena made important changes in the organisational structure of the party. From then on, a Social-Democratic organisation was established within each constituency, and all party members were to belong to it. Only very serious reasons could excuse them from that obligation. Smaller organisations were allowed to be set up in any town where there were Social-Democrats. There were also provisions for the establishment of regional and provincial organisations (i.e., consisting of party members in a particular German state) which had the right to direct their own everyday work and adopt their own rules; however, the latter had to conform to the general party Rules. Thus, the proxy system, a holdover from the days of exclusive anti-Socialist legislation, was preserved only in areas where party organisations were banned by law. Therefore, the principle of collective organisational contacts was firmly established in the party. Local party bodies were to report to the party's Executive Board. All organisations were to contribute one-fourth of their revenue to the party coffers from then on.³ For all its incon-

¹ Arturo Labriola, *Riforme e Rivoluzione Sociale*, Egisto Cagnoni e C°, Società Editrice "Avanguardia", Lugano, 1906, pp. 15-16, 194, 195, 210, 211, 217.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Jena Congress of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 291.

³ *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Abgehalten zu Jena vom 17. bis 23. September 1905*, Berlin, 1905, S. 6-10.

sistencies and flaws, the new Rules reflected the trend towards the organisational strengthening of the party and a fuller realisation of democratic centralism.

At its Leipzig Congress in 1909 the SPD went further than in Jena by revising the wording of the party membership provision as follows: "Each person who recognises the principles of the party programme and is a member of a party organisation belongs to the party."¹ The last prewar Rules of the SPD approved by the Chemnitz Congress in 1912 envisaged the establishment, along with the Executive Board, of a commission of representatives of regional and provincial organisations. It, together with the Executive Board, was to discuss the party's political and organisational issues. This innovation, supposed to provide for a better response to the local views, contravened the centralisation tendency, introduced an element of federalism into the management of party affairs and restricted the rights of the Monitoring Committee, where the left wing had the upper hand. As a result, the position of the left was weakened, and that of the opportunists strengthened. Generally, however, a series of successive changes improved the SPD Rules. Lenin highly appreciated the SPD experience in building up the party and stressed that by properly using the bourgeois legality for about 50 years, the SPD had created "the best proletarian organisations".²

At the same time, the SPD experience clearly showed that improving the structure could have a positive effect only if party leaders were true Marxists and pursued a consistent revolutionary proletarian policy. However, only the Bolsheviks succeeded in making their structure correspond to their policies. Only the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, were solving these problems consistently, including the question of the organisational break with the opportunists.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats within the SPD had to contend with a sort of the "organisational fetishism" of the right-wing leaders. The latter refused to sanction mass proletarian non-parliamentary action, claiming that party organisations had to be expanded and strengthened first. The Jena Congresses of the SPD in 1905 and 1913 were a case in point. Speaking at a May 1913 meeting in Leipzig, Luxemburg had this to say about that line of reasoning: "We are often told, with financial statements and membership lists in hand, that our membership is still insufficient, that our coffers are still too weak to undertake large-scale action. O, those petty

¹ *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Abgehalten zu Leipzig vom 21. bis 18. September 1909*, Buchhandlung Vorwärts, Berlin, 1909, S. 6.

² V. I. Lenin, "Two Worlds", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 310-11

bookkeepers! I do not underrate the importance of organisations; no assessment can properly evaluate their worth. But it would be absolutely wrong to maintain that before we launch the great march against capitalism, all working men and women without exception must first enroll as members of the party."¹ Many works by Luxemburg were aimed at preventing party organisations from turning into shackles that would hamper the mass movement. She repeatedly criticised the SPD Executive Board for passivity and indolence and the party apparatus for red tape which impeded vigorous political activity. Simultaneously, she worked to enhance the initiative of local party organisations; she believed that this would make a positive impact on central party bodies. Setting forth her views in the article "Again Masses and Leaders" (1911) she stressed that only opportunists benefited from blind submissiveness and the habit of waiting for directives from above.²

Although Luxemburg attacked the opportunist "organisational fetishism" from a correct, Marxist position, in the period under review she still lacked a positive comprehensive programme of party organisation. While resolutely opposing the inadequate attention given to the organisation of broad and vigorous proletarian action, the approach she encountered in the German and Polish labour movements, her arguments were sometimes biased. In assessing the relationship between the party's leading role and the efforts of the masses, she overrated their ability to take independent action.

The German revolutionary Social-Democrats' discussion of organisational issues was linked with their struggle against opportunist theory and practice, with the requirements of the mass revolutionary movement. The SPD left wing sometimes initiated and publicised important efforts. A case in point was their drive to ensure an uncompromising political course in the party newspaper *Vorwärts*, the central organ of the SPD. As early as 1905, Franz Mehring dealt a crushing critical blow to the newspaper's mode of operation, which had resulted in "disunity in matters of principle and theory".³ He also raised such important issues as ensuring that the party properly control its press, achieving ideological unity among its editorial board members, and regularly training future Social-Democratic journalists. Mehring repeatedly returned to these issues later, invariably advocating that the SPD press be turned into an effective ideological and political weapon.

Karl Liebknecht worked consistently to organise systematic anti-militarist propaganda. At the Mannheim SPD Congress in 1906, he

¹ Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 3, Berlin, 1973, p. 218.

² Ibid., pp. 37-42.

³ *Dokumente der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung zur Journalistik*, Teil 1, Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig, Berlin, 1961, S. 223-43.

was among those who favoured the proposal to establish a special committee for that purpose. In his well-known brochure *Militarism and Anti-Militarism* and later in his statements at the SPD Congress in Essen (1907) Liebknecht again came forward with a similar proposal, but it failed to secure enough support for it to be implemented.

In their efforts to ensure compliance with the fundamental principles and decisions of the labour party, the revolutionary Social-Democrats resolutely opposed the Baden opportunists at the Magdeburg Congress of the SPD in 1910. Contradicting the Social-Democratic principle of refusing to support the budget of the bourgeois state, and in obvious violation of party discipline and numerous SPD decisions, the Baden opportunists voted in favour of the budget in the Landtag. Liebknecht harshly denounced that action and warned Congress delegates against underrating the deadly threat to the party inherent in this blatant violation of the "absolutely inalienable elements of any party discipline". In his opinion, this discipline had to be especially rigid precisely because it was voluntary. The left-wing Social-Democrats demanded that, instead of merely confining itself to censuring the Baden group, the Congress declare that any fresh deliberate violations of basic party decisions, committed in full awareness of their consequences, would mean crossing "the line beyond which party membership ceases to exist".¹ In his report at the Congress, August Bebel also threatened the opportunists with expulsion from the party if they again approved the budget.

The German revolutionary Social-Democrats were right in pointing to the adverse impact SPD leaders' gradual shift to opportunism had on the organisation of the party. Speaking at the 1913 Jena Congress, the last before the war, Luxemburg said point-blank that the slow numerical growth of the Social-Democratic Party and the drop in the circulation of its newspapers were rooted not only in the economic crisis, as the SPD Executive Board claimed, but also in the character of party policies.²

Nevertheless, the German revolutionary Social-Democrats still failed to arrive at an integral, balanced and consistent concept of a new type of the party the proletariat needed to meet the new historical circumstances. While they fought against the right wing and then against the centrists, they were trying to correct the political course of the existing party and, although in a number of specific cases they referred to the need for expelling the opportunists from the party, they never carried the struggle to the end—they never raised the issue of an organisational break with the opportunists.

¹ Karl Liebknecht, *Ausgewählte Reden, Briefe und Aufsätze*, S. 173, 174.

² Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 3, S. 330-31.

The revolutionary Socialists of other countries faced similar tasks, and their efforts concerning party structure ran along similar lines.

The Bulgarian Labour Social-Democratic Party (BLSDP) (the Tesnyaks) successfully developed into a new type of a party. The direct impact of Lenin's ideas on the Tesnyak leaders played an important role in this process. But the Marxist core of the party had to fight a group of liberal-anarchists who bitterly attacked the democratic centralism principle and claimed it was "tyrannical" and "autocratic". They actually demanded decentralisation, autonomy for local organisations, no party discipline, restriction of Central Committee rights, and no Central Committee control over the party press. In their statements in the periodicals *Novo Vreme* and *Rabotnicheski Vestnik*, the Tesnyak leaders defended the Marxist principles of party organisation. Dimitar Blagoev played an especially important part in that. He wrote: "*Centralism* in a Social-Democratic party is a necessary condition for its existence and development"¹.

The 12th Congress of the BLSDP(T) in 1905 rejected the petty-bourgeois individualist views of the liberal-anarchists and pointed to the necessity of party discipline. Since the liberal-anarchists continued their factionalist activities, they were soon expelled from the party. The 13th Congress of the party held in 1906 reaffirmed the inviolability of the principle of centralised party structure.

Simultaneously, the Tesnyaks had repeatedly to repulse the social-reformists who tried to use the resolutions on the unity of Social-Democratic parties adopted by the 1904 Amsterdam and the 1910 Copenhagen Congresses of the Second International for an unprincipled unification of the revolutionary Social-Democrats with the opportunists. The 13th Congress of the BLSDP(T) again endorsed the position of its Central Committee which, having approved the Amsterdam Congress unity resolution, unequivocally stated in September 1904 that unification with the "common causers" was unthinkable since they were revisionists rejecting the principles established by international congresses and pursuing a policy of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie. The Tesnyaks remained loyal to their policy despite the pressure from the Second International leaders.

From 1907, the so-called Progressist group emerged within the BLSDP(T), and it also insisted on unification with the "broad socialists". In the course of their polemics with this group, the party's leaders proved that unity of the proletarian vanguard was only possible on the basis of revolutionary socialist theory and policy, and that alliance with the "common causers" would mean betraying the cause of socialism. At the 15th Congress in 1908 the Progressists'

¹ Димитър Благоев, *Съчинения*, том 10, Издателство на Българската комунистическа партия, София, 1959, стр. 377.

views and activities were condemned, and they themselves were soon expelled from the party for factionalism.

In 1909-1911, Christian Rakowski, who came to Bulgaria for that purpose and even launched the newspaper *Napred*, and Lev Trotsky tried to persuade the Tesnyaks to unite with the "common causers". The Tesnyaks, above all Dimitar Blagoev, flatly rejected their interference in the affairs of the Bulgarian labour movement and explained the Tesnyak position vis-à-vis "common cause" opportunism. They also criticised the Second International and the International Socialist Bureau leaders for their indiscriminate admission of various organisations and their readiness to open the door to opportunists.

In 1906, the right-wing nationalist elements withdrew from the Polish Socialist Party and formed the so-called PPS-revolutionary faction. The majority of the party set up the PPS-Leftist which, in the course of its development, moved close to the internationalist, Marxist Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania in its approach to major problems. That was how the split between the revolutionary and right-wing Socialists, begun as early as at the time of SDKPL formation, continued.¹ But consolidation of all revolutionary forces was not yet achieved.

An organisational split between the revolutionary and opportunist elements also took place among the Dutch Social-Democrats, albeit after long delays and hesitation. Issues of organisation played a prominent part in the struggle of the revolutionary Social-Democrats against opportunism in Holland because 1905 witnessed an aggravation of the conflict between the Executive Board of the Social-Democratic Labour Party and its parliamentary faction which was dominated by the right wing. After the right wing secured a majority in the Executive Board at the Utrecht Congress in 1906, the Marxist forces rallied around the weekly *De Tribune* and continued their struggle. When, in 1909, the editors of *De Tribune* were expelled from the party, the Marxist supporters of the weekly founded the Social-Democratic Party of the Netherlands—the organisational centre of the truly revolutionary forces in the country's working-class movement. A year later Roland-Holst's group left the Social-Democratic Labour Party and founded the Revolutionary Socialist Union.

The revolutionary forces in the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) had to wage an unremitting struggle against the right and "left" reformists and against the anarcho-syndicalists. Although the Tenth PSI Congress in Florence (1908) declared the anarcho-syndicalists

¹ For more details see Teodor Ladyka, *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Frakcja Rewolucyjna) w latach 1906-1914*, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa, 1972; Janina Kasprzakowa, *Ideologia i Polityka PPS-Lewicy w latach 1907-1914*, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa, 1965.

theory and practice incompatible with the principles and tactics of the Socialist Party, its influence was not fully overcome. Specifically, it was felt in the proposals about merging the party with the trade unions, repeatedly raised within the PSI. But most importantly, the social-reformist groups turned the victory over the anarcho-syndicalists to their own advantage. In organisational issues, they preached unlimited autonomy and factionalism and accorded priority to the parliamentary faction.¹

The left elements in the PSI set up a revolutionary faction and succeeded, at the Reggio-Emilia Congress in 1912, in having a number of prominent social-reformists (Leonida Bissolati, Ivanoe Bonomi and others) expelled from the party. The expelled right-wingers set up a new organisation—the reformist socialist party. This split in the PSI represented an organisational break with the right-wing social-reformist group. It consolidated the party ideologically and politically and considerably strengthened the positions of the revolutionary faction within it. Lenin wrote that “the party of the Italian socialist proletariat has taken the right path by removing the syndicalists and Right reformists from its ranks”.²

Still, the opportunist group of “leftist reformers” and some proponents of the anarcho-syndicalist views remained in the PSI. Besides, the leaders of the revolutionary faction themselves lacked unity and consistency. Specifically, one of them was Benito Mussolini, who for some time edited the Party’s central organ *Avanti!*. He was expelled from the party in 1914 for supporting the imperialist policy of the Entente and subsequently headed the Italian fascist movement. In the final analysis, the necessary restructuring of the PSI on a Marxist basis was not accomplished.

In the Belgian Labour Party, Left Socialist leaders Hendrik de Man and Louis de Brouckère harshly criticised the opportunist policy and organisational structure advocated by the party’s leadership as one of the factors that promoted opportunism in its ranks. In the articles they published in *Neue Zeit* in 1911, they showed that since the party was a “federation of workers’ groups dominated by cooperatives, mutual aid societies and labour unions” and “purely political unions are relatively scarce”, the party paid too much attention to the cooperative effort and economic struggle, and this hampered the progress in the political awareness of the working class.³ Man and de Brouckère thought it imperative to change that

¹ For details see Luigi Cortesi, *Il socialismo italiano tra riforme e rivoluzione. 1892-1921*, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1969.

² V. I. Lenin, “The Italian Socialist Congress”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 172.

³ Hendrik de Man, Louis de Brouckère, *Die Arbeiterbewegung in Belgien*, Verlag und Druck von Paul Singer, Stuttgart, p. 34.

state of affairs. But they lacked the resolve to break with the opportunists.

Founded in 1905, the SFIO largely retained in its Rules the structure, and the management system of the SPF. It even strengthened the party's control over its parliamentary faction and press. Obligations were laid down to be undertaken by each member of parliament; there were provisions for regular reports by the faction to the national party congress, for control to be exercised by the National Council (the party's supreme body between the congresses) over the deputies individually and the faction as a whole, and even for penalties imposed on deputies by the congress upon recommendation by the National Council. The National Council was to control both the periodicals belonging to the party and the privately owned party organs. The party press was to observe SFIO and international congress decisions. The Rules' flaw was their complicated system of appointing members of the National Council which somewhat weakened the role of the congress in determining the Council's composition. Nevertheless, the Rules were a considerable step forward in improving the structure of the party. That was a victory of the Guesdists who advocated a mass centralised party of the working class, over the Jauresist ideas of federalism and broad autonomy. Subsequently, however, as the Guesdists gradually lost ground in the SFIO and turned into a sect of sorts within the party, the advances secured in 1905 were neutralised. The Rules became a dead letter; autonomist and federalist trends grew stronger and eroded the unity and militant character of the party. Excessive concentration on election campaigns adversely affected everyday work among the masses and strengthened the hand of the parliamentary faction. The SFIO turned into "a typical Second International party, characterised by a growing gap between word and deed, incapable of correctly and consistently directing the struggle of the working class".¹

Nationalist and separatist trends were gaining ground among the Austrian Social-Democrats. After 1905, the national parties no longer even convened joint congresses. Since 1907, five fully independent ethnic Socialist factions functioned in the Reichsrat. They constituted a union, but even that disintegrated in 1911. In that same year, there was a split among the Czech Social-Democrats. Besides the separatist Czecho-Slav Social-Democratic Labour Party which had by that time completed splitting the trade union movement by national affiliation, the Czech Centralist Social-Democratic Labour Party emerged and demanded that the united trade unions be preserved. Leaders of the Slovak organisations also tried to isolate them from the

¹ *Histoire du Parti communiste français (manuel)*, Editions sociales, Paris, 1964, p. 42.

Social-Democratic Party of Hungary, but they rejoined the party in 1906. The Hungarian revolutionary Social-Democrats (Ervin Szabó, Gyla Alpári, Jenő László, Béla Vágó and others) paid great attention to organisational issues. They demanded that the merger of the party with the trade unions be annulled and independent party organisations be established.

In 1905, a group of leftists led by Szabó presented a draft of a new Rules to the congress. For all its anarcho-syndicalist flaws, the draft undermined the position of the reformist leadership. After the Copenhagen Congress of the Second International, where Lenin held a conference of left forces, Alpári was the first to advance the idea of an organisational break with opportunism and the creation of a proletarian revolutionary party under the motto "For a new, genuine Social-Democratic party". The SDPH leadership expelled Alpári from the party, and the ISB, under pressure from the opportunists, approved the expulsion. Alpári's attempt to create a new, truly revolutionary party failed to secure the necessary support at the time.¹

The left-wing elements in the Socialist Party of the United States—Eugene Debs, Charles Ruthenberg, William Haywood and others—opposed the petty-bourgeois domination of the party and demanded that it become the vanguard party of the working class and be cleansed of opportunists and mere sympathisers who opposed effective revolutionary work. They wanted party members to become true leaders of the socialist movement. In a number of local organisations, the left were temporarily in control. Ruthenberg and his supporters wanted to have the party's structure improved and democracy ensured within it.²

There were distinct organisational problems in Great Britain. The order of the day here was the unification of several socialist organisations into a single party. The formation of the British Socialist Party in 1911 was a significant step in that direction, but this did not yet mean the unity of all Socialists. Up to World War I the unification of the British Socialist Party with the Independent Labour Party and the British Labour Party remained a topical issue of the working-class movement. In Britain, this unification would have strengthened the influence of the revolutionary elements. Still, the problem was not solved because of disagreement among the workers' organisations concerned.

¹ For details see T. M. Islamov, *Political Struggle in Hungary on the Eve of World War I*, Moscow, 1972 (in Russian); Ferenc Mucsi, *Die Kämpfe für die organisatorische Reform der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Ungarns (1900-1918)* Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1975, S. 15-22.

² Oakley C. Johnson, *The Day Is Coming. Life and Work of Charles E. Ruthenberg. 1882-1927*, International Publishers, New York, 1957, pp. 65-67, 73.

By 1914, of the 41 labour parties united in the Second International, only the Bolshevik Party fully met the requirements of the new historical stage. The Bulgarian Tesnyaks were close to that status. Despite the efforts by the revolutionary Social-Democrats, the organisational forms and principles of many parties were obviously not equal to the new tasks. Lenin wrote that "typical of the socialist parties of the epoch of the Second International was one that tolerated in its midst an opportunism built up in decades of the "peaceful" period, an opportunism that kept itself secret, adapting itself to the revolutionary workers, *borrowing* their Marxist terminology, and evading any clear cleavage of principles. This type has outlived itself."¹

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¹ V. I. Lenin, "What Next?", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 110.

Chapter 5

THE STRUGGLE OF TRENDS IN THE TRADE UNIONS

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT. THE GROWTH OF THE REVOLUTIONARY TREND

In the early decades of the 20th century, trade unions continued to grow rapidly, and that was an integral part of the general upsurge of the international working-class movement. New trade unions sprang up, and those already in existence grew larger. Just in the course of the 7 years preceding World War I, trade union membership grew by 5 to 7 million people and reached 14 to 16 million by 1914. In addition their social composition expanded to include new groups of the working people: unskilled and semi-skilled workers including farm-hands, employees of government and private agencies, and those working in the services. Women workers were organising in trade unions. Thus, the movement represented the interests of a much wider variety of workers than before. Still, compared to the total number of hired workers, the share of the union members was rather small barely exceeding 20 per cent of the entire proletariat of a given country.

The union growth was hampered by the low degree of concentration of production in sectors of the economy still dominated by handicraft-like manual labour, and by the widespread traditional craft unionism that left unskilled workers unorganised. Besides, the awareness of the need to organise was far from universal among the workers. Aside from that, trade unions encountered various obstacles, first and foremost, the anti-labour policy of the employers and the bourgeois state: legal bans, restrictions and often outright persecution.¹ In many cases the status of the trade unions was not legally formalised, and they were subject to arbitrary court decisions. For example, the anti-trust Sherman Act in the United States defined trade union activity as criminal "conspiracy". The Clayton Act of 1914 formally dropped the unions from that definition but introduced new legal

¹ Allen Hutt, *British Trade Unionism. A Short History*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1975, pp. 52, 53.

loopholes, empowering the courts to ban strikes and boycotts in order to "prevent irreparable injury to property"—that is, to capitalist property. In Germany, many categories of workers (railroad employees, farm-hands, etc.) and government employees were forbidden to set up trade unions. In Japan, a law and order act of 1900 hampered trade union activity; in 1912 the government, supported by the business community, set up a reformist friendship society (Yu-ai Kai).

There were other factors impeding trade union growth too: some trade union leaders opposed the admission of unskilled workers and the idea of mass trade unions in general; in some countries opportunist labour leaders, using the least politically conscious groups of workers, supported the bourgeoisie's efforts to foment ethnic strife and the policy of racial discrimination; sometimes trade unions were indifferent and even hostile to the admission of women and young workers.

As unions grew, a trend toward improving their structure emerged. Previously, most of them had been organised on the craft principle, and the workers' forces had been scattered. Union locals were often set up not at enterprises but in the workers' residential areas and united into territorial organisations (local branches and the like); union bodies (committees) at factories were rare. The growing concentration of production, the greater scale and acuteness of labour conflicts, and the increasing interference in the latter by the government which used powerful repressive machinery against the working people—all that increased the pressure on the trade unions to coordinate their actions and reorganise themselves on the industrial basis. This was advocated above all by the rank and file and local activists, and top labour officials had to take that initiative into account. As a result, trade unions operating in one industry began to merge on a federative basis locally and nationally. Thus, associations emerged which were becoming similar in structure to mass industrial trade unions. For example, in 1910-1914 the earlier "amalgamation" of small unions comprised of workers of related trades in Britain led to the establishment of the construction workers', municipal transport workers', textile and garment workers' associations, the National Union of Railwaymen, etc. In Germany, where in 1905 only 4 unions had had more than 100,000 members, there were 7 large unions in 1913, and the metal workers' union membership was over 500,000.¹

There were also new trade unions established and amalgamated on the industrial principle: for example, in 1905-1910 in France,

¹ D. Fricke, *Zur Organisation und Tätigkeit der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (1891-1914)*, pp. 225-28.

24 labour federations were set up, including construction workers, metal workers, gardening workers, etc. New union centres established to serve as nationwide associations (like the Industrial Workers of the World in the USA) were often set up on that principle too. An important role in this respect was played by the formation of trade unions in Russia: since their formation was directed by the revolutionary party of the proletariat, they were usually industrial organisations. This course was generally followed by the recently formed yet rapidly advancing trade unions of Bulgaria. In Austria-Hungary, the 1907 trade union congress officially recognised the industrial principle as the highest form of union. The same trend gained ground in Germany's free trade unions, and even in Britain where active mass involvement in the restructuring of the trade unions made the industrial principle dominant (for example, the Miners' Federation included 90 per cent of all coal miners in 1912).¹

The growing consolidation of the movement was evident in the creation of new national trade union centres. They sprang up in countries where unions were a relative newcomer, specifically, in several East and Southeast European countries: in 1904 the General Workers' Syndical Union (GWSU) was established in Bulgaria; in 1906, the General Commission of Romanian Trade Unions (GCRTU), etc. New national labour centres also continued to emerge in some West European countries and the United States as well. In 1906 the General Confederation of Labour (CGdL) was organised in Italy; its membership numbered 250,000—about one-third of all organised labour.² In 1910 in Spain, alongside the previously established General Labour Union (UGT), the National Confederation of Labour (CNTE) emerged as the centre of anarcho-syndicalist unions.³ In 1905 the Industrial Workers of the World, a national centre of industrial unions, was set up in the United States.

Changes in the membership, composition, and union structure of the movement that took place over years of intense struggle against the capitalists affected the character and efficiency of union activity. It spread to new spheres of the working-class socio-economic interests, becoming increasingly diversified. Improvement of the workers' material status remained its key objective. Mutual aid was also an important element: it assumed various forms and relied on trade union funds which consisted of admission fees, regular membership dues and emergency contributions. As a rule, trade unions aided the families of workers who suffered occupational injuries, who were

¹ Allen Hutt, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63.

² Adolfo Pepe, *Storia della CGdL dalla fondazione alla guerra di Libia, 1905-1911*, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1972, p. 16.

³ Jaime Castiñeiras Muñoz, Javier Dominguez Martín-Sánchez, *Un siglo de lucha obrera en España*, Ed. Mensajero, Bilbao, 1971, p. 136.

sacked, unemployed, persecuted by the authorities or arrested; unions issued various benefits, financed striking workers—mostly by paying them lump or weekly grants, and offered financial support to their colleagues abroad.

Many trade unions paid considerable attention to securing and expanding the working people's social rights and to gaining their legal recognition. As a result, more often than ever before, the state had to pass laws concerning maximum working hours, occupational safety, regular holidays, minimum wage, pensions, disability and unemployment insurance, etc. Trade unions sought to take part in monitoring compliance with labour legislation.

The development of the workers' class consciousness, the raising of their cultural level and organisation of their recreation emerged as important aspects of trade union activities. Publishing houses grew in number and sometimes achieved quite impressive results, trade union periodicals were being launched everywhere; trade union libraries, workers' schools, concerts and lectures were organised.

In some countries trade unions went into business and, using the quite considerable funds at their disposal, set up, jointly with workers' cooperatives, various enterprises (printing houses, trade union clubs, hotels, etc.).

Labour's everyday struggle against capital was a most important field of trade union activity. While the traditional demands for higher wages and shorter working hours were as before high on the agenda, in each country they had their distinctive features. For example, in the United States the struggle was spearheaded against the intensification of labour, against the Taylor system, etc. Among other things, trade unions defended the workers' rights to organise, and they sometimes secured recognition of these rights to a certain degree (and of the employers' obligations) through collective bargaining. Trade unions contributed to the increase in the number of solidarity actions and of strikes encompassing an entire industry or even several industries simultaneously; boycotts and picketing were organised more often.

All this strengthened the working people's hand in the struggle to resist the growing pressure of monopoly capital. In many countries, trade unions began to exert a more or less perceptible influence on the domestic political climate.

In the turbulent years of 1905-1907 in Russia, the trade unions made a revolutionary appearance on the country's political scene. A salient feature of Russian trade unions was that they emerged already based on the unity of socialism with the mass working-class movement. The revolutionary Social-Democrats were already at work and could consolidate and lead the unions. Most of them followed the Bolsheviks and consistently defended the working

people's interests. True, a section of the unions was influenced by the Mensheviks who tried to keep organised labour from engaging in proletarian class politics.

In the period of reaction and brutal tsarist repressions, by 1910, 81 labour societies were destroyed and 161 societies were banned for "harmful activities",¹ and union membership fell to a mere 13,000. Yet, even then the unions continued their stubborn defence of the workers' rights, combining clandestine and legitimate methods. So, at the time of the new revolutionary upsurge, most trade unions served as the revolutionary proletarian party's key means of contact with the masses, responded to all major political developments, demanded freedom of the press, assembly and unions, and rendered material assistance to political prisoners. In their struggle to secure the workers' everyday needs, Russian trade unions also oriented organised labour toward militant political action corresponding to the prospects of revolution.

In Great Britain, the trade union movement was definitely turning toward politics, although this turn was dominated by openly conciliatory trends. Trade unions were the mass base of the Labour Party. In the USA, union members became more active in politics, although mostly during election campaigns in which organised labour votes were an important factor.

The class proletarian trend found graphic expression in the widespread solidarity campaigns during the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907. International solidarity was often evident in various mutual assistance actions by the trade unions in a number of countries to support large-scale strikes in one of them, these strikes thus often assuming political significance. A case in point was the general strike in Sweden in 1909, financially supported by trade unions of Denmark, Norway, Great Britain, Germany and some other countries.

Trade unions in many countries were increasingly turning to anti-militarist action and some fought against the colonial policies of the imperialist powers.

Two major trends, revolutionary and opportunist, confronted each other in the movement. There were conflicting views of both programme provisions and practical action. Sometimes even the workers influenced by opportunists realised that purely economic and social demands were not enough. A typical case in this respect is the debate at the 1908 British Labour Party Conference. The draft of a resolution submitted by the printing workers' union proclaimed, as the final objective, "the overthrow of the present competitive system of capitalism and the institution of a system of public

¹ See V. Ya. Laverychev, *Tsarism and the Labour Question in Russia (1861-1917)*, Mysl. Moscow, 1972, p. 220 (in Russian).

ownership and control of all the means of life". That document opposed the traditional view that trade unions "were not out ... for ultimate objects; they were out for Old Age Pensions; ... for immediate industrial legislation; ... for some kind of effective and helpful legislation on the subject of unemployment".¹

Such differences in the interpretation of the prospects of struggle often led to open breaks in an organisation. Sometimes new confederations sprang up alongside the existing ones, and while fighting to secure partial concessions from the capitalists, proclaimed the overthrow of the capitalist system as their end goal. For example, at its constituent congress in June 1905, the IWW, set up in the USA in opposition to the reformist AFL on the initiative of left-wing socialists (Eugene Debs, Daniel de Leon and William Haywood), approved a manifesto stating that the new centre was founded on the principles of class struggle and that its general administration "must be conducted in harmony with the recognition of the irrepressible conflict between the capitalist class and the working class". The IWW, it continued, was not only to "protect the interests of the working people of to-day in their struggle for fewer hours, more wages and better conditions.... It must offer a final solution of the labor problem."²

In the pre-war decade, union members grew increasingly dissatisfied with capitalist ways and the status accorded to the working people. Such views took deep root among industrial and some transport workers, who usually formed close-knit proletarian communities, and also among certain groups of handicraft and semi-handicraft workers who protested bitterly against low earnings and exploitation.

A militant spirit was often introduced into the trade unions by the workers engaged in heavy manual labour—both skilled (for example, hereditary miners were highly skilled and traditionally used to concerted action) and unskilled (longshoremen), and also by seasonal workers whose pay was extremely low (navvies, lumberjacks, etc.).

The shaping of the revolutionary trend was a complex and contradictory process, not always leading trade unions to the right path in the class struggle, and sometimes assuming distorted forms. Striving to free themselves from capitalist exploitation as soon as possible, radical union members often strayed off to a pseudo-revolutionary road. Though militant, they lacked the necessary training and organisation and often proceeded from naive, immature notions derived only from their own limited experience.

¹ A. L. Morton and George Tate, *The British Labour Movement, 1770-1920. A History*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1956, p. 229.

² Bill Haywood's Book. *The Autobiography of William D. Haywood*, International Publishers, New York, 1958, pp. 177, 178.

The revolutionary trend was opposed by the conciliatory approach. Trade union opportunism had a motley social base. Above all it was composed of the labour aristocracy—some of the comparatively well-off skilled workers at large industrial and transport enterprises, and the trade union bureaucrats at the top and sometimes middle levels.

The social milieu of the conciliatory trend also included certain categories of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, mostly in the semi-handicraft industries, at small-scale urban enterprises (e.g., some garment workers), those employed in the services, and some in agriculture, and a proportion of trade and clerical workers. These categories were only beginning to organise and, due to their petty-bourgeois traditions and direct dependence on the employer, tended to tread very cautiously; the socio-psychological habit of "trusting" the employer and shunning open conflict was quite deeply ingrained in them.

The rivalry between the revolutionary and the opportunist trends permeated all spheres of the movement and was reflected in the everyday activities of both individual organisations (local and national) and union associations (trade union centres).

This confrontation was evident in the way the workers' demands were formulated at the grass roots level and at union congresses. The resolute and militant approach to topical issues, the efforts at involving, consolidating and strengthening the masses in the struggle against capital ran into opposition from those elements which preached moderation and unprincipled compromise and relied on the employers' and authorities' goodwill. "Better to achieve little than call a strike" was the motto of the French miners' trade union of the Pas-de-Calais and Nord provinces, led by the social-reformist Emile Basly.

However, strikes were acquiring an unprecedented scope and intensity; they turned into months-long battles against the bourgeoisie and its punitive apparatus. This was largely due to the contribution made by the militant trade union forces. At the same time, there was an obvious bias towards avoiding decisive battles against capital. Even forced by circumstances into taking part in strikes, the conciliation-minded leaders often refused to continue them at the most critical moment, thus actually helping the employers to win or to secure a compromise to their advantage.

Opportunists generally considered the strike an obsolete and even "barbarous" method. Suppressing the militant initiative of the masses, reformist union leaders preferred solving conflicts between labour and capital in arbitration bodies—conciliation conferences, arbitration courts and the like. Opportunist leaders often demanded a scrupulous observation of charter rules on strike procedures—not because they wanted to make strikes particularly concerted actions (that was the

very reason such rules were included in trade union charters¹) but, on the contrary, to frustrate them.

As a result, strikes were launched contrary to the wishes of the opportunist leadership; they were branded as "wildcat" and deprived of financial support from union headquarters. Meanwhile, in German free trade unions, for example, 80 per cent of membership dues went to the central treasury of the union, and local branches possessed no funds of their own to finance strikes.

Typically, although many trade unions possessed considerable financial resources, they allotted comparatively small sums for strike support. For example, in 1913, British trade unions spent most of their budget, 57 per cent, on mutual aid programmes, and only 12 per cent on strikes. (These figures refer to the registered unions that numbered a little under 50 per cent of all trade unions in the country. At that time British trade unions, considered "the richest in the world of trade", possessed a reserve fund of 6.5 million pounds. The revenue of the German free trade unions was 82 million marks. Source: I. Maisky, *Trade Union Movement in the West: Major Types*, Leningrad, 1926, pp. 83-84, 91, 193, in Russian.) Funds were similarly allocated in Germany's free trade unions, in the reformist-led French National Syndicate of Railroad Workers, etc.²

There were cases when opportunist leaders of trade union associations refused financial assistance to strikes of nationwide importance. For example, in August 1909 the workers, outraged at a mass lockout, forced the Central Confederation of Swedish Trade Unions (CCSTU) to call a general strike. Simultaneously though, it was announced that strike benefits would no longer be paid to strikers.³

It is also significant that labour leaders often encouraged workers to cooperate with the capitalists by investing part of the union's funds in their enterprise so as to increase the funds. As a result, both sides were interested in the smooth functioning of "their business". Besides, this practice deprived the union of the funds necessary to finance strikes, since the investment could not be withdrawn promptly. A case in point was the 1910 general strike of boiler-makers in Britain.

The rivalry between revolutionary and opportunist trends was especially obvious because the great intensity of socio-political

¹ For example, in Great Britain a strike had to be approved by two-thirds of the union's membership; in Germany it had to be approved in writing by the central union board, and the workers' decision to call a strike had to be approved first by the local and then by the regional board of the union, etc.

² See V. M. Dalin, *Strikes and the Crisis of Anarcho-Syndicalism in Prewar France*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1935, p. 140 (in Russian).

³ Knut Bäckström, *Arbetarrörelsen i Sverige*, Arbetarkultur, Stockholm, 1963, pp. 131-38.

contradictions faced the working-class movement with the issue of the mass political strike as an effective means of the class struggle. Russia's proletariat offered an example of such a strike in October 1905, which trade unions in other countries did not forget.

In 1906-1909, the idea of a general political strike became very popular with Swedish workers who regarded it as a sure means to put an end to the employers' offensive. The growth of the strike movement in the country abruptly sharpened the confrontation between the trade union rank-and-file and the reformist leaders of the CCSTU. While the masses were eager to take action, union leaders did all they could to avert a general political strike and said it would be "suicidal".

The growing government repression against the working-class movement prompted trade union members to rebuff the ruling class with the most resolute action. Typical in this regard was the speech delivered by the president of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain at the Manchester Trades Union Congress in 1913 soon after the authorities brutally put down the heroic strike by 80,000 Irish transport and general workers in Dublin. "If revolution is going to be forced upon my people," he said, "by such action as has been taken in Dublin and elsewhere I say it is our duty, legal or illegal, to train our people to defend themselves."¹

However, there were developments in the opposite direction, too, when many union leaders resorted to direct collaboration with the capitalists and the authorities. For example, it was established in 1913 that, in the USA, AFL leaders received hundreds of thousands of dollars from the National Association of Manufacturers and the Republican Party.² Such "contacts" were not accidental and could not be explained by the corruption of individual labour leaders or other such excuses. AFL unions which had about 1.5 million members were dominated by the "pure and simple" trade-unionist approach advocated by Gompers. He proceeded from the underlying principle of class collaboration between labour and capital. AFL unions defended only the interests of a small number of skilled workers and ignored the needs of the mass of unorganised proletarians. Deals with employers and the inevitable kickbacks were a routine occurrence with AFL leaders. The very structure of the Federation (its 120 unions were based on the craft principle) divided the proletariat's forces: AFL leaders often made deals with employers to prevent unionisation of unskilled workers. The AFL policy of compromise with the bourgeoisie became the model of conciliation in trade unions. Opposing that approach, the revolutionary workers in the United States

¹ Allen Hutt, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

² William Z. Foster, *Outline History of the World Trade Union Movement*, International Publishers, New York, 1956, p. 208.

who set up the militant IWW defended both a different line of trade union activity and the industrial principle of union organisation which offered membership to the masses of unskilled workers, too.

The rivalry between the two trends in the trade union movement was obvious in their attitude to the traditional workers' holiday—May Day. The revolutionary elements in the trade unions wanted to turn it into a show of the proletariat's militant spirit, but the opportunists tried to deprive May Day of all manifestations of it.

An important problem facing the working-class movement both theoretically, and in practical politics at that time was the relationship between the trade unions and the political parties. These relations were determined by many specific historical causes that shaped the trade-union and socialist movement in a given country or group of countries. One can single out 4 major types of such relations that emerged in the period under review (although each of them, in its turn, comprised its own specific varieties).

First, there were the trade unions led by a revolutionary proletarian party and, consequently, correctly combining the struggle for the proletariat's immediate interests with the struggle for socialism. This type of relations emerged in the countries where the revolutionary Social-Democrats organised and led the trade unions, in Russia and some Southeast European countries like Bulgaria, for example. In Russia, the Bolsheviks worked to develop revolutionary trade unions and unite them under the leadership of a revolutionary party of the proletariat. "It is important that at the very outset," Lenin pointed out, "Russian Social-Democrats should strike the right note in regard to the trade unions, and at once create a tradition of Social-Democratic initiative in this matter, of Social-Democratic participation, of Social-Democratic leadership."¹ Bolshevik leadership over the Russian trade union movement became one of the key prerequisites of its revolutionary development.

Viewing the trade union as an organisation linking the workers with the party, helping it lead the working people to their final objectives in a revolutionary struggle, Lenin observed that "work in the trade unions must be conducted not in the spirit of trade-union neutrality but in the spirit of the closest possible relations between them and the Social-Democratic Party".²

The Bolsheviks sought to impart to trade union activity an uncompromising class character which would not serve the interests of the bourgeoisie. Lenin noted that these "inevitably give rise to a striving to confine the unions to petty and narrow activity within the

¹ V. I. Lenin to S. I. Gusev, October 13, 1905, *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 359.

² V. I. Lenin, "Trade-Union Neutrality", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 460.

framework of the existing social order, to keep them away from any contact with socialism".¹ Lenin showed that the Menshevik theory of trade union neutrality actually served to disguise the bourgeoisie's attempts at controlling the working-class movement. He stressed that it was possible "to uphold trade-union neutrality as a means of widening the original field of proletarian struggle" when the bourgeoisie exerted little or no "systematic influence on the unions". But amid heightened class contradictions, fundamental differences arose even regarding the methods of improving the workers' material status "within the bounds of contemporary society".²

The Mensheviks were actually trying to separate the drive for better working conditions under capitalism from the preparation for the destruction of the system. The liquidationist slogan of the "freedom of coalitions" was aimed at integrating the working-class movement into Russia's bourgeois development à la Stolypin.

The Bolsheviks believed that the workers' status could not be improved by giving up the struggle against capital and that the concessions won by the workers should be used to ensure the proletariat's total emancipation. The Bolsheviks criticised the Menshevik approach to trade union activity because it inevitably took the edge off the proletariat's class struggle and diminished the unions' role. In Lenin's words, "Social-Democrats should never lose sight of unity of the trade-union organisation."³

In 1908, the RSDLP Central Committee passed a resolution on trade unions based on major Bolshevik principles. The resolution suggested that party members set up party groups within trade union organisations and that these groups be directed by local party centres. The Central Committee recommended clandestine trade union branches where open organisation was banned. The resolution stressed that trade unions' legal status must not make their objective any less militant.⁴

The Bolshevik leadership of the trade union movement fully justified itself both in the period of reaction and during the new revolutionary upsurge that followed it, predicting the second bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia.

Like the trade unions in Russia, those in Bulgaria that were part of the General Workers' Syndical Union expanded and grew stronger in close collaboration with the Tesnyak revolutionary party, whose fundamental trade union policy was close to that of the Bolsheviks.⁵

¹ Ibid., p. 466.

² Ibid., p. 467.

³ Ibid., p. 464.

⁴ Ibid., p. 532.

⁵ See *История на Българската комунистическа партия*, София, 1972, стр. 106; Д. Коджейков, *Партията и профсъюзното движение в България*, София, 1970, стр. 14.

A resolution adopted at the constituent congress of the GWSU recognised the leading role of the BLSDP (T).

The second type was represented by the trade unions which, although ideologically influenced by, and even organisationally linked with, Social-Democrats, mostly confined their activity to economic struggle and were actually politically neutral. These included the free trade unions in Austria-Hungary and Germany and many unions in the Netherlands, Romania, Serbia, the Scandinavian and some other countries.

The leaders of such Social-Democratic trade unions increasingly turned them in buffers which lessened the shock of capital's pressure on the working class; consequently, their task was confined to defending only the immediate interests of the workers. The motto was: A pfennig added to a mark is nearer and dearer than any politics. In actual fact this political neutrality meant that Social-Democratic leaders refused to let the trade unions get involved in the struggle for fundamental transformation of the existing system.

This course and the concomitant reliance on winning concessions mostly by conciliation and compromise with employers encountered stubborn resistance on the part of the militant forces in the movement and the revolutionary Social-Democrats associated with them. While the trade union leadership in Hungary hoped for compromise with the Imperial Court in Vienna even when organising anti-government actions under the slogans of universal suffrage, the vigorous activity of the trade unions and its allies, the revolutionary Social-Democrats, turned the fight for universal suffrage, unfolding during the repressions of 1906-1909, into a mass movement.

In 1910-1911, the Scandinavian countries witnessed the emergence of "trade union opposition" organisations which advocated turning the working-class movement into a militant and vigorous force; the trade union opposition was often led by the young Social-Democrats.¹ The German revolutionary Social-Democrats who were directly involved in trade union work (like Ernst Thälmann, leader of the Hamburg transport workers, Fritz Heckert, secretary of the construction workers' union in the city of Chemnitz since 1912, and many others) educated the workers politically and helped them understand the true role of the trade unions in the class struggle. In their speeches and articles addressed to the union audience, the revolutionary Social-Democrats firmly rebuffed the liberal labour policy of German trade union leaders. Creatively assimilating the Russian experience, Rosa Luxemburg helped many workers grasp the true content and meaning of trade union activity. She showed that, contrary to the

¹ *Fagforeningskundskab*, København, 1936, p. 69; *Norges kommunistiske partis historie*, Bd. 1, Norges kommunistiske parti, Oslo, 1963, p. 48.

assertions of reformist labour leaders, instead of threatening the trade unions' survival, strikes strengthened the class organisation of the proletariat. Publicising the international significance of the revolutionary experience gained by the Bolshevik-led trade unions of Russia, she demonstrated that a revolutionary trade union policy could win much more for the workers than moderate, "reasonable", and politically "neutral" activity could.¹

The revolutionary Social-Democrats exposed the conciliatory policy pursued by the leaders of the General Commission of German Trade Unions and explained that the success of the mass movement depended not only on how full the union coffers were, but above all and ultimately on the revolutionary action of the trade union masses and their leaders. A case in point is Luxemburg's speech at a trade union meeting of Hagen metal workers on October 1, 1910.²

However, although the revolutionary Social-Democrats were greatly popular with the workers, they often failed to pay sufficient attention to consolidating their position in the trade union movement organisationally. As a result, reformist leaders emerged on top.

Besides, the Social-Democratic trade union movement often displayed strong nationalist tendencies. For example, Austrian trade unions were adversely affected by the social-reformist theory and practice of "cultural and national autonomy" which permeated the SDPA. These fallacious principles further aggravated the historical fragmentation of the trade unions by national affiliation. Workers at the same factory were members of different ethnic trade unions; sometimes they were unable to coordinate their strikes; Czech workers even frustrated strikes begun by Austrian workers and vice versa. National separatism and federative tendencies eroded and split the movement; this helped the capitalists in their struggle against the efforts and organisation of the working class.

Third, the trade-unionist type of relations between unions and political parties was widespread. Its various forms emerged mostly in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in some other countries of Western Europe.

British trade unions were collective members of the Labour Party they themselves established. However, the Labour Party merely represented the unions in Parliament and was not really independent of the liberals. There was actually no Socialist leadership of the trade union movement. Even if the latter did turn to political activity, the opportunist leaders of the Labour Party and the British Trades Union Congress channelled it towards narrow practical objectives, designed only to improve the workers' conditions marginally and not to

¹ Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 2, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1972, S. 141-44, 182-87.

² *Ibid.*, Bd. 2, S. 463-83.

contribute to the proletariat's emancipation from exploitation. True, a trend towards more active political struggle surfaced in British trade unions, especially during the "Great Unrest" of 1910-1914. The 1912 TUC said it favoured political action. In 1913, a delegation of the TUC Parliamentary Committee handed the Prime Minister a list of demands envisaging nationalisation of land, railways and the mining industry, the introduction of universal suffrage, etc.

The relationship between the party and the trade unions were similar in Belgium. Like other nonpolitical organisations of the working people (cooperatives, mutual aid funds, etc.), the unions were, according to the charter of the BLP, its collective members. Their activity followed the reformist course of the party's policy, shaped by BLP leaders. They were opposed by a left-wing group, especially active in 1911-1914, which included Joseph Jacquemotte, later to become a founder of the Communist Party of Belgium, Charles Massart, Emile Chapelier and others.

In the United States, AFL theory and practice, based, as before, on the principles advanced by Samuel Gompers, offered the fullest and purest example of refusal to pursue an independent labour policy. Decreeing that the unions should avoid political struggle in the hope of securing economic concessions from the capitalists, labour leaders tried to further that objective by casting the union vote for one of the bourgeois parties in election campaigns. In its turn, a 1905 conference of socialist parties in New Jersey condemned neutrality vis-à-vis the unions; it, however, inconsistently refused to adopt a resolution on political support of individual unions, including the IWW. The left-wing Socialists (Eugene Debs and others) continued their firm opposition to the neutrality of the unions and devoted certain efforts to changing that situation.

The fourth, distinctive type of relations between the trade unions and the political parties of the working class emerged in the Latin countries. The reformism and sectarianism of the socialist movement was opposed by anarcho-syndicalism, which was very popular with the trade unions and advocated separation of the mass movement from political struggle and parties.

Thus, the decade that preceded World War I failed, with a few exceptions, to provide a solution to the union-party problem on a revolutionary-class basis.

The growing pains of the revolutionary trend in the trade union movement were largely due to the fact that in some countries it was still a newcomer (Eastern Europe), while in others it was at a stage when truly revolutionary proletarian political parties were still non-existent. It is not surprising that the revolutionary spirit of proletarians joining trade unions, no matter what their subjective motives, often took on distorted shape which had nothing in common

with the fundamental interests of the working class. A typical example was the further consolidation of anarcho-syndicalism, a distinctive trade union trend.

ANARCHO-SYNDICALISM

Anarcho-syndicalism, also known as revolutionary syndicalism or often simply syndicalism, took especially firm root in France, Spain, and Italy. It also gained considerable influence in Latin American countries and could be felt in Austria-Hungary, Romania, Sweden, the United States, Britain and some other countries. In the workers' organisations of Latin countries, anarcho-syndicalism emerged under the great influence of anarchism which had existed there since the late 19th century. In the industrially developed capitalist nations, anarchist influence was evident in the revolutionary syndicalist trends which reflected the social protest of certain categories of workers and their opposition to conciliatory trade unionism (for example, in the United States and Britain).

The anarcho-syndicalist doctrine was a blend of views which differed widely in their origin and character: Proudhonism, Bakunin's theories, Kropotkin's views, "pure" trade unionism and elements of Marxism misunderstood and distorted by the anarcho-syndicalist ideologists. Some of those were proletarian and semi-proletarian self-made theorists who had joined the labour élite—such as Victor Griffuelhes or Emile Pouget—and others were petty-bourgeois fellow travellers of the working-class movement, for example, Georges Sorel¹, Hubert Lagardelle and others.

The eclecticism generally typical of anarcho-syndicalist concepts took various forms and differed quite considerably from country to country depending on the distinctive conditions and development of the trade union movement. For example, while the anarcho-syndicalist leaders of the French CGT took pride in the fact that it united only a limited part of the proletariat,² the British syndicalists were striving to make the trade unions include all workers. For all its differences, anarcho-syndicalism comprised certain features common to all its forms. These were especially evident in the Amiens Charter, the programme document of the French CGT adopted in 1906.³

¹ Sorel's major book was written in 1906-1908 (Georges Sorel, *Réflexions sur la violence*, Paris, 1921). For the bibliography on Sorel and his attitude to syndicalism see P. Delesalle, "La bibliographie sorellienne" *International Review of Social History*, vol. IV, 1939.

² See T. Militsina, *Internal Rivalries in the French Trade Union Movement*, Sotsekgiz, Moscow, 1937, p. 215 (in Russian).

³ "La Charte d'Amiens. Texte de la résolution adoptée au Congrès de la C.G.T. en 1906", *Cahiers de l'Institut Maurice Thorez*, No. 16, 1969, pp. 79-80.

The syndicalists firmly rejected the need for the working class to engage in political struggle in any form and regarded political action as not only useless but even harmful for the proletariat. This negation of political action was mostly rooted in the militant workers' rejection of compromise, ministerial gamble, the idiocy of parliamentarianism, and opportunist conformism displayed by the social-reformist leaders of parties and trade unions. Any political activity was regarded as "politicking", corruption, and behind-the-scenes parliamentary wheeling and dealing. Hence the conclusion that the trade unions should not stoop so low and should instead act independently of political parties, including socialist parties.

In the anarcho-syndicalist view, trade unions are truly proletarian organisations for, unlike political parties where intellectuals play an important part, they unite workers by their class affiliation and not by their political views. Hostility toward intellectuals and "ouvrierism" (from the French *ouvrier*, worker) were also to a large degree a response to the parliamentary extremes of reformist Socialists.¹ Only the trade unions, the major tool for overthrowing the exploitation system and the principal element which will manage production and distribute the results of labour in the new society were declared to be able to lead the workers to emancipation.

Anarcho-syndicalism described the ultimate objective of the working-class struggle as the elimination of the hired labour system, the creation of a social system free from private capitalist enterprise and exploitation, and, in the words of the Amiens Charter, "complete emancipation which can only be achieved by expropriating the capitalists". The idea of a social revolution was an organic component of anarcho-syndicalist doctrine which reflected the views of the workers who refused to reconcile themselves to the capitalist system. Viewed from this angle, the recognition of the need for a fundamental social revolution was, as Lenin put it, a vital element in anarcho-syndicalism.²

The anarcho-syndicalists saw class struggle as the means of ending the system of oppression. "There can be no peace so long as hunger and want are found among millions of the working people and the few who make up the employing class have all the good things of life,"³ said the preamble to the Manifesto of the IWW, the organisation which attracted those proletarian elements in the United States, who, as in other countries too, were often driven to anarcho-syndi-

¹ See F. F. Ridley, *Revolutionary Syndicalism in France. The Direct Action of Its Time*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 267-68.

² V. I. Lenin to A. V. Lunacharsky, November 1907, *Collected Works*, Vol. 34, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 371.

³ *Bill Haywood's Book*, p. 185.

calism by their "perfectly legitimate hatred of ... opportunism and reformism"¹.

But anarcho-syndicalists interpreted the progressive ideas of the class struggle in such a distorted way that the vital element in their concepts and activity was neutralised; moreover, anarcho-syndicalism sooner or later led the labour movement into an impasse. The distortions concerned above all the goals of the class struggle. True, according to Arthur Merrheim, a man wholeheartedly devoted to revolutionary ideals and one of the key leaders of the French trade union movement in 1904-1914, the goal "we all are out to attain" was the "radical restructuring of society". But since, according to the anarchist view, the state was regarded as the greatest evil, it followed that the working class should not try to win political power because it would only perpetuate the "evil". The socialist objective was supposed to be secured without any political struggle, without the leadership of a revolutionary political party; the socialist system was pictured without a government but as a federation of labour organisations. The much-publicised "radical restructuring of society" was therefore an illusion.

Another reason why the anarcho-syndicalist negation of politics and the state attracted certain sections of the working class who opposed capitalism was that these sections (first and foremost, people fresh from the rural areas and from among the urban petty bourgeoisie and the proletarians related to them in their social status) were traditionally distrustful of the state, because petty-bourgeois consciousness had always viewed it as nothing but a source of injustice and trouble. Politics in the early 20th century was filled with scandalous revelations compromising the bourgeois state, and this aggravated the hostility on the part of some of the workers towards everything and everyone connected with state institutions. Originally petty-bourgeois, this distrust of the state provided an additional ideological and socio-psychological stimulus to the anarcho-syndicalist negation of any contacts with socialist parties.

As regards the means of the class struggle, of all their diversity only so-called direct action was recognised, that is, according to anarcho-syndicalists, the kind of action undertaken directly and exclusively by the workers relying only on their own forces.² Specifically, direct action meant economic strikes, obstruction and boycott. For example, the Amiens Charter, proclaiming the purely class platform of the French CGT, maintained that the class struggle "opposes,

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of the Communist International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 201.

² For details, see Christian de Goustine, *Pouget. Les matins noirs du syndicalisme*, Editions de la Tête de Feuilles, Paris, 1972, p. 102.

on economic grounds, the working people to all forms of exploitation and oppression, both material and spiritual, used by the capitalist class against the working class".

The strike—this distinctly proletarian way of fighting capital—was viewed as particularly important: it was contrasted to political action, the latter described as retreat from the real struggle. "It is much more convenient to harangue forth at an election rally than to strike against the employer," Sorel wrote. On the contrary, "the great advantage of the strike, conducted jointly by the workers, without interference from any politician", is that "the worker learns to rely on his personal worth and effort, value his own responsibility and the impact of his present sacrifices on the future".¹

The fallacy of the anarcho-syndicalist approach to strikes was not only that it opposed "politics" (hence the negation of political strikes). Advocating economic strikes, anarcho-syndicalists saw no need for thorough day-to-day work to support the workers' economic demands or for preparing strikes organisationally. As a rule, no measures to ensure concerted mass action preceded strikes; there were neither plans nor any clear-cut, agreed-upon programme of demands. Strikers rarely received regular assistance from the unions' meagre means. In 1911, regular payments to strikers from federation and syndicate treasuries were made in 61 cases out of a total of 1,471 in France; in 1912, the figure was 43 and 1,116; in 1914, 19 and 672.² French CGT leaders refused even to consider the need for the unions to set up strike funds. Pseudo-revolutionary reasons were advanced, maintaining that hungry workers would fight the employer with greater resolve than the well-fed ones assisted by the strike fund. Essentially, anarcho-syndicalism ignored the unions' organising mission in economic struggle. Thus, it not only underrated the true role of strikes as training for the civil war, but often even undermined the effectiveness of the strike movement. Appeals to concentrate on "direct action" led, Lenin wrote, "to disorganisation and to the shouting of 'slogans' which are futile because they are isolated, instead of conducting work in every field on the widest possible scale".³

The anarcho-syndicalist approach to strikes was wrong in that it viewed them above all as revolutionary callisthenics. They should be called as often as possible, no matter what the objective situation, because they keep the workers ready to fight. Strikes were declared to be the unceasing "training" of the revolutionary proletarian spirit

¹ Victor Griffuelhes et Louis Niel, *Les Objectifs de nos luttes de classes*, Préface de Georges Sorel, La Publication Sociale, Paris, s.d., pp. 7-8.

² B. L. Vulfson, "On the Strike Movement in France on the Eve of World War I", *The French Yearbook*, 1961, Moscow, 1962, p. 283 (in Russian).

³ V. I. Lenin, "A Caricature of Bolshevism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 393.

for "revolt"¹. Hence the principle of offensive action whatever the situation, of calling solidarity strikes even when they were absolutely unwarranted. For example, trade unions in France sometimes launched them without explaining anything to the workers first. Victor Griffuelhes (CGT Secretary-General in 1901-1908) recalled: "There was a delegate appointed by the union at each shipyard in Marseilles vicinity.... For no reason that delegate often gave a sudden whistle during work. It was a signal ... for each worker to stop working.... A strike.... Why? No one knew: neither the employer nor the workers."²

The typically anarcho-syndicalist penchant for strikes was, to a certain degree, a reflection of the militant spirit of the masses and pointed to their eagerness to take practical action and their protest against reformism. But, by turning strikes into an end in itself, by encouraging workers to strike indiscriminately, anarcho-syndicalists sapped energy the proletariat needed for truly revolutionary struggle. These "revolutionary callisthenics" inevitably exhausted the proletariat and discredited trade unions in the eyes of the workers. Arthur Merrheim wrote bitterly that the loudmouths' incessant calls for a general strike made people weary and indifferent, and it was their fault that the idea of a general strike became trite and worthless.

Closely related to the one-sided emphasis on "direct action", and above all on strikes, was the anarcho-syndicalist notion that the general economic strike would automatically destroy the capitalist system. Anarcho-syndicalism interpreted the general strike rather broadly. Victor Griffuelhes wrote that "the general strike in its ultimate form" was not merely a work stoppage, it meant that the workers would take possession of "the social riches which will be used by the workers' corporations of the syndicate type for the benefit of all. This general strike, or revolution, will be either violent or peaceful, depending on the resistance it will have to overcome."³

Thus, the notion of a general strike comprised both a peaceful strike of "folded arms"—that is, the workers' passive refusal to work—and the violent revolutionary general strike through which the capitalists would be expropriated.⁴ The important thing, however, was that the general strike was seen as a cure-all.

Besides, anarcho-syndicalists did not intend to organise for the general strike: they relied on a spontaneous joint work stoppage which would happen one "great day" as a result of their tireless "revolutionary callisthenics". They maintained that any, even a completely unforeseen strike might trigger off a revolution. "Everything for and

¹ Christian de Goustine, *op. cit.*, pp. 85, 216.

² Victor Griffuelhes, *Voyage révolutionnaire*, Librairie Marcel Rivière et Cie, Paris, s.d., pp. 24-25.

³ *Le Mouvement Socialiste*, No. 6, 1904, p. 160.

⁴ For more details, see T. Militsina, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

through the general strike, nothing for politics or for an individual strike"¹—such was the slogan of anarcho-syndicalist union leaders practically everywhere.

In actual fact, the anarcho-syndicalist leaders' incessant calls for a general strike were merely ultra-left rhetoric. Lenin severely criticised this kind of tactics because it amounted to "waiting for 'great days' along with an inability to muster the forces which create great events", and because "the syndicalists inclined towards anarchism, slipped into revolutionary phrase-mongering, destroyed the discipline of the working-class struggle".²

Overrating the actual potential of the trade union struggle in general and regarding the general strike as a miraculous weapon that would overthrow capitalism, the anarcho-syndicalists underestimated the power of the bourgeois state and ignored the historical experience of the working-class movement. Meanwhile, this experience was already sufficient to show that the economic strike by itself would never seal the fate of the capitalist system. This strike could only force the bourgeoisie to make concessions and, more importantly, it could play an important part in rallying and organising forces. But to play this part effectively, let alone to achieve anything more significant, the economic strike should be combined with political struggle, and be led by a revolutionary working-class party.

Side by side and in connection with strikes, the anarcho-syndicalists theoretically and practically advanced sabotage and boycott. Sabotage meant slow and careless work, damage to equipment and destruction of products. A distinctive anarcho-syndicalist type of obstructionism was the work-to-rule method. According to Emile Pouget, who wrote a special propaganda brochure called "Boycott and Sabotage" (1906), sabotage was the proletariat's guerrilla warfare against the bourgeoisie: a small coin, he said, could wreck a machine, and a handful of sand, a locomotive. But these paeans to sabotage often concealed an inability to organise mass proletarian action.

Along with strikes and sabotage, trade union struggle often took the form of boycotts and "labeling". Boycotts were used against companies particularly hostile to workers. "Labeling" was its opposite: the goods produced by a company that met the union's demands were labeled and the label was the workers' seal of approval for the company.

¹ Victor Griffuelhes, "Romantisme et révolutionnaire", *L'Action Directe*, 23 Avril 1908.

² V. I. Lenin, "Differences in the European Labour Movement", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 349; V. I. Lenin, "The Italian Socialist Congress", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 170.

The anarcho-syndicalists resorted to crudely violent means of social protest. Coupled with a rejection of political struggle, they appealed to the "rebel" spirit of a certain part of the union membership. Disguised as a kind of revolutionary programme of anarcho-syndicalism, it was merely an expression of the originally petty-bourgeois impatience on the part of certain categories of workers who hated their employers.

The petty-bourgeois lack of faith in the creative potential of the proletarian masses was also typical of the much-publicised anarcho-syndicalist "active minority" theory. It regarded the workers as "human zeros who are only of value if put to the right of conscious entities; they are passive creatures whose latent forces can only be mobilised by an impulse from outside, from those who are vigorous and courageous".¹ This revolutionary minority was to ferment the rest of the masses; the general strike is also the task of the minority.² This theory was organically linked with the refusal to create mass organisations led by a central authority and with a disdain for organisation work.

Thus, for all its revolutionary rhetoric, anarcho-syndicalism provided no serious opportunities for the mass working-class movement, failed to guide the unions in their struggle, and doomed the working class to marking time. That was why Lenin called anarcho-syndicalism "revisionism from the left".³

The proletarian masses influenced and led by anarcho-syndicalists usually failed to see through their pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric and were even attracted by the show of militancy. Since in many countries the revolutionary socialist trend in the working-class movement remained undeveloped, the anarcho-syndicalists often made the proletariat believe that they were working to solve the key problems of the emancipation struggle, the problems which the opportunist labour leaders refused to tackle.

Therefore, despite its errors, anarcho-syndicalism almost invariably opposed the right wing in the trade-union and partly even in the socialist movements. Denjiro Kotoku's efforts in the Japanese socialist movement were a case in point. In Portugal, the proletariat's militant forces consolidated within the trade union movement. Adherence to anarcho-syndicalist views was often explained by the insufficient political experience of the broad revolutionary proletarian masses. A graphic example of this was the IWW, an organisation

¹ E. Pouget, *Les bases du syndicalisme*, Paris, 1910, p. 20.

² E. Pouget, *Grève générale reformiste et grève générale révolutionnaire*, Paris, 1903, p. 4; Christian de Goustine, *Pouget. Les matins noirs du syndicalisme*, Paris, 1972, p. 101.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Marxism and Revisionism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 38.

that left a significant imprint on the international working-class movement. Besides, one should also take into account the inconsistency of anarcho-syndicalist policies: although their proponents proclaimed negation of political struggle, they often (for example, in Spain, Italy and France in the prewar years) led mass anti-militarist campaigns, May Day manifestations, and fought against governmental coercion in all its forms.

CHRISTIAN AND YELLOW-DOG UNIONS

Christian syndicalism was a distinctive, religion-related type of trade union compromise; it was led, ideologically and morally, by the Church: sometimes bishops even appointed religious advisers to the trade unions. As before, Christian unions tried to prevent the believers among the workers from joining the "Reds" and from becoming involved in the joint struggle of organised labour against capital; they tried to fence them off against the "destructive ideas" of socialism. Christian unions continued to recruit their members from among the least politically conscious elements of the proletariat, mostly those working outside major industries.¹

Clerical unions both criticised some of capitalism's faults and preached moderation, they called on the workers to be quiet, cautious and polite, to respect the authorities and to make no attempts against the existing system.

Accordingly, their practices were confined to "Christian solidarity"—setting up cooperatives, mutual aid funds, credit unions, trade union hostels, offering legal consultation and charity to the unemployed and disabled, etc. The programme of the Austrian Christian unions association said, for example, that since the employers and the workers were bound together by a community of interests, Christian unions rejected both the theory and practice of class struggle.² Nevertheless, life led them away from the principles of humility; protest was increasingly evident in the Christian unions; sometimes they even found themselves involved in strikes.

An openly apolitical approach was a salient feature of Christian trade unions. Their charters decreed that members should abstain from political struggle: the unions must be non-partisan, i.e., they must not join political parties. True, sometimes Christian unions (for example, in Belgium and Germany) took part in election campaigns and tried to send their delegates to the parliament. However, up to

¹ See M. Y. Domnich, *Essays on the History of Christian Syndicalism*, Nauka, Moscow, 1976, pp. 21-22 (in Russian).

² *150 ans de Mouvement Ouvrier Chrétien en Europe de l'Ouest (1789-1939)*, Rédaction de S. H. Scholl, Editions Nauwelaerts, Louvain, 1966, p. 118.

World War I, this approach was not typical of the movement in general.

Christian unions remained organised on a craft basis. Still, in the prewar years some of them increasingly favoured consolidation: in 1907, the Federation of Christian Syndicates was set up in Switzerland and the Central Committee of the Austrian Christian Unions appeared; 1908 saw the establishment of the Confederation of Christian Syndicates in Belgium.

By 1914, Christian trade unions were few: their membership was only a little over 500,000. Nevertheless, they were "a wedge of hostile forces driven into the organization and ideology of the working class", later to become "an additional hindrance in the forward drive of the working class in many countries".¹

Another wedge was represented by what is known as yellow-dog unions which had emerged as early as the late 19th century. More correctly, these strike-breaking organisations, set up with employers' money under the aegis of the authorities, were the opposite of trade unions. They comprised the more backward elements of the working class and the petty-bourgeois elements who had gone broke and wanted to stage a comeback by collaborating with the employers. These unions were often led by shady characters, stool pigeons and the like. Employers relied on these unions to stem the growth of the working-class movement, and so they donated large sums to them (often disguised as dues) and financed their large bureaucracy. Yellow-dog union members were better paid; they enjoyed privileges during mass dismissals, and were told that it was not struggle but diligence, loyalty and thrift that can make the working man free and content. These unions constantly betrayed the workers' struggle, stabbing them in the back.

In the prewar decade these unions amalgamated on a local or even national scale (for example, in 1910 the Association of German Trade Unions was established in Magdeburg and included most of the country's yellow-dog unions). An attempt at convening an international congress of yellow-dog organisations had been made earlier but failed.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION ORGANISATIONS

International coordination of trade union activity continued to increase in the prewar decade. By mid-1914, there were 32 international industrial secretariats (printing, metal, transport and other workers). By 1913, the International Trade Union Secretariat (ITUS),

¹ William Z. Foster, *Outline History of the World Trade Union Movement*, International Publishers, New York, 1956, p. 225.

renamed the International Federation of Trade Unions, included 19 national labour centres with a membership of about 7 million.

Certain practical measures taken by the ITUS positively affected the international trade union movement. These measures included, above all, information supplied to national trade unions about unemployment, anti-labour legislation and migrant labour, and in addition, labour statistics necessary for the correct guidance of union activities, organisation of mutual assistance, etc. The Fifth ITUS Conference adopted an important resolution condemning strike-breaking. The Conference also called on all labour organisations to bring pressure to bear on their governments so that they would sign an international convention for workers' health protection. The ITUS coordinated mutual international support during strikes. For example, in 1912-1913, 80,000 marks were sent to the trade unions of Serbia and Bulgaria, and in 1913 10,400 marks went to the workers in Belgium who went on general strike to change the franchise laws.¹

International trade union associations helped develop the international forms of coordination in the socio-economic struggle of the working class. However, the opportunism of ITUS leaders led to serious flaws.

The ITUS' right wing was made up of reformist leaders headed by Carl Legien; they wanted the Secretariat to be merely an information and statistics bureau, completely isolated from the revolutionary Social-Democrats. As early as the First International Trade Union Conference, Legien stressed that the ITUS was not to consider "general questions", which were fully within the sphere of competence of the Socialist International. The 1907 ITUS Conference in Christiania refused to discuss "international trade union action against war". On Legien's insistence, the 1909 ITUS Conference in Paris declined the French delegates' demand that the question of the general strike be discussed.²

True, often the anarcho-syndicalists, who initially enjoyed influence in the Secretariat, prodded it into action. Their demands reflected the urgent needs and interests of the proletarian masses who were dissatisfied with the leaders' policy of compromise. Specifically, the French syndicalists called for vigorous action against militarism and a general strike as a means to that end. Many other representatives of various national centres also advocated discussion of such issues. Nevertheless, the social-reformists who dominated the ITUS held their ground: Legien, Gompers and their supporters refused to deal with "general questions", referring to the unions' "lack of competence" in politics.

¹ W. Schevenels, *Forty-Five Years. International Federation of Trade Unions*, Brussels, 1956, p. 54.

² For more details, see W. Foster, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-73.

The growth of anarcho-syndicalism in the world trade union movement enabled French union leaders to concentrate on establishing a new international organisation that would rival the ITUS. To that end they temporarily withdrew from the ITUS in 1909. The question of establishing a more representative and active international trade union centre was discussed at a 1913 London conference of trade unions from Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Norway, Sweden and some other countries. However, the disagreements that surfaced and then the world war prevented the realisation of that plan.

Christian trade unions, from the early 1900s on, also tried to establish an international association of their own. In large measure this was due to their rivalry with Social-Democratic trade unions; the ideological justification was the "universal character of Christianity". International associations of individual Christian unions began to appear as early as 1900. In 1908 a conference of Christian unions from Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland decided to set up an international trade union secretariat, which began functioning in Cologne in 1909. Adam Stegerwald, the leader of the German Christian trade unions, was elected its secretary general. The international Christian trade union centre united about 500,000 members. Its activity was confined to correspondence contacts, and it ceased to exist as the war began.

* * *

In the period under review, the trade union movement in general advanced perceptibly; its membership grew and structure improved, and it exerted increasing influence upon the struggle of the proletariat and all the working people.

The militant, revolutionary trend was gaining ground in the trade unions, and in some countries, above all in Russia, it even dominated in them. At the same time, reformist practice developed in labour organisations in the period of prewar imperialism. In some countries the militant trade union effort was channeled into anarcho-syndicalist pseudo-revolutionism. The ruling classes and their governments skilfully used and fostered the fragmentation of the trade union movement to strengthen the system of exploitation.

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Chapter 6

THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY AND SOCIALISM: THE POLITICAL ASPECT

Marxist tactics was considerably enriched by the theoretical and practical work done by the left-wing Social-Democrats throughout the world, above all by the Bolsheviks, during the Russian revolution and the upsurge of the world working-class and democratic movement in 1905-1907. Now this revolutionary tactics was to be asserted, developed and applied to the specific conditions in different countries.

Meanwhile, the situation which took shape as a result of the defeat of the 1905-1907 Russian revolution gave rise to attempts at distorting and refuting the great experience of the mass revolutionary struggle. The new upsurge of the international working-class movement, especially strong in 1910-1914, was accompanied with greater monopoly oppression and increased influence of bourgeois ideology on the masses. The ruling quarters of the major countries did much to foment nationalism and chauvinism and thus involve the popular masses into the rapidly approaching imperialist war.

Besides, the revisionists and other social-reformists were becoming increasingly blatant in their attempts at compromise. They called on the working people to give up mass action and tried to confine the policies of the labour parties to parliamentary struggle and moderate reforms.

The social-reformist practice was reflected in the further development of "ministerialism"—i.e., unprincipled participation in bourgeois governments which sacrificed working-class interests to political career. Alexandre Millerand was followed by Aristide Briand and René Raphaël Viviani in France and Leonida Bissolati in Italy. In 1907-1908, in Germany Social-Democratic members of the landtags in Württemberg, Baden and Bavaria violated their party's decision and voted for the government's budget. Subsequently, their example was followed by Social-Democratic members of other parliaments, not only in Germany. Henry Mayers Hyndman supported the imperi-

alist policy of his government claiming that Great Britain had to arm itself in self-defence. In 1913, the largest Social-Democratic parliamentary group—that in Germany—approved appropriations to strengthen the army. The social-reformists tried to turn workers' organisations into capital's "loyal opposition" which was supposed to criticise only the extremes while generally supporting the basis and policy of imperialism.

However, the opportunist line ran counter to the profound objective trends in the development of the proletarian movement. In October 1911, Lenin observed that, on the one hand, reformism "in many countries ... is raising its head ... on the other hand, there is a growing number of indications that in the most advanced countries the period of so-called 'peaceful parliamentarianism' is drawing to a close and a period of revolutionary unrest among the masses is setting in"¹. Sometimes, the mass proletarian movement spontaneously found new means and methods of struggle. The Marxists were to guide that struggle, help the working class understand the meaning of the changes under way, creatively chart a political course for the working-class movement and adapt it to new conditions, find the most effective ways and means of struggle, and prepare the proletariat for the revolution.

LENIN AND THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY ON THE REVOLUTIONARY POLICY AND TACTICS OF THE PROLETARIAT

Like Marx, Lenin determined Marxist tactics—which he described as the direction and methods of the working-class movement—in strict accordance with the principles of dialectical materialism. He defined the essence of the Marxist approach as follows: "Only an objective consideration of the sum total of the relations between absolutely all the classes in a given society, and consequently a consideration of the objective stage of development reached by that society and of the relations between it and other societies, can serve as a basis for the correct tactics of an advanced class. At the same time, all classes and all countries are regarded, not statically, but dynamically, i.e., not in the state of immobility, but in motion (whose laws are determined by the economic conditions of existence of each class)."²

At a time when the working-class movement in many countries particularly suffered from opportunism brought on by the corrupting influence of bourgeois politics and ideology, Lenin was especially

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Election Campaign and the Election Platform", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1968, p. 285.

² V. I. Lenin, "Karl Marx", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 75.

emphatic about the need to observe the fundamental Marxist principle: while fighting in the name of the immediate objectives and interests of the working-class movement, one should also safeguard its future. Studying the correspondence of Marx and Engels, published in 1913, he stressed that, unlike many workers' leaders of the early 1900s, they displayed a "most profound comprehension of the *basic* aims of the proletariat in bringing about change", and provided "an unusually flexible definition of the tasks of the tactics of the moment from the standpoint of these revolutionary aims, without making the slightest concession to opportunism or revolutionary phrase-mongering".¹

The defeat of the Russian revolution made it particularly urgent and difficult to solve the problems concerning the forms, methods and means of the proletariat's struggle which would absorb the mass experience and lessons of the entire international working-class movement, concerning the timely change and coordination of these forms and means. In 1909, Lenin wrote that during the revolution "we learned to 'speak French' Now, in this time of stagnation, reaction and disintegration, we must learn to 'speak German', i.e., to work slowly (there is nothing else for it, until things revive), systematically, steadily, advancing step by step, winning inch by inch."² The opportunists tried to interpret this change in the forms of struggle, inevitable when the revolution ebbed and reaction took over, in the spirit of reformism and legalism, to refuse to prepare the masses for the revolution, and to reject revolutionary methods of struggle in general. On the contrary, the Bolsheviks saw their greatest task in preserving the experience of mass revolutionary struggle at a low point of the revolution. Like Marx, Lenin believed in "utilising the periods of political stagnation or of sluggish, so-called 'peaceful' development in order to develop the class-consciousness, strength and militancy of the advanced class, and ... to find practical solutions for great tasks in the great days, in which 'twenty years are embodied'".³

Thus, Lenin's work to develop the revolutionary tactics of the working class and to apply it properly in Russia and other countries was based on a profound scientific study of the objective situation and its trends, and on the consequent formulation of the working-class movement's tasks. In these efforts Lenin differentiated between overall tasks which remained unchanged during the turns of history if the fundamental alignment of classes remained unchanged, and the tasks

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Marx-Engels Correspondence", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1963, pp. 553-54.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Liquidation of Liquidationism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1963, pp. 458-59.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Karl Marx", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 75.

depending on the changes in the specific socio-political situation.

In his examination of the world working-class movement Lenin concluded that the initial stage of rallying and organising working-class forces was drawing to an end. Some countries, above all Russia, were facing the tasks of bourgeois-democratic revolutions which were moving closer in time to socialist revolutions; in other, developed capitalist countries, the task of the Social-Democrats was actually preparing the proletariat for the struggle against the bourgeoisie for power, for the elimination of the capitalist system.

However, although the objective tasks of the Social-Democrats were different in different countries, the need to prepare the masses for revolution brought all sections of the international working-class movement closer together and pointed the way for the Left wing of the Social-Democrats throughout the world. In this connection Lenin noted the importance of the Russian working-class experience for Western European countries, "since there was no doubt that in the period of socialist revolutions events there would resemble those that had taken place in Russia".¹

Lenin's conclusion that a new revolution was maturing in Russia was based on the analysis of complex and contradictory processes that were under way in Russia during the reactionary period; the prospects of a new stage in the struggle against tsarism were examined in organic connection with the factors which were making the overall international situation increasingly revolutionary. This was the basis of a resolution of the Fifth All-Russia RSDLP Conference (1908) and of subsequent party decisions too.² In 1912-1913, Lenin observed that the outcome of the revolutionary crisis building up in Russia depended both on a host of domestic factors and on the situation in Europe and Asia, that one of the factors aggravating that crisis in Russia was the glaring clash between the situation in Russia and "the state of affairs in all neighbouring—not only European but Asian—countries".³ It was therefore necessary to take into account the entire system of class forces and their relations, and to pay due attention to the experience of revolutionary, democratic struggle and of counter-revolution both in individual countries and worldwide.

The strategic course of Russia's revolutionary proletariat, worked out by Lenin and implemented by the Bolsheviks in 1905-1907, remained unchanged both in the years of reaction and during the

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Contemporary Russia and the Working-Class Movement", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 47.

² See *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, pp. 250, 329, 374-75.

³ V. I. Lenin, "May Day Action by the Revolutionary Proletariat", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 221.

new revolutionary upsurge that followed; "the line of political demarcation between the classes, which is the *same* during an upheaval and in its absence",¹ was borne out. Lenin consistently fought for the proletariat's hegemony in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, against all attempts at forcing the Russian working class to choose the reformist way, at abandoning the unabridged demands of the 1905 Revolution: a democratic republic, an eight-hour working-day, and confiscation of landed estates. He exposed the schemes of the liberal bourgeoisie and revisionists, graphically expressed in liquidationism, to lead the proletariat astray from the revolutionary socialist path to the road of insignificant reforms and of patching up the shabby cloak of tsarism. This line pursued by the Bolshevik Party acquired immense international significance when the problem of realising the proletariat's leadership in the approaching revolutions was becoming a particularly important element in the Marxist policy of Social-Democrats throughout the world.

Proceeding from the experience accumulated by the working-class movement Lenin stressed that ensuring the proletariat's leadership required, first, that the class of hired workers become united, organise its own party, and develop its consciousness until it was aware of its great historical objectives, and second, that the democratic forces, willing and able to put an end to all hold-overs of medievalism on the basis of a mass movement, get organised.² The Bolsheviks' struggle against any liberal labour policies was very important in this regard. These liberal policies, Lenin noted, recognised the workers' need and right to have their own class party, to take part in politics as an independent organised force, and to fight—but only for improving their status as an oppressed class and not for overthrowing the system which doomed them to oppression. Only the right to secure concessions from the propertied classes was recognised and not the right to carry out a radical restructuring of society. On the contrary, the Marxist proletarian policy, while using every opportunity to secure genuine reforms and partial improvement within the old society, explained the fallacy of reformism to the masses and led them along the revolutionary path of fundamental social change which would secure emancipation from serfdom at the first stage of the struggle and from the oppression of capital at the second.

Pursuing the Marxist proletarian policy and exposing opportunism which led the working class towards submission to the bourgeoisie,

¹ V. I. Lenin, "A Liberal Labour Party Manifesto", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, pp. 319-20.

² See V. I. Lenin, "The Campaign for the Elections to the Fourth Duma", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, pp. 373-79; V. I. Lenin, "Political Parties in Russia", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, pp. 50-51.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks accorded priority to uniting the democratic forces capable of supporting the proletariat in its revolutionary struggle.

The announcement of the 1913 Cracow Conference of the RSDLP Central Committee with party activists said: "New democratic forces are rapidly expanding and growing stronger among Russia's peasants and urban bourgeoisie."¹ The Bolsheviks continued their efforts to establish a leftist bloc, and these were reflected in the decisions of the Fifth RSDLP Conference, the Sixth (Prague) All-Russia RSDLP Conference in 1912, and the Cracow and Poronin Conferences of the RSDLP Central Committee with party activists in 1913. Lenin countered the liquidationist approach by stressing that leftist blocs were imperative for all workers' parties in any bourgeois-democratic movement. Pointing to the fundamental difference between the workers' and peasants' democracies stemming from the distinction between the status of the class of hired workers and small peasant landowners, he wrote: "In Russia today, the tasks which the workers and the peasants have in common are drawing the working-class democracy and the peasant democracy closer together. While necessarily following different paths, the two democracies can, and for the purpose of achieving success should, act jointly, against all that is contrary to democracy."²

Lenin's guidelines for the attitude of the proletariat and its party towards the peasants had that aim in view. They provided for a joint revolutionary democratic struggle of the proletariat and the peasants, with the proletariat in the lead and with due regard to the distinctive features of the situation and the demands of the broad peasant masses which presented an objective alternative to Stolypin's agrarian policy. In the course of these efforts, Lenin considered it necessary for the proletariat and its party to pursue a class policy and consolidate the movement, advocating the path of development best suited to the proletariat and the working masses, and fighting traditional prejudices, stagnant parochialism and petty-bourgeois socialism. In their relations with the petty-bourgeois parties which were supported by the peasant masses, the Bolsheviks recognised that the apparently quasi-socialist but essentially unscientific and reactionary doctrines of those parties were "the ideological vestments of a really revolutionary—and not compromising—bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie in Russia".³ Consequently, for example, the resolution of the Poronin Conference, while demanding that a struggle

¹ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, p. 357.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Trudoviks and the Worker Democrats", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 37.

³ V. I. Lenin, "How the Socialist-Revolutionaries Sum Up the Revolution and How the Revolution Has Summed Them Up", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 341.

be waged against the petty-bourgeois socialism of Narodnik parties, their vacillation and abandonment of consistent democracy, stressed the task of "supporting the republican-democratic trends in the peasant masses, constantly stressing that only the consistently democratic socialist proletariat can be a reliable leader of the poor peasant masses in their struggle against the monarchy and the system of landowners' estates".¹

The Bolsheviks worked to ensure that the proletarian party use all the available ways and means of influencing the peasant masses and that the ideological and organisational preparation of the proletarian-led peasant revolution be integrated. They did very much to preserve and develop the peasant masses' experience of revolutionary struggle which, although in different forms, continued after the revolution's defeat. They sought to expand Social-Democratic propaganda in the provinces and advocated a democratic agrarian revolution. In criticising the Menshevik programme of agrarian municipalisation, Lenin stressed that a Social-Democratic agrarian programme should comprise directives about organising peasant action. Its implementation depended on the work at the grass roots level, on mass struggle and formation of bodies of the peasant committee type. He maintained that these "organisations of the fighting people ... must serve as the instrument of the full power of the people ... and as the means for securing it".²

Lenin also pointed to the need for greater Social-Democratic propaganda among those sections of the proletariat which were linked to the peasants. During the new revolutionary upsurge, the Bolsheviks maintained that one of the most effective means of overcoming the apathy, despair and fragmentation of the agricultural proletariat and the peasants, was a mass revolutionary strike by the proletariat. It would awaken political initiative and involve broad masses into revolutionary struggle. In early 1913, Lenin wrote: "It is essential that the smouldering resentment and subdued murmurings of the countryside should, along with the indignation in the barracks, find a centre of attraction in the workers' revolutionary strikes."³

The Bolsheviks' efforts to rally and organise the left-wing democratic forces and to enhance the role of the proletariat as the dominant force of the general democratic movement paralleled their work to develop a militant democratic spirit among the masses of both the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie. The work in this direc-

¹ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, p. 390.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Agrarian Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-1907", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, pp. 357-58.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Development of Revolutionary Strikes and Street Demonstrations", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 477.

tion, especially in the period of reaction, was extremely impeded by the abruptly increased and manifold opportunism of the urban petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. Recalling the experience of all countries where revolutions had been defeated, Lenin wrote: "...One and the same psychology, one and the same class peculiarity (that of the petty bourgeoisie, for example) is displayed both in the dejection of the opportunist and in the desperation of the terrorist."¹

While condemning this extremism, Lenin, at the same time, advocated attention to all manifestations of discontent, to any mass conflicts with autocracy, even in their primitive forms.

In this connection, he considered it a sectarian mistake to disregard student outbreaks, even though they were not generally political, were confined to academic demands—like the autonomy of educational establishments—and were not coordinated with the political movement of the proletariat. Lenin called for a thorough examination of the conditions in which the actions by students took place and of their relation to the political movement. If they blunted the aims of the movement, fragmented it and misled its participants, the Social-Democrats must campaign against them. But if the students raise their protest amid general tranquillity, the Social-Democrats must support it in every way and help it expand. Lenin wrote that this support, like "every other support of primitive forms of movement by Social-Democracy ... should consist most of all in ideological and organisational influence on wider sections who have been roused by the conflict, and to whom this form of conflict, as a general rule, is their *first* experience of political conflicts".²

A policy of supporting, consolidating and expanding the democratic movement led by the proletariat, although particularly warranted in Russia, was important for other countries too. Any true labour party faced the task of advancing both purely proletarian and general democratic objectives, of working vigorously for their implementation, and of resisting the attempts by the ruling classes at imposing liberal labour policy principles on the proletariat. As Lenin stressed, "the entire policy of the British liberals, who have so profoundly corrupted the British workers, is to allow the workers to try 'to prevail upon the propertied classes', but *not to allow the workers* to win for themselves the leadership of a movement of the whole people".³

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Some Features of the Present Collapse", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 152.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Student Movement and the Present Political Situation", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 216.

³ V. I. Lenin, "From the Camp of the Stolypin 'Labour' Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 290.

Charting the ways of securing the proletariat's leadership in those capitalist countries which lacked any significant democratic movement of small-scale landowners against large manorial land ownership and where petty-bourgeois parties supported the liberal bourgeoisie, Lenin stressed the need for rallying the non-proletarian masses—above all, small-scale peasants and the commercial and industrial petty bourgeoisie in the towns—around the proletariat so they could fight both for bourgeois-democratic objectives and against capitalism. This alliance was facilitated, on the one hand, by the development of capitalism which crushed and dispossessed small-scale producers, and on the other, by Social-Democratic propaganda. For example, an analysis of German political life led Lenin to conclude in 1913 that the mood prevalent in the masses of the petty bourgeoisie had changed and that the sympathies of the peasants and the urban middle strata now lay with the Social-Democrats. Lenin also stressed that there was still much to be done as far as political education in rural areas was concerned.¹

Describing the prospects of the emancipation struggle in Germany, Lenin emphasised that the revolution which was on the rise in that country "encounters a special, peculiar political situation that does not resemble other pre-revolutionary periods in other countries.... The chief feature of this peculiar pre-revolutionary situation consists in the fact that the coming revolution must inevitably be incomparably more profound, more radical, drawing far broader masses into a more difficult, stubborn and prolonged struggle than all previous revolutions."² The proletarian party was to involve the broad masses in that struggle, to advance demands that were close and understandable to them, that affected their vital interests. In 1910 Lenin commented on August Bebel's speech at the Magdeburg Congress of the SPD and wrote: "All his references to the aggravation of contradictions, the difficulty of reforms in Prussia, the inextricable position of the government and the classes in command, the growth of resentment among the masses, the danger of a European war, the intensification of the economic yoke as a result of the high cost of living, the amalgamation of the capitalists in trusts and cartels, etc., etc.—all are clearly intended to open the eyes of the Party and the masses to the inevitability of a revolutionary struggle."³ Advancing general democratic objectives was becoming neces-

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "Fresh Data on German Political Parties", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 269-71; V. I. Lenin, "There's a Trudovik for You!", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 434-35; V. I. Lenin, "Zabern", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 514-15.

² V. I. Lenin, "Two Worlds", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 310.

³ Ibid.

sary for preparing the revolutionary struggle against the entire bourgeois system, for involving the working masses in it. For example, Lenin demonstrated that the approaching socialist revolution should not permit a respite in republican propaganda, because a weaker republican tradition would mean a weaker understanding of revolutionary objectives in general.¹ In this connection he recalled Engels's words to the effect that, faced with the growing power of the proletariat, the ruling classes might abandon the bourgeois constitutional rule of law and violate it for the sake of preserving the rule of the bourgeoisie. Noting the distinctive character of the pre-revolutionary situation in Germany, Lenin wrote that "a party which has magnificently utilised a half-century of bourgeois legality *against* the bourgeoisie has not the slightest reason to renounce those conveniences in the struggle, that advantage in battle afforded by the fact that *the enemy is caught in the toils* of his own legality, that the enemy is compelled ... to shatter his own legality".²

Advancing consistent general democratic demands concerning the nationalities question was an important element in rallying the democratic forces around the proletariat. The problem of waging a general democratic struggle for the rights of nationalities was topical not only for Russia but also for the countries that were far ahead of it with regard to bourgeois-democratic transformations. Lenin differentiated between mass national movements connected with the emergence of bourgeois-democratic society and the period when mass bourgeois-democratic movements were typically absent, but he never treated this distinction as an absolute. He noted that "the two periods are not walled off from each other; they are connected by numerous transitional links".³ Historical experience also bore out that approach. Even in 19th-century Britain, where the bourgeois revolution had long been completed, Marx and Engels considered it necessary for the English workers to support the bourgeois-democratic movement in Ireland, to give it a revolutionary impetus, once it had started, and to see it through to the end—because that would be in the interests of the freedom of the English proletariat itself. Lenin, too, closely followed the 1913 Dublin events in connection with the national liberation struggle in Ireland and interpreted these developments as evidence that in a "peaceable, cultured, civilised free state" the class struggle "has become accentuated to the point of class war"; he noted that despite the opportunist resistance, these events exerted revolutionary influence on the

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "The Happening to the King of Portugal", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, pp. 472-73.

² V. I. Lenin, "Two Worlds", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 311.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 401.

English workers.¹ Lenin noted the constitutional crisis connected with the developments in Ireland and the British ruling quarters' clash with their own law, "when the noble landowners of Britain tore the British constitution and British law to shreds and gave an excellent lesson of the class struggle".²

Mapping out the ways leading the proletariat and the non-proletarian strata to the socialist revolution, Lenin deduced the need for the Social-Democratic parties to advance bourgeois-democratic objectives even in the more developed capitalist countries both from the fact that their bourgeois development was not quite complete and from the consequences of bourgeois development itself. For example, he noted that "a number of *pre-bourgeois*, medieval institutions and privileges of the landed gentry have been preserved in Britain".³ True, these did not give rise to the kind of mass democratic protest movement which existed in Russia, but, significantly, they did attract the attention of politicians who tried to win the masses' support by publicising reform plans. Lloyd George's "agrarian campaign" in 1913 was a case in point.

On the other hand, imperialism evoked among the masses new democratic demands which reflected protest against monopoly oppression and against the violation of bourgeois-democratic freedoms. Lenin's assessment of the changes in US politics is typical in this regard. He observed that bourgeois reformism which strengthened in the United States in the pre-war years advanced a new programme proclaiming a kind of capitalism allegedly capable of establishing "social and industrial justice" and ensuring, with the help of the government, a decent place in society for the workers. These promises were a response to the growth of the working-class movement and the socialist trend; they took into consideration the mood of the masses who were not content with small concessions and wanted to change their social status. Lenin observed that bourgeois reformists succeeded in capturing four million US votes merely because the voters felt that "it is *impossible* to go on living in the old way".⁴

The Social-Democrats could use these growing feelings in bourgeois-democratic countries as a basis for launching the drive to win power, to attain socialism.

This struggle was to inevitably pass through several stages, to advance intermediate demands which would be considerably differ-

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "Class War in Dublin", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 332, 336.

² V. I. Lenin, "Constitutional Crisis in Britain", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 227-28.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

⁴ See V. I. Lenin, "The Results and Significance of the U.S. Presidential Elections", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 402-04.

ent in countries differing in the level of capitalist development, in the forms of bourgeois domination, in the degree of maturity of the working-class movement and its distinctive features, etc.

In 1912, Lenin pointed to the beginning of great battles for socialism in Europe and America. However, in 1913 he wrote that the British workers were right in advancing, as a partial demand, the slogan of political reform, quite feasible on the constitutional basis.¹ In 1914, Lenin praised the US workers' "plain, obvious and immediate demands" aimed at eliminating the exploiter consumption typical of the capitalists, their supporters and toadies, at using the nation's resources for ensuring a decent income for all worker families and a normal working-day.² He believed that in countries like the United States, where there was no vigorous revolutionary and socialist tradition among the proletariat, nationwide democratic objectives had already been secured, the proletariat followed the bourgeoisie and did not independently use the considerable political freedom, and the Social-Democratic movement was comparatively weak, the Socialists' sectarian disdain of the demands advanced by the workers themselves was especially dangerous. Like Marx and Engels, Lenin stressed that in these conditions the Socialists were to adapt "to the theoretically helpless, but living and powerful mass working-class movement that is marching alongside them", "to join with the working-class movement so as to *shake up* the proletariat *politically*".³

In countries where the working class faced important general democratic tasks still unresolved because the bourgeois-democratic revolution had not been completed or was yet to be launched and where the proletariat pursued an independent policy, and the Social-Democrats were active, Lenin considered it especially dangerous to depreciate the tasks and scope of the working-class movement. By and large, the main task was to raise the workers above their everyday concerns and lead them along the path of revolutionary struggle, with due regard for the historically distinctive features of the working-class movement in this or that country.⁴

In the period under review, problems of militarism and colonial rule were especially important in the drive to consolidate and organise the proletariat, to involve the proletarian and non-proletarian

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "A Week After the Dublin Massacre", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 349.

² See V. I. Lenin, "Four Thousand Rubles a Year and a Six-Hour Day", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 68-70.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Preface to the Russian Translation of *Letters by Johannes Becker, Joseph Dietzgen, Frederick Engels, Karl Marx and Others to Friedrich Sorge and Others*", *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, pp. 363, 373.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 373, 377-78.

working masses into the struggle against imperialist policy. Lenin proceeded from the indelible link between the anti-war movement and the proletariat's preparation for the revolution.

Apart from defining other tasks of revolutionary preparations based on the 1905-1907 experience, Lenin's draft resolution adopted by the Fifth RSDLP Conference in 1908 particularly stressed the need for party work in the army.¹ The Conference decided that it was absolutely inadmissible to vote for military appropriations, and called for a vigorous campaign against the counter-revolutionary foreign policy pursued by the government and the parties supporting it, as well as against the imperialist and nationalist schemes of the various groups of the Russian bourgeoisie. This course was later reiterated at the Sixth (Prague) RSDLP Conference in 1912.² In his approach to the problem of war Lenin held that the decisive factor was not merely whether the war was defensive or offensive but how it affected the interests of the class struggle and the international proletarian movement.³

At the Copenhagen Congress of the Second International in 1910, Lenin argued in favour of opposing militarism by using the important fundamental demand of the Social-Democrats about replacing the bourgeois army with the armament of the people. Although that slogan was not feasible under capitalism, it was necessary as an integral part of the demands which led the masses towards revolution. During the preparation for the Basel Congress of the Second International (1912), Lenin worked to ensure that the manifesto drafting committee rebuff the right-centrist views of the German and Austrian Social-Democratic leaders *et al.* who renounced the proletariat's mass revolutionary anti-war struggle.⁴ At the same time, Lenin was against the ultra-left anarcho-syndicalist calls about rebuffing war by direct action, by the anti-war strike. He believed that, instead of launching an anti-war strike in the unfavourable conditions of the war's initial stage, it was necessary to strengthen the clandestine organisations of the proletariat and to prepare it for revolution. Referring to the ISB measures to implement the anti-war resolution adopted by the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International, Lenin wrote in 1910 that "what is in question is not an isolated act of 'preventing war' (averting), but revolutionary pressure by the *masses* of the proletariat in general" and

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "The Fifth (All-Russian) Conference of the R.S.D.L.P., December 21-27, 1908", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 324.

² See *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, pp. 253, 254, 333.

³ See V. I. Lenin, "Bellicose Militarism and the Anti-Militarist Tactics of Social-Democracy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 199.

⁴ See V. I. Lenin to Karl Radek, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971, p. 172; V. I. Lenin to Camille Huysmans, *Collected Works*, Vol. 43, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 306-07.

in this connection he pointed to the need for a thorough analysis of the course and conditions of 1905 strikes.¹ In July 1914, in his notes for the article "Revolution and War" he had this to say about the anti-war struggle: "...Experience of workers in Russia. Best war against war: revolution."²

Lenin's treatment of the proletariat's anti-colonial policy also led the masses towards revolution, made it possible to couple the proletarian struggle in the imperial countries with the national liberation movement in the colonial and dependent territories. Lenin considered it necessary to wage "the struggle of Social-Democrats against colonial policy, their agitation among the masses against colonial robbery, the awakening of a spirit of resistance and opposition among the oppressed masses in the colonies".³

Led by Lenin, the Bolsheviks were the first in the history of the international working-class movement to provide many fine examples of active proletarian support for the national liberation struggle of the oppressed colonial peoples. The Leninist approach implied both exposing the colonial policies of their own and other imperialist governments, spreading revolutionary ideas among the troops sent to suppress the national liberation movements and organising direct assistance to that movement by arms and volunteers.⁴

* * *

In 1908-1914, the diverse revolutionary tasks of the working-class movement had to be tackled in a complex, contradictory and constantly changing socio-political situation. Both in Russia, where the reactionary period was replaced by a new upsurge in the working-class movement, and in other countries, political crises were mounting. Lenin closely followed the indications of the lower classes not wanting to live in the old way, manifested in different ways in different parts of Europe. In 1913, he noted the gradual growth of powerful protest among the German proletariat, and the realignment of social forces in Britain which, although not expressed in figures, was felt by everybody.⁵ The profound analysis of the situation,

¹ V. I. Lenin, "To the Editorial Board of *Sotsial-Demokrat*", *Collected Works*, Vol. 43, p. 262.

² V. I. Lenin, "Plans for an Article 'Revolution and War'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969, p. 335.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 244.

⁴ For details see *Lenin in the Struggle for a Revolutionary International*, Nauka, Moscow, 1970, pp. 276, 279 (in Russian).

⁵ See V. I. Lenin, "The British Labour Movement in 1912", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 467-68; V. I. Lenin, "Deputy Frank Favours the Mass Strike", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, pp. 256-57.

of the way it was becoming increasingly explosive, was one of the sources of Lenin's inexhaustible revolutionary optimism. He said, however, it was difficult to foretell whether "one of those turning-points like the Ninth of January in the Russian revolution was due now or not just yet, this very minute or the next".¹ Still, Lenin was not only looking for the key trend in the changing situation, he was trying to ascertain how fast the revolution was approaching; he stressed the need to consider "the objective conditions which at first give rise to a full-scale political crisis, and then, when the crisis becomes acute, to civil war".² That explained the special urgency and difficulty in solving the question of the forms, methods and means of the proletarian struggle.

As a dialectical materialist, Lenin did not approach the forms of the working-class struggle as something immutable, based on abstract formulas and doctrinaire prescriptions. New ways and methods of struggle, he maintained, stemmed not from the study-room wisdom of proletarian leaders but from the mass movement itself. Marxism recognises, Lenin stressed, "that new forms of struggle, unknown to the participants of the given period, *inevitably* arise as the given social situation changes. ...Marxism demands an absolutely *historical* examination of the question of the forms of struggle. To treat this question apart from the concrete historical situation betrays a failure to understand the rudiments of dialectical materialism."³

Changes in the ways and methods of struggle, Lenin noted, were caused by the differences in the economic, political, national-cultural, living and other conditions, by the far-reaching changes in the entire psychological make-up of the working class, by the awakening of its ever greater sections to conscious and vigorous action, by the very content of the struggle and its earlier techniques used by both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces, by the activity of revolutionary parties which analysed, organised and explained the former and newly emerging forms of struggle.⁴ Besides, he observed, these forms enter into combinations, complement one another, and it was precisely this combination—for example, of strikes and parliamentary activities—that often ensured a wider scope and

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Two Worlds", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 312.

² V. I. Lenin, "Some Features of the Present Collapse", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 153.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Guerrilla Warfare", *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, pp. 213, 214.

⁴ See V. I. Lenin, "New Tasks and New Forces", *Collected Works*, Vol. 8, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 211; V. I. Lenin, "The Dissolution of the Duma and the Tasks of the Proletariat", *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 118; V. I. Lenin, "Guerrilla Warfare", *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, pp. 213-14.

greater influence of the mass movement and facilitated the parliamentary activities of the working people's representatives.

During the reaction period in Russia, Lenin and his supporters in the RSDLP leadership argued in favour of the objectively determined "forms enabling the illegal Party to influence more or less broad masses",¹ the tactics of the feasible combination of clandestine party work with legally sanctioned efforts—the activities in the Duma and in legalised and semi-legalised proletarian organisations. The Bolsheviks defended this course in their uncompromising struggle against the fallacious tactics which were particularly graphically reflected in liquidationism and otzovism. The conference of the extended editorial board of *Proletary*, convened by the Bolsheviks in 1909, adopted a resolution which stressed, among other things, that "the liquidationists on the right claim that there is no need for a clandestine RSDLP, that the Social-Democrats should concentrate exclusively or almost exclusively on legally sanctioned opportunities. The liquidationists on the left turn it upside down: for them, legally sanctioned opportunities in party work do not exist, clandestine activities at any cost are all they want."²

Lenin's treatment of issues concerning the election and parliamentary activities of the Social-Democrats was especially important for the correct proletarian course combining legal and clandestine forms of struggle. Proceeding from the revolutionary prospects of national development and from the profound analysis of foreign experience and the situation in Russia,³ he advanced a programme of Duma activities which was adopted by the party and implemented in the course of struggle "against Menshevik opportunism, liquidationism and parliamentary idiocy".⁴ Its significance was not confined to the Russian Social-Democrats, although it was especially important for them due to the particular difficulties of parliamentary activities in Russia.

Lenin regarded issues of parliamentarianism as an integral part of the overall problem of the proletariat's revolutionary struggle within the framework of bourgeois society. He resolutely opposed the unjustified isolation of these questions, reflected both in the right-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Resolutions of the Conference of the Extended Editorial Board of *Proletary*", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 447.

² *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, pp. 251, 270-71.

³ See V. I. Lenin, "The Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, pp. 468-71; V. I. Lenin, "An Organ of a Liberal Labour Policy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, pp. 487-90; V. I. Lenin, "A Poor Defence of a Liberal Labour Policy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, pp. 556-61; V. I. Lenin, "The Second Ballot in Russia and the Tasks of the Working Class", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, pp. 562-68.

⁴ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, p. 278; see also pp. 251-55, 277-80, 333-34, 384-86.

opportunistic fetishist devotion to bourgeois parliamentarianism, and in the anarchist forays against it; he believed that the work of the parliamentary group should serve the interests of the working-class movement as a whole.

Lenin stressed that elections were quite important in consolidating and politically educating the workers, that their results reflected the will of the proletariat and the successes of the Social-Democrats in their struggle to win the masses over to their side; and that they enabled the Social-Democrats to use the parliamentary rostrum. However, he also pointed to the subordinate nature of the party's electoral and technical work, to its dependence on the long previous revolutionary propaganda, on the topical ideological and political tasks of the proletariat. In the course of an election campaign, the success of the workers' candidates was determined by the solution of political questions advanced by the party, by their implementation in the complex propaganda and organisational work. Lenin also paid attention to the inevitable "disparity between the real strength of the various classes and its reflection" even in the most ideal of bourgeois parliaments.¹ It was precisely the proletarian and broad democratic strata of the petty bourgeoisie that were represented there only marginally.

As to the proper objectives of the Social-Democratic parliamentary work, it should differ radically from the objectives of other parties, conform to the development and prospects of the mass movement of the proletariat and other democratic sections of society, and enhance non-parliamentary mass action, instead of confining all attention to legislation.² Especially harmful in this connection were the Menshevik calls for the "legislation" work by the Social-Democratic members of the hidebound reactionary Duma which was set up to prevent revolutionary development in Russia.

Lenin stressed that the use of the Duma rostrum by the Social-Democrats must reflect a class proletarian approach to both the government and the bourgeois parties, that it must be an integral part of the effort to educate and prepare the masses for a new revolutionary offensive. Referring to the experience of the German Social-Democrats under the Anti-Socialist Law, he wrote that a clandestine party must be able to use the legalised representation in the

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "The Assessment of the Present Situation", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 275; V. I. Lenin, "The Campaign for the Elections to the Fourth Duma", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, pp. 378-79; V. I. Lenin, "Fundamental Problems of the Election Campaign", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, pp. 399-400; V. I. Lenin, "Material on the Conflict Within the Social-Democratic Duma Group", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 459-61; V. I. Lenin, "The Results of Six Months' Work", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 196-97.

² See V. I. Lenin, "Speech and Draft Resolution on the Tasks of the Bolsheviks in Relation to Duma Activity", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 439-41.

Duma and turn it into a party instrument equal to its task; he thought it necessary for the parliamentary group to maintain constant contact with the party, expound party views, and implement the decisions of party congresses and central bodies.¹ Lenin opposed both overrating and underrating the role of Social-Democratic parliamentary groups. He said that "the parliamentary group is not a general staff ... but rather a unit of trumpeters in one case, or a reconnaissance unit in another, or an organisation of some other auxiliary 'arm'".² Such, Lenin held, was the group's role in submitting draft legislation, inquiries, amendments, and so on in parliament. In this connection, he believed it necessary to use the rich parliamentary experience of the West European Social-Democrats, but warned against opportunist deviations. The resolution adopted at the Fifth RSDLP Conference in 1908 stressed that the Social-Democratic group in the Duma was a body acting under the party and its Central Committee and said: "The group's key mission in the counter-revolutionary Third Duma is to serve, as one of the party bodies, the cause of Social-Democratic propaganda, agitation, and organisation, without taking the road of the so-called positive legislation, or searching for small pseudo-reforms, and, without restricting itself to acting only on the questions raised by the Duma majority, to do its best to raise those questions in the Duma that concern the worker masses and our party."³ Typical in this regard was Lenin's "Explanatory Note on the Draft of the Main Grounds of the Bill on the Eight-Hour Working Day".⁴ At a time of reaction, when Social-Democratic propaganda faced extreme difficulties, he stressed that it was necessary not only to briefly proclaim the principle of the eight-hour working-day, the way the French Socialists and German Social-Democrats did, but also to provide the specific propaganda material required, to make the bill and the explanatory note to it understandable to the broadest sections of the proletariat. The task was to get the unorganised and backward workers interested in the bill; this would be a new step in their transition to Social-Democratic ideology as a whole. Lenin stressed the importance of providing the working class with the most definite concept of the link between social reform and general democratic political changes. The Bolsheviks used the same approach in submitting Social-Democratic bills in the Duma on the freedom of association and strike, on workers' insurance, etc. Each separate reform was to be accompanied with demands for

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "On the Road", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 351-52; V. I. Lenin, "Speech and Draft Resolution on the Tasks of the Bolsheviks in Relation to Duma Activity", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 439-41.

² V. I. Lenin, "Two Letters", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 294.

³ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, p. 253.

⁴ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 110.

appropriate democratic and especially proletarian democratic institutions; another task was to explain that these reforms were impossible without radical political transformations. Referring to the question of the Social-Democrats' parliamentary activity, the Poronin Conference of the RSDLP Central Committee (1913) noted that if the Duma considered a bill aimed even at a partial improvement of the working people's conditions, the group should "vote in favour of the provisions envisaging these improvements. However, when the conditions imposed by the Fourth Duma make this improvement doubtful, the faction shall abstain, *necessarily* providing a special explanation of its abstention and having first discussed the issue with representatives of workers' organisations."¹

The course Lenin mapped out for the Bolsheviks' activities in the Duma consistently upheld and creatively developed the revolutionary parliamentary tactics of the international proletariat.² That task was especially topical because many parliamentary groups of labour parties were strongly infected with opportunism. While supporting and publicising the revolutionary use of the parliamentary rostrum in other countries, Lenin exposed parliamentary myopia and unprincipled compromise with bourgeois parties. He resolutely rebuffed anarchist and other reckless forays against the mistakes committed by Social-Democratic members of parliament; he worked to ensure the party's positive and creative influence on the parliamentary group and the latter's close contact with the workers. The workers, he held, should receive comprehensive information about the group's activities; they should be able to influence it.³ The parliamentary Social-Democratic activities were to be closely related to the non-parliamentary forms of struggle. Thus, the Bolshevik Duma members were to act both in the Duma and when they acted outside it as party propagandists and organisers who

¹ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, p. 385.

² See, for example, V. I. Lenin, "Trotsky's Diplomacy and a Certain Party Platform", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, pp. 360-64; V. I. Lenin, "The Fourth Duma Election Campaign and the Tasks of the Revolutionary Social-Democrats", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 17-21; V. I. Lenin, "Concerning the Workers' Deputies to the Duma and Their Declaration", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 420-23; V. I. Lenin, "Concerning the Event of November 15", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 424-26; V. I. Lenin, "Disruption of Unity Under Cover of Outcries for Unity", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, pp. 327-47.

³ See, for example, the following articles by Lenin: "Report on the Conference of the Extended Editorial Board of *Proletary*", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 430-31; "Conference of the British Social-Democratic Party", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, pp. 173-78; "Debates in Britain on Liberal Labour Policy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 360-65; "In Britain", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 55-56; "The German Social-Democrats and Armaments", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, pp. 242-43; "August Bebel", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 295-301; V. I. Lenin to Inessa Armand, *Collected Works*, Vol. 43, pp. 396-97.

formed a legally functioning party centre and used the right of parliamentary inviolability for clandestine work.

In his analysis of the various forms of the working-class movement, Lenin saw the revolutionary significance of each of them, including those that were to ensure partial improvement of the working people's conditions. The point was to maintain at all times the link between the struggle to achieve the slightest improvement of the workers' condition and the proletariat's fundamental revolutionary objectives: in that case the struggle for reforms would be "filled with a far from reformist content".¹ The desire to secure even minimal improvement of the working people's condition could and should be linked to their education, organisation and ability for further class action. Thus, it was inadmissible to prefer "methods of securing this improvement that involve a blunting of the proletarian class struggle".² Besides, Lenin pointed out, the struggle of the working class was important not only as far as the concessions it secured were concerned. Summing up the results of the 1913 general strike in Belgium, he wrote: "The achievement of the strike is not so much this fragment of a victory over the government as the success of the organisation, discipline, fighting spirit and enthusiasm for the struggle displayed by the mass of the Belgian working class."³

In his detailed analysis of all the forms and means developed by the international working-class movement, Lenin exposed the biased approach to them on the part of the social-reformists and anarchists; he stressed the relative importance of any form of struggle and the unquestionable need to use them efficiently in the interests of the revolution and on the basis of a scientific analysis of the objective situation.

Specifically, Lenin and other Bolsheviks constantly stressed the importance of compromise that helped avoid obviously disadvantageous battles, of using the strivings of all kinds of class forces in the interests of revolution. In late 1911, noting that the new revolutionary upsurge would take a new path, Lenin wrote: "In order to be able properly to approach this 'new', to be able to influence it and help it grow successfully, we must not confine ourselves to the old methods, but must search for new methods as well—we must mingle with the crowds, feel the pulse of real life, and sometimes make our way not only into the thick of the crowd, but also into the liberal salon."⁴

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Notes of a Publicist", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 384.

² V. I. Lenin, "Trade-Union Neutrality", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 467.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Lessons of the Belgian Strike", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 234.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Slogans and Organisation of Social-Democratic Work Inside and Outside the Duma", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 335.

The formal political alliance with Pyotr Struve, a bourgeois liberal leader, in 1901-1902, combined with an uncompromising ideological and political struggle against bourgeois liberalism and against even the vaguest evidence of its influence within the working-class movement, was quite useful, and the Bolsheviks continued to resort to this tactics. In March 1914, Lenin deemed it necessary to find out what methods of struggle against the government were acceptable to the liberals, whether they were capable of providing financial support, launching a clandestine newspaper, etc. Ivan Skvortsov-Stepanov was on the information committee established by bourgeois representatives, and Lenin wrote him: "Our aim is to inform ourselves and spur them on to give every possible active assistance to the revolution."¹

But compromise was especially important as a means by which the proletarian party influenced various groups within the proletariat and the many intermediate, semi-proletarian and petty-bourgeois strata that surrounded the proletariat. Such relations with petty-bourgeois parties made it possible to use the practical experience of large masses of the working people to win them over to the revolutionary side. Later, Lenin gave the following summing-up of the Bolshevik experience in this regard: "It is entirely a matter of *knowing how* to apply these tactics in order to *raise*—not lower—the *general* level of proletarian class-consciousness, revolutionary spirit, and ability to fight and win."²

But Lenin recognised that the proletariat's very role as the leader of the general democratic movement brought it closer to other, non-proletarian strata, that proletarian forms and methods of struggle interacted with non-proletarian ones. On the one hand, this interaction brought the politically conscious proletariat closer to the non-proletarian elements, for there are no tactics of struggle "such as would shut off the proletariat by a Chinese wall from the strata standing slightly above or slightly below it".³ On the other hand, since the proletariat acts as the leading force of the entire liberation movement, the proletarian forms and methods of struggle are also dominant; they permeate the non-proletarian democratic masses and create a special atmosphere influencing, one way or another, the non-proletarian forms and methods of struggle. That, for example, was what happened to strikes. Lenin described the all-Russia political strike in October 1905 as "the first great nation-

¹ V. I. Lenin to I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, March 24, 1914, *Collected Works*, Vol. 43, p. 396.

² V. I. Lenin, "'Left-Wing' Communism—an Infantile Disorder", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 74.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Guerrilla Warfare", *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 221.

wide strike".¹ At the same time, it was precisely due to the powerful growth in the strike movement of the Russian proletariat that increased the significance of the parliamentary opposition representing the petty-bourgeois strata, above all the peasants.

In his efforts to preserve and enlarge the revolutionary experience of the masses after the revolution's defeat and in anticipation of its new upsurge, Lenin comprehensively analysed problems related to the mass revolutionary strike. He specially noted the importance of this new form of struggle for the revolutions of the time.²

Lenin's analysis showed that this type of strike was a synthesis of the economic and political strike, the demonstration strike. Unlike the reformists who saw the unity of economic and political demands as a weakness of the strike struggle, Lenin argued in favour of integrating them even more closely. This, in his opinion, made it possible to involve the broadest masses into the movement, make them more conscious and organised, and develop the proletariat. The drive to meet their immediate needs, which would improve these masses' condition, helped them become aware of the tasks concerning the country's overall progress. "As it strives to improve its living conditions," Lenin noted, "the working class also progresses morally, intellectually and politically, becomes more capable of achieving its great emancipatory aims."³ Besides, it was precisely the integration of economic and political demands, Lenin observed, that ensured the mass character, strength and success of strikes, made the movement a nationwide cause. This integration helped it shake off the trade-unionist, guild-like drive for purely economic interests and the doctrinaire emphasis on political demands unrelated to the immediate economic tasks the working people understood.

Lenin's analysis of the strike struggle in Russia made it possible to single out the specific linkage between economic and political struggle, its importance for the proletariat and its influence on the broad non-proletarian strata.

The revolutionary strikes of the Russian proletariat concerned the entire people. They were aimed at accomplishing the urgent tasks of democratic transformations. This course of the proletariat's active struggle coincided with the basic interests of the democratic public, reflected "a sentiment of concentrated indignation" of the semi-proletariat and the peasants, and enjoyed "the sympathy of

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Extraordinary All-Russia Railwaymen's Congress, January 5-30 (January 18-February 12), 1918", *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 493.

² See V. I. Lenin, "Plan for a Lecture 'Revolutionary Upsurge of the Russian Proletariat'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, p. 254.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Economic and Political Strikes", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 85.

the vast majority of the population".¹ Thus, the mass revolutionary strike was an ideological, political, organisational and practical form of implementing the leadership of the proletariat.² However, Lenin did not ascribe any absolute significance to the mass political strike; he stressed that it was one of the methods of struggle which was necessary in certain conditions, and argued in favour of combining revolutionary strikes with revolutionary rallies and manifestations, distribution of revolutionary newspapers and brochures, etc. In summing up the experience of the Russian proletariat, Lenin saw the revolutionary strike as the key link, the major form of struggle at a certain stage. As the nationwide political crisis grew, he held, this form would lead the masses to the highest form of the movement—the armed uprising. Lenin proved that in revolutionary periods strikes acquired their own objective logic of development. He revealed the interaction among the various forms of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary action which turned a strike into an uprising. And he pointed to the uneven and contradictory character of this process in which isolated uprisings would set the stage for a well-developed movement.³

The proletariat is actively involved in the replacement of one form of the movement by another, and its vanguard, the party, plays the guiding role in this objective process. However, the party, which is to prepare and lead the uprising, cannot "organise" it unless the situation leading to the revolution is ripe and the conscious struggle of the masses makes the armed uprising both necessary and possible. Later, as an antidote to the ultra-left revolutionary adventurism, Lenin reminded: "We Marxists have always been proud that we determined the expediency of any form of struggle by a precise calculation of the mass forces and class relationships. We have said that an insurrection is not always expedient; unless the prerequisites exist among the masses it is a gamble."⁴

Working on the problems of the armed uprising, Lenin noted its new peculiarities as early as the 1905-1907 Russian revolution:

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Development of Revolutionary Strikes and Street Demonstrations", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 472.

² See V. I. Lenin, "The Revolutionary Uprising", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 105; V. I. Lenin, "Report of the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Brussels Conference and Instructions to the C.C. Delegation", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 516.

³ See V. I. Lenin, "Days of Bloodshed in Moscow", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, pp. 339-41; V. I. Lenin, "The Political Strike and the Street Fighting in Moscow", *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 348; V. I. Lenin, "Lessons of the Moscow Uprising", *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, p. 171; V. I. Lenin, "The Revolutionary Upswing", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 106-09.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Revolutionary Phrase", *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 24.

"In ... a period of nation-wide political strikes, an *uprising* cannot assume the old form of individual acts restricted to a very short time and to a very small area." He pointed out that the uprising was taking "the higher and more complex form of a prolonged civil war embracing the whole country, i.e., an armed struggle between two sections of the people. Such a war cannot be conceived otherwise than as a series of a few big engagements at comparatively long intervals and a large number of small encounters during these intervals."¹

Lenin maintained that guerrilla warfare, widespread in Russia after the defeat of the 1905 December uprising, was another form of skirmishes in the interim between the "big engagements" of the civil war. This warfare was waged by individuals or small groups; when it rose highest, it actually established revolutionary power. Thus, the uprising and guerrilla warfare were the two major and often interconnected methods of armed struggle to secure power. However, the general uprising was the decisive form.

Lenin's analysis of mass revolutionary struggle is inseparable from the examination of the development of the revolutionary situation. On the one hand, strikes, as the most widespread means of the proletariat's struggle during the preparation for the Russian revolution, were a form of the mass movement which directly influenced the shaping of the revolutionary situation. On the other hand, Lenin specially noted the connection between a mass revolutionary strike and the build-up of the direct revolutionary crisis; he stressed the difference between strikes in Russia and in Western Europe, where great national crises in which the proletarian masses would participate independently had not yet taken place.² That was how Lenin both warned against mechanically applying the Russian experience in Western Europe and fought against the opportunist attempts at gauging the Russian revolutionary situation by the yardstick of "constitutional periods" in Western Europe.

Thus, the revolutionary tactics drawn up and implemented by the Bolsheviks led by Lenin comprised various forms, means and methods of the proletariat's struggle. They were to be applied flexibly and in combination depending on the changes in the objective revolutionary situation, to actively influence the masses, and to help the revolution. "Marxist tactics," Lenin wrote in April 1914, "consists in combining the *different* forms of struggle, in the skilful transition from one form to another, in steadily enhancing the consciousness

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Guerrilla Warfare", *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, pp. 222-23.

² See V. I. Lenin, "Economic and Political Strikes", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 83-84; V. I. Lenin, "A Word About Strikes", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 541; V. I. Lenin, "May Day Action by the Revolutionary Proletariat", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 220-21.

of the masses and extending the area of their collective actions, each of which, taken separately, may be aggressive or defensive, and all of which, taken together, lead to a more intense and decisive conflict."¹ The Bolshevik tactics naturally combined efforts to help the masses acquire political experience through their struggle with actively influencing them through all available means of propaganda. This Marxist tactics opposed both the opportunist separation of propaganda from practical revolutionary action and organisation, and the anarcho-syndicalist disdain of all forms of work among the masses except for prodding them to take "direct action". Besides, the Bolsheviks fought against crude revolutionism which advocated useless outbreaks when no conditions existed for open mass action, and against trailing behind the events which hampered the use of all means of propaganda in such situations. Based on the analysis of objective and subjective factors in the working-class movement, the Bolshevik tactics was a scientifically-grounded system of political action by the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat. It should also be noted that its effectiveness depended on its competent use and on the revolutionary intuition enriched by the experience of revolutionary struggle.

THE POLICY OF THE LEFT SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS

The Bolsheviks were the vanguard of those forces in the Second International who tried to define the policy of the proletariat in the new historical conditions and in the specific situation of different countries.

The left wing of the German Social-Democrats did much to achieve this end; it was led by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin, Franz Mehring, Julian Marchlewski, Wilhelm Pieck and others. In 1909, the Dutch Marxist Anton Pannekoek who took part in the work of the left wing of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany published a work entitled *Tactical Differences in the Working-Class Movement*, an attempt at a scientific analysis of these issues.

Proceeding from the comparative analysis of the objective conditions and their development trends in Germany, the experience of the German and international working-class movement and the lessons of the 1905-1907 Russian revolution, the revolutionary Social-Democrats in Germany worked to further develop the "old, tried and tested revolutionary tactics".² They believed that the

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Forms of the Working-Class Movement", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, p. 210.

² Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 3, S. 352.

programme of the working-class struggle should not be confined to merely expanding the party organisation and its parliamentary representation. "We live in a period," Rosa Luxemburg wrote, "when the key political issues can only be affected by the actual interference on the part of the broad masses: sudden changes in the international situation, the danger of war, issues of suffrage, and questions of the honour of the working class resolutely call for mass action."¹ Pannekoek explained that the working class, especially in Germany, would not be able to assume control of the state apparatus by peaceful means: in the coming struggle for power both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat would inevitably use their deadliest weapons.² Liebknecht stressed that popular pressure was becoming "increasingly dangerous for ... the entire Prussian establishment".³

In their examination of the objective conditions of the revolution's approach, the left Social-Democrats in Germany considered a complex of economic and political factors which included the degree of development of the mass movement. Although they did not rise to a Leninist definition of the revolutionary situation, they mapped out correct ways of its analysis.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats saw the political line of the SPD in the struggle of the proletariat for its immediate objectives which, as the situation matured, would later turn into the socialist revolution. This struggle was to form, educate and organise the proletariat's army and free it from bourgeois influence. Only a resolutely offensive, proletarian revolutionary policy and tactics, Clara Zetkin stressed, would win large masses of the population over to the side of the Social-Democrats.⁴

Consequently, the revolutionary Social-Democrats maintained that parliamentarianism and extra-parliamentary activity complemented each other depending on the situation and the tasks of the moment and "together formed the party's tactics".⁵ Therefore, the Social-Democratic group in the Reichstag was to help in determining the class objectives of the proletariat and in involving the masses in the struggle against capitalism.⁶

¹ Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 3, S. 248.

² A. Pannekoek, *Die Machtmittel des Proletariats*, Verlag: Sekretariat des Sozialdemokratischen Vereins, Stuttgart, o. J., S. 8.

³ Karl Liebknecht, *Ausgewählte Reden, Briefe und Aufsätze*, S. 167.

⁴ *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Abgehalten in Jena vom 14. bis 20. September 1913*, Berlin, 1913, S. 315.

⁵ A. Pannekoek, *op. cit.*, S. 14.

⁶ R[osa] L[uxemburg], "Die alte Programmforderung", *Sozialdemokratische Korrespondenz*, No. 11, January 27, 1914; J. K[arski], "Lasset die Toten die Toten begraben", *Sozialdemokratische Korrespondenz*, No. 25, February 28, 1914;

The revolutionary Social-Democrats exposed parliamentary reformism assiduously propagated by the SPD leadership, especially after the party's victory in the 1912 elections; they resolutely opposed the unprincipled "practical policy" of alliance with bourgeois parties. At the same time, they insistently warned against ignoring parliamentarianism and underrating the parliamentary rostrum as the proletariat's means of fighting not only for reform. They upheld the best revolutionary parliamentary traditions of the party. Liebknecht provided fine examples of how to use the Reichstag in the pre-war years.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats connected the class proletarian policy with advancing general democratic objectives in Germany's Junker-bourgeois system. For example, they viewed the republican slogan as a practical demand which the people understood, which called on them to fight against the existing system, against militarism and naval rivalry, against the colonial policy and the struggle for world domination, against the sway of the Junkers and the Prussianisation of Germany, "against all these specific expressions of the rule of reaction".¹ That was a correct approach to solving the urgent problem of combining the struggle for democracy with the proletariat's struggle for socialism, for political power; the general democratic objectives of the working class were viewed in organic unity with the proletariat's distinctive objectives. Of great importance for the specific application of that policy were Liebknecht's proposals on the government reform in Prussia, submitted to the 1910 Social-Democratic congress of Prussia as a democratic programme of anti-imperialist struggle.²

The Left also demonstrated a class approach to mobilising the popular masses for the struggle against militarism. In Franz Mehring's words, "in order to be effective, the Social-Democratic criticism of militarism must be waged from a clear position of principle ... and not by sentimental forays".³ Revolutionary propaganda, Julian Marchlewski stressed, should explain that the danger and disgrace of the system of militarism could only be eliminated "together with the elimination of the existing capitalist state with all its other abominations".⁴

F. M[ehring], "Parlamentarismus und Proletariat", *Sozialdemokratische Korrespondenz*, April 25, 1914; R[osa] L[uxemburg], "Nichtzuständig", *Sozialdemokratische Korrespondenz*, May 5, 1914; F. M[ehring], "Regierung und Reichstag", *Sozialdemokratische Korrespondenz*, May 12, 1914.

¹ Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 2, S. 302, 303.

² See Karl Liebknecht, *Gesammelte Reden und Schriften*, Bd. II, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1960, S. 342-424; *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 2, S. 147-49, 151-52; Annelies Laschitzka, op. cit., S. 204-35.

³ *Sozialdemokratische Korrespondenz*, No. 53, May 12, 1914.

⁴ *Sozialdemokratische Korrespondenz*, No. 5, January 10, 1914.

However, the revolutionary Social-Democrats in Germany, in their approach to the broad democratic and socialist struggle, set no specific objectives in relation to certain non-proletarian, particularly peasant, sections of the population. They failed to make use of the lessons of the Russian revolution, of the Bolshevik experience in this regard, although Lenin, in identifying the common and specific features in the situation and struggle of the peasants in Russia and Germany, noted in those years that the German Social-Democrats should work among the peasants. The German revolutionary Social-Democrats paid little attention to the problem of the proletariat's allies.

The revolutionary German Social-Democrats saw the mass strike as the central element of Marxist policy and tactics. In the pre-war period, they actually interpreted it in two ways: as a definite form of the class struggle and, broadly, as tactics in general. The revolutionary forces in the SPD held that the possibility and necessity of the mass strike was dependent on the changes in the objective situation in the country and the proletariat's desire to launch an offensive. At that, they did not intend to trail in the wake of developments but worked to ensure that the party pursue "offensive, resolute and consistent tactics" which would "put the emphasis of the struggle on mass action".¹

The left wing of the German Social-Democrats stressed that "the mass strike cannot, as it is pictured today in some quarters, be launched on orders from trade union and party leaders",² insisted on a revolutionary ideological and political mobilisation of the proletariat, and did much to explain that point. The left wing also saw the mass struggle itself as a powerful means of educating the working people. It was mostly on "educating the Social-Democrats for a political offensive" that the left forces of the SPD relied for securing changes in the party structure appropriate for this offensive.

In criticising open opportunists and centrists who were ready to recognise mass strike only as an auxiliary of a reformist policy, the revolutionary Social-Democrats stressed the danger of such "experiments" based on parliamentary illusions and collusion with the bourgeoisie. The important thing, in their opinion, was not merely resorting to the mass strike but making the entire party line militant and following the tactics which would, in the course of struggle, ensure the most active effort in all fields, give a militant rebuff to all enemy forays, and maximally enhance the energy and fighting spirit of the proletariat.³ Mass strike, they held, should be an em-

¹ *Protokoll ... des Parteitages ... in Jena ... 1913*, S. 194.

² *Ibid.*, S. 293.

³ Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 3, S. 248-49.

bodiment of that tactical line. Despite their mistaken assertion that mass strike was the highest and most effective form of the proletariat's struggle, their interpretation of it brought forth the question of preparing for the revolution.

The Polish proletarian revolutionaries, above all those representing the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPL), aimed to follow the course which, in the words of Adolf Warszawski (Warski), one of the party's leaders, was directed at ensuring the triumph of the revolutionary tactics.¹ Much was done to that end by Rosa Luxemburg, Julian Marchlewski, Felix Dzerzhinsky, Jakub Hanecki, Henryk Walecki, Marian Bielecki and others. The rich experience of many prominent Polish Social-Democrats who took part in the proletarian movement in other countries played a positive part in this. The Polish revolutionary Social-Democrats supported the Bolsheviks on the major issues in the struggle for revolutionary policy and tactics. However, since they were not always consistent in their opposition to liquidationism and otzovism and disputed the Bolshevik approach to a number of organisational issues, this sometimes adversely affected the revolutionary political course pursued by the SDKPL leadership.²

The Bulgarian Labour Social-Democratic Party (Tesnyaks) was working out and implementing tactics of the class struggle proceeding from the concept of independence of the working-class movement.³ Issues of election campaigns and parliamentarianism were an important element in the work of the party. The 1908 circular of the Central Committee stressed that the task was not merely to win mandates but mostly to win over the masses.⁴ In connection with the 1911 election campaign, Dimitar Blagoev wrote that the party must lead the workers to immediate objectives without losing sight of the end goal—gaining control of political power; he saw the elections as a form of class struggle.⁵ At the party's 18th Congress in 1911, Vasil Kolarov analysed the objectives of the election campaign from the viewpoint of greater class consciousness, consolida-

¹ CPA IML, f. 163, op. 1, d. 266, l. 2-2 ob.

² See R. A. Yermolayeva and A. Ya. Manusevich, *Lenin and the Polish Labour Movement*, Mysl, Moscow, 1971, pp. 190, 194, 207-15, 240-53, 278-79, 288, 292; S. M. Falkovich, *Russia's and Poland's Proletariat in the Joint Revolutionary Struggle (1907-1912)*, Nauka, Moscow, 1975, pp. 273, 286, 306-07, 345-17, 366-67 (both in Russian); Aleksander Kochański, *Socjaldemokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy w latach 1907-1910 (problemy polityczne i ideologiczne)*, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa, 1971.

³ А. Аврамов, *Политическата стратегия и тактика на БКП, 1903-1923*, София, 1974, стр. 62-108.

⁴ See *A History of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Moscow, 1971, p. 126 (in Russian).

⁵ Димитър Благоев, *Съчинения*, том 14, Издателство на Българската комунистическа партия, София, 1961, стр. 437, 447-48.

tion and organisation of the proletariat in the name of the socialist revolution; he paid special attention to propaganda in rural areas.¹ The party upheld Bulgaria's independence, exposed bourgeois nationalism, opposed the imperialist policy of great powers and advocated alliance with Russia's revolutionaries.² The Tesnyaks and the Serbian left Social-Democrats were the first to advance the slogan of consistently solving the national question in the Balkans by establishing a federated Balkan republic. However, they underrated the possible role the proletariat's leadership could play in this regard. The Tesnyaks accorded priority not to a democratic revolution of the workers, peasants and other sections of the working people, but to prodding the bourgeoisie towards Balkan unity by waging uncompromising class struggle.³

The revolutionary Social-Democrats in the Dutch working-class movement tried to explain to the workers the difference between the tactics of resolute class struggle and the revisionist tactics employed by the party leadership.⁴ The following questions were becoming particularly topical: should the party in parliament pursue an opportunist policy or stick to the principle? Should its demands be confined to securing minor advantages whenever possible or should the group engage in forthright struggle? Should the party enter into a more or less constant alliance with the liberals or pursue an independent policy? What should be the Social-Democratic approach to the trade union movement?⁵ Proceeding from the political situation in the Netherlands and abroad, the Tribunist revolutionary Social-Democrats explained that one should not count on the election reform promised by the liberals who had come to power. They opposed conciliation with the trade union leaders who hampered the propaganda in favour of a mass strike.⁶ In the decisions of the founding congress of their party in 1909, the Tribunists advocated a programme based on both parliamentary and non-parliamentary action, on participation in the trade unions and a combination of economic and political struggle. Despite its small membership, the Social-Democratic Party of the Netherlands emerged as the focus of the struggle against reformism and anarcho-syndicalism. However, it did commit sectarian mistakes in relation to the work among the rural population and participation in mass campaigns.

¹ Васил Коларов, Избрани произведения, т. I, Издателство на Българската комунистическа партия, София, 1954, стр. 209, 211.

² М. Маринова, Българските марксисти в защита на националната независимост (1900-1912), София, 1975, стр. 99-101, 108-18.

³ See *A History of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, p. 140.

⁴ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 1, Nr. 26, 1908/1909, S. 965-66.

⁵ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 2, Nr. 48, 1909/1910, S. 799.

⁶ *Ibid.*, S. 804.

It is to the Tribunists' great credit that they drew up revolutionary tactics on the colonial question, the tactics aimed at awakening "a spirit of resistance and opposition among the oppressed masses in the colonies".¹ In 1909, David Wijnkoop, Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party, wrote about the need to "awaken the resistance of the oppressed colonial peoples ... to weaken the capitalist classes and governments of Europe".² At the party's 1913 Congress he stressed: "Colonial rule props up capitalism. We must therefore support any native resistance to it and fight against colonial policy."³ The Dutch Tribunists advocated that the secession of Indonesia (but only Indonesia) from the Netherlands was necessary. And, although they were neither consistent nor flexible enough in this respect, they were essentially the first socialists in Western Europe to support the struggle of the oppressed colonial peoples in the revolutionary Marxist spirit.⁴

The left Social-Democrats of Sweden, supported by the socialist youth organisation, also centred their attention on the struggle against parliamentary complacency, against subordinating the party's policy to that of the trade unions. In July 1910, the leader of the socialist youth movement, Zeth Hoeglund, a left Social-Democrat, published an article entitled "How Much Longer Will the Lethargy Last?" in the newspaper *Stormklockan* he edited. The article exposed the party's leaders "who sit with their arms folded, uselessly and pointlessly dreaming of a mandate in the first chamber of the Riksdag". In December 1911, in his article "On Disintegration", Hoeglund wrote that since "the party's leadership has embarked on a decisive swing to the right, broad party masses must resist it strongly so that this course of the leadership do not lead the party towards degradation, disintegration and internal disorder".⁵

A gratifying factor in the pre-war period was the resolute protest against opportunism in the British working-class movement. In 1908-1909, some of the workers entrusted the defence of their interests to Albert Victor Grayson, elected to Parliament contrary to the will of the Labour Party leadership, whose stand he harshly criticised. At the Independent Labour Party Congress in 1911, Leonard Hall, one of the party's founders, and George Lansbury, a Member of Parliament, attacked the party's transformation into a left wing of liberalism. At the 1912 Congress, debate again flared up concern-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 244.

² *De Tribune*, No. 12, January 2, 1909.

³ *De Tribune*, No. 29, April 19, 1913.

⁴ Quoted from: G. G. Bauman, "Tribunists in Indonesia (1907-1914)", *Narody Asii i Afriki*, No. 1, 1972, pp. 66-67, 69.

⁵ Knut Bäckström, op. cit., S. 186, 203.

ing parliamentary tactics; in actual fact, the subject was the Social-Democratic and the Liberal labour policies. A resolution was submitted proposing a firmer stand in Parliament on all issues depending on the essence of the matter considered and without looking up to the Liberals. In their description of the mass working-class movement in Britain, the revolutionary Socialists noted that even while the objects of struggle remained unchanged, the methods and the position of the masses were changing, a decisive blow had been struck against the cult of parliamentarianism, and prospects were arising for the development of economic into political struggle.¹

The left wing of the socialist movement, above all John Askew, Theodore Rothstein, William Gallacher, Zelda Kahan (Coates), opposed the chauvinistic course pursued by some of the movement's leaders, especially Henry Mayers Hyndman. At the 1911 Congress of the Social-Democratic Party, a resolution was submitted calling for a resolute protest against any increase in armaments, against any aggressive policy of enslavement, both colonial and financial. In 1913, a congress of the British Socialist Party adopted a decision aimed against the old party leadership and imposing on party members the obligation to observe Second International resolutions on war adopted in Stuttgart (1907) and Basel (1912).

In 1910, a left wing emerged in the Italian Socialist Party—the Revolutionary Faction, with its own Central Committee and, from 1911, its own central organ—the newspaper *La Soffitta* (The Attic). The title was chosen in response to a statement made by Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti who said that “the Socialist Party has considerably curtailed its programme, Karl Marx has been sent to the attic”.² The newspaper was to “speak out in defence of the great interests and lofty ideals of the party that are in danger”.³ The Revolutionary Faction aimed at opposing reformism and returning the party to the principles of class struggle. Significantly, two weeks after it was launched, *La Soffitta* carried an article by Rosa Luxemburg, commissioned by the editorial board and calling for an end to the party's evolution into an appendage to the parliamentary group, for greater revolutionary propaganda.⁴ The Revolutionary Faction attacked the conciliatory approach of the party's parliamentary group, the illusion of the omnipotence of parliamentary activity, and ministerialism. It was they who brought off the expulsion of the right reformists from the party and assumed

¹ Th. Rothstein, “Der grosse Streik und seine Lehren”, *Die Neue Zeit*, 1911/1912, Bd. 2, S. 163, 165.

² Giuseppe Mammarella, *Riformisti e rivoluzionari nel Partito socialista italiano. 1900-1912*, Marsilio Editori, Padova, 1968, p. 283.

³ *La Soffitta*, May 1, 1911.

⁴ *La Soffitta*, May 15, 1911.

party leadership after 1912. While the Libyan war of 1911-1912 was going on, on the eve of World War I, the Revolutionary Faction made the party adopt decisions directed at strengthening anti-war propaganda, at fighting the expansionist foreign policy and reorganising the armed forces on a more democratic basis. On the whole, however, the left wing of the PSI, quite heterogeneous in its composition and in the basic views of its leaders—Constantino Lazzari, Giovanni Lerda, Giacinto Menotti Serrati, Angelica Balabanoff and others—failed to provide a positive analysis of the key issues in the policy and tactics of the Italian working-class movement in new historical conditions. This contributed to the spread of pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric and the arbitrary, ultra-left approach to the revolutionary process, which was graphically expressed in Mussolinism. As Antonio Gramsci recalled later, there was an obvious lack of “a strong and homogeneous group of revolutionary leaders closely connected with the basic proletarian nucleus of the Socialist group”.¹

In 1909-1911, criticism mounted in the Belgian Labour Party of the policy pursued by party leadership which rejected the extra-parliamentary methods of struggle and relied exclusively on the party's alliance with the bourgeois liberals against the clericals. The left rejected unscrupulous deals with the bourgeoisie. In 1911 two works were published—one written by Hendrik de Man and the other by Louis de Brouckère under the common title *The Working-Class Movement in Belgium*. The authors criticised the BLP, its leaders and its narrow-minded pragmatism, unscrupulousness, the “dominant tactics” and “practical revisionism”.² However, de Man and de Brouckère failed to apply the course they advocated to the practical side of the class struggle. They did not advance “active slogans but merely more radical parliamentary tactics”.³

In the Finnish Social-Democratic Party (SSP), the left wing led by Edoard Walpas, Yrjö Syrola and Otto Kuusinen had long effectively fought against the right wing and the moderates (centrists), who wanted to reduce the party's activity to compromise with the bourgeoisie and to election campaigns, and rejected the need for common struggle by the Finnish and Russian peoples. After their victory at the Oulu congress, the left strengthened their hand in the party's leadership. Besides, they controlled both the party's theoret-

¹ 2000 pagine di Gramsci, vol. I, il Saggiatore, Milano, 1964, p. 768.

² See Hendrik de Man, Louis de Brouckère, *The Working-Class Movement in Belgium*, p. 31.

³ See Claude Renard, *Octobre 1917 et le mouvement ouvrier belge*, Éditions de la Fondation Joseph Jacquemotte, Bruxelles, 1967, p. 34.

ical journal and its central organ, headed by Kuusinen in 1907-1916. The strife in the party became particularly acute in 1910-1913, with regard to the course aimed at unprincipled deals with the bourgeois parties in the parliament, pursued by the right wing and the moderates. The left wing exposed their revisionism.¹ Speaking at the 1911 congress of the SSP, Kuusinen said that for the Finnish bourgeoisie, the working-class movement was a greater enemy than the Russian autocracy, that only Russia's proletariat was an ally of the Finnish working class. Syrola pointed out the danger of Väinö Alfred Tanner's revisionism as early as 1909. Still, gradually revisionism gained the upper hand in the party leadership.

The left wing of the Serbian Social-Democrats led by Dimitar Tutzowicz successfully fought against opportunism and led the party along the revolutionary path. The position of the Serbian left was clearly anti-war and internationalist, especially in the light of the aggravated situation in the Balkans.²

In the American Socialist Party, Eugene Debs, William Haywood and Charles Ruthenberg vigorously opposed the reformism and chauvinism of the party's leaders, defended the revolutionary course and searched for new ways to implement it.³ The bourgeois-liberal policies of the Australian Labour Party were challenged by the Australian Socialist Party which proclaimed the socialisation of production, distribution and exchange as its goal and pledged to fight all forms of militarism. The left wing of the Spanish Socialist Party, led by Facundo Perezagua, García Quejido and Virginia González, spoke out against the leaders' conciliatory policy.

The opposition to opportunism in the socialist movement sometimes assumed a syndicalist character. That was usually due to the inadequate theoretical training of those who sincerely supported the proletariat's revolutionary struggle or to the immaturity of the socialist movement in certain countries. A good example was the position of Japan's "firm" Socialists led by Denjiro Kotoku, whose views were considerably influenced by anarcho-syndicalism, albeit rather declarative, and reflected both the reaction to the liberal-reformist policy of the Socialists and the weakness of socialist theory in Japan at that time. After the movement was defeated and Kotoku, its leader, executed, attempts increased at screening

¹ *Suomen sosialidemokratisen puolueen kuudennen edustajakokouksen. Pöytäkirja*, Kymenlaakson työväen kirjapaino, Kotkassa, 1909, s. 150, 236.

² See *Историјски архив Комунистичке партије Југославије*, т. III, Београд, 1950, стр. 158-59, 225, 233, 257, 263, 269-73 et seq.

³ For details see V. M. Bykov, *Eugene Debs, Leader of the US Proletariat*, Mysl, Moscow, 1971, pp. 63-68, 77; M. I. Lapitsky, *William Haywood*, Mysl, Moscow, 1974, pp. 110-16, 123-24 (both in Russian); Oakley C. Johnson, *The Day Is Coming*, pp. 29-65, 86-88.

the working class from the influence of socialism. These attempts were vigorously opposed by Sen Katayama.¹

In the SFIO, Jules Guesde, in an effort to uphold the class, proletarian policy of the party, criticised both conciliatory reformism and anarcho-syndicalism. Other champions of Marxism were Paul Lafargue and Charles Rappoport, who, among other things, represented the Guesdists in the discussion of SFIO tactics at its Fifth Congress in 1908. Marcel Cachin, who was in charge of the party's propaganda in 1906-1911, played a prominent part in the anti-militarist effort.

However, while attacking social-reformism and anarcho-syndicalism from seemingly orthodox Marxist positions, Guesde and his supporters often shied away from reality and were quite inconsistent when forced to face it. Although Guesde did voice doubts regarding the possibility of "social transformation ... by casting votes" and stressed the "historical inevitability" of the uprising,² as a rule, the Guesdists neither seriously analysed the objective situation nor prepared the masses for decisive revolutionary action. Only some of them, like Paul Lafargue, realised that one could not "confine party propaganda exclusively to the subject of ownership". "I believe," Lafargue wrote, "the party should show interest in all issues and in any movement, introducing socialist ideas and socialist decisions into them."³ Charles Rappoport disagreed with Guesde on the question of the anti-militarist drive and, to help the latter, he launched the newspaper *Contre la guerre* in 1912.⁴ Still, the left wing of the Guesdists, including Lafargue, did not publicise their differences of opinion with Guesde.

Meanwhile, in their efforts to expose anarcho-syndicalism, Guesde's supporters overlooked the new, revolutionary significance of the general strike the latter assumed after the Russian revolution. Without any justification, they sometimes dismissed the working masses' action as anarchist "revolutionary calisthenics". In 1912 the right Guesdists Henri Ghesquière and Compère Morel called on the workers to avoid strikes and strive instead towards agreement with the employers. Although he did reject the anarchist methods of

¹ See E. Zhukov, "The Last Letter of Denjiro Kotoku", *On the History of Socio-Political Ideas*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 690-701 (in Russian); D. I. Goldberg, "The Third Stage in the Working-Class and Socialist Movement in Japan", *Oriental Studies*, No. 6, 1959 (in Russian).

² *L'Humanité*, April 15, 1909.

³ Quoted from: V. M. Dalin, *Men and Ideas*, Moscow, 1970, p. 182 (in Russian).

⁴ For details see Ya. Yemnits, "The French Socialist Party Against the War Threat, 1907-1914", *The French Yearbook*, 1968, Nauka, Moscow, 1970, pp. 142-43, 153 (in Russian).

anti-war struggle, Guesde failed to counter them with Marxist, revolutionary methods. He thought that uprising was absolutely impossible in wartime, "for that is when the entire country is one indivisible whole", and believed that "all Frenchmen, especially the proletarians", were duty bound to defend the country should it be attacked.¹

The Guesdists failed to use the struggle for reforms in order to prepare the working class for the socialist revolution. While proclaiming the necessity of the revolution, they failed to find specific ways to approach it or carry it out. Lenin recalled later that Guesde's trend was publicly giving up the ghost in "that typically lifeless and insipid Guesdist magazine, *Le Socialisme*, which was incapable of taking an independent stand on any important issue".² As a result, Guesde was in fact gravitating towards the social-reformist tactics of securing votes advocated by the SFIO. The right wing of the Guesdists were getting increasingly close to the party's opportunist majority. On the eve of the world imperialist war, fearing that "the country where the proletariat is best organised might be defeated",³ Guesde took a bourgeois-nationalist stand.

The striving of the revolutionary Social-Democrats to uphold the Marxist political course of the working-class movement was evident in each country and in the sections of the Second International. However, in different Social-Democratic parties these efforts differed in scope, strength and maturity. An intransigent reaction to opportunism sometimes went side by side with sectarian and leftist mistakes. In their rejection of opportunist compromise and anarchist "impatience", the revolutionary Social-Democrats found correct tactical solutions often only empirically. Few of them managed to rise to a theoretical analysis of the Marxist policy and tactics of the working-class movement in those difficult times. This makes the Bolsheviks' contribution all the more impressive: they, and above all Lenin, tackled fundamental questions of the proletariat's policy and tactics to apply them to the new conditions of imperialism. Lenin's revolutionary course was indeed of international significance; it enabled the Bolsheviks to lead the struggle against social-reformism, anarchism and centrism among the Social-Democrats on the international level.

¹ *Le Socialisme*, February 4, 1911.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 239.

³ *L'Humanité*, July 17, 1914.

THE GROWTH OF OPPORTUNISM

Politically, the left wing of the Social-Democrats throughout the world was opposed by opportunism. Resisting the growth in the militancy of the proletarian masses and playing on the defeat of the Russian revolution of 1905-1907, opportunist leaders stepped up their efforts to preach reformism and reject the revolutionary course. In 1912, Lenin noted "the general growth of opportunism, and the 'balancing' of its forces with those of revolutionary Social-Democracy in the big countries of the labour movement".¹

This applied, first and foremost, to Germany, where the Bernsteinian revisionists and the "practical" opportunists among the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party and the trade unions, although forced to take into account the upsurge in the working-class movement in the country, ignored its true content; they still maintained that mass action, and especially the political strike, was only important in the struggle for suffrage.

The artificial restrictions imposed on the ever growing struggle of the proletariat were aggravated by the efforts to prevent "excessively" determined action. The revisionists falsified the experience of the Russian workers, denied that it was applicable in Germany, and regarded the mass strike not as a means of winning other strata of the population over to the proletariat's side, but as a means to be applied depending on the mood of these non-proletarian strata.²

The opportunists in the leadership of the SPD and the free trade unions did all they could to slight the revolutionary Social-Democrats for their active involvement in the struggle of the German proletariat. At the same time, they had to complain that the left were becoming "extremely popular" with the party.³

The revisionists denigrated the objectives of the mass working-class movement because, as Lenin put it, they believed wholeheartedly in the bourgeois "legality", in the bourgeois "parity of rights"; they adopted the position of those who regarded this bourgeois legality as something eternal, "who think that socialism can be fitted inside the framework of this legality".⁴ The revisionists used sophistry to argue that popular freedom could "flourish under a democratic monarchy" as easily as in a republic; they spoke in favour of the "British" path of monarchist development which allegedly made republican propaganda pointless.⁵

¹ V. I. Lenin to V. A. Karpinsky, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 193.

² *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, H. 26, III. Bd., 1909, S. 1665; H. 18-20, III. Bd., 1913, S. 1059, 1135.

³ *Protokoll ... des Parteitages ... in Jena ... 1913*, S. 234-35, 293-98; *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, H. 15, 1914, S. 951.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Two Worlds", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 306.

⁵ *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, H. 19-20, 1909, S. 1255, 1262.

This unrealistic approach to the Junker-bourgeois German state and to the prospects and objectives of the country's mass working-class movement also affected the opportunist view of Germany's foreign policy. They maintained that German imperialism was not particularly dangerous and that the struggle against it was not at all important. Emasculating the principles of proletarian internationalism, the revisionists rejected the need to make a joint effort to fight imperialism and war.¹ Bernstein ignored the realities of imperialism, advocated a system of treaties among the countries of the "cultured world", and proclaimed that the privileges enjoyed by certain great powers in trade in the colonies, regulating "world politics" (i.e., in the struggle for colonial domination, etc.), should be restricted or abolished.² At the same time, the revisionist Calwer justified his support of "their government's" colonial and overall foreign policy by claiming that the destinies of the German workers and capitalists were "intertwined" and that the growing population of Germany must be ensured living space in the face of foreign competition.³ The revisionists recognised that the military appropriations claimed by the government would ensure "participation in imperialist annexations in Africa and Asia"⁴; they cynically proclaimed that they did not intend to observe the principles of struggle against militarism and war adopted by the Social-Democrats.⁵

The opportunists energetically disseminated their views. The number and influence of their supporters in the leadership of the SPD—the largest party of the Second International—and in its parliamentary group increased, especially after the death of August Bebel in 1913, when Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann became the party's leaders. The growth of opportunism was facilitated by the spread of centrism.

While paying lip service to the revolutionary objectives, ways, forms and methods of the proletariat's struggle, the centrists essentially refused to prepare the masses for active revolutionary struggle. They idealised parliamentarianism, ignored the objective changes that foreshadowed crucial battles between labour and capital, and resisted the efforts to develop the political course which the working-class movement was to pursue in the new situation. Allying themselves with the right opportunists against the revolutionary Social-Democrats, the centrists criticised revisionism in the pre-war years merely to ensure that its policy respond more

¹ *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, H. 9, 1909, S. 567-69; H. 10, S. 624-29; H. 16-18, 1910, S. 1017-20.

² *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, H. 18-20, 1911, S. 1168.

³ *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, H. 2, 1907, S. 105.

⁴ *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, H. 13, Bd. 2., 1913, S. 793-97.

⁵ *Protokoll ... des Parteitage ... in Jena ... 1913*, S. 469.

flexibly to the changing mood of the masses. That was the basis of the alliance between the right reformists and the centrists which distracted the proletariat from the Marxist policy of struggle for democracy and socialism.

In the period under review, Karl Kautsky, generally considered to be the major theoretician of the Second International, was increasingly becoming a typical centrist. In his book *The Road to Power* published in 1909, he still opposed the revisionist demands about replacing revolution with the tactics of joint effort with the bourgeois parties close to the proletariat and forming a coalition government together with them; he foresaw a period of struggle which, he believed, would soon considerably strengthen the proletariat and establish its dictatorship in Western Europe. He pointed out that only this forecast should serve as the basis of the party's policy.¹ Later, however, Kautsky leaned increasingly towards opportunism.

When in the pre-war years the political situation in Germany began to grow increasingly acute, when mass struggle was spreading and the revolutionary Social-Democrats demanded that everything be done to support and develop it, Kautsky opposed them. Although he still theoretically recognised the role of mass strike, he did all he could to prevent propaganda in favour of this form of struggle which prepared the masses for revolution.² He claimed that reliance on mass action was an obsolete "strategy of overthrow" and contrasted it to a "strategy of wearing the opponent down".

In 1910, Kautsky wrote an article entitled "Between Baden and Luxemburg" in which he, as a representative of the "Marxist centre", disassociated himself both from the tactics of the social reformists who collaborated with the bourgeoisie in Baden and from the "extremism" of Rosa Luxemburg, from the revolutionary Social-Democrats who advocated extra-parliamentary methods of struggle.³ In 1912, Kautsky adopted a reformist position in his debate with Anton Pannekoek who opposed the centrist "theory of lying passively in wait" because, in actual fact, all too often it approached revisionist tactics.⁴ Subsequently too, Kautsky increasingly came out against the tactics of mass strike advanced by the revolutionary Social-Democrats.

Renouncing his earlier views on the Russian revolution, its prospects and impact on the international scene as "proven wrong", Kautsky claimed that the forms and methods of the Russian workers' struggle were important neither for the proletarian movement in

¹ Karl Kautsky, *Der Weg zur Macht. Politische Betrachtungen über das Hineinwachsen in die Revolution*, S. 11, 12, 52, 53, 104.

² *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 2, Nr. 28, 1909/1910, S. 33, 40; Nr. 29, S. 78, 80.

³ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 2, Nr. 45, 1909/1910, S. 667.

⁴ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 2, Nr. 42, 1911/1912, S. 591, 592.

Western Europe nor for the future revolutionary battles in Russia. He relied exclusively on the parliamentary methods of struggle.¹ He said he was all for revolution in Germany and only against its "destructive" form; to avoid it, it was better to delay it for a few years. Then, in case of revolution, the ruling classes would voluntarily surrender power and deliver themselves to the Social-Democrats to escape popular wrath.²

Kautsky revised his previous stand, supported the social-reformists and opposed the revolutionary Social-Democrats on another key political issue of the time—the struggle against militarism and war. Criticising the revisionists in his *The Road to Power*, he regarded the drive against "world politics" and militarism as an immediate international task of the German proletariat and connected it to the socialist revolution.³ At that time, he wrote that "the world war is coming dangerously close" and, as the record of the previous decades proved, "war also means revolution and entails radical political changes".⁴ But already in the spring of 1911 he maintained that "everyone will become a patriot" once war broke out, and if anyone decided to swim against the current, he would be torn apart by the enraged mob. He pinned his hopes of peace on the "countries representing European civilisation" forming a United States of Europe.⁵ In 1912, on the eve of the Basel Congress of the Second International which was to discuss the anti-war struggle, Kautsky argued that war would relegate class contradictions to the background and doom the proletariat's mass anti-war action to failure.⁶ Lenin interpreted that statement as "obviously the official opinion of the Germans, the Austrians and others"⁷ and noted that "Kautsky advances purely opportunistic arguments",⁸ that "with Kautsky it turns out to be a *pledge* against a *revolutionary* mass strike. This is inadmissible both from the Russian standpoint (there are 100,000 political strikers *now* in St. Petersburg, with revolutionary meetings and sympathies for the sailors 'mutiny!') and from the general European standpoint".⁹ Later, contradicting obvious facts and asserting that the working masses of France, Italy, Austria and Russia refused to protest against the danger of war, Kautsky questioned the advisability of anti-war

¹ Karl Kautsky, *Der politische Massenstreik. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Massenstreikdiskussionen innerhalb der deutschen Sozialdemokratie*, Verlag Buchhandlung Vorwärts Paul Singer G.m.b.H., Berlin, 1914, S. 14, 194-95, 208, 209, 240, 300.

² Ibid., S. 203, 243.

³ Karl Kautsky, *Der Weg zur Macht*, S. 84, 102.

⁴ Ibid., S. 105.

⁵ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 2, Nr. 30, 1910/1911, S. 104, 105.

⁶ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 1, Nr. 6, 1912/1913, S. 191-92.

⁷ V. I. Lenin to G. V. Plekhanov, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 202.

⁸ V. I. Lenin to L. B. Ka menev, *Collected Works*, Vol. 43, p. 306.

⁹ V. I. Lenin to G. V. Plekhanov, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 202.

action in Germany too.¹ That was how the way was gradually paved for the betrayal of the proletariat's fundamental interests.² Subsequently, Lenin observed that such learned Marxists and dedicated socialists among the leaders of the Second International as Kautsky, while fully aware of the need for flexible tactics, while learning Marxian dialectics and teaching it to others, failed to become practical dialecticians. It turned out that they were incapable of keeping track of the rapidly changing forms and the speed with which old forms were filled with new content. They went politically bankrupt because they "were hypnotised by a definite form of growth of the working-class movement and socialism, forgot all about the one-sidedness of that form, were afraid to see the break-up which objective conditions made inevitable".³

Jaurèsism was a special version of the social-reformist political line. Jean Jaurès never claimed to be a theoretician of socialism, let alone a Marxist. He was concerned above all with practical efforts to bring about reforms. Jaurès called for "fully transforming society, eliminating capitalism and the institution of hired labour" gradually, by "evolutionary methods". That, he proclaimed, was "essentially a revolutionary undertaking", an inevitable social revolution in the form of orderly progress in conditions of democracy". He was a dedicated champion of reform, proclaiming that "all our efforts even partial ones, will be successful; all our gains, even those that are gradual and limited, will be effective, if we are always guided in our work by the great idea of socialism, if the proletariat always acts as an organised force".⁴ He viewed struggle as a continuous process in which each reform became a starting-point for more far-reaching demands and more comprehensive reform.⁵

Jaurès hoped to persuade the capitalists to agree to that course too, holding that "no revolutionary doctrine, even that of eventual expropriation, could discourage or antagonise" those "true captains of industry".⁶ Irrespective of his subjective intentions, he presented the working people who were rising to join the struggle with a fallacious reformist picture of progress instead of showing them the prospects of the class struggle.

Even though he supported certain strikes, on the whole Jaurès was aiming at preventing the development of the strike movement

¹ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 2, 1912/1913, Nr. 40, S. 513-23.

² For details on Kautsky's evolutions see Marek Waldenberg, *Wzlot i upadek Karola Kautsky'ego*, t. II, Wyd-wo lit., Kraków, 1972.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism—an Infantile Disorder", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 102.

⁴ *L'Humanité*, May 26, 1912.

⁵ *L'Humanité*, December 7, 1911.

⁶ *L'Humanité*, September 11, 1913.

by promoting the workers' agreement with the capitalists. However, while maintaining that contracts arrived at by collective bargaining "impose obligations and moral responsibility" on the workers which kept them from striking, he recognised the right of the working class in general to "legitimate self-defence" by means of the general strike.¹ Jaurès threatened the recalcitrant ruling quarters with mass action and convulsive revolution, but he still hoped that they had enough sense to avoid such extreme development. In the SFIO, Jaurésists were supported both by the ministerialists and by the followers of Bernstein, and their position became considerably stronger in the pre-war years.

Largely a reaction to the policy of the social-reformists, anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism were also incapable of adopting a policy that would suit the new objectives of the proletariat; they impeded the development of the working-class movement and were undergoing a crisis. The failures of "direct action" pushed the anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists from their ultra-revolutionary stand closer to social-reformism. Later, Lenin recalled the "innumerable cases of extreme 'Left' anarchists, syndicalists and others fulminating against parliamentarianism, deriding bourgeois-vulgarised parliamentary socialists, castigating their careerism, and so on and so forth, and yet themselves pursuing the *same kind* of bourgeois career *through* journalism and *through* work in the syndicates (trade unions)?"²

The anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists and social-reformists were united not only in their opposition to Marxism but also in their attitude to the threat of a world imperialist war. Some social-reformists did not believe such a war was possible and did nothing to prevent it. Others spoke out against the danger of war as helpless bourgeois pacifists.

Jaurès, a dedicated opponent of militarism, colonial rule and predatory wars, threatened the ruling quarters with a general strike and even revolution should war break out. He hoped that those threats were enough to ensure a peaceful settlement of international disputes. He believed that a general anti-war strike could force governments to preserve peace. At the SFIO Congress in July 1914, many social-reformists and anarcho-syndicalists shared that point of view.

In actual fact, the anarcho-syndicalist demand that a declaration of war should be answered by a general strike in any circumstances imposed a binding pattern of action on the workers' organisations, restricted their freedom of action and put them at a disadvantage

¹ *Annuaire d'études françaises* 1975, La Science, Moscou, 1977, p. 250.

² V. I. Lenin, " 'Left-Wing' Communism—an Infantile Disorder", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 114.

in the struggle against the militarists. The social-reformists practically refused to join the struggle: they declared that they would only support a general strike that would begin simultaneously in all belligerent countries.

In the Italian working-class movement, the Bernsteinian creed of the right-wing reformists, set forth by Ivanoe Bonomi in the book *The New Roads of Socialism*, became the official doctrine of the independent right reformist party established in 1912. The "Left-wing reformists" led by Filippo Turati, while professing their loyalty to the principles of the class struggle, were preaching a policy and methods conforming to the "ideological principles of evolutionary socialism",¹ and were in fact pursuing a policy of class collaborationism. Turati argued that arbitration was preferable to the strike at a comparatively high level of social evolution; the general strike was recognised only as a means of self-defence against the onslaught of reaction.² The anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists resisted the growth of social-reformism but, just as it happened in other countries, they countered it with a mistaken concept of the working people's struggle.

In Austria, where mass strikes brought about victory in the struggle for universal suffrage and then brought success to the Social-Democrats in the 1907 elections, the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party of Austria under Victor Adler relied on the prospects of an alliance between the working class and the emperor, and not on the possibilities of encouraging a mass movement to secure further transformations.

Karl Renner and his followers also advocated collaboration with the Imperial government. Karl Leuthner, editor of *Die Arbeiter-Zeitung*, and other right-wingers preached an openly chauvinist policy.³ The leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of Hungary under Ernő Garami declared that the need for a mass strike depended on the bourgeoisie's support of the party. Otto Bauer and Friedrich Adler with their own followers recognised the need for more radical methods of struggle, criticised revisionism and reformism, and set great store by the political activity of the working class and the working masses. However, those Social-Democrats did not form an independent force within the party; they followed Victor Adler.⁴

¹ Giuseppe Mammarella, op. cit., p. 217.

² Giovanni Zibordi, *Storia del Partito Socialista Italiano attraverso i suoi congressi*, Editrice "La Giustizia", Reggio Emilia, 1958, p. 71.

³ Jacques Hannak, *Karl Renner und seine Zeit. Versuch einer Biographie*, Wien, 1965, S. 104.

⁴ Tibor Erényi, "Die Frage der Revolution und der Reform in der Arbeiterbewegung Österreich-Ungarns um die Jahrhundertwende", *Études historiques hongroises 1975 publiées à l'occasion du XIV^e Congrès International des Sciences Historiques...*, S. 52-53.

In Spain, the leadership of the Socialist Labour Party (PSO) entered into an alliance with the bourgeois republicans in 1909 and assumed the role of the junior partner in the Republican-Socialist bloc. Although that alliance contributed to the anti-monarchist struggle and secured the first Socialist seat in the Cortes in the 1910 elections, it adversely affected the overall evolution of the party. Besides, it strengthened the hand of the anarchists.¹ In Portugal, the Socialist leaders acted similarly.

Simultaneously, the Folketing group of the Social-Democratic Party of Denmark "became the parliamentary basis of the government"² and voted for a budget comprising military appropriations. The ruling Australian Labour Party pursued a bourgeois-liberal nationalist policy and built up armaments. In 1911, the congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Sweden adopted programme guidelines initiated by the opportunists and drawn up in the spirit of radical liberalism. The 1912 National Convention of the American Socialist Party succumbed to the pressure of the social-reformists led by Morris Hillquit and decided to restrict the political activity of party members to participation in elections to legislative and administrative posts.³

Both right-wing and "Leftist" opportunist trends surfaced in other countries too.

Liquidationism—the Russian strain of opportunism and revisionism—violently resisted efforts to lay down and implement the proletariat's revolutionary policy. Renunciation of the first Russian revolution and of preparation for new revolutionary struggle was a salient feature of that trend. All liquidationists advocated, in one form or another, the prospects of the bourgeoisie winning power by peaceful means. Hence the conclusion that "drawing up one's tactics in the hope for the coming 'nationwide upsurge' would be pointless", that "the working class must organise not 'for the revolution' or 'expecting the revolution' but simply for the firm and orderly defence of its special interests in all fields".⁴

Resisting the Bolshevik tactics of forming leftist blocs which served the interests of the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie for leadership in the revolutionary movement, the liquidationists advocated the tactics of agreement with the bourgeoisie to force the propertied classes into taking some steps towards making legislation more democratic and broadening constitutional guarantees.

¹ See J. García, *Spain in the Twentieth Century*, Moscow, 1967, p. 60 (in Russian).

² Oluf Bertolt, Ernst Christiansen og Poul Hansen, *En Bygning Vi Rejser*, Bd. I, Forlaget Fremad, København, 1954, s. 354.

³ Socialist Party, *Proceedings of the National Convention, 1912*, p. 134.

⁴ *Vozrozhdeniye*, No. 11, 1910, column 11; *Delo Zhizni*, No. 2, 1911, column 18.

Fawning on the opportunists of other countries, the liquidationists complained that "the Russian Social-Democrats spoke too much Russian" instead of "general European", that no one in Russia managed to arrive at Kautsky's "strategy of wearing the opponent down".¹

The liquidationists countered the Bolshevik efforts to prepare for the revolution using all legal and clandestine forms and methods of struggle with the drive for the legally sanctioned methods. They rejected the Bolsheviks' thorough work to organise and develop the strike movement; they dismissed it as merely playing at strikes and said one should look for a different path.² They reacted to the Russian proletariat's new revolutionary upsurge with warnings that it was dangerous to combine economic strikes with political action.³ The liquidationists opposed the Bolshevik tactics of revolutionary parliamentarianism inseparable from the struggle to implement the immediate goals of the Social-Democrats and advanced a policy of partial demands and compromise for securing the freedom of coalitions. At a time when nationalist trends increased, the liquidationists also attacked the programme demand of national self-determination.

Trotsky's political stand practically coincided with the Mensheviks' liquidationism, although he did preach revolution and, like a centrist, was searching for a "middle course". They were also unanimous in rejecting both the possibility of a bourgeois-democratic revolution and the revolutionary role of the peasants, and in opposing the Bolshevik tactics with the demand for freedom of coalitions, etc.

Georgi Plekhanov, the foremost theoretician among the Mensheviks, mostly observed the party's decisions on fighting the liquidationists in that period. However, his stand reflected his previous vacillation. Although loyal to the old Marxist tactics, he did nothing to apply it to the new conditions. He admitted that the Bolsheviks had an advantage because of their more revolutionary tactics, but he also accused them of being too narrow-minded.⁴ In 1913 Plekhanov believed that Russia was becoming "rapidly revolutionised, and that offers great opportunities to anyone who would like to serve the cause of Russian revolution".⁵ Still, during the new revolutionary upsurge he failed to turn to the practical course, forms, methods or means of the proletariat's mass struggle; and that was

¹ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 2, Nr. 51, 1909/1910, S. 913, 919.

² See *Luch*, November 17 and 21, 1912.

³ See *Nevsky Golos*, May 20, 1912.

⁴ See G. V. Plekhanov, *Works*, Vol. 19, Gosizdat, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, p. 358 (in Russian).

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 557.

imperative for preparing oneself for the coming revolutionary crisis. In 1914 Plekhanov wrote: "Only the working mass led by the politically conscious proletariat can join decisive battle against the government.... The peasants make up a great part of that mass."¹ However, he obviously underestimated the need for fighting the bourgeoisie for leadership in the revolution; he not only failed to help but even hampered the implementation of the proletariat's leadership. Even supporting the Bolsheviks in their struggle against Russian revisionism, Plekhanov was against his followers supporting Lenin's approach to the revolutionary policy and tactics of the working class. Worse than that, in 1914 Plekhanov moved closer to the liquidationists and began to argue in favour of their alliance with the Bolsheviks.

On the most topical issues of the time—those of the struggle against militarism and the war threat—Plekhanov also failed to adopt a creative Marxist position. He defended the 1907 Resolution of Stuttgart, particularly stressing that, thanks to the revolutionary forces of the Second International, it connected "the practical wartime objective with the end goal of the Social-Democrats".² He exposed revisionism and anarchism but did not offer a correct solution based on the mounting mass struggle of the proletariat.

Aside from the liquidationists, the proletariat's revolutionary political course further developed by Lenin was opposed by the "leftist liquidationists"—the otzovists and the ultimatumists. Demanding a withdrawal from the Duma, they isolated the parliamentary issue from the overall issues of the proletarian movement. Their policy was in fact Menshevism inside out: equally, it dismissed the need to differentiate the approach to representative institutions at different stages of the proletariat's struggle. As a resolution of the extended session of the *Proletary* editorial board stressed in 1909, the otzovists' and ultimatumists' tactics "would inevitably lead to a complete break with the tactics of the Left wing of the international Social-Democracy as applied to the current situation, to anarchist deviations".³ The entire record of the international Social-Democracy bore out the need for fighting such deviations, the finest revolutionary Social-Democrats were on the side of the Bolsheviks. Meanwhile, the opportunists in the international Socialist movement did all they could to support Russian opportunists, to reconcile them and the Bolsheviks and to unite them in a single party.

¹ G. V. Plekhanov, *Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 447, 448.

² *Ibid.*, p. 327.

³ *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, p. 276.

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In 1908-1914, the revolutionary Social-Democrats led by Lenin did a very important job of laying down the policy and tactics of proletarian organisations, of uniting Socialism with the mass working-class movement.

The social-reformists were forced to make certain concessions, although they stepped up their overall attacks against the revolutionary Marxists' political course. Besides, opportunists held key positions in the overwhelming majority of the Second International parties. That greatly impeded the implementation of the revolutionary policy which conformed to the new upsurge of the working-class movement in the pre-war years; it also adversely affected the development of the world Social-Democratic movement.

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Additional sources on the subject: *Lenin in the Struggle for a Revolutionary International*, Moscow, 1970 (in Russian); *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 2, Berlin, 1966; A. Laschitz, *Deutsche Linke im Kampf für eine demokratische Republik*, Berlin, 1969; M. Маринова, *Български марксисти в защита на националната независимост (1900-1912)*, София, 1975; *Suomen sosialidemokraattisen puolueen kuudennen edustajakokouksen. Pöytäkirja*, Kotkassa, 1909; V. M. Bykov, *Eugene Debs, Leader of the US Proletariat*, Moscow, 1971; M. I. Lapitsky, *William Haywood*, Moscow, 1974 (both in Russian); O. C. Johnson, *The Day Is Coming. Life and Work of Charles E. Ruthenberg 1882-1927*, New York, 1957; Ya. Yemnits, "The French Socialist Party Against the War Threat, 1907-1914", *The French Yearbook*, 1968, Moscow, 1970 (in Russian); K. Kautsky, *Der politische Massenstreik. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Massenstreikdiskussionen innerhalb der deutschen Sozialdemokratie*, Berlin, 1914; M. Waldenberg, *Wzlot i upadek Karola Kautsky'ego*, Kraków, 1972; G. Zibordi, *Storia del PSI attraverso i suoi congressi*, Reggio Emilia, 1958; J. Hannak, *Karl Renner und seine Zeit. Versuch einer Biographie*, Wien, 1965; *A History of the Second International*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian); T. Erényi, "Sozialistische Revolution und bürgerlich-demokratische Reform in der Arbeiterbewegung der zerfallenden Österreich-Ungarischen Monarchie", *XIV International Congress of Historical Sciences*, San Francisco, 1975; J. García, *Spain in the Twentieth Century*, Moscow, 1967 (in Russian).

Chapter 7

THE MASS WORKING-CLASS AND SOCIALIST MOVEMENT IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

In the period under review, the working-class movement developed against a background of mounting imperialist contradictions. In 1913, Lenin wrote: "The high cost of living and the tyranny of the trusts are leading to an unprecedented sharpening of the economic struggle, which has set into movement even the British workers who have been most corrupted by liberalism. We see a political crisis brewing even in the most 'diehard', bourgeois-Junker country, Germany. The frenzied arming and the policy of imperialism are turning modern Europe into a 'social peace' which is more like a gunpowder barrel."¹

Imperialism was opposed by the increasingly strong working-class movement. It not only aimed at winning concessions from the employers and the authorities, it kept trying to change the social status of the working class. A head-on collision of the proletarian masses with the entire system of capitalist or capitalist-landlord domination was approaching. The growing currency of the anti-imperialist, democratic trend was also facilitated by the awakening of the peoples of the dependent and colonial countries to revolutionary struggle.

These overall trends varied from country to country in their manifestation, depending on their distinctive histories, political systems, traditions and the forms that the working-class movement took. Different contingents of the world labour force contributed their own valuable specific features to the common revolutionary effort. At the same time, however, their actions also reflected their one-sidedness, their theoretical and practical shortcomings.² In some countries, distinctive national features were particularly striking in the working-class movement.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 585.

² V. I. Lenin, "Inflammable Material in World Politics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 186-88.

THE PROLETARIAT'S WORKING AND LIVING CONDITIONS

The domination of monopolies and the financial oligarchy that emerged in the early 1900s considerably changed the situation of the working class.

In the more developed countries, the rapid growth of large enterprises using the latest equipment brought about a shift from extensive production to intensive production, based on further specialisation and cooperation, on new technologies and organisational principles, on new methods of exploitation and labour intensification. The United States, the most "advanced" capitalist country, set an example to be gradually followed in introducing mass production and assembly lines and the latest systems of labour organisation—the Taylor sweatshop, etc.—which enabled employers to greatly accelerate working speed, and thus considerably raise the level of labour productivity and exploitation. Lenin stressed that in capitalist society "progress in science and technology means progress in the art of sweating", which brings huge profits to the capitalists.¹ New forms of capitalist production "overlapped" old ones, existing side by side and combining with them. In some countries (France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria and others) a large part of the workers were engaged in handicraft industry at home and in small workshops. Their working conditions differed little from those Engels described, using the British proletariat in the 1840s as an example, when children often worked alongside adults.

The steep rise in labour intensity and the economising on safety measures made accidents more frequent. For example, in Britain in 1904, there were 4,000 killed and 115,500 disabled in industrial accidents; in 1910, the figures were 4,500 and 154,400 respectively.² In the United States, there were about two million accidents in 1914. A man died on the job every 16 minutes.³ In Russia, there were almost twice as many industrial accidents in 1913 as compared to 1905.⁴ Increased exploitation meant increased labour turnover. In 1914, the average annual figure was 100 per cent for the US manufacturing industry.⁵

The proletariat's drive for shorter working hours forced the bour-

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "A 'Scientific' System of Sweating", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 595; V. I. Lenin, "The Taylor System—Man's Enslavement by the Machine", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 153.

² *The Socialist Annual for 1912*, London, 1912, p. 21.

³ See L. I. Zubok, *Essays on the History of the Working-Class Movement in the United States, 1865-1918*, Sotsekgiz, Moscow, 1962, p. 284 (in Russian).

⁴ See *1913 Reports of Factory Inspectors*, Industry Department, Ministry of Finance, St. Petersburg, 1914, p. XVII (in Russian).

⁵ See W. Ashworth, *A Short History of the International Economy, 1850-1950*, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1952.

geoisie to concede. Nevertheless, the average working-week in industry was still 54 hours in the United States and 60 hours in Europe in 1910; the working-day was first reduced in the mining industry and in the textile industry only much later.¹ The domestic, semi-handicraft workers were in a particularly difficult position: they had to work 14 to 18 hours a day. Different countries had their own peculiarities. For example, in Japan, a country burdened with vestiges of feudalism, the workers at government-owned munitions factories worked 10 hours a day, and 16 to 18 hours at large private enterprises in the textile and mining industries. The 1914 working-day figure for Russia was 9.5 to 10 hours on average, not counting overtime; in actual fact, it was 13 to 15 and sometimes more hours.² The average figure for Serbia was almost 12.5 hours in 1911.³ In France, the government decreed that the working-day was to be 10.5 hours at 37 per cent of the enterprises and 12 hours at 27 per cent of them. As the Bolshevik newspaper *Zvezda* wrote on April 1 (14), 1912, republican France "is still among the most backward countries as to the legislative reduction of the working-day". This shows that the drive to reduce the working-day remained topical.

The drive for an eight-hour working-day, which assumed international significance, not only represented the demand for the right to survive but also for the right to leisure and culture. This also applied to some other social gains in respect of the working-day for women and teenagers, the banning of child labour, etc. Partial concessions to the working people were included in new social security laws passed in France (1905), Germany (1911), Britain (1908 and 1911), and Russia (1912).

The somewhat shorter working-day contributed to the rise in the educational level of the workers in Europe, North America and Japan. In Central Europe, Britain and the United States the urban proletarian had, on average, already completed four to six years at school. In Eastern and Southern Europe the figure was one to three. Almost a third of the Japanese workers had completed their elementary school education. However, educational systems differed greatly from country to country. Lenin noted that educational allocations in the United States, a country which was not among the more advanced ones as far as mass literacy was concerned, exceeded the Western European appropriations for the purpose by 2.7 to 4.6 times

¹ See W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production*, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1953, p. 367; Jürgen Kuczynski, *Eine Weltübersicht über die Geschichte der Lage der Arbeiter*, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1967, S. 97.

² See G. A. Arutyunov, *Russia's Working-Class Movement During the New Revolutionary Upsurge of 1910-1914*, Nauka, Moscow, 1975, pp. 45-49 (in Russian).

³ *Синдикални покрет у Србији*, стр. 486.

and the nationwide ratio of schoolchildren was four times that in Russia.¹

Another important point is that the value of the positive changes in the life of the proletariat it secures in the course of struggle depends on the changes the proletariat undergoes according to the law of growing requirements. In this respect, the period under review witnessed radical changes in contrast to the late 19th century. On the one hand, the rapid rise in the productivity and intensity of labour, the growth of enterprises and towns considerably expanded the requirements of the worker families. On the other hand, the turn of the century formed the watershed in the dynamics of real wages: their growth lagged increasingly behind the growing labour productivity. This impoverished the proletariat and reduced its share of the national income while its exploitation increased.² That was mainly because the monopolies inflated the prices of consumer goods. In 1912, Lenin wrote: "The cost of living is rising. Wages, *even* with the most stubborn and *most* successful strike movement, are increasing much more slowly than the necessary expenditure of labour power."³

On average, the nominal industrial wage was gradually, though haltingly, rising in almost all countries. Over the seven prewar years, it rose by 14 per cent in Germany, by 11 per cent in the United States, by 8 per cent in France, and in Japan by 58 per cent between 1900 and 1912. But that growth, which lagged behind the intensification of labour, as it was, was almost cancelled out by the skyrocketing prices of food and the basic consumer goods. From 1896-1899 to 1910, according to the understated official statistics, prices rose by 18 per cent in Britain and France, by 28 per cent in Germany, and by 32 per cent in the United States. In Japan, by 1912 they had risen 68 per cent (including the 100 per cent hike in rice prices). As a result, the world average real industrial wage was almost one per cent lower in 1909-1914 than in 1903-1908. In 1905-1914, the real wage of German and French workers only wavered around the 1900 level; in Britain it was a steady 4 to 6 per cent lower than that, and in the United States it sometimes rose 3 to 6 per cent above it, but then plunged back to the 1900 level.⁴ Significantly, in Russia,

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Question of Ministry of Education Policy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1963, p. 140.

² See Jürgen Kuczynski, *op. cit.*, S. 111-12, 118-19; Simon Kuznets, *National Income. A Summary of Findings*, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1946, p. 50.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Impoverishment in Capitalist Society", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 435.

⁴ Calculations by the Department of the Socio-Economic Condition and Strike Movement of the Proletariat of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Working-Class Movement, on the basis of national statistics.

where the proletariat's heroic struggle forced the nominal wage up 31 per cent between 1904 and 1914, the real wage dropped by 8 per cent in 1905-1909 as compared to the 1900-1904 level, and by an additional one per cent in 1910-1914.¹

Wage levels differed greatly from country to country, a typically capitalist example of uneven development. For example, the real hourly wage in the United States was 70 per cent higher than in Britain in 1905-1909, while the German level was 32 per cent, and in France 38 per cent, lower than in Britain.² While, as Lenin observed, the difference in the annual output of an industrial worker in Russia and the United States was over 250 per cent, the average wage of the American industrial worker in 1910 was four times that of the Russian worker in 1911. Comparing the situation in Russia in 1911 and in the United States in 1860, Lenin summed it up as follows: "Twentieth-century Russia, the Russia of the June Third 'Constitution', is in a lower position than slave-owning America."³ A unique situation emerged in the Balkan countries. In Bulgaria, the bourgeoisie lacked the extra capital needed to expand the technological basis of production; it did, therefore, avoid hiring skilled workers and economised on wages by using the cheap labour of part-time semi-peasant workers and day labourers. The wages of those industrial workers in Bulgaria who had to pay their rent was only 54 per cent of their family budget.⁴ In Romania, the real wages of workers at large industrial enterprises declined by about one-third in 1909-1915.⁵

There were striking contrasts in the living standards of the various strata of the proletariat in different countries too. For example, the skilled worker in Britain earned 35 to 40 shillings a week; that sum allowed the head of the family to eat meat once a day, while the other members of the family lived on the diet of semi-skilled workers who could afford meat once a week, but subsisted mainly on flour, bread, margarine, potatoes and scant amounts of jam, tea,

¹ Calculated from S. Strumilin's data. See E. E. Kruze, *The Condition of the Working Class in Russia in 1900-1914*, Nauka (Leningrad Department), Leningrad, 1976, p. 215 (in Russian).

² See Carl von Tyszka, *Die Lebenshaltung der arbeitenden Klassen in den bedeutenderen Industriestaaten: England, Deutschland, Frankreich, Belgien und Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika*, Verlag von Gustav Fischer, Jena, 1912, S. 13, 66.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Our 'Achievements'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 597.

⁴ See M. A. Birman, "Concerning the Emergence of the Bulgarian Proletariat (Numbers and Structure in the Early 1900s)", *The Working Class in the World Revolutionary Process*, Moscow, 1977, pp. 152-53 (in Russian); Л. Беров. *Положението на работническата класа в България при капитализма*, София, 1968, стр. 51.

⁵ See A. K. Moshanu, *The Working-Class and Socialist Movement in Romania, 1907-1914*, Shtiintsa, Kishinev, 1974, p. 171 (in Russian).

sugar and condensed milk. Unskilled workers were even worse off.

Meanwhile, the situation of skilled workers was also deteriorating; the gap between their wages and those of unskilled workers was narrowing. By 1914, it dropped to 42 per cent in the US engineering and steel industries. The gap was about the same in the British engineering industry in 1914; in French industry it was a little over 33 per cent; and about 25 per cent in the Austrian engineering and steel industries and in German industry in general in 1907-1909.¹

The living and working conditions of the rural proletariat were especially hard. In Austria-Hungary, the back-breaking working day was 13 to 17 hours in summer and up to 13 hours even in winter. The labourers were at the mercy of their employers' whims. The meagre wages were spent on food, mainly potatoes, and rent, often for a dugout or a cowshed. In Russia and Japan, the agricultural proletariat was even worse off than in Austria-Hungary; the situation in Germany and France was a bit better. In the United States, agricultural workers were in much more difficult conditions than industrial workers; however, the former had already begun to operate machinery, and their wages were about six times those of an agricultural worker in Russia's Black-Earth Belt.

Certain sections of the working class continued to suffer from severe discrimination. For example, in the United States an American worker was paid 50 to 100 per cent more than an equally skilled Japanese worker for equal work; black workers were subjected to particularly harsh discrimination. In tsarist Russia, discrimination was directed against the oppressed non-Russian workers. In Austria-Hungary, a worker in Ljubljana or Zagreb was paid less than two-thirds of what an equally skilled worker in Vienna received for doing the same job. The gap between men's and women's wages was considerable throughout the capitalist world.

Significantly, even when real wages did increase marginally in the period under review, the workers' and their families' living standards in many cases deteriorated, nevertheless, since the wages were barely sufficient to satisfy basic human needs; education, recreation and the like were out of the question. In 1909-1914, the workers' wages in the United States covered less than two-thirds of the official "Minimum Health and Decency Budget"; the situation was worse than in 1904.² Another important point was that in some years the

¹ See Jürgen Kuczynski, op. cit., S. 122-23; *Oxford Bulletin of Statistics*, April 1951, p. 111; *International Labour Office. Wage Changes in Various Countries, 1914 to 1925*, Geneva, 1926, p. 14.

² See *Trends in American Capitalism. Profits and Living Standards*, International Publishers, New York, 1948, p. 91; Jürgen Kuczynski and Marguerite Steinfeld, *Wages in Manufacturing Industries, 1899 to 1927*, AFL, Washington, 1928, pp. 25-26.

percentage of children attending elementary school dropped in the United States and France. In his analysis of German statistics, Lenin referred to impoverishment in capitalist society in the period under review and said: "The worker is becoming impoverished *absolutely*, i.e., he is actually becoming poorer than before; he is compelled to live worse, to eat worse, to suffer hunger more, and to live in basements and attics."¹

The housing problem deteriorated greatly. Rents skyrocketed. The rent in the proletarian districts of French cities rose 30 to 45 per cent in 1900-1911.² A similar situation was found in other countries, too. Living space was especially expensive in the poor quarters; apartments were overcrowded and lacked elementary amenities. In Russia's coal-mining, and metal and oil producing areas, contractors quartered workers on crude bunks in damp, stuffy, dark dugouts or low-ceilinged barracks. So overcrowded, dirty and insanitary they were that 50 per cent of the deaths were due to gastrointestinal diseases. The deterioration in the living standards of the working class also led to mass emigration from Britain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia and other countries.

Recurrent economic crises greatly aggravated the proletariat's situation. The 1907-1908 crisis was a case in point: it led the monopolies to make a direct attack on the working class. For example, in 1908 the United States Steel Corporation cut its work force by 45,000 and reduced wages by 22 per cent. Many other corporations followed suit. In 1908, unemployment in the United States reached an unprecedented level of some 3,000,000. Over 700,000 desperate people returned to Europe.³ The losses connected with unemployment drove real wages down 16 per cent in 1908 as compared to 1906. In 1908-1909, up to 20 to 30 per cent of the workers in several leading British industries (like the shipbuilding and steel industries) were unemployed.⁴ Unskilled and unorganised workers were hit hardest. Some estimates showed that in 1908, 750,000 skilled and 1,500,000 unskilled workers lost their jobs in Great Britain; if we include their families, the figure for those affected by unemployment becomes 6,750,000. In 1908, the capitalists reduced the wages of almost

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Impoverishment in Capitalist Society", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 435.

² *Statistique générale de la France. Salaires et coûts de l'existence à diverses époques*, Paris, 1911, pp. 412-50.

³ See L. A. Mendelson, *A Theory and History of Economic Crises and Cycles*, Vol. 3, Social and Political Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1969, p. 92 (in Russian); *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1960, p. 73.

⁴ *Fourteenth Abstract of Labour Statistics of the United Kingdom*, London, 1911, pp. 3-6.

500,000 workers, and in 1909, of almost 1,100,000.¹ Only resolute resistance by the trade unions prevented a further reduction in the average nominal wage in 1910-1911.

Germany's monopolies also used the crisis to crack down on the workers. The coal syndicate reduced the miners' wages both in 1908 and in 1909. In 1913 and 1914, real industrial wages still fell short of the pre-crisis level. Meanwhile, a new economic crisis was beginning.

In Russia, the crisis brought about unemployment, longer working hours almost everywhere disguised as overtime, cut rates and pay days delayed, sometimes for several months. In 1908-1909, the average annual wages of Russian industrial workers dropped by almost 10 per cent, counting the losses brought about by unemployment. But an average of 10 per cent meant that many workers were in a desperate state. The effects of unemployment were aggravated by the migration to the towns of the peasants forced off their land.

In 1908-1914, four to six million people were unemployed in the "civilised" countries; counting their families, it meant that 15 to 20 million people were destitute. The unemployment level in the economic cycle of 1908-1914 was 4 per cent in Britain, 10.5 per cent in the United States; in Germany, it was 2.6 per cent throughout the 1902-1914 period.² In some industries it was even higher.

The imperialist state played a special role in furthering capitalist exploitation. Although forced to make certain concessions by the struggle of the working class, the authorities were increasingly resorting to violence by sending the police and the army to suppress the proletarian movement. The working population bore the brunt of the rising government taxes. In 1900-1913, per capita taxation increased 250 per cent in the United States, 100 per cent in Germany, 80 per cent in Britain, 60 per cent in Italy, 30 per cent in France and 20 per cent in Russia.³

The situation of the working class was also adversely affected by the extreme aggravation of the inter-imperialist contradictions which manifested itself in a series of international crises—the Bosnian crisis in 1908, the Moroccan crisis in 1911, the Italian-Turkish War of 1911-1912 and the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. Militarism and the growing military expenditures played one of the foremost roles in the robbing of the working people. In 1908-1913, these expenditures rose more than 25 per cent in the eight largest countries. Direct per capita military spending alone exceeded educational allocations

¹ Ibid., p. 69.

² See Jürgen Kuczynski, op. cit., S. 101.

³ *The British Economy. Key Statistics 1900-1966*, Times, London, s.d.; *World Economy. A Collection of Statistics*, Ministry of Finance, People's Commissariat of Finance Publishing House, Moscow, 1926 (in Russian).

four times in Italy and Germany, 5.5 times in France, six times in Britain, and 68 times in Russia.¹ Military appropriations grew much more rapidly than the productive forces or the nominal wage. The conditions of the working class in Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania sharply deteriorated during the Balkan wars of 1912-1913.

All these factors were closely connected with the emergence in 1908-1914 of "a new and incomparably higher stage in the international proletarian struggle".²

THE RUSSIAN PROLETARIAT IN THE PERIOD OF REACTION AND DURING THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY UPSURGE

In the period of reaction which followed the defeat of the 1905-1907 revolution, the Russian proletariat had to wage its struggle in the extremely difficult conditions of reprisals, persecution, the banning of mass labour organisations (trade union membership fell from 250,000 to 13,000), and the pressure from the capitalists who tried to liquidate the workers' gains. This onslaught on the part of the tsarist government and the capitalists considerably weakened the working class.

It also severely reduced the number of those willing to take part in proletarian action. According to the figures on enterprises subject to the Industrial Inspection Department, in 1907 almost 42 per cent of all the workers took part in strikes: in 1908, less than 10 per cent; in 1909, 3.5 per cent; and in 1910, 2.4 per cent.³ However, in 1908-1910 the average annual number of strikers was 2.2 times that in the pre-revolutionary decade. In 1908, the strikes were still mainly political. The workers of Baku Gubernia were most involved in strikes in 1908 (47,000 participants); Lenin called them "the last of the Mohicans of the mass political strike".⁴ The proletariat of Russia's large industrial centres marked May Day of 1908 with a strike of about 63,000 workers at 268 factories.⁵ Such action also occurred in 1909. However, now they were mostly economic strikes: over 85 per cent in 1909 and 96 per cent in 1910. The rearguard action of the working class offered fine examples of proletarian solidarity. For example, the workers involved in protracted, five-month-long strikes in Byelorussia and the Northwest Territory received support from the pro-

¹ F. B. Brandt, *Advanced Thinking in American Education*, Camden, 1935, p. 117.

² V. I. Lenin, "Inflammable Material in World Politics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 182.

³ See V. I. Lenin, "Strikes in Russia", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 534-35.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Strike Statistics in Russia", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 401.

⁵ See I. Ye. Gorelov, *The Bolsheviks in the Period of Reaction (1907-1910)*, Vysshaya Shkola, Moscow, 1975, p. 211 (in Russian).

letariat not only in other parts of Russia but also in Germany, France, Belgium and the United States.¹

The Bolsheviks continued to lead the working-class movement during the period of reaction. Having to contend with an extremely adverse situation brought about by the onslaught of counter-revolution, they succeeded in overcoming the liquidationists' conciliatory approach, the petty-bourgeois pseudo-revolutionism of the otzovists, and the influence of other non-proletarian trends on the working class. The Bolsheviks aimed at protecting workers' organisations and warned against untimely action. But the Leninists also took advantage of every opportunity, both illegal and legal, to organise resistance to reaction and rally forces in preparation for new revolutionary battles; they also used the reactionary parliament, the Third Duma.

In the Duma elections, the proletariat voted only for Social-Democrats, together with some of the peasants and democratic sections of the urban population. Work in the reactionary Duma was very difficult. Still, even given the lack of the necessary experience and despite the resistance of the Mensheviks in the Social-Democratic group, the Bolsheviks succeeded in leading it along the correct path. The Duma was used as a rostrum for defending the vital interests of the working people and for propaganda aimed at preparing the ground for a new revolution. Here contact was established with democratic opposition elements. Besides, the Bolsheviks used the reactionary Duma to strengthen the main centre of revolutionary activity—the party underground.

Trade union, cooperative, cultural and educational organisations of the working class became important strongholds of the Bolshevik revolutionary effort; legally convened congresses and preparations for them were also used.² The RSDLP Central Committee resolution "On Co-operatives" (1908) recommended that Social-Democrats take part in the existing workers' cooperatives and help develop them by enhancing their democratic principles; however, the resolution warned against overrating their part in the working-class movement.

In their efforts to implement Lenin's idea of the proletariat's leadership, the Bolsheviks worked not only among the proletarian masses but also with other democratic social strata, with special emphasis on the working peasants. The latter did not cease their struggle

¹ See *Essays on the History of the Communist Party of Byelorussia*, Part I, Belarus, Minsk, 1968, pp. 172-73 (in Russian).

² For details see P. V. Barchugov, *The Bolsheviks' Revolutionary Work in Legitimate Workers' Organisations*, Rostov University Press, Rostov-on-Don, 1963; G. V. Knyazeva, *The Bolsheviks' Struggle to Combine Clandestine and Legitimate Work in the Years of Reaction, 1907-1910*, Leningrad University Press, Leningrad, 1964; N. I. Letunovsky, *Lenin's Tactics of Using Legitimate All-Russia Congresses in the Struggle for the Masses in 1908-1911*, Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1971 (all in Russian).

during the period of reaction: landowners' manors continued to go up in flames, there were armed rebellions and destruction of government-promoted rich peasant farms. The Bolsheviks supported in various ways the student action of 1908-1909, nor did they overlook other democratic sections of the urban population.

In their work during the period of reaction, the Bolsheviks proceeded from the way Russia developed, from the emergence of "more and more ... new elements of a revolutionary crisis".¹ Their build-up, directly furthered by the revolutionary party of the proletariat, led to a fresh upsurge of the working-class and democratic movement. The underlying reason was that revolutionary objectives in Russia remained unrealised and were becoming increasingly urgent. During the period of Stolypin's reaction, the elite of feudal landowners were pushing the country along the path of bourgeois transformations. Bourgeois reforms coupled with extremely repressive methods did not remove the glaring contradictions existing in Russia. The development of imperialism within the decaying framework of tsarist rule which disguised absolutism in pseudo-constitutional garb aggravated and swelled those contradictions.

The new upsurge of the working-class movement already made itself felt in the summer of 1910; in 1911, there were more than twice as many strikes and strikers as in 1910. Qualitative changes were also emerging: the struggle was becoming better organised and more persistent, and was turning increasingly to political and overall democratic issues. In November 1910, the proletariat of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Nikolayev, Kiev, Yekaterinoslav, Yuriev and other towns responded to an appeal by the Bolsheviks and launched a wave of political strikes, rallies and demonstrations to mark the death of Leo Tolstoy with the demand to abolish capital punishment. The workers won in 51 per cent of the strikes in 1911.

The events at the Lena goldfields were an important landmark in the development of the revolutionary upsurge. The goldfields were owned by the Lena Gold-Mining Society, whose shareholders included members of the royal family and top-level officials. The arbitrary treatment of workers there led to a general strike in March 1912. Troops were moved in to suppress the strike and arrests began. On April 4, a demonstration of 3,000 workers demanding freedom for their comrades was fired upon; 270 people were killed and 250 wounded.

The Lena massacre, followed by a statement by the Minister of the Interior that "that is the way it was and that is the way it will be" set off a storm of outraged protest throughout the country. There

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Assessment of the Present Situation", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 279.

were about 700 political strikes held in April 1912. May Day was marked by over 1,000 strikes in 50 gubernias; the action was greater than the largest wave of May Day strikes in 1905. Even incomplete estimates put the number of 1912 strikers at over 1,000,000. Over 80 per cent of strikers took part in political strikes.¹ This was unprecedented both for Russia and for any other country. About 42 per cent of the strikers emerged victorious. Political strikes in the autumn of 1912 were combined with demonstrations in the streets. Demonstrators in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, Revel, Nikolayev, Berdyansk and Nizhni Novgorod protested against the savage repressions of mutinous sailors in the Black Sea Fleet.²

In 1913, there were over 2,000,000 strikers; over 60 per cent of them took part in political strikes. The Poronin Conference of the RSDLP Central Committee in the autumn of 1913 noted that "the movement is approaching the point of an all-Russian political strike"; systematic preparation for it was to be launched everywhere and without delay.³ In late 1913 and early 1914, the Bolsheviks were trying to unite the proletariat's strike movement throughout the country. The slogans they advanced for a new people's revolution—a democratic republic, an eight-hour working-day, and confiscation of the landed estates—rallied together more and more workers, made it possible to actively enhance the revolutionary spirit of the peasants, and the semi-proletarian and non-proletarian urban population.

In the first half of 1914, more workers went on strike than in the whole of 1913; 80 per cent of the strikes were political.⁴ The workers of St. Petersburg led the way: about 300,000 people took part in the nationwide strikes to mark the anniversary of January 9, 1905, and in St. Petersburg 140,000 workers responded to the Bolsheviks' appeal and joined the strike. In March 1914, over 30,000 people called strikes to protest against the persecution of the labour press. That same month, 53,000 people took part in the St. Petersburg strikes in support of the Social-Democratic group's inquiry in the Duma about investigating the Lena events.⁵ Students also joined the strug-

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "Factory Owners on Workers' Strikes", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 126. The data Lenin used—*The Society of Industrialists and Factory Owners of the Moscow Industrial Region (A Report of the Council)*, Moscow, 1913—contain figures on enterprises exceeding those quoted by the Industrial Monitoring Commission.

² See *Pravda*, November 1, 1912; *The Working-Class Movement in Petrograd in 1912-1917. Documents and Materials*, Lenizdat, Leningrad, 1958, pp. 71-74 (in Russian).

³ See *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, p. 383.

⁴ See *The Red Archive* (Moscow History Archive Institute), Vol. 3 (82), Politizdat, Moscow, 1937, p. 139 (in Russian).

⁵ See *The Bolshevik Group in the Fourth Duma*, Sotsekgiz (Leningrad Department), Leningrad, 1938, p. 617 (in Russian); *The Working-Class Movement in Petrograd...*, pp. 142-51, 153-62, 615-16.

gle and called one-day and two-day strikes at some of the largest universities and colleges in St. Petersburg and Moscow. There was mass action to protest cases of toxication at rubber factories. In April and May 1914, a new wave of action followed, echoed in other parts of Russia, too. A May Day pamphlet issued in Kiev said: "The St. Petersburg proletariat indignantly protests against the brutal treatment of its chosen representatives by the reactionary Duma and the bloodthirsty autocracy. On this great proletarian holiday, let all the proletariat of Russia add its protest and indignation to the powerful voice of the St. Petersburg workers."¹ May Day strikes swept the country, over 500,000 people taking part.²

In the summer of 1914, the Bolsheviks led a powerful campaign of solidarity with the Baku workers whose strike and demonstration in May triggered off mass reprisals by the employers and the police. The Bolsheviks called for a fund-raising campaign to support Baku. Solidarity strikes were called in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkov, Kolomna, Kiev, Rostov and other towns. The movement gathered momentum despite attempts at armed reprisals by the police and lockouts by the employers. St. Petersburg was shaken by mass strikes of 150,000 to 190,000 workers. The struggle went on for five days and reached the point of street barricades. Strikes and protest demonstrations were staged in many towns.³ In July 1914, the secret police issued a fake pamphlet allegedly written by the Bolsheviks and calling for the seizure of the armoury and the launching of an armed uprising. Certain leftist elements in St. Petersburg also called for an armed uprising. However, on the Bolsheviks' initiative, the St. Petersburg workers called off the strike on July 14 (27), 1914.⁴ The situation was not yet ripe for an armed uprising, it would have been doomed to failure.

The reason was that the mass revolutionary movement was extremely uneven. Although the number of strikers was more than 2,000,000 in 1914, and by the summer of that year it exceeded the 1905 level, the movement developed mainly in a few proletarian centres. In 1914, the workers of St. Petersburg made up more than 50 per cent of all the strikers. In many other areas, including the Central Industrial Region, the workers were only just beginning to join

¹ *The Working-Class Movement in the Ukraine During the New Revolutionary Upsurge, 1910-1914. A Collection of Documents and Materials*, Gospolitizdat of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev, 1959, p. 559 (in Russian).

² See G. A. Arutyunov, *op. cit.*, pp. 339-41.

³ See *The Working-Class Movement in Petrograd...*, pp. 209-31, 232-39; G. A. Arutyunov, *op. cit.*, pp. 364-77.

⁴ See *The Proletarian Revolution*, Vol. 7 (30), Partizdat, CC CPSU(B), 1924, pp. 47-48; Vol. 8-9 (31-32), 1924, pp. 314-15 (in Russian); *The Working-Class Movement in Petrograd...*, pp. 231-32, 240-42.

the struggle. The revolutionary movement in rural areas and in the army was lagging behind in 1912-1914, there was no such mass peasant or soldiers' action as in 1905-1907.

On July 19 (August 1), 1914, the world imperialist war broke out and temporarily prevented the mass revolutionary struggle from developing further.

The strike movement of 1912-1914 was gigantic in scope, great in the public response it generated, and revolutionary in essence. In June 1913, Lenin wrote: "...The series of strikes in Russia during the last eighteen months, was revolutionary in character as distinguished not only from the usual economic strikes but from demonstration strikes and from political strikes demanding constitutional reforms, like, for instance, the last Belgian strike."¹ A nationwide crisis was developing in Russia. The proletariat played the leading role in it, and the strike, a purely proletarian means of struggle, assumed a distinctively universal character. The strike was the most effective form of implementing the proletariat's leadership in the coming revolution. Strikes brought the revolutionary slogans of the working class out into the streets, addressed them directly to the people and generated a widespread response.

The spontaneous mass movement found its expression in strikes and received the necessary organisational impetus from the tireless, continuous, thorough and heroic work of the Bolsheviks. Their slogans—"Down with the Tsarist Government", "Long Live the Republic", "Long Live Socialism"—helped organise and bring out into the open the indignation at the Lena massacre which swept through the workers of Russia and enhanced the dissatisfaction and protest they had long harboured. Those slogans helped the working-class movement spread throughout the population, brought forth a favourable response from the democratic students, and had an impact on the army. In raising Russia's "accursed questions" in the course of strikes, the Bolsheviks were fighting for influence over the proletarian masses and resolutely opposed the attempts by the bourgeoisie, the liquidationists and the "August bloc" to lead the movement into the quagmire of reformist illusions, to undermine it by the slogan of the "freedom of coalition". By leading and organising numerous strikes, studying and analysing the record of the strike movement, the Bolsheviks aimed to broadly and flexibly combine various forms and methods of struggle, both offensive and defensive, to alternate between them. The goal was to save as much of the workers' strength as possible and to ensure that the movement continued to grow. "Whether or not there will be a revolution does *not* depend on us *alone*," Lenin wrote.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "May Day Action by the Revolutionary Proletariat", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 221.

"But we shall do *our* work, and this work will never be in vain."¹

The Cracow Conference of the RSDLP Central Committee summed up the results of the working-class struggle in 1912 and noted the need to pay close attention to the conditions in which strikes were started and searching for new forms of struggle. The Conference entrusted the party with staging revolutionary street demonstrations, both combined with political strikes and as independent action.²

The Bolsheviks also used strikes as a means of organising the masses of workers for revolutionary struggle. The situation in Russia was such that that approach was especially important due to the illegal status of the party and to the limits imposed on the trade union, cooperative and other legitimate organisations.

The tsarist authorities very often banned the existing trade unions and refused to register new ones. There were bans on the most elementary trade union activities, like holding parties, organising trips, setting up libraries or cafeterias, or assisting the unemployed. Still, despite all those difficulties, the Bolsheviks continued their work in the trade unions, whose membership rose to 100,000 by the summer of 1914 (it was no more than 60,000 in 1910). There were many clandestine trade unions, and even registered unions carried on underground operations. In 1912-1914 trade unions in many cities (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Lodz, Riga, Kiev, Rostov-on-Don, etc.) were so strong that even when banned, they retained.³ The Bolsheviks considered it necessary for the underground party groups to cooperate with the trade unions and the party groups within them, and with individual union activists, in order to secure the leadership of the strikes. The trade unions responded to all major political developments, advanced demands for political freedoms and an eight-hour working-day, provided financial assistance to the revolutionaries, and allocated increasing sums to support the strike movement. The trade unions were also involved in the 1912 drive for new insurance laws, a social gain of the proletariat. For all their limited membership—less than 3.5 per cent of all industrial workers in 1914—the unions carried great weight with the masses and acted as revolutionary proletarian organisations.

The Bolsheviks also aimed at guiding the activities of the workers' independent cooperatives, which numbered at least 50,000 members by 1913, in a similar manner. The headquarters of one of the largest—the Ivanovo-Voznesensk consumer society called Unity Is Strength—housed an underground Bolshevik printing shop, and meetings of the party committee were held there. Elsewhere, cooperatives were

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Platform of the Reformists and the Platform of the Revolutionary Social-Democrats", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 384.

² See *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol. 1, p. 359.

³ For details see G. A. Arutyunov, *op. cit.*, pp. 249 et seq.

also used as a cover for clandestine party work. At the 1913 All-Russia Cooperative Congress, the Bolshevik Grigori Petrovsky explained to the workers active in the cooperative movement what means they had at their disposal for the mass political struggle of the working class.¹

The Bolsheviks paid great attention to work among young people.

In those years, the younger generation of the Russian working class took an active part in strikes and demonstrations and sometimes acted independently, advancing its own specific demands; it also played an important part in the revolutionary movement in the army and navy.² The Bolsheviks also attached great importance to working among the students and aimed at uniting their movement with the young workers' struggle.

The Bolshevik press, especially *Pravda*, contributed greatly to organising the new revolutionary upsurge and to resisting the bourgeoisie and the liquidationists' attempts at capturing the backward sections of the proletariat. Despite persecution by the tsarist authorities, it helped develop the movement of the Russian proletariat ideologically, politically and organisationally. The features it published on the workers' living and working conditions introduced new sections of the working class to politics and made them actively committed to the struggle. *Pravda* explained the importance of strikes, helped the strike movement by publishing information on their progress, reported decisions to launch them, ran notices on boycotts of enterprises, published lists of strike-breakers, and raised funds to support strikers. The newspaper became a rallying point for its readers and correspondents, and for the large number of workers who followed the Bolsheviks. Together with other Bolshevik publications, *Pravda* helped the working class ally itself with, and lead, the semi- and non-proletarian sections of the working people; the latter saw the newspaper as their champion.

The Bolsheviks used the 1912 election campaign to the Fourth Duma to bring political education and organisation to the working masses at a time of arbitrary rule and brutality, when the masses had very little opportunity to make their genuine will known. The planks of the Bolshevik election platform contributed to the rise of the revolutionary strike movement, to the struggle against all kinds of reactionary forays. When the St. Petersburg election committee barred 30 delegates from the largest enterprises from taking part in the

¹ See L. F. Morozov, *From Bourgeois to Socialist Cooperation*, Mysl, Moscow, 1969, pp. 28-29 (in Russian); P. V. Barchugov, op. cit., pp. 217-18.

² *The Revolutionary Youth Movement, 1896-1915. A Collection of Documents*, Leningrad, 1932, pp. 62-67, 70-76, 126, 133 (in Russian).

elections it had to back down before a protest strike by 100,000 workers in the capital.¹

Despite the sway of the reactionary majority and the resistance of Menshevik deputies, the Bolsheviks in the Duma carried on with revolutionary educational work and at the same time maintained links with clandestine party chapters as organisers and propagandists.²

The draft declaration of the Social-Democratic Duma group prepared by Lenin used a revolutionary approach to deal with the country's major political questions and the practical issues of the working-class movement.³ Bolshevik members of the Duma proceeded from that position in raising the issues of reforms, and of improving the situation of the proletariat. Speaking in the Duma on mass toxication at St. Petersburg enterprises, Badayev said that the working class "will not stand for its comrades being poisoned by the hundred or buried in the debris of all those cave-ins and explosions".⁴ Together with workers' representatives, the Bolshevik deputies prepared a number of bills (on the eight-hour working-day, on workers' insurance, etc.) which both championed the interests of the working masses and furthered the cause of revolutionary propaganda and the class education of the proletariat.

The workers vigorously supported their Duma representatives. On the Bolsheviks' initiative, the day the Fourth Duma was inaugurated—November 15 (28), 1912—was marked in St. Petersburg by a strike of about 50,000 people. The Workers' Commission of the Bolshevik Duma group also played an important role by taking part in the discussion of the issues arising in the course of the Duma activities and by strengthening the group's contacts with the masses. The workers repeatedly came out in support of their deputies and protested against the discrimination against them in the Duma.⁵

Lenin directly guided the activity of the Bolshevik deputies. He drafted their speeches on many important questions. The Bolsheviks' participation in the election campaigns and their activities inside and outside the Duma enabled them to overcome liquidationism and otzovism and to flexibly combine covert and overt forms

¹ See *The Working-Class Movement in Petrograd...*, pp. 64-71, 610.

² On the clandestine work of the Bolshevik group in the Fourth Duma as reported by the police, see *The Red Archive* (Moscow History Archive Institute), Vol. 4 (77), Politizdat, Moscow, 1936, pp. 64-84 (in Russian).

³ See V. I. Lenin, "Concerning Certain Speeches by Workers' Deputies", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 413-19; "Concerning the Workers' Deputies to the Duma and Their Declaration", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 420-23.

⁴ *The Bolshevik Group in the Fourth Duma*, p. 264.

⁵ See *History Archive*, No. 5, 1955, pp. 84-85 (in Russian); *The Working-Class Movement in Petrograd...*, pp. 74-79, 82-85, 86-93, 173-75; *The Red Archive*, p. 62.

and means of struggle to prepare the Russian revolution. When informing other communist parties about the Bolshevik record, Lenin wrote about the tremendous importance of the fact that in 1908-1914 the Bolsheviks had won in the hard battle over the imperative need to combine covert and overt forms of struggle, to participate even in the work of a most reactionary parliament and in a number of other institutions governed by reactionary laws.¹

The Bolshevik Party inspired and organised the mass movement against militarism and the threat of war. In the period of ruthless reaction, the Bolsheviks fearlessly exposed tsarist foreign policy, the government's involvement in the suppression of the revolution in Iran, and the fettering nature of the loans used to build up the army. The tsarist government "needs those million-strong armies to keep the proletariat in bondage, to wreak plunder and violence which are called war",² a Bolshevik pamphlet said at the time. The Bolsheviks re-established their organisations in the army after they had been crushed. The RSDLP Central Committee's Bureau of Army Organisations published anti-war literature for propaganda among the soldiers; revolutionaries were being specially trained to work among the troops.

The Bolsheviks in the Duma scathingly criticised the tsarist government's war preparations and refused to vote for the military budget. Referring to the First Balkan War in his theses incorporated in the November 1912 declaration of the Social-Democratic Duma group, Lenin wrote: "Against the interference of other Powers in the Balkan war... War against war! Against all interference! For peace! Such are the slogans of the workers."³ He wrote the appeal "To All Citizens of Russia", which connected the objectives of the struggle against the imperialist policy of the great powers with the overthrowing of the monarchies in Russia and in the Balkan countries and with the establishment of democratic republics. The workers' representatives in the Duma branded the arbitrary oppression of soldiers in the army and demanded that regular armies be replaced with the general arming of the people. *Pravda* and *Rabochaya Gazeta* exposed the arms race and the aggressive foreign policy of the tsarist government and its imperialist allies. The Bolsheviks organically linked the struggle against the threat of war, against nationalism and chauvinism in Russia with efforts to uphold the revolutionary principles of the anti-imperialist movement of the working class and all the working

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "'Left-Wing' Communism—an Infantile Disorder", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 36.

² See *Anti-War Traditions in the International Working-Class Movement*, Mysl, Moscow, 1972, p. 106 (in Russian).

³ V. I. Lenin, "Concerning Certain Speeches by Workers' Deputies", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 414.

people on an international level; they prepared the masses to exploit any possible crisis resulting from the war for revolutionary purposes.

The Bolsheviks with their anti-war slogans led mass May Day demonstrations of Russian workers in 1912-1913. From 400,000 to one million people took part.¹ "Down with War" was one of the key demands of the strikes by about 250,000 workers in October and November 1912. The revolutionary Social-Democrats abroad regarded the July 1914 action by the St. Petersburg proletariat as a model of the anti-war struggle: the action was carried out during the visit of Raymond Poincaré, President of France, who came to Russia to hold negotiations concerning preparations for war.

The leading role of the Russian working class in the development of the world proletarian struggle in the period under review was above all due to the new wave of popular revolution rising in Russia.

The situation in Russia and the world turned this new, mounting revolution into the centre of the international working-class and world emancipation movement. Apart from that, the Russian proletariat had accumulated unique experience in securing its leadership in the emancipation movement, both at the highest stage of mass action and in conditions of severe reprisals. The Russian proletariat was led by the Bolshevik Party under Lenin. That party was a strong political organisation of a new type, and it had armed Russia's workers with a revolutionary theory. In analysing new developments in Russia and throughout the world, and highlighting the prospects for the revolutionary classes' future development and ways of achieving it the Bolsheviks drew up and implemented a Marxist strategy and tactics. It was in Russia that the key objective and subjective factors combined to make the fulfilment by the proletariat of its historic mission both necessary and possible.

THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRE-REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION IN GERMANY

Since parliamentarianism in Germany had long been a distinctive means in the proletariat's struggle, more important than in other countries, it continued to have an impact on the way the working-class movement developed in Germany in the pre-war years. Election issues were especially topical because they affected the consolidation of those forces in capitalist society which opposed the working class.

The drive to make the country more democratic, manifested in the vigorous action of 1905-1907 to demand reforms in suffrage, was

¹ See G. I. Zaichikov, *The Bolshevik Struggle Against Militarism and the Imperialist War in 1907-1914*, Vysshaya Shkola, Moscow, 1964, p. 66 (in Russian).

becoming increasingly pronounced, there were new signs of further aggravation in class contradictions.

The reactionary election system, especially in Prussia, the stronghold of Junker-German imperialism, continued to be used to prevent the strengthening of the positions held by the working class and its party. True, even there the Social-Democrats were moderately successful in the Landtag elections of 1908. However, with about 599,000 votes they only won six seats.¹ The need to fight for reform in suffrage in the heart of the empire was highlighted by the success the Social-Democrats achieved in Saxony despite all the qualifications and inequalities built into the suffrage system introduced in 1908.

The struggle for democracy acquired particular significance due to the increasing police oppression, militarist sway and the attempts by the ruling quarters at violating or even completely doing away with the existing law and order. In 1908, a law was passed in Germany on unions and assemblies which restricted the right to hold meetings in languages other than German, gave the police a free hand in suppressing Social-Democratic propaganda, and banned persons below the age of 18 from joining political unions and attending political meetings. Soon attempts were made at turning that law against the free trade unions. Social-Democrats were barred from certain jobs (for example, on the railways). The workers' rights to establish organisations and hold strikes were violated and strikers were taken to court. The reactionary forces continued to urge an "exceptional law" against the Socialists and planned the establishment of a dictatorship without a parliament. The emperor held forth on his "divinely ordained" independence of the opinions of the parliament or popular assemblies. Chauvinism and flag-waving patriotism were rampant. Hundreds of thousands of members of military and other militarist and nationalist organisations were behind a vitriolic campaign against the Socialists.²

Simultaneously, the bourgeoisie, which regarded "the ballot as an effective safety valve to prevent the revolution",³ was aiming at "taming" the Social-Democrats by reforms.

¹ *Statistisches Jahrbuch für den Preussischen Staat, 1914. Zwölfter Jahrgang*, Verlag des Königlichen statistischen Landesamts, Berlin, 1915, S. 632.

² For details see Kurt Stenkewitz, *Gegen Bajonett und Dividende*, Rütten und Loening, Berlin, 1960, S. 74-96, 162-80, 281-99; *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterjugendbewegung, 1904-1945*, Verlag Neues Leben, Berlin, 1973, S. 62-64; K. Saul, *Staat, Industrie, Arbeiterbewegung im Kaiserreich*, Düsseldorf, 1974; Jürgen Kuczynski, *Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Imperialismus*, Bd. II, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1950.

³ Friedrich Naumann, *Demokratie und Kaisertum. Ein Handbuch für innere Politik*, Buchverlag der "Hilfe", Berlin-Schöneberg, 1905, S. 11.

Lenin noted that the situation in Germany reflected "the greater (in comparison with anything hitherto) domination of *legality*, which has become an obstacle to those who introduced it".¹ The important thing was to do everything possible to use the opportunities offered by the existing legal system, striving to expand them further, and to use the dissatisfaction of the masses with the arbitrary, anti-democratic policy of the authorities who violated their own laws. However, in the pre-war years, objective conditions were replacing the stage in German history during which the SPD made exemplary use of bourgeois legality to establish the proletariat's organisations and its press, and to educate and consolidate its own ranks, with a new stage. The age of great proletarian battles was approaching.² Hence the task of preparing the party and the masses for flexibly combining use of bourgeois legality and struggle against it in the interests of the revolution. Whether the proletariat could solve that question or not depended, to a large extent, on the state of affairs in the socialist movement.

In the pre-war years, the German Social-Democrats strengthened their positions. Many German workers pinned their hopes on a political victory of the SPD. This was borne out by an opinion poll, which indicated that about 40 per cent of the metal workers, about 45 per cent of the textile workers, and over 20 per cent of the miners³ supported the party. Its membership increased from 720,000 in 1910 to 1,086,000 in 1914. At the 1912 elections it won 4,250,000 votes and formed the largest Reichstag group of 110 members.⁴ In large cities, the Social-Democrats captured 50 per cent of the votes (a little over one-third throughout Germany) and about 75 per cent in Berlin. A vast section of the party's supporters, even considering the fact that large groups of the working people were deprived of the right to vote, was, in the period under review, approximately four to five times the numerical strength of the party and made up about one-third of the nation's proletariat.⁵ The SPD's allies included the 2,500,000-strong free trade unions and also youth organisations, cooperatives, sports and other unions.

The influence of the party press increased. In the period under review, there were more than 90 daily newspapers with a circulation

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Two Worlds", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 310.

² Ibid.

³ Calculated from: Adolf Levenstein, *Die Arbeiterfrage. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der sozialpsychologischen Seite des modernen Grossbetriebes und der psycho-physischen Einwirkungen auf die Arbeiter*, Verlag Ernst Reinhardt, München, 1912, S. 222-23, 232, 241-42.

⁴ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 2, S. 173, 176, 185.

⁵ See V. I. Lenin, "Fresh Data on German Political Parties", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 270-71; V. I. Lenin, "How Vera Zasulich Demolishes Liquidationism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 405, 407.

of 1,500,000 copies; other periodicals were also published, with some of them—about 20, with a circulation of 150,000—addressed mainly to the rural population.¹ The combined circulation of the Social-Democratic press reached a total of almost 2 million. About 60 trade union newspapers also had a circulation of almost 2 million copies. The sports, singers', tourist and other organisations affiliated with the party produced nearly 100,000 to 150,000 copies of their own periodicals. *Vorwärts*, the party's publishing house, annually put out about 500,000 copies of educational books and pamphlets. According to polls conducted by sociologists, party and trade union socialist literature had an impressive number of readers among the workers: at least 43 or 44 per cent of the metal and textile workers and about 20 per cent of miners. Over 88 per cent of the Greater Berlin party membership read the party press.² Other educational and propaganda work was also carried out. In 1913, the party's 364 educational committees organised lectures and reports for an audience of 188,000 listeners; 44,000 attended 420 lecture courses. In 1910-1911 alone, the SPD held over 13,000 public meetings and rallies.

However, the SPD and the free trade unions increasingly idealised parliamentarianism and election campaigns. The bloc of open opportunists and centrists which emerged in the party and trade union leadership on the eve of the world war proclaimed that the main goal was success at elections and in parliament; therefore, all forms of extra-parliamentary struggle were regarded as subordinate. That was also the approach used vis-à-vis all party and trade union work. At this point one should recall that the 1908 law was used to disband youth organisations and to distract the younger generation from politics.³ Party propaganda was becoming increasingly conciliatory. In her letter to Franz Mehring in 1913, Clara Zetkin noted that many members of the Berlin organisations had been adversely affected by "that pathetic *Vorwärts*" over the years.⁴

To counter that, the left Social-Democrats—above all, their leaders Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Julian Marchlewski (Karski), Wilhelm Pieck and others—tried to employ both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary means of struggle in the interests of the revolutionary movement. They used the publications accessible to them, meetings, congresses, rallies and demonstrations for uncompromising socialist propaganda.

¹ See *Handbuch des Vereins Arbeiterpresse. Dritter Jahrgang 1914*, Verlag des Vereins Arbeiterpresse, Berlin, 1914.

² Adolf Levenstein, op. cit., S. 392, 398, 403; *Statistische Erhebungen über die Partei-Organisation Gross-Berlins, 1906*, "Vorwärts", Berlin, 1907, S. 135.

³ Walter Sieger, *Das erste Jahrzehnt der deutschen Arbeiterjugendbewegung. 1904-1914*, Rütten und Loening, Berlin, 1958, S. 111-89.

⁴ CPA IML, f. 201, op. 1, d. 1062, l. 3.

Karl Liebknecht was an exemplary socialist parliamentarian in his struggle against reaction and militarism, for the victory of the German proletariat. He did much to work out a correct revolutionary, anti-militarist course for youth education. Clara Zetkin made a similar contribution, especially to the women's movement.¹

Another important factor was that left Social-Democrats were among the leaders of some local party organisations. For example, Clara Zetkin helped strengthen the class party approach in the Württemberg organisation. Wilhelm Pieck worked successfully in Teltow-Beskow-Charlottenburg (Greater Berlin). Referring to the difficulties he encountered in the Berlin Social-Democratic organisation, Clara Zetkin wrote in 1913: "It is no wonder that Comrade Pieck cannot say immediately: *veni, vidi, vici*. But for all that, I find that he is not fighting in vain. The first steps for the better are being taken in Berlin, too.... We really have the right to continue our struggle without giving up hope."² The Left wing was supported by such large party organisations as the Stuttgart organisation of the Sixth Berlin Constituency with its proletarian districts of Moabit and Wedding, and the organisation of Nieder-Barnim, Berlin's proletarian suburb.

Still, the revolutionary Social-Democrats were quite a small and fairly heterogeneous group and they lacked an organisation of their own. They were clearly not strong enough to impart a class, proletarian character to the party's parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activities, or to the masses who followed the party; they were unable to prepare those masses for struggle in conditions of the impending general political crisis in Germany. The SPD was dominated not by the left opposition but by the party bosses who were leaning increasingly to the right. From the autumn of 1913, the revolutionary Social-Democrats' scope of action shrank even more. They were practically denied access to *Die Leipziger Volkszeitung* and *Die Neue Zeit*. Articles published in *Sozialdemokratische Korrespondenz*, a special bulletin launched by Rosa Luxemburg, Mehring and Marchlewski, remained inaccessible to the mass audience. The voice of the left who demanded a vigorous anti-militarist campaign and mass proletarian action was drowned by the voice of the central and local party press. Still, the propaganda on the party's revolutionary wing which reflected the proletariat's vital needs did reach workers. Life itself

¹ For details see Walter Bartel, *Die Linken in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie im Kampf gegen Militarismus und Krieg*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1958; Heinz Wohlgemuth, *Karl Liebknecht. Eine Biographie*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1973; Luise Dornemann, *Leben und Wirken*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1973; Annelies Laschitzka, Günter Radczun, *Rosa Luxemburg. Ihr Wirken in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1971.

² CPA IML, f. 201, op. 1, d. 1062, l. 3-4.

led the latter to take vigorous action against the existing system.

In 1908-1909, although strikes became fewer, they still continued. In October 1909, 10,000 Mansfeld miners struck. The strike spread quickly throughout the area. For six weeks the Mansfeld strikers, supported by the proletariat throughout Germany, refused to back down, even when threatened with armed force. Although they did not win, their action, which was not confined to economic demands but championed the proletariat's political rights, was an important landmark; it heralded a new wave in the mass working-class movement in Germany.

The turning point was reached in 1910. That was obvious in the rise of economic and political struggle which took many different forms. In 1910-1913, the average annual number of strikes grew by 60 per cent as compared to 1908-1909, the number of strikers increased by 200 per cent, and that of man-days lost, by 180 per cent.¹ The strikes were intense and protracted. Almost one-third of them lasted for three weeks or more; in 1913, over 25 per cent of all the participants were on strike for more than 50 days.² After 1908, strikes became more effective. In 1911-1913, almost two-thirds of the strikes ended in a victory for the workers. The share of lost strikes dropped to 19 per cent (it was 34 per cent in 1908). Partially successful strikes made up about 16 per cent of the total.

"Conflicts without work stoppages" were an integral element of the struggle between labour and capital. This kind of the workers' action regarding working conditions, wages, and tariff agreements did not reach the strike stage but ended usually in direct or mediated negotiations and a compromise with the employers. Sometimes, the workers managed to win certain concessions without resorting to a strike. As a rule, however, the refusal to call a strike ran counter to the wishes of the masses and was brought about by deals between union leaders and employers. For example, union leaders put a damper on the 1912 miners' strike, the biggest strike in the pre-war years, and on the 1913 shipbuilders' strike. The largest "conflict without a work stoppage", which broke out over new tariff agreements in the construction industry in 1913, ended in a deal between union leaders and the employers.³ The number of such conflicts grew by 50 per cent in 1910-1913 as compared to 1905-1906, and that of the participating workers, by 250 to 300 per cent.⁴

¹ *Statistik der Deutschen Reichs*, Bd. 278, Berlin, 1914, S. 11, 17.

² *Ibid.*, S. 17.

³ For details see *From Germany's Modern History*, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1958, pp. 108-61; *German History Yearbook*, 1972, Nauka, Moscow, 1973, pp. 127-35 (both in Russian).

⁴ Calculated from: *Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der gewerkschaften Deutschlands*, Nr. 9, 1914; *Statistische Beilage*, S. 250-52.

Typically, the pre-war strikes of the German proletariat firmly advanced not only economic claims but also demands for more democratic conditions at enterprises. Those demands were permeated with a desire to uphold the rights of the working class and its organisations. The strike movement was becoming increasingly political, too.

The strike movement in Germany was accompanied by large-scale demonstrations and protest rallies which were, as a rule, obviously political, democratic and anti-imperialist. The drive for a suffrage reform in Prussia continued to be particularly important, its greatest upsurge occurring in 1910.

Early that year the proletariat's discontent manifested itself in demonstrations by many thousands of people protesting against the government's plan for a strictly limited reform of the Prussian election system. On February 13, 1910, 200,000 people took to the streets in Berlin, 12,000 in Dortmund, 10,000 in Düsseldorf, 15,000 in Essen, 20,000 in Frankfurt am Main, 15,000 in Halle, 25,000 in Hanover, and about 10,000 each in Kiel, Cologne and Magdeburg. In some places, the police attacked the demonstrators, and bloodshed ensued. That triggered off nationwide protests. On February 23, 1910, 25,000 workers staged a political protest strike in Frankfurt am Main. Similar action was taken in Hanau and Kiel in March. On March 6, 150,000 people evaded the police ban to gather for a rally in the Tiergarten in Berlin. On April 10, 250,000 people attended rallies in Berlin alone. Germany had never before witnessed such large-scale and powerful rallies.¹ It was becoming increasingly clear that "street demonstrations in general will soon be insufficient".² However, the SPD leadership did all it could to curb the movement and make it more orderly. Thus, by the summer of 1910, the mass upsurge subsided, but the feeling of discontent persisted and grew more acute.

In the spring of 1910 the proletariat launched large-scale strikes. The attempt by the employers' association to wreck workers' organisations by lockouts was resisted by the strike of over 160,000 construction workers. The campaign, which lasted from April to June, spread throughout the nation and was successful. The shipbuilding industry workers were on strike from August to October; they were partially successful. A wave of meetings and rallies against price rises and the onslaught of reaction swept the country in September. Tensions came to a head in September 1910: in Moabit, a proletarian district of Berlin, strike-breakers, supported by the police, attempted to put an end to a strike; that led to armed clashes between tens of thousands of workers and the police. Similar clashes occurred in Cologne in early October, in Bremen in the latter

¹ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 2, S. 150, 382.

² Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 2, S. 292-93.

half of October, and in Wedding, a proletarian district of Berlin, in late October.¹ In September 1910, August Bebel said at the Magdeburg Congress of the SPD: "Class contradictions are not easing but becoming more acute. We are approaching very, very serious times."² A pre-revolutionary situation was taking shape in Germany. A revolutionary storm was drawing nigh.

Meanwhile, there was increased polarisation among the Social-Democrats and in the free trade unions between the class, proletarian course and the reformist approach. The conflict became more pronounced between the revolutionary policy of the left, on the one hand, and the openly opportunist "positive work", the Centrist "strategy of wearing the opponent down" on the other. Among the workers, dissatisfaction grew with the methods used to fight the existing system. The revolutionary Social-Democrats' demands for resorting to a mass political strike and their republican slogan were enthusiastically welcomed.³

In 1911, the proletariat's movement against the reactionary insurance legislation was particularly widespread. An unprecedented number of people took part in May Day actions; the campaign for a suffrage reform continued to expand. Of special importance was the German workers' indignant protest during the Moroccan crisis which threatened to turn into a world war. However, SPD leaders refused to launch a propaganda campaign against the warmongering of the German imperialists. Hermann Molkenbuhr, a member of the SPD Board, justified that by claiming that resistance to the government's reckless venture would damage the party's "vital interests" and its chances in the coming Reichstag elections.⁴

Nevertheless, right from the very beginning of the Moroccan events, local party organisations launched a mass protest movement in which the party's revolutionary forces were active. They harshly criticised the party leadership, conducted propaganda among the masses, and called for international proletarian unity in the struggle against militarism and the war threat. Finally the SPD Board was forced to issue an appeal urging the holding of protest meetings. Many thousands of people attended nationwide rallies and demonstrations. On September 3, 1911, more than 200,000 people took part in a protest rally held in Berlin's Treptow-Park.⁵

¹ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 2, S. 157.

² *Protokoll ... des Parteitages ... in Magdeburg ... 1910*, S. 258.

³ See Rosa Luxemburg, *Briefe an Karl und Luise Kautsky*, S. 139-40; Annelies Laschitzka, *Deutsche Linke im Kampf für eine demokratische Republik*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1969.

⁴ *Protokoll ... des Parteitages ... in Jena ... 1911*, S. 467.

⁵ See *Anti-War Traditions of the International Working-Class Movement*, pp. 139-40; *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. Chronik*, Teil I, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1965, S. 265-66.

In 1912, when the Balkan War aggravated international tensions, the German proletariat again voiced its protest at mass rallies in many towns. Over 250,000 people attended the Berlin rally. Anti-war demonstrations were held in several places across the country.¹ That same year, 250,000 Ruhr miners launched a strike demanding a shorter working-day, higher wages and a more democratic system at enterprises. Although the miners lost, the strike demonstrated the proletariat's readiness to resort to mass strike.

Throughout the period under review, the German Social-Democrats kept debating the issues involved in organising mass action. True, party and union leaders managed to have decisions against mass strike adopted, but it was generally felt that their position was shaky. At the 1913 SPD Congress, the left draft resolution aimed against the leadership's opportunist approach to the mass strike captured about one-third of the vote despite the intrigues and pressure on the part of the party's Board and union leaders. Many local party organisations supported the left in the discussion held after the Congress. The will to fight, and not only on the defensive, was becoming increasingly widespread and profound. At the Congress, the Düsseldorf delegate said: "I was amazed at the way even those comrades who could be least expected to do so championed the mass strike.... Organised workers demand resolute action ... they cannot be held back by useless resolutions. Besides, the workers do not confine themselves merely to suffrage in Prussia; they are talking about political equality, about political power, about bringing down capitalism in general."² In June 1914, a Berlin party conference not only approved preparations for mass proletarian action but also decreed that a special financial fund be established for the purpose; it was recommended that all other party organisations follow suit. In this connection, the opportunists complained that the decisions taken at the general conference of the Berlin party organisation "are spreading throughout the party and are exceptionally popular with party comrades in the provinces".³

Tensions continued to build up in Germany. The 1913 Zabern affair was a graphic example. A Prussian officer insulted recruits in a small town in German-annexed Alsace. The people responded with demonstrations against forced Prussianisation. The reprisals, unleashed by the military administration in violation of the elementary principles of bourgeois law, were approved both by the army high command and government officials up to the German Chancellor.

¹ See B. A. Aizin, *Revolutionary German Social-Democrats Against Imperialism and War (1907-1914)*, Nauka, Moscow, 1974, pp. 252-54 (in Russian).

² *Protokoll ... des Parteitages ... in Jena ... 1913*, S. 321.

³ *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, H. 15, 1914, S. 951.

This triggered off not only mass protest but also censure of the Chancellor by an overwhelming majority in the Reichstag.¹ It was another indication that the period of Germany's "orderly" development under the aegis of the Prussian Junkers was drawing to a close, and that a profound political crisis was approaching. In their attempts at strengthening their position, the ruling quarters stepped up their persecution of the more active members of the revolutionary wing of the working-class movement. Besides, chauvinist propaganda swept the country; preparations for war were accelerated.

In those conditions, the best of the German Social-Democrats led an extensive anti-militarist campaign. In obvious contradiction to the course of the party leadership and its Reichstag group, which approved the military budget in 1913, mass meetings of workers enthusiastically welcomed Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg who exposed German militarism. In one of her speeches, Rosa Luxemburg unequivocally stated that, should Germany's ruling quarters attempt to start a war, German workers must refuse to fight against their foreign brothers. She was put on trial for that, but she turned the dock into a rostrum of revolutionary propaganda.²

Those who attended numerous meetings and demonstrations, despite the obstacles engineered by the police, followed the example of the finest Social-Democrats and spoke out vigorously against war and the arbitrary rule of the country's militarists. The left wing of the SPD tried to use those statements in educating the masses in a revolutionary spirit. However, the party leadership did all it could to prevent it. Despite the initiative of local organisations and repeated appeals by Wilhelm Pieck, party leaders refused to organise an anti-war campaign of protest against the Luxemburg trial.³

At the same time, the masses of workers were displaying their growing discontent with their working conditions and rules. In spite of all the difficulties arising from the crisis, which hit Germany in 1913-1914 and despite the union leaders' policy, the intensity of the struggle did not significantly subside: taking into account the "conflicts without work stoppages", 1913 witnessed the greatest number of clashes between labour and capital in the period under review. The total number of such clashes was about 10,000; they affected almost 92,500 enterprises and involved over 1,700,000 participants. The shipbuilders' strike was one of the most important; about 60,000 people defied the ban by the union leadership and joined the strike.

¹ For details see Kurt Stenkewitz, op. cit., S. 125-40.

² See *Rosa Luxemburg im Kampf gegen den deutschen Militarismus. Prozessberichte und Materialien aus den Jahren 1913 bis 1915*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1960, S. 45-59; Heinz Wohlgemuth, op. cit.

³ CPA IML, f. 209, op. 1, d. 1342, l. 1-19.

In 1913, Lenin wrote: "There is slow but steady growth of awareness among German Social-Democrats that more resolute, active, mass struggle by the workers is necessary. If the opportunists, of whom there are many in the parliamentary group and among the officials of the labour movement, are opposed to such a struggle, the masses of workers accept it with greater and greater sympathy."¹ The proletariat's mounting discontent and mass action played an important part in Germany's social development in the pre-war years; they were a key element in the pre-revolutionary situation that was taking shape. That action, aimed directly at reforms and anti-war objectives, was vitally important for the popular masses. Given the existence of powerful working-class organisations—the party and the trade unions—that action made it possible to prepare the proletariat for the coming revolutionary battles, consolidate its ranks, and establish ties with its allies in the general democratic struggle. The strike, the proletariat's mass weapon of struggle, was winning recognition as a means of attaining political goals, too. However, due to the activities by the bloc of open opportunists and Centrists which emerged in the SPD and trade union leadership in the pre-war years, the important upward trends in the mass struggle of the working people failed to consolidate or develop. As the pre-revolutionary situation in Germany was maturing on the eve of World War I, it was becoming obvious that the development of the political crisis would, to a large extent, depend on the outcome of the rivalry between the revolutionary and the opportunist trends among the Social-Democrats, on the strength of each trend and its influence on the mass working-class movement.

BRITAIN: THE PROLETARIAT'S MOUNTING STRUGGLE AGAINST THE BOURGEOISIE

In their claims that strikes were only typical of the working-class movement in countries where capitalist development was lagging behind, the revisionists usually cited highly developed Britain as an example to denigrate the Russian experience. History, however, disproved their allegations. In the pre-war period, Lenin noted, Russia's workers were followed by "the British workers who have lent a new great impetus to the strike movement with regard to economic strikes".²

The British strike movement of 1908-1909 did much to prepare the explosion that followed. Strikes were becoming more numerous,

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The German Social-Democrats and Armaments", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971, p. 243.

² V. I. Lenin, "Economic and Political Strikes", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 83.

and so was the number of strikers. In the pre-war period, the amount of man-days lost in 1908—almost 11,000,000—was only exceeded in 1912-1913. The year 1908 was also remarkable in the determination displayed by the strikers: each of them struck for an average of 36.5 days as against 26 days in 1905.¹ The biggest strikes of 1908 were that of the cotton spinners in Lancashire, the miners' movement, and the strike of mechanics and shipbuilders of the Northeast coast. The first of these conflicts came to a head a few months after the question of wages had been "settled", thus proving that the conciliatory system was inadequate. The miners' movement culminated in the establishment of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain with a membership of 600,000. That same year, the Federation managed to have Parliament adopt a law on an eight-hour working-day for miners, thereby setting a precedent for workers in other industries.

In the years that followed, the strike movement continued to grow stronger. Compared to the period of 1900-1909, when the number of working-days lost annually through strikes in Britain varied between 2 and 3 million, the 1910 and 1911 figures were about 10 million each year; in 1912, the loss was nearly 41 million and in 1913, 11.6 million. Of particular importance were the strikes by the transport, metal and textile workers and miners (in 1912 alone, the mining industry lost 31.6 million man-days). The struggle also reached unprecedented proportions in the construction and garment industries.

In 1910, there were strikes by the railwaymen in Newcastle, the boiler-makers at the Clyde and Tyne shipyards, the metal workers in Birmingham and the miners of South Wales.² The struggle increasingly revealed the differences between the workers and union leaders. The South Wales strike was especially important. Brought about by a drop in the Cambrian Combine rates, it was joined by 12,000 people. Police and army detachments were sent against the strikers, there were numerous casualties and widespread arrests. Still, neither reprisals nor the truckling of the union leadership were able to stop the strike: it lasted for ten months—a case without precedent in the British coal industry. Although this action by the Welsh miners was on the whole defeated, it played an important part in the subsequent upsurge of the strike movement.

The end of the South Wales miners' strike in the summer of 1911 coincided with the rise of a new wave of strikes. For two months, nationwide strikes followed in a continuous succession involving over 900,000 people. Britain's ports were paralysed twice by strikes of sailors, dockers and transport workers. On August 3, 1911, a nationwide strike of railwaymen was staged. It was touched off by the

¹ See Table 2 on p. 116, Table 3 on pp. 380-81.

² For details see Yu. P. Mador, *The Rise of the British Working-Class Movement in 1910-1913*, Nauka, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian).

"Liverpool massacre": during a strike in Liverpool, the police and the army tried to break up a rally that was attended by tens of thousands of railwaymen. Open clashes continued late into the night, even barricades were erected; several hundred wounded were taken to the city's hospitals. The bloodbath triggered a city-wide strike by transport workers and railwaymen, and also strikes in several other cities. Then the trade unions, which united 148,000 people (about 25 per cent of Britain's railwaymen), officially declared a general strike. During the first two days, it was joined by 230,000 people. Delivery stoppages brought many factories to a standstill. The police and the army were sent against the strikers, and its leaders were strongly pressured to accept "conciliation" on the allegation, among other things, that the strike adversely affected the nation's position in international politics. Although the strike had every chance of succeeding, trade union leaders overruled the workers' protests and decided to end the strike; for all the might the movement acquired, the results were meagre. Still, the determination of hundreds of thousands of both organised and unorganised workers, the growing distrust of truckling "conciliation" bore witness to the new processes under way in the working-class movement.

These processes were especially manifest in the miners' general strike of 1912. It was touched off by the workers' demand for a guaranteed minimum wage. The government and the right-wing union leaders did all they could to restrain mass discontent. The struggle against those efforts produced new-trend leaders, and their proposals in favour of mass nationwide action were widely welcomed. In January 1912, in voting on whether a nationwide strike should be launched, 446,000 miners supported the strike and only 114,000 voted against it. The strike, started without the go-ahead of the leaders, involved about 1,000,000 workers by early March, although the membership of the trade unions concerned was only about 800,000. Work stoppages at mines soon brought pig iron and much of rolled steel production to a halt. A month later, the industries dependent on coal deliveries virtually came to a standstill. The government responded by passing partial reforms with unprecedented haste. Using the law on the minimum wage—a half measure that often simply deceived workers—and actively supported by the right-wing trade union leaders, the government succeeded in bringing the strike to an end at the price of insignificant concessions. However, the strike brought about a clearly perceptible change in the alignment of the nation's social forces. Lenin observed that "while the railway strike in 1911 showed the 'new spirit' of the British workers, the miners' strike definitely marked an epoch".¹

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The British Labour Movement in 1912", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 467.

The legislation on the minimum wage for one of the most important sections of the British proletariat served as a starting point for further struggle not only in the coal-mining industry, but in other industries, too. The strike greatly enhanced the workers' solidarity and convinced them that economic demands were not enough; they became aware of their strength and ceased to be passive tools in the hands of the union leaders.

After the miners' general strike in England, Ireland emerged as the centre of struggle. The Dublin strike in August 1913-January 1914 was not only the most powerful action by the Irish proletariat in the pre-war years; it was also an important factor in the political crisis in Britain.¹

The strike was launched on August 26 by the Dublin tram workers in response to a lockout of some of their comrades, members of the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union. The strikers' key demand was reinstatement of those dismissed from their jobs. In the course of the strike it was joined by dock, railway, delivery and construction workers and by the agricultural labourers of the agrarian area around Dublin (in the County of Dublin, 90 per cent of all the agricultural labourers were members of the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union). In November the strike was almost general; Dublin was paralysed. Right from the very start, the strike was accompanied by demonstrations and workers' clashes with the police and the army. On August 31, "Bloody Sunday", during a rally of 50,000 strikers, scores of workers were wounded and two killed. The strike leaders James Larkin and James Connolly were arrested, but later released because of popular pressure.

On the initiative of James Connolly, recognised as the leader of the Irish Socialists, the strikers formed an armed organisation, the Irish Citizens' Army. Its objectives were an Irish Republic and the emancipation of labour.² Although by the end of 1913 its ranks had thinned, it made a significant contribution to the national liberation struggle of the Irish people.

The struggle of the Irish workers generated a widespread response in England. Solidarity and support strikes began: dockers struck in Manchester, drivers in London, and miners in South Wales. Workers raised funds and sent several shiploads of food to Dublin. Still, because of the resistance on the part of reformists in the TUC leadership, whose greatest fear was that the conflict might spread to the rest of the country, and who therefore undermined the solidar-

¹ For details see Ye.B. Chernyak, "The Dublin Strike of 1913", *Academic Papers on Modern History*, Issue 3, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1957, pp. 215-87 (in Russian).

² See "The Workers' Republic", *Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland. Report of Commission*, London, 1916, p. 7.

ity campaign, the support was inadequate. Apart from that, the situation was aggravated by the reactionary attempts in Ireland at playing on national and religious contradictions. Besides, many months of struggle exhausted the strikers' financial resources. Under TUC pressure a compromise agreement with the employers was made. The locked-out workers were reinstated and the strike soon ended.

The pre-war strike movement of the British proletariat was not confined to narrow economic objectives. Even action on wages often concentrated on the establishment of a minimum wage, thus imparting nationwide significance to such strikes. The social and political demands advanced not only by the rank and file but also at the trade union leadership level comprised nationalisation of the railways, land, mineral resources, mines and canals; the introduction of universal suffrage; the government financing of elections; better living conditions and paid holidays for the workers. Thus, the compromise trend in the trade union movement which attempted to direct it solely at protecting the privileges of the labour aristocracy, was gradually being overcome by the heroic mass struggle of the working class. It contributed to the unity of the proletariat. The strikes of 1910-1913 involved both large numbers of miners, relatively well-paid categories of metal, textile and construction workers, and those sections of the working class whose economic situation was quite shaky. Unskilled workers joined strikes in particularly large numbers. The struggle forged the unity of the workers of a given company, area and industry. A typical feature emerged during the ten-month strike of South Wales miners in 1910: a striving to unite all forces in the struggle against the companies.¹ Strikes were overcoming the barriers of craft unionism. In 1911-1912, for the first time since the Chartist movement, Britain faced nationwide action by railwaymen and miners.

Solidarity was evident at all levels of the strike movement. "Sympathy strikes" to support co-workers at a given enterprise or in a given industry; strike-prompted mergers of different trade unions in the same industry (for example, the establishment of the National Union of Railwaymen); the striving to support strikers in a related industry (it was precisely at that time that ideas of joint struggle by miners, railway and transport workers were advanced; in 1914, the Triple Alliance was formed which united the organised workers in those three industries); the remarkable demonstration in England of support for the Irish during the 1913 Dublin strike—all those were manifestations of the upsurge in the proletariat's class struggle. Proletarian solidarity was not confined to Britain. Workers

¹ See *The Times*, May 16, 1911, p. 8.

in Russia, Germany, France, Belgium and other countries closely and sympathetically followed the struggle of the British miners in 1912; the latter, too, hoped for support from their foreign comrades. The authorities were greatly concerned about miners' strikes in Russia and they took steps to prevent such action.¹ The Bolshevik newspaper *Zvezda* of March 1 (14), 1912 stressed the decisive importance of possible international miners' action for the success of the British strike.

Mass struggle by the British proletariat was on the rise despite efforts to contain it on the part of the employers, the government, and the opportunist union leaders. Typical in this respect was the role played by arbitration and conciliation boards and committees set up to settle conflicts between labour and capital. The number of conflicts discussed by those bodies in 1912 was three to four times as great as in 1900-1902 and exceeded the number of strikes in 1910 by 450 per cent; those held in 1911, by 400 per cent; and those of 1912, by over 200 per cent.² In the prewar years, the overall number of strikes increased; so did the share of conflicts that were settled and the share of strikes which were ended by mediation and conciliation.³ The data on the activities of conciliatory and mediating bodies, compared to the great upsurge of the strike movement, show both that attempts at hampering it were growing and that they were not very successful. That stemmed from the colossal store of inflammable material—the British proletariat's discontent.

That gradual build-up of discontent explains the solidarity action by thousands of workers on seemingly unimportant pretexts which surprised employers and union leaders. A case in point was a Newcastle railwaymen's strike in 1910 which took but four days to win. The strikers supported their comrade, a switchman who refused to comply with the management's unwarranted order transferring him to a different section of the railway. When referring to the 1911 transport workers' strike mentioned earlier, Ben Tillett, a leader of the Transport Workers' Union, said: "That it has happened is a great marvel to us, and almost as great a surprise as it is to the employers."⁴ Another typical example is the confession the National Sailors' and Firemen's Union leaders made in connection with the 1911 strikes to the effect that they could not restrain their men any longer; leaders of the Transport Workers' Union admitted they had taken a

¹ For details see *The Modern Working-Class Movement*, Nauka, Moscow, 1964, pp. 459-64; M. K. Korbut, *The European Coal-Miners' Strike Echoed in Russia*, Kazan, 1927 (both in Russian).

² *Sixteenth Abstract of Labour Statistics of the United Kingdom*, Printed under the Authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1913, pp. 167-68.

³ In 1911, 78 per cent of the total; in 1910, 68 per cent as against 45-55 per cent in the first years of the century (ibid., p. 163).

⁴ *Justice*. August 19, 1911.

conciliatory stand and held union members back for more than five weeks until the workers went on strike themselves, etc. On the eve of the 1912 miners' strike, the right-wing leaders of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain declared that the strike was uncalled for, that it would be "a great shame" and that it "can and must be prevented by reasonable settlement".¹

Although the opportunist leadership promised the strikes would fail and used its truckling policy to lead the workers' struggle to defeat or a compromise favouring the employers, the mass movement was so powerful that it often upset its official leaders' plans, swept aside the obstacles they erected and became increasingly effective. In the strikes of 1910-1913, the capitalists failed to get the upper hand much more often than before. While in 1901-1905, from one-third to one half of all the strikers failed to win, their share dropped to about one-fourth in 1906-1909, to about one-seventh in 1910 and 1912, and to about one-tenth in 1911; in 1913, it was about one-fifth.²

One should not forget that the workers' action was opposed by the monopolies and the government, which did everything possible to support the monopolies. For example, during the seamen's strike of 1911 the Shipping Federation systematically turned down the strikers' just demands and, with the government's acquiescence, fraudulently recruited strike-breakers abroad. When a miners' general strike was about to break out in 1912, a group of mine-owners led by the monopolist David Alfred Thomas refused to support 60 per cent of the mine-owners and the government who had agreed to establish a minimum wage. At the height of the strike, Thomas demanded that the government should use a surgeon's knife and not adhesive tape to cure the cancer. Aware of the threat of a railwaymen's strike in 1911, the government promised the railway barons comprehensive protection so they could continue their activities.³

As contradictions between labour and capital grew, the ruling quarters combined social trickery with violence. David Lloyd George, appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1908, was a past master of social demagoguery. In April 1909, he submitted to Parliament a draft 1909/1910 budget, which allocated a small amount of funds for financing the social reforms of the Liberal government—above all those concerning disability and unemployment insurance.

¹ Yu. P. Mador, op. cit., pp. 89, 112, 125.

² See *Seventeenth Abstract of Labour Statistics of the United Kingdom*, Stationery Office, London, 1915, p. 191.

³ See *The Parliamentary Debates (Official Report)*, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. XXVIII, London, 1911, col. 1512; *Imperialism and the Working-Class Struggle. A Collection of Articles in Memory of F. A. Roethstein*, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1960, p. 289 (in Russian).

These funds were supposed to come in part from taxes on landed property. The drive to introduce this tax dominated the British political scene for several years. For all its insignificance, the Liberals' attempt at depriving the landowners of one of their major privileges—land was exempt from taxes—created a stir in politics. Lloyd George skilfully exploited the situation to present his plan as the cause of the people—consequently, above all of the workers—against the House of Lords, the mainstay of the landowners, thus leading workers away from the fight for their vital needs.¹ At the same time, right-wing extremists in Britain were prepared to openly violate bourgeois law if it failed to contain the rise of the mass movement. That aspect was especially pronounced in the Ulster question. Although related to opposition to Ireland's autonomy, the question concerned not only purely Irish issues but mostly the coming general political crisis in Britain.² Winston Churchill's stand was quite typical of the ruling quarters' policy at the time: he authorised the use of troops against strikers. But, hoping to force the proletariat to submit to violence, he, nevertheless, considered a more efficient social security system necessary for containing the workers who had "started a class war" and for strengthening Britain's hand in its rivalry with Germany.³ Still, neither the government's manoeuvring nor reprisals could bring about a social "peace".

The great upsurge in the struggle of the masses of British workers also pointed to a change in their class awareness. A definite trend in the proletarian movement towards becoming more political emerged both in the course of confrontation between the workers and the authorities and in the policy of the trade unions, in the type of demands they advanced; a trend was emerging which led from a trade-unionist to a socialist movement. As Lenin observed, the masses of workers were learning about socialism at first hand.⁴

Britain's ruling classes failed to get the trade unions' political activity banned in practice. An attempt at securing such a ban was connected with the Osborne case, named after the plaintiff who took his trade union to court in 1909, demanding a rebate on his membership dues which had been used for political purposes. The House of Lords as the highest juridical body decided in Osborne's favour. That created a precedent which could have prevented the trade

¹ For details see K. B. Vinogradov, *David Lloyd George*, Mysl, Moscow, 1970, pp. 106-15, 137-41, 147-52 (in Russian).

² See Ye. B. Chernyak, "The Ulster Movement (1912-1914)", *Imperialism and the Working-Class Struggle*, pp. 314-18, 333-36.

³ See *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 71, No. 3, April 1966, p. 853; V. G. Trukhanovsky, *Winston Churchill*, Mysl, Moscow, 1977, pp. 119-20 (in Russian).

⁴ See V. I. Lenin, "In America", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 215.

unions from raising funds for political purposes. It threatened the financial status of the Labour Party and many types of trade union activities,¹ the unions losing the ground they had taken many years to win. The vast majority of workers regarded the Osborne judgement as a challenge and responded by strengthening solidarity and stepping up their strike movement. But only in 1913 did a new law partially restore the rights of the workers' organisations: from then on trade unions could collect dues for political purposes but members had a right to be exempted from paying them. At a Labour Party conference to support political action, almost two-thirds of the delegates voted to retain an independent parliamentary group of the party.²

The growing support for a socialist proletarian policy was also due to the increasingly critical approach on the part of the workers to the policy of limited social reforms pursued by the Liberals, who tried to act as leaders of the working class. The Liberals' religious and nationalist means of influencing the workers were losing their effectiveness; the workers increasingly discovered the capitalist system to be their chief enemy.³ The spread of socialist ideas undermined the Liberals' positions and enhanced the growth of the Labour Party.⁴ The growing number of trade unions belonging to that party meant that the basis for compromise between the unions and the workers' party was expanding. The number of trade union members who were also Labour Party members increased from 904,000 in 1906 to 1,572,000 in 1914; there was a two-fold increase in the number of local Labour Party organisations and the trades councils that joined the party. The councils united urban workers of different trades and conducted election campaigns on a local level.⁵ After the 1910 elections the Labour Party won 42 seats in Parliament, as compared to 29 in 1906.

Still, the Labour Party's influence grew comparatively slowly: from 1906 to 1910, the share of those who voted Labour grew by less than 1.5 per cent and accounted for 7.3 per cent of the total number

¹ See Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *The History of Trade Unionism, 1666-1920*, The Authors for the Trade Unionists of the United Kingdom, London, 1920, pp. 620-22.

² *Report of the Special and Annual Conferences of the Labour Party, Held in the City Hall, Glasgow, on Tuesday, January 27th, 1914 and Three Following Days*, The Labour Party, London, 1914, Appendix V.

³ See Kenneth O. Morgan, *The Age of Lloyd George*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1971, p. 76; *What the Workers Want*, by "Mark Tyme" of *Forward*, Reformers' Bookstall, Glasgow, s.d., pp. 10, 12.

⁴ See Walter Kendall, *The Revolutionary Movement in Britain. 1900-21. The Origins of British Communism*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1969, p. 22; Henry Pelling, *Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain*, Macmillan and Co., London, 1968, pp. 119-20.

⁵ Henry Pelling, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

of voters.¹ That was apparently due to the party's poor record in Parliament. From 1907, when James Ramsay MacDonald became head of the Labour Party parliamentary group, it became increasingly dependent on the Liberals. Significantly, the group even failed to support the bill on a minimum weekly wage of 30 shillings for all adult workers, submitted by one of its members in April 1911. At Trades Union congresses, the Labour Party was criticised for its close ties with the Liberals.² Within the party itself, rivalry intensified between the reformist leadership and those who favoured militant socialist-oriented action in the interest of the workers and independent of the Liberals. That rivalry affected the various organisations that were members of the Labour Party.³

At the 1908 Labour Party Conference, there was already a clash between party leaders—like John Robert Clynes—and advocates of socialist views—W. Atkinson, J. J. Stephenson. A resolution was passed as a result which, although not binding, proclaimed one of the party's goals to be "the socialisation of the means of production, distribution, and exchange, to be controlled by a democratic State in the interest of the entire community; and the complete emancipation of Labour from the domination of capitalism and landlordism".⁴ Compared to the objectives formulated when the party was being established (nominating and supporting workers' candidates at elections), it was a step forward. The rivalry went on and was felt particularly acutely in the Independent Labour Party. Significantly, at the 1914 Independent Labour Party Conference, a resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority advocating a policy free from Liberal influence.⁵ Two years before that, a similar draft had been rejected by an overwhelming majority.

Although socialist trends did, to a certain extent, spread among the British working people who were members of the Labour Party, that party was led by reformists. Lenin described it as "the workers' organisation that is most opportunist and soaked in the spirit of liberal-labour policy".⁶ The Independent Labour Party was also

¹ See *Modern British Politics*, Faber and Faber, London, 1965, pp. 145-46.

² See *Report of Proceedings at the Forty-Fifth Annual Trades Union Congress, Held ... on September 2nd to 7th, 1912*, Co-operative Printing Society, London, 1912, pp. 231-32.

³ See L. Ye. Kertman, *The Working-Class Movement in Britain and the Rivalry of Two Trends in the Labour Party (1900-1914)*, Book Publishing House, Perm, 1957, pp. 282-322 (in Russian).

⁴ *Report of the Eighth Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Held on Monday, January 20th, 1908, and the Two Following Days*, The Labour Party, London, 1909, p. 76.

⁵ *Independent Labour Party. Report of the Coming-of-Age Conference Held at Bradford, April, 1914*, London, 1914, p. 118.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, "In Britain (The Sad Results of Opportunism)", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 55.

opportunistic and even sectarian. For all the revolutionary rhetoric of its leaders, their brand of socialism was essentially a summary of ideas and wishes in respect of ethical reforms, acceptable to a great many people in Britain who were far from, and even hostile to, Marxism.¹ The key postulates of the Fabian Society were socialist only in name; they were "step-by-step" reformism, reflecting the interests of the more prosperous sections of the petty bourgeoisie. Contrary to the Fabians' repeated claims, they exerted no perceptible influence on the working-class movement. They almost fully withdrew from participating, either by word or by deed, in the proletariat's direct, daily mass struggle; they isolated themselves from the workers. In its composition, the Fabian Society remained a narrow, non-proletarian sect.²

Of all the socialist and labour organisations only the Social Democrats (in April 1908 the British Social Democratic Federation was renamed the Social Democratic Party) advocated a kind of socialism which was more or less close to Marxism. The SDP provided theoretical training for some leaders of the working-class movement, such as Tom Mann; others left it to return to the Liberal course (John Burns, Will Thorne, James Lansbury). True, as Lenin said, Henry Mayers Hyndman, the party's leader, was an example of how a bourgeois philosopher "finally makes his way to socialism, but never completely throws off bourgeois traditions, bourgeois views and prejudices".³ His views were a peculiar mixture of occasional Marxist concepts and imperialist and even racist notions. He regarded the Social Democratic Party as the elite of the working-class movement and acted to prevent closer contacts with the masses of workers. Still party members increasingly spoke out against separatism, for closer relations with the trade unions and for active assistance to the working-class movement. Local party branches were quite independent and often refused to submit to Hyndman's directives. The healthy proletarian spirit in the party was often victorious—in particular, on the issue of unity of the socialist forces. The number of Social Democratic Party branches and its membership were growing, especially in London and Scotland. Demands were increasing for it to affiliate with the Labour Party. At the

¹ See *The International Review of Social History*, Vol. 18, 1973, Part I, p. 4; *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 87, No. 345, 1972, p. 717.

² The prominent British historian E. J. Hobsbawm even believes that the Fabians should be regarded not as part of the British socialist movement, but as a sort of bourgeois reaction to the collapse of the political and ideological realities typical of the free enterprise period and Britain's transition to imperialism (see E. J. Hobsbawm, *Labouring Men, Studies in the History of Labour*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1964, p. 266).

³ V. I. Lenin, "Hyndman on Marx", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1963, p. 309.

1908 Social Democratic Party Conference, the sizable minority which advocated those demands attempted to achieve its objectives, but the majority believed that the Social Democratic Party should not ally itself to Labour until the latter recognised the class struggle and socialist principles.

The Social Democrats also paid great attention to the content of the education that young workers and children were getting. The nationwide movement for socialist-oriented Sunday schools for workers and their children culminated in the establishment, in 1910, of the National Union of Socialist Sunday Schools which comprised 100 schools with 6,000 pupils.¹ In 1909, the Central Labour College (CLC) was set up, with local branches. It was intended to equip the working class as a whole with the knowledge that would aid their fight against capitalism and lighten the road to socialism. The reason was the need for "in the first place economic changes of such a character as to lead to the eradication of capitalist economy".² It was no accident that workers drawn into the Central Labour College system played an important part in founding trade unions during the upsurge of the mass proletarian movement.

The 1910 annual Social Democratic Party Conference decided to assist in uniting the party and socialist groups into a single organisation; this was facilitated by a powerful wave of strikes. Harry Quelch, one of the Social Democratic Party leaders, advanced the following grounds for unification: "...Every man or woman who believes in the social ownership and control of all the means of production, distribution and exchange, and the common enjoyment of the product, in a democratic society ... is a Socialist."³ The periodical of the British Social Democrats published appeals to go to the workers and promote their socialist consciousness. On September 30-October 1, 1911, the inaugural conference of the new party was held in Manchester, attended by 219 delegates representing 35,000 socialists, including the newspaper *Clarion*, local Independent Labour Party organisations, and various small socialist groups. The programme resolution submitted by Quelch said: "...The Socialist Party, though striving for the realisation of immediate social reforms demanded by the working class, is not a reformist but a revolutionary party, which recognises that social freedom and equality can only be won by fighting the class war through to the finish, and thus abolishing for ever all class distinctions."⁴ The conference

¹ Brian Simon, *Education and the Labour Movement. 1870-1920*, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1965, p. 50.

² *Ibid.*, p. 330.

³ *The Social-Democrat*, March 15, 1911, pp. 99-100.

⁴ *Official Report of the Socialist Unity Conference Held at Caxton Hall (Manchester), on September 30th and October 1st, 1911*, The Twentieth Century Press, Ltd., London, 1911, p. 5.

adopted the new party's official name—the British Socialist Party; its formation was completed in November 1911 with the adoption of its charter.

The establishment of the British Socialist Party was definitely a step forward in the development of the socialist movement in Britain. However, the Socialists failed to lead the mass upsurge of the working-class movement or have any serious impact on it. The bitter rivalry between Hyndman's supporters who slipped further into chauvinism and their opponents continued.

Nevertheless, progressive workers increasingly realised the need for the socialist remaking of society.¹ Simultaneously, there was a growing desire among the masses of workers to rely on their own resources and not on any intriguer or a leader in securing reforms that would change the social status and living conditions of the working class and enable it to defend its rights and interests. All this was manifest in the powerful upsurge of the British proletariat's strike movement in 1910-1913 and in the development of syndicalism which opposed political intriguing. For all the immaturity of their concepts, the British syndicalists reflected the revolutionary aspirations of the proletariat; besides, unlike the syndicalists in France or Italy, they often did not deny the importance of the political struggle and parliamentarianism. The prominent syndicalist Tom Mann believed that political activity would be much more effective if assisted by an "economic fighting force" and wanted Parliament to become a revolutionary tribunal.² Besides, the British syndicalists aimed at fighting against the philistine guild spirit in the unions on a basis which included the old trade unions, too.

The emergence of new trends in the British working-class movement was also borne out by the contention over the issues of imperialism, militarism and war. While the parliamentary group of the Labour Party was in this regard an "example of how opportunism leads to the *betrayal* of socialism, the *betrayal* of the workers' cause",³ the party's rank-and-file felt differently. The 1912 Labour Party Conference adopted a resolution demanding that the parliamentary group struggle for a change in Britain's foreign policy. The left-wing elements in the British Socialist Party resolutely opposed the notions of defending the country, of militarism and Hyndman's and his supporters' social-chauvinism.⁴ The syndicalists selflessly

¹ See *Report of the First Annual Conference of the British Socialist Party*, London, 1912, pp. 10-11.

² *Tom Mann's Memoirs*, The Labour Publishing Company, London, 1923, p. 255.

³ V. I. Lenin, "In Britain (The Sad Results of Opportunism)", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 56.

⁴ See *A History of the Second International*, Vol. II, Nauka, Moscow, 1966, pp. 255-56 (in Russian).

fought against using the army against the working-class movement. In 1912, "Open Letter to Soldiers" was distributed in army barracks. Written as a pamphlet by Guy Bowman, editor of a syndicalist periodical, it called on soldiers not to follow orders to fire on strikers. The authorities responded by convicting and imprisoning not only the author of the letter and those who distributed it, but also Tom Mann who affirmed his solidarity with them.¹

The unprecedented upsurge of the mass working-class movement, the growing socialist trends, and the workers' efforts to secure meaningful reforms were of special significance for Britain. In 1913, Lenin wrote: "Britain *has* the foundations of political liberty, *has* a constitutional regime, generally speaking. The freedom of association demanded by the workers is one of the reforms absolutely necessary and quite achievable under the present constitutional regime...".² Unlike Russia, such reforms were feasible without a revolution, but they appeared as a prerequisite for it. The struggle of the British working class for urgently needed economic, social and political reforms was potentially anti-capitalist and could become an integral element in preparing the proletariat for the struggle for power and socialism. However, this trend in the struggle, this active involvement of the masses encountered vigorous opposition on the part of the opportunist elite of the British labour movement which favoured compromise with the employers and the authorities. Britain lacked revolutionary forces capable of organising and leading the struggle of the masses.

THE STRENGTHENING OF REVOLUTIONARY TRENDS IN THE US WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT AND THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF SOCIALIST IDEAS

In the period under review, the US workers' movement developed similarly. Strikes were becoming increasingly widespread. True, in 1908 the total of those involved in strikes and affected by lockouts dropped by 60 per cent compared to 1907 and was 54.6 per cent lower than the average 1904-1907 figure. But a turning point came as early as 1909. In 1910-1913, the annual number of those involved in strikes and affected by lockouts reached 800,000 to one million.³ This should be viewed against the background of the serious obstacles the proletariat was facing. Bourgeois law in the United States regarded practically any collective stoppage as illegal and damaging to

¹ See V. Ye. Keĭner, "Tom Mann: Man and Revolutionary", *Modern History*, No. 2, 1976, p. 98 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, "A Week After the Dublin Massacre", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 349.

³ See Table 3 on pp. 380-81.

the employers' property. Court orders prohibited strikes and boycotts and demanded that their participants either stop their struggle or look for jobs elsewhere. Such orders were issued particularly often after the 1908 Supreme Court decision. Bourgeois courts also protected the "employers' right" to impose on each applicant for a job an individual contract with a clause about his "voluntary" refusal to join a union; it was also against the law to boycott those employers who prevented their workers from organising in unions.¹ Arbitration committees and employers' organisations were used against the working-class movement. Government bodies stepped up their "conciliatory" functions. The Industrial Relations Commission established in 1912 studied industrial conflicts and suggested settlements. The Department of Labor, created in 1913, was charged with mediation and conciliation.

At the same time, striving to check the spread of the mass movement, the government adopted several items of social legislation. Many states passed laws restricting the use of child and female labour and the working hours in industries hazardous to health, laws on an eight-hour working-day for government employees, on wages, etc. Theodore Roosevelt's election campaign under the aegis of the new Progressive Party which captured over 4 million votes in the 1912 elections was a striking example of bourgeois-reformist adaptation to the changing mood of the masses. Lenin noted that "the entire programme and entire agitation of Roosevelt and the Progressives turn on how to *save capitalism* by means of *bourgeois reforms*", and the 1912 elections were "the unusually clear and striking revelation of *bourgeois reformism* as a means of combating socialism".² That same bourgeois reformism permeated the policy and, in particular, the social legislation, of President Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, who came to power in 1912. At the same time, the pre-war years in the United States witnessed brutal reprisals against the working class in violation of the most elementary norms of law and order. With President Wilson's blessing, federal troops and the National Guard of states were used to put down strikes and destroy strikers' camps, resulting in deaths even among women and children.³ Prisons in many cities were crammed with those who joined the IWW-led struggle.

¹ Benjamin J. Taylor, Fred Witney, *Labor Relations Law*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1971, pp. 37-39, 43-48, 136-37; Carolyn Sims, *Labor Unions in the United States*, Franklin Watts, Inc. New York, 1971, p. 47.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Results and Significance of the U.S. Presidential Elections", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 403, 402.

³ See L. I. Zubok, op. cit., pp. 467-68; I. A. Belyavskaya, *Bourgeois Reformism in the United States (1900-1914)*, Nauka, Moscow, 1968, pp. 209-302, 312-20, 336-37, 358-59, 362-63 (in Russian).

Employers also continued their offensive against the rights of workers' organisations in the form of the "open shop drive" or the "American Plan". These measures were actually aimed at refusing to conclude any agreement with the unions, at undermining their positions. Especially active were the largest US monopolies, such as the United States Steel Corporation or the Colorado Coal Company, led by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. In 1908, for example, of the 118,000 employees of US Steel Corporation only 8,000 people were members of the Iron and Steel Workers' Union (the 1901 membership was 60,000).

The strikes that occurred in the United States in 1909-1914 were called "deep social revolts"¹ and reflected an exacerbation of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, particularly that "mounting movement against trusts"² which Lenin foresaw in 1908 for Britain and the United States. In 1909, a US Steel offensive against the unions and for lower wages touched off a strike, which lasted for 14 months but failed to win; as a result, the corporation managed to deny the workers their right to form unions for over 25 years. Strikes at other steel works also failed. Garment workers also vigorously opposed the "open shop" and harsh working conditions. In 1910, they held a strike in New York which was called a mass rebellion against the sweatshop system. The workers secured significant concessions on the part of the employers. Despite provocations by the authorities, construction and other workers in the United States also waged an unremitting struggle. In 1911, there were strikes by railwaymen in Chicago and to the south and west of Illinois. In 1912-1913, West Virginia miners held lengthy strikes to win recognition of their union and such working conditions as the United Mine Workers Union had secured in the central United States.³

The tenacious struggle of the US proletariat for its rights prodded the AFL leadership into anti-monopoly action. The AFL membership was 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 in 1910-1914. The Federation took an active part in the workers' struggle against US Steel and supported the drive to defend the leaders of the Metal Workers Union who fell victim to an anti-union police conspiracy. The Federation secured certain material concessions for its members, but it still refused to admit unskilled workers and held a chauvinist position vis-à-vis

¹ See Lewis L. Lorwin, Jean Atherton Flexner, *The American Federation of Labor. History, Policies, and Prospects*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1933, p. 106.

² V. I. Lenin, "Inflammable Material in World Politics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 186.

³ See L. F. Zubok, op. cit., pp. 447-48; Jack Hardy, *The Clothing Workers*, International Publishers, New York, 1935, pp. 28-29.

immigrants and especially the black population.¹ The Federation's leaders disrupted the unity of the US working-class movement, hampered its organisation and pursued the "businesslike policy" of class collaboration. In politics and election campaigns they directed Federation members to support the bourgeois party they pinned greater hopes on at a given moment, playing the two-party game "strictly by the rules".

All that made especially important the activities of the IWW, a militant internationalist organisation of the US proletariat which opposed the opportunism of the American Federation of Labor and proceeded from the postulate that the exploited and the exploiters could not be reconciled. True, the Fourth IWW Convention in 1908 obviously strengthened anarcho-syndicalist trends in the organisation which rejected the need for political struggle and a political party of the proletariat. IWW-led strikes were staged among the low-paid lumber and agricultural workers, among miners in the West and textile workers in the East. They were examples of a resolute struggle, which sometimes turned into civil wars of sorts. The tactics of each war were drawn up with due consideration for the conditions at individual enterprises.² Led by the IWW, unorganised low-paid workers were able to start strikes against the largest of the trusts, particularly in the steel and motor industries. Local IWW branches often had to resort to force to rebuff armed thugs hired by the employers or the authorities. Typical in this respect was the 1909 strike by 5,000 unskilled metal workers in McKees Rocks against the local US Steel subsidiary supported by the authorities of Pennsylvania. The IWW led this strike in which workers of 16 nationalities fought as a single force. The strike lasted for 45 violent days; 13 people were killed and more than 50 wounded, but the strikers won. Almost all of their demands were satisfied, and 3,000 people joined the new IWW branch established during the strike—the Car Builders' Industrial Union.³

In 1912-1913, the IWW held several large strikes—in Paterson (N.J.), the centre of the US silk industry, at rubber factories in Akron (Ohio), etc. But what shook the nation was the gigantic strike of textile workers in Lawrence in 1912, when unorganised workers of

¹ See A. N. Shlepakov, *Immigration and the US Working Class in the Imperialist Era*, Mysl, Moscow, 1966, pp. 97-110 (in Russian); *The Negro and the American Labor Movement*, Edited by Julius Jacobson, The Anchor Books Edition, New York, 1968, p. 158.

² For details see Philip S. Foner, *History of the Labor Movement in the United States*, Vol. IV, *The Industrial Workers of the World, 1905-1917*, International Publishers, New York, 1965, pp. 88-98; Melvyn Dubofsky, *We Shall Be All. A History of the Industrial Workers of the World*, Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1969, pp. 120-70.

³ Philip S. Foner. op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 281-305.

20 nationalities demanded higher wages. As many as 25,000 workers were on strike for over two months; the strike became general. IWW leaders succeeded in ensuring concerted action by the strikers. The strike was financially supported by the workers of other enterprises in Lawrence and other cities, both IWW members and those of the American Federation of Labor and socialist organisations. Despite reprisals, all kinds of provocations and obstacles, the strikers displayed great tenacity and unity and defeated the American Woolen Company.¹ The rise in wages which the strike secured for 30,000 Lawrence workers also applied to 250,000 textile workers in New England: the employers decided to use the concession to prevent new strikes and a strengthening of workers' organisations. The strike showed how the struggle forged the workers' solidarity and organisation. Such workers' victories also stimulated action against monopoly oppression at other enterprises.

The sympathy which IWW-led action evoked in many US workers served to step up the class struggle and make it more acute.

The IWW paid much attention to education. They set up educational leagues and workers' clubs, issued pamphlets and held rallies, debates, lectures for local audiences, etc. Libraries organised by the IWW acquainted many workers with books by Marx and Engels, Darwin and Spencer, Voltaire and Jack London. Still, the IWW often underestimated the importance of political struggle and organisation, and that affected the educational work they pursued.

The intense IWW-led struggle brought both successes and defeats. Among the heaviest losses was that of the 1913 Paterson strike which lasted for 22 weeks.² All of the city's workers (about 25,000) took part. As in Lawrence, a general strike committee was set up comprising 250 to 300 members and an executive committee of 15 to 20 members. The strike brought about an alliance of workers and progressive urban intellectuals, including John Reed. However, the leaders committed several tactical errors and the strikers, after surviving an unprecedented wave of arrests, succumbed to poverty and hunger. The workers' defeat damaged the IWW prestige.

The 1914 action by Colorado miners, one of the best-known strikes of the pre-war period, was a landmark in the struggle of the US proletariat.³ About 9,000 workers struck for 15 months. There was even a clash between the strikers on the one hand, and armed company guards and the state militia on the other. Driven out of their company-owned homes, the strikers lived in tent camps in the moun-

¹ Ibid., pp. 329-50.

² For details see M. I. Lapitsky, *William Haywood*, Mysl, Moscow, 1974, pp. 127-36 (in Russian).

³ For details see George S. McGovern and Leonard F. Guttridge, *The Great Coalfield War*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1972.

tains. On April 20, 1914, the militia set fire to one of these settlements, called Ludlow Camp. People were killed by the fire and by the militiamen's guns. The workers took up arms. They captured several villages, burned down mining installations and finally held a sizable area. The miners' armed struggle against the troops, known as the Ludlow Massacre, lasted for ten days. During the strike President Wilson alternated between using troops and attempting to act as moderator to reconcile workers with employers. However, the latter, led by Rockefeller, rejected the President's suggestion of compromise. The workers, exhausted by the uneven struggle, were forced to surrender. But even after that domestic tensions remained high in the United States. The authorities admitted that the Ludlow events had brought the country to the brink of civil war and revolution.¹

The Colorado developments forced the employers into a change of policy and prompted Rockefeller to draw up an "Industrial Representation Plan" which contained the embryo of the "companionable" union based on the industrialists' paternalism.

IWW-organised political campaigns—"the struggle for the use of the streets for free speech and the right to organize"²—acquired particular importance in the pre-war years. In 1908, the IWW, together with members of the socialist parties, were already fighting for freedom of speech first in Los Angeles and then in Missoula, Montana. The first large-scale campaign for the "right to the street", for freedom of speech was held in Spokane, Washington, in 1909, in response to the city hall ban on street rallies. The IWW violated the ban by holding rallies to defend freedom of speech, and the authorities answered with reprisals. Still, neither the arrests of hundreds of IWW activists (including 19-year-old Elizabeth Gurley Flynn,³ later to become a prominent figure in the US working-class movement) nor the jailers' brutality could break the freedom fighters. The workers eventually won. In 1909-1913, the IWW held similar campaigns in Montana, Pennsylvania, California, Washington and South Dakota. Despite severe persecution by the authorities, these campaigns for the "right to the street", for freedom of speech displayed great selflessness and tenacity. They often ended in victory, reaffirming the right to carry on propaganda directly in the streets. The fact that IWW activities were politically oriented was quite important. However, the IWW's struggle against the authorities suffered from certain ultra-leftist extremism. Lenin described the IWW as "a

¹ *American Violence. A Documentary History*, Edited by Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1970, p. 162.

² Philip S. Foner, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 172-73.

³ See Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, *I Speak My Own Piece. Autobiography of "The Rebel Girl"*, Masses and Mainstream, New York, 1955.

profoundly proletarian and mass movement" and said its mistakes and inconsistencies were rooted not so much in the contamination with petty-bourgeois anarchist views as in "the political inexperience of proletarians who are quite revolutionary and connected with the masses".¹ The mass movement did not fit the trade-unionist pattern that the American Federation of Labor tried to impose on it. The conflict with the organs of the bourgeoisie's class domination which occurred in the course of IWW-organised campaigns and strikes accelerated the development of class consciousness among both IWW members and other workers, including AFL members.

In spite of all the efforts by Federation leaders, the objective, spontaneous attraction to socialism was making itself increasingly felt within the American Federation of Labor. True, the right-wing socialists in the Federation put a reformist construction on that trend, but the left-wing socialist elements also consolidated their positions. The socialists led the unions of miners, painters, mechanics, and some others. At the Federation Convention in 1912, the socialist candidate for the AFL presidency captured 5,000 votes, although he failed to win.² The rise in these trends was further borne out by the strengthening of socialist ideas and the US Socialist Party. Its membership grew from 41,000 in 1909 to 150,000 by May 1912. While in 1904 the socialists had about 40 periodicals, in 1912 they published at least 323 in English and other languages. In late 1912, the circulation of the *Appeal to Reason* reached 984,000 copies; the socialist press grew bigger and stronger despite persecution by the courts. Socialist ideas had won a place of their own in the nation's politics. They were attacked in Congress. The United States Postal Service hampered the distribution of periodicals that advocated those views. Still, it was no longer possible to disregard socialist ideas. The Socialist Party was increasingly supported by voters, especially in the areas where it contributed to the rise of the mass movement. In the autumn of 1911, over 1,000 Socialist Party candidates were elected to local bodies in 337 towns and villages. In the 1912 Presidential election, over 900,000 people voted for Eugene Debs, the Socialist candidate, compared to a little over 420,000 votes in 1908. Significantly, one-third of the Federation's membership voted for Debs and not for the candidate favoured by the leaders.³

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second Congress of the Communist International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 200.

² See William Z. Foster, *Outline Political History of the Americas*, International Publishers, New York, 1951, p. 338; John H. M. Laslett, *Labor and the Left. A Study of Socialist and Radical Influences in the American Labor Movement, 1881-1924*, Basic Books, New York, 1970, pp. 161-62, 205.

³ I. Kipnis, *The American Socialist Movement, 1897-1912*, Greenwood Press Publishers, New York, 1968, pp. 247, 367; I. A. Belyavskaya, op. cit., p. 202; L. I. Zubok, op. cit., p. 503; *Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1957*, US Government Printing Office, Wash., 1960, p. 682;

One should not forget, however, that the ideas advanced by the Socialist Party were rather far removed from Marxism; they were sometimes shared even by those who were quite sceptical of socialism.¹ The right-wing and centrist party leaders rejected revolutionary struggle and took up a chauvinist position. The 1910 party convention adopted a resolution welcoming measures aimed at banning immigration from abroad. Party leaders ignored the black movement, which at that time established the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

The left wing of the Socialist Party played an active part in the development of the mass working-class movement in the pre-war years. Charles Ruthenberg was searching for new ways in which the working class could wage its struggle. Eugene Debs resolutely advocated a revolutionary course in that struggle. William Haywood was skilled at leading gigantic strikes. The right-wing leaders of the Socialist Party harassed Haywood, falsely accusing him of giving up political activity in favour of violence and "direct action" alone, thus making it impossible for him to remain a party member. Haywood resigned and 40,000 members followed suit; by the summer of 1913, the Socialist Party membership had decreased almost two-fold. Subsequently, Haywood's supporters joined the activities of industrial unions. Although they had not formally belonged to the Socialist Party, they spread socialist ideas among the masses.

Still, most of the organised labour remained loyal to Gompersite principles, which proclaimed the rejection of socialism combined with "a search for respectability for labor in its acceptance by American society as a whole".² But even the Federation leadership's policy advocating collaboration between the worker and the employer under the aegis of "industrial democracy" was a reaction of sorts to objective developments in the United States. This policy, narrowly confined to the economic interests of skilled workers, was also a distorted reflection of the objective need for radical changes in the "American way of life". The development of the working-class movement in 1910-1914 and the policy of the bourgeoisie testified to the urgency of that problem. Exposing the bourgeois-reformist essence of Theodore Roosevelt's programme, Lenin keenly observed that the promises of the most advanced industrial legislation, of government control of all industry which would ensure "decent" wages for all, and of "anti-trust" pledges to establish "social and industrial

Albert Fried, *Socialism in America. From the Shakers to the Third International. A Documentary History*, Doubleday and Company, New York, 1970, pp. 453-54.

¹ See Albert Fried, op. cit., pp. 386, 387; I. Kipnis, op. cit., pp. 250-51.

² William M. Dick, *Labor and Socialism in America. The Gompers Era*, Kennikat Press. New York, London, 1972, p. 113.

justice" raised the issue of the "very existence of capitalism" and revolved around it.¹ It was essentially the rivalry of the socialist and the state-monopoly trends, the latter meaning "government control" under tycoons such as Rockefeller and Morgan, who owned about one-third of the country's national wealth. Unfortunately, capital, which was well organised and commanded vast resources for material and moral pressure, was opposed by a working class that lacked adequate political experience and class organisation.

FRANCE: THE STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT , REFORMISM AND ANARCHO-SYNDICALISM

The class struggle in France in the early part of the second decade of the 20th century proved that the "pent-up hatred of the proletariat for its oppressors"² was continuing to build up and explode periodically. Still, although, unlike Britain and the United States, the revolutionary and socialist traditions of the working class were alive in France, they often had to overcome great obstacles, largely connected with the overall situation in the French socialist and trade union movements. The "division of spheres" between party and trade union workers' organisations, their rivalry and the negative consequences of reformism and anarcho-syndicalism were felt very acutely in France.

By 1914, the French Socialist Party (SFIO—Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière) comprised about 77,000 members, twice the 1906 figure. Over that period, the number of votes it captured rose from 878,000 to 1,400,000, and that of the seats in parliament, from 51 in 1906, to 74 in 1910, to 103 in 1914.³ However, the SFIO did not pursue a consistent proletarian policy. Though they declaimed their opposition to ministerialism, many Socialist members of parliament in fact increasingly led the party along a leftist bloc course, in which the price of participation in the government was abandonment of the socialist revolutionary policy. In 1913-1914, efforts by Albert Thomas and Gustave Hervé who had made an abrupt turn to the right, led to that course being proclaimed openly. Conciliatory parliamentarianism was also enhanced by the positions taken by the two rival groups within the SFIO—the Guesdists and the Jaurèsists. Guesde fought passionately against the opportunist distortion of parliamentarianism, but his Marxist

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "The Results and Significance of the U.S. Presidential Elections", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 403, 404.

² V. I. Lenin, "Inflammable Material in World Politics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 187.

³ See J. Parel, *Le Mouvement ouvrier français. Syndicalisme et socialisme (1872-1914)*, t. 1. Villemomble, Bréal, 1971, p. 79.

stand was not consistent and did not contain a positive practical programme of revolutionary activity that would take into consideration the tasks facing the proletariat in all their complexity. While personally untainted with careerism or ministerialism, Jaurès followed a reformist course in his attempts to use the parliament for solving some practical problems of the French working-class movement. Considering politics as its only sphere of activity and reducing it to parliamentary reformism, the SFIO practically withdrew from the struggle for the workers' economic needs.

The reformists in the leadership of the French General Confederation of Labour (CGT), which, on the eve of the war, united 550,000 of the million-odd members of the syndicates,¹ advertised and implemented a conciliatory policy. They claimed that as workers' organisations developed, they should avoid strikes, since peaceful settlement of conflicts achieved more impressive victories. The reformists also justified their policy by pointing to the danger of anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism which exerted considerable influence on the French working-class movement, especially on the trade unions. Actually, however, opportunism and unprincipled intriguing, the Socialists' refusal to organise the strike movement and disdain for economic demands had an opposite effect: the revolutionary trends in the working-class movement developed in an anarchist, syndicalist direction. The political organisation of the proletariat, the parliamentary activities of workers' representatives, and any political action in general were increasingly rejected.

Neither the reformist nor the anarcho-syndicalist course could properly channel the growing discontent of the working masses. At times, signs appeared indicating that the masses were tired of both the anarcho-syndicalist "revolutionary calisthenics" and the need to overcome the reformist leaders' efforts to hamper the struggle. Still, life itself, economic, social and political oppression repeatedly called the workers to struggle. In the pre-war years, the struggle was generally on the rise, although sometimes interrupted.

The proletarian movement had to overcome the growing resistance on the part of the employers and the government which supported them. To coordinate their forces in the struggle against the workers, the capitalists set up "mutual aid funds"—employers' associations, which numbered 400,000 members by 1914. For example, 18,000 industrialists were members of the National Federation of Patronal Construction Syndicates whose leaders even looked for support abroad (in Germany) for joint efforts against the strike movement. Armed detachments were formed for fighting strikers. Numerous

¹ See Marcel Gonin, *Histoire du mouvement ouvrier et des centrales syndicales en France*, édité par la C.F.D.P. (C.F.T.C.), Paris, 1969, p. 34.

strikers were put on trial.¹ The growing intensity of class contradictions was also borne out by the rallying of the bourgeoisie, from radicals to reactionaries, against the proletariat, graphically expressed in the election of Raymond Poincare as President in 1913.

In 1908-1909, the number of strikers continued to decrease, but by 1909 the number of strikers had already increased by 70 per cent compared to 1908, and the number of man-days lost in strikes, by over 100 per cent, having almost reached the 1907 level. Some strikes, even during periods when the strike movement was on the wane, were quite stormy and reached the stage of barricades. This occurred, for example, in Draveil, a suburb of Paris. The strike of construction and excavation workers lasted from May to August 1908 and ended in bloody clashes with government troops. The demonstration organised in Villeneuve-Saint George to protest against government reprisals was also fired upon.

In the spring of 1909, a strike of postal and telegraph workers was started, indicating that the social basis of the strike movement had expanded by absorbing government employees, a fairly numerous section of the French population.² The strike was led by medium-paid skilled salary earners. The movement spread from Paris to the provinces. In Lyons, of the 1,300 postal workers 1,100 went on strike. But the strikers did not receive adequate support either from the CGT or the SFIO, and therefore lost. Socialist Party leaders, taking care not to interfere in the "syndicalist sphere", merely made an ineffectual parliamentary inquiry. The 1909 strike movement was also joined by construction, textile, metal, leather and other workers. The success of a large strike of construction workers in Paris in September 1909 partly offset the depressing defeat of the postal and telegraph workers.

In 1910-1911, the French strike movement rose above the 1908-1909 level by 40 per cent in the number of strikes, by 90 per cent in the number of strikers and by 70 per cent in the number of man-days lost. But those were mostly small-scale strikes of up to 50 people, and their incidence was very uneven nationwide. There was a mass movement against price rises; it spread to all industrial centres of any significance in the North and the Northeast of the country. Strikes were combined with demonstrations, marches to market-places, "vigilance committees" and attempts to establish stable prices.³

¹ See B. L. Vulfson, "Pages from the History of the Strike Movement in France on the Eve of World War I", *French Yearbook*, 1961, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1961, pp. 271-78 (in Russian).

² For details see V. M. Dalin, *Strikes and the Crisis of Anarcho-Syndicalism in Pre-War France*, Sotsekgiz, Moscow-Leningrad, 1935, pp. 103-26 (in Russian).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

In the autumn of 1910, despite all the efforts of the reformists in the trade union and SFIO leadership to contain the growing struggle, a strike was started by railwaymen, one of the largest and best organised sections of the French proletariat. They demanded a general wage raise in view of rising prices, set working rules, better pensions, and a minimum annual wage for low-paid workers. Those who started the strike—the workers of the Northern Railway—were resolved to fight until they won even if their union's central strike committee tried to prevent the strike from spreading to other railways. As a result, in October 1910 the National Syndicate of Railway Workers had to call a general strike.¹ The strike was also supported by the Federation of Engineers and Mechanics which included highly-paid workers. According to official figures, almost one half of the personnel of the Northern and Western railways, one-third of those working on the Southern Railway, and a large part of the workers on other railways took part in the strike. However, the government took resolute measures: it declared railwaymen to be mobilised, brought in troops to service the railways, etc. The reformist leaders of the syndicate, who called the strike against their will, vacillated. The strike lasted for one week and was defeated.²

Construction workers were especially active in the strikes of 1910-1911. They accounted for one-fourth of all the strikes and all the strikers, and for every third striker in 1911. However, construction workers' strikes were seriously affected by the flaws in their union's anarcho-syndicalist leadership. A case in point was the biggest strike by Paris construction workers in the summer of 1911 which demanded an eight-hour working-day and an end to the existing hiring system. The strike by 50,000 workers was poorly organised and therefore failed. It seriously discredited the anarcho-syndicalist tactics of "direct action".

In the years that followed, the overall scope of the strike movement diminished. In 1912-1914, miners led the strike movement. They accounted for about 50 per cent of all the strikers; in 1912, two-thirds of the nation's miners took part in strikes. Demanding an eight-hour working-day, a guaranteed minimum wage and a more progressive pension system, the miners were ready to stage a general strike to express solidarity with the striking miners of Britain. Union leaders barely managed to force a decision to limit the action to a 24-hour solidarity strike. However, by no means all the miners were happy with it. There were demands for a joint general strike by the miners of France, Britain and Germany to secure objectives which had been advanced for 15 years. The syndicate's leaders op-

¹ *L'Humanité*, October 11 and 12, 1910.

² For details see V. M. Dalin, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-64.

posed that. In 1913, when a new miners' strike was in the air, the leaders themselves called a strike and then ended it citing an insignificant concession by the employers as an excuse and without consulting the workers. The strikers' protests were overruled, and they were forced to return to work.¹

There were large-scale strikes in other industries, too. At the juncture of 1911 and 1912, Paris taxi drivers were on strike for almost five months. In June and July 1912, the nation's ports were paralysed by a strike of 18,500 seamen and dockers; dockers in Marseilles struck until September. In 1913, 4,000 workers at the Renault motor works fought heroically against the introduction of the Taylor sweatshop system for six weeks. The metal workers of Marseilles staged a general strike in the spring of 1914. Agricultural workers kept striking throughout the pre-war period.

The strikes of 1908-1914, like those of 1905-1907, advanced economic demands that often either turned political or were combined with political action; economic struggle was evolving into severe political clashes. Generally, however, the strikes of that period were less effective than earlier. As a rule, about half of them ended in defeat. The strikes won by the workers usually accounted for 17 per cent of the total (about 21 per cent in 1909-1910), and those ending in compromise, from 30 to 40 per cent. Only 1913 brought victory to a considerable number of the strikers—almost 40 per cent; in 1910, the figure was only 11 per cent; in 1911, 9; in 1912, about 7; and in 1914, about 8 per cent.²

On the whole, the CGT provided incompetent strike leadership. Its 1912 Le Havre congress brought the crisis of anarcho-syndicalism into the open. Some syndicalist leaders under Léon Jouhaux drifted closer to reformism.³ Neither the Socialists nor the anarcho-syndicalists were capable of leading the struggle of the French working masses. The peasant movement, which was a source of powerful action by the vine growers in 1910-1911, also failed for lack of leadership.

The rivalry between the SFIO and the CGT, the artificial distinction between the economic struggle of the working class as the sphere of trade union activity and the workers' political struggle as the sphere of party activity hampered the objective trends towards

¹ Ibid., pp. 52-60.

² *Statistique des grèves et des recours à la conciliation et à l'arbitrage survenus pendant l'année 1908*, Paris, 1909, pp. 366-67; *Statistique ... 1909*, Paris, 1911, pp. 348-49; *Statistique ... 1910*, Paris, 1912, pp. 468-69; *Statistique ... 1911*, Paris, 1913, pp. 446-47; *Statistique ... 1912*, Paris, 1913, pp. 402-03; *Statistique ... 1914*, Paris, 1919, pp. 230-31.

³ Jacques Julliard, "La C.G.T. devant la guerre (1910-1914)", *Le Mouvement social*, No. 49, 1964, pp. 47-62.

unity. Besides, all this came to the foreground in connection with the anti-militarist movement which was fairly widespread throughout France in the period under review.

Within the SFIO, an active anti-militarist stand and a broad anti-war campaign were associated above all with Jaurès and Vaillant. They proceeded from the need to oppose the predatory war by any means, up to a general strike and an armed uprising, and from the possibility of opposing the threat of such a war by a broad anti-war movement, capable of stemming the growth of militarism even before the Socialists secured a parliamentary majority. Jaurès and his supporters also cited the well-known anti-war resolution of the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International in 1907. Jaurès, always militant and sincerely trying to understand the needs of the popular masses, was the soul of the anti-war movement. He continuously fought against militarism and war, although he was handicapped by his reformist and pacifist illusions. His thundering voice was heard throughout France and abroad, and his brilliant anti-militarist speeches helped kindle anti-war feelings. The Guesdists Marcel Cachin and Charles Rappoport also vigorously opposed the reactionary wave of chauvinism, nationalism and imperial ambitions.

The CGT also started anti-militarist activities. Its emergency conference in 1911 reaffirmed the anarcho-syndicalist anti-war tactics: to respond to a declaration of war with a general revolutionary strike, according to the decision of the Marseilles Congress of 1908.¹ At the same time, the anarcho-syndicalist course of the CGT isolated the trade unions' anti-militarist activities from the struggle waged by the Socialists. CGT leaders often used various pretexts to oppose the Socialist course aimed at "a *proletarian bloc*, i.e., the alliance of socialist workers and syndicalist workers".²

In 1911, a wave of protests against the war threat swept through France, triggered off by the Morocco crisis. Protesters said they were ready to follow the Stuttgart resolution and oppose war by any means. The Socialists and the syndicalists acted jointly in this campaign. In 1912, on the Socialists' initiative, a wave of demonstrations and solidarity strikes rose against the war threat in connection with the Balkan War. The workers of Paris responded to a call of the International Socialist Bureau and, in unison with the workers in other countries, staged a 100,000-strong demonstration in which foreign Socialist representatives took part. The Bolshevik newspaper *Pravda* reported: "Old-timers who have witnessed many protests by the French proletariat are saying this red holiday is exceptional.

¹ See Jean Bruhat, Marc Piolot, *Esquisse d'une histoire de la C.G.T.*, Confédération Générale du Travail, 1958, p. 60.

² V. I. Lenin, "From France", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 254.

Together with the proletariat of other countries, the French worker expressed his will and showed international diplomacy whom it will have to reckon with."¹ Demonstrations were held in other cities too.

The CGT launched a nationwide "Soldier's Sou" campaign, aimed against militarism and the military establishment. Lenin observed that "an interesting feature among the French is the practice known as 'The Soldier's Half-penny'. Every week the worker pays one sou to the secretary of his union. The money collected in this way is sent to the soldiers 'as a reminder that, even in soldier's clothes, they belong to the exploited class, and that in no circumstances should they forget this'."²

In early 1912, hundreds of thousands of people throughout France took part in the action to protest against reaction using the so-called villainous laws applied against working-class activists for organising strikes and disseminating anti-militarist propaganda. The protest movement, joined by both the unions and the SFIO, reached its peak in January 1912, when those laws were invoked to try the arrested activists of the construction workers' federation. In Paris alone, nine large rallies were held; 40,000 workers of the Seine Department staged demonstrations. The protests often ended in clashes with the police.³

Simultaneously, there was mass action protesting the arbitrary rule of the military and reprisals against those who exposed them. Both Socialists and syndicalists took part in a 200,000-strong demonstration of the working people of Paris on February 11, 1912; it showed that all French workers favoured joint struggle. In the months that followed, rallies and demonstrations were attended by many thousands of people throughout the nation.

Broad sections of the population, led by the proletariat, also took part in the struggle the SFIO waged in 1913 against the bill extending the term of military service. All across France, thousands of protest rallies and meetings were held. The peasants also openly opposed the bill. There were countless reports of protests, of support campaigns for petitions issued by the SFIO to counter the new militarist offensive. From mid-April to late May, the number of people who signed the petitions grew from 100,000 to 600,000, and reached about 750,000 in early July.⁴ A protest demonstration of 150,000 people was held in Paris in late May. Non-socialist workers and dem-

¹ *Pravda*, November 13 (26), 1912.

² V. I. Lenin, "Bellicose Militarism and the Anti-Militarist Tactics of Social-Democracy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 198 (Notes).

³ See A. A. Trembitskaya, "The Socialist Movement in France in 1899-1917", *Academic Papers of the Lenin Institute of Education*, No. 220, Moscow, 1964, pp. 296-300 (in Russian).

⁴ See *L'Humanité*, March 31, April 19, May 26, and July 14, 1913.

ocratic organisations took part in the movement.¹ The unity of the proletariat, soldiers and peasants was emerging. In May 1913, there were disturbances in many French garrisons. Still, neither the SFIO nor the CGT provided leadership for the soldiers' movement and practically refused to have anything to do with it.

The growing anti-war feelings, the upsurge of the anti-militarist movement, also borne out by the increased desertion from the army, forced the CGT leadership to revise its separatist course. For example, in the struggle against the military service bill, the CGT cooperated with the Socialist party in the nationwide campaign. But CGT leaders drew an artificial distinction between domestic militarism and the foreign war threat. While they considered it necessary to fight against the former, defending strikers against the arbitrary action of the military, they often assumed a position of non-interference towards the latter. CGT leaders obviously overestimated the "peaceful intentions" of French imperialism. In 1912, CGT leaders under Léon Jouhaux prevented the organisation of joint action by the proletariat of different countries against the war threat. They tried to counter the measures taken by the International Socialist Bureau with independent trade union initiative, and referred to the need to retain trade union independence to justify their opposition to joint action with the SFIO.² The lack of unity between the Socialist Party and the trade unions, the sway of reformism and anarcho-syndicalism adversely affected the development of the French working-class movement.

ITALY: AGGRAVATION OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION, AND THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT

The Italian proletariat's mass action developed quite unevenly in the pre-war years. A slump in 1908-1909 was followed by the beginning of a revival in 1910-1911. The working people's struggle was affected by a number of distinctive factors, including the "problem of the South", the extremely acute agrarian question, the peculiar features of Italian imperialism, Giolitti's course, and the war with Turkey in 1911-1912. As in France, the working-class movement in Italy was adversely affected by the influence and rivalry of reformism and anarcho-syndicalism. The reformists, including the trade union leadership, did all they could to hold back the mass struggle. The anarcho-syndicalist tactics did provide some outlet for popular discontent, but prevented the working people from correctly deter-

¹ For details see A. A. Trembitskaya, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-68; B. L. Vulfson, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-15.

² See *L'Humanité*, November 15, 1912.

mining their course. It was no accident that the Parma strike of 1908 was followed by a slump in the movement.

The anarcho-syndicalists, who relied for support on the masses of farmhands in Parma Province, turned the area into a proving ground of sorts for syndicalist strikes. In ten months, 34 strikes of agricultural workers were held in the province, often ending in disillusionment. The peak was a two-month-long general strike of 30,000 agricultural workers in the spring of 1908, started in response to the Agrarians' provocations. The strikers, supported by the working people of other regions, fought heroically for their rights. The struggle encountered numerous terrorist acts against the movement's activists; troops and the police were sent to put down the strike, which they did. At the same time, the strike exposed both the fallacy of anarcho-syndicalist attempts at fighting a "decisive battle" that way and the intention on the part of the reformists in the PSI and CGdL leadership to evade resolute mass struggle. The defeat of the Parma strike brought about a general slump in the strike movement. In the years that followed, the reformists, who managed to have the anarcho-syndicalists expelled from the Socialist Party soon after the Parma strike, consolidated their positions in the leadership of the party and the trade unions. The immediate programme lacked even fundamental democratic demands—a republic, land allotted to the peasants, and an eight-hour working-day. CGdL leaders, striving for the leading role in the working-class movement, relied mostly on conciliatory parliamentarianism and distracted the unions from active mass struggle. The positions of the PSI, and the working class in general, were seriously weakened.¹

From 1910-1911, however, a revival began in the strike movement. The number of industrial strikes and strikers reached the 1906 level, and the number of man-days lost was considerably higher. Strikes by agricultural workers, on the wane in 1908-1910, involved 133,000 participants in 1911 and emerged as an important integral element of the overall upsurge in the nation's working-class movement.² The growth in the numbers of strikes and strikers testified to greater activity on the part of the workers at larger enterprises, and the more numerous man-days lost meant that the struggle was becoming more protracted and insistent. This was borne out by the way strikes were conducted. For example, workers at the Elba mines and Piombino enterprises controlled by the Ilva steel trust were on strike for six months, and those at the FIAT works in Turin, for 65 days. Still,

¹ See *A History of Italy*, Vol. 2, Nauka, Moscow, 1970, pp. 376-78 (in Russian); *La Confederazione Generale del Lavoro negli atti, nei documenti, nei congressi 1906-1926*, Edizioni "Avanti!", Milano, 1962, pp. 78-79.

² *Annuario statistico italiano*, Seconda Serie, Vol. V, Anno 1915, Tipografia Nazionale Bertero, Roma, 1916, p. 269.

more than half of all the strikes (almost two-thirds in 1910) were held at comparatively small enterprises; they only accounted for a little over one-third of all the strikers (47 per cent in 1911). The employers fought against strikes, above all large ones, with mediation and arbitration, although the share of the latter was less than one per cent.¹

The strengthening of the strike movement was all the more remarkable in that it developed in a complicated situation. The year 1911 ushered in the final stage of the "Giolittian liberal era", marked by especially vigorous efforts to secure broad social support for the government among the working masses. At the same time, having launched a nationalist, chauvinist campaign in 1910-1911 and using it to appeal for class unity, Italy's imperialists started the Libyan War to annex Turkish territories in Africa. The PSI parliamentary group actively supported Giolitti who returned to power and proposed a suffrage reform and a course towards improved social legislation. However, Giolitti offered a ministerial post to the right-wing reformist Leonida Bissolati, who took part in the talks held in the royal palace on the composition of the cabinet. The "Bissolati case" angered the party's grassroots organisations and touched off a heated debate among the party leadership and in the parliamentary group. Bissolati was forced to refuse the ministerial post he had been offered and to merely promise to support Giolitti's course. However, many people in the PSI and CGdL leadership and especially in the Socialist parliamentary group were inclined to approve of Bissolati's stand or at least support Giolitti's course.² The party leadership under Filippo Turati, while proclaiming the need to secure a suffrage reform by means of mass struggle, failed to issue a firm condemnation of ministerialism. Revolutionary Faction members stressed that the outcry over the new suffrage legislation was supposed to distract public attention from war preparations; they urged the party to heed the growing threat of the nationalist movement.

As war preparations gathered momentum, and even at a time when the war threat became a reality, the "left-wing reformists" who led the party tried to remain passive, having delegated the decision-making to the parliamentary group. But rumours of the army's forthcoming departure for Libya triggered off disturbances all over Italy. In these circumstances, the leadership of the Socialist Party and the CGdL and the parliamentary group, under pressure from the

¹ Adolfo Pepe, *Storia della CGdL dalla fondazione alla guerra di Libia, 1905-1911*, Bari, 1972, pp. 538-39; ejusdem, *Storia della CGdL della guerra di Libia all'intervento. 1911-1915*, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1971, pp. 344-45, 358-59, 374-75.

² Gaetano Arfè, *Storia del socialismo italiano (1892-1926)*, Giulio Einaudi, Torino, 1965, pp. 94, 107-08, 127-28.

party's grassroots organisations and the Revolutionary Faction and out of fear of losing control over the growing anti-war movement, decided to condemn the war and hold a 24-hour protest strike. Despite all the measures the government adopted to wreck it, the anti-war strike of September 27, 1911 spread to large areas of Italy. In some places, it led to clashes with the police and nationalist groups which staged "patriotic" processions. The strikes were especially effective in Genoa, Milan and Reggio Emilia. However, Southern Italy remained completely unaffected, and the movement was limited in Rome, Florence, Bologna and Turin. That was largely due to the reformist course of PSI leaders.¹

After the war became a reality on September 29, 1911, the right-wing reformists began to justify it. Although this time the "left-wing reformists" condemned their right-wing comrades, they advocated continued unity with the latter and subsequently hampered vigorous anti-war activity. The Revolutionary Faction harshly criticised the reformist leadership. The 1911 PSI congress adopted a resolution proclaiming "irreconcilable hostility to war on the part of the Socialist Party and the organised proletariat".² The anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists were divided into two camps. One upheld the anti-militarist course demanding an end to any support of the government and calling on soldiers to desert from the army. Members of this camp launched a campaign to protect those who were persecuted for refusing to serve in the army. There were also anarcho-syndicalists who saw war and violence as factors necessary for imbuing the masses with the revolutionary spirit. The views held by the ideologists of "imperialist syndicalism", including Arturo Labriola, were essentially an apologia of imperialism.³

The Libyan War, advertised as a picnic by bourgeois propaganda, brought heavy losses. It wasted half the national budget and it took a toll of 70,000 casualties. Italian monopolies profited from the war, but it meant new burdens for the people: bread prices and taxes rose. Government promises to end unemployment, agrarian overpopulation and emigration remained unrealised. In 1912, 711,000 people emigrated; in 1913, 873,000. Giolitti's policy was showing growing signs of authoritarianism. The war was declared even without the sanction of the parliament which the government failed to convene in time.

¹ Maurizio degl'Innocenti, *Il socialismo italiano e la guerra di Libia*, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1976, pp. 29-46.

² *Resoconto stenografico del XII Congresso Nazionale del Partito Socialista Italiano (Modena, 15-18 ottobre 1911)*, Società Anonima Editrice "Avanti!", Milano, 1912, pp. 9-10.

³ For details see Z. P. Yakhimovich, *The Italian Working-Class and Socialist Movement in 1901-1914*, Kursk Institute of Education, Kursk, 1976, pp. 65-67, 86-87 (in Russian).

Censorship was rampant, the socialist press was persecuted. Anti-war protesters were arrested (more than 220 people were convicted).

The anti-war movement of the Italian working people continued throughout the annexationist ventures in Africa.¹ There were rallies and demonstrations, protests against the shipping of military cargoes, anti-war propaganda, even among soldiers, refusals to serve in the army, desertions, etc. Turin and Milan became important centres of anti-war action, to a large extent, due to the efforts of young Turin workers, later to become prominent activists in the Italian Communist Party—Antonio Oberti, Mario and Rita Montagnana, Battista Santhià, Giovanni Parodi and others. Many people attended rallies in Liguria and Ancona, Leghorn and Apulia. In the spring of 1912, despite bans by the authorities, gigantic protests were held in Apulia and Naples with cries of "Out of Africa". Anti-war slogans also marked May Day celebrations in 1912. The PSI was energetically spreading anti-war propaganda. Specially written pamphlets were published in hundreds of thousands of copies. Much of the credit for that goes to the Revolutionary Faction, to its members Constantino Lazzari, Giovanni Lerda and Giacinto Menotti Serrati. Revolutionary Faction activists exposed the onslaught of reaction in Italy and traced its connection to the war in Africa. The socialist Youth Federation was also quite active. It launched the "Soldi for a Soldier" movement to raise funds for anti-militarist propaganda among draftees and soldiers, to assist their families, etc. The federation sent anti-war literature and leaflets to Italian soldiers in Libya, called on them to resist orders and protest against the sending of troops to Africa. Anarchist societies and syndicalist organisations also stepped up their anti-war activities, although those comprised negative elements, too—in particular, they extolled terrorism against individuals.

Meanwhile, the right-wing reformers increasingly supported the government. An overwhelming majority of Socialist members of parliament approved the decree annexing territories in Africa. Together with bourgeois members of parliament, they came to the royal palace to greet the king after he escaped an assassination attempt by the anarchists. That "second edition of the Bissolati case" stirred up a storm of protest in the PSI. The Revolutionary Faction demanded that the right-wingers be expelled from the party. The Italian Socialist Youth Federation also stepped up its criticism of the right wing and attacked the inconsistent policy of PSI leaders.²

¹ Ibid., pp. 93-97; Z. P. Yakhimovich, *The Italian-Turkish War of 1911-1912*, Nauka, Moscow, 1967, pp. 176-79 et seq. (in Russian).

² Gaetano Arfè, *Il movimento giovanile socialista. Appunti sul primo periodo (1903-1912)*, Edizioni del Gallo, Milano, 1973, pp. 75-76.

At the 13th PSI congress in 1912, the right-wing reformists tried to justify the Libyan War by referring to Italy's "civilising" and "democratic" mission abroad. The "left-wing reformists" attempts at smoothing over the contradictions failed. The Congress expelled the right-wing reformists from the party and spoke out in favour of a class policy and strict opposition to the government; party leadership passed into the hands of the Revolutionary Faction.

As a result, the PSI grew stronger. Its membership grew from 28,000 in 1912 to 45,000 in 1914.¹ At the 1913 elections the PSI won over 900,000 votes; almost one-third of the voters supported its candidates in the nine largest industrial centres. Consequently, the number of PSI seats in parliament rose from 41 to 52. The 1914 municipal elections also brought considerable gains to the party.² All that was all the more significant because the 1913 election campaign already united the forces that opposed the Socialist Party. Election results meant that the policy aimed at taming the Italian worker and the socialist movement had collapsed; this was reaffirmed by Giolitti's resignation.

Amid the growing pressure from the monopolies, which tried to impose their will on the working people without any regard for their rights and organisations, amid the increasingly reactionary situation and police reprisals, especially against the peasant movement in Southern and Central Italy, the struggle of the working class was developing, expanding and becoming more persistent. The proletariat not only advanced economic demands, but also protested against encroachments on the rights of its organisations, against the authorities' brutality and against militarism.

Turin workers played an important part in the strike movement in the pre-war years. In the early 1900s, industrial production became increasingly concentrated in Turin, and the city emerged as a breeding ground for new developments connected with the shifting, in 1912-1914, of the focus of the struggle into the large-scale industry, with the industrial proletariat assuming the foremost role.³ Left-wing trends were strong in the Turin organisation of the PSI.

The 95-day strike of Turin motor workers in 1913 was very important for the development of the working-class movement. The strikers fought for the implementation of a programme drawn up by

¹ A. Riosa, *Il Partito Socialista Italiano dal 1892 al 1918*, Roma, 1969, p. 177.

² Giulio Trevisani, *Lineamenti di una Storia del movimento operaio italiano. Dalla svolta liberale allo scioglimento della C.G.L.*, V. 3, Edizioni del Callo (gia Edizioni "Avanti!"), Milano, 1965. In the 1913 elections, the right-wing reformists who enjoyed certain support among voters ran independently for the first time.

³ See *A History of Italy*, Vol. 2, pp. 403-04.

their union's left-wing leadership and comprising both demands for better conditions for the workers and provisions to expand their trade union rights. The strike was especially important because it was aimed against the monopoly bourgeoisie, which united in *Confindustria*, an employers' organisation, in 1910. As the strike went on, the working people of Turin and other industrial centres supported their comrades and assisted them financially. The threat of a mass lockout failed to break the workers' spirit, and the authorities, obviously fearing that the conflict might become more acute and have a nationwide impact, refused to support the employers. The strikers won. That victory in the hard struggle with the new, monopoly bourgeoisie marked the beginning of a process aimed at overcoming the reformist-corporativist and anarcho-syndicalist flaws in the working-class movement.¹

The Turin strike was followed by the syndicalist-led general strike of Milan workers. The thousands of troops and the numerous arrests failed to stop that strike. The movement was a succession of waves—in May, June and August. The struggle reached the barricade stage and gave rise to solidarity action in many areas of the country. Miners and railwaymen also started strikes. Share-croppers and agricultural labourers in Ferrara Province struck for six months; neither hunger nor police reprisals managed to break them.² CGdL leaders, who withdrew from active involvement in the anti-militarist action during the war and turned to collaboration with the employers after it, were unable to organise a struggle to defend the workers' interests. Consequently, the Confederation, which numbered about 330,000 members in 1913, was losing its prestige with the masses.

The strikes of 1912-1913 showed that the workers were ready for independent action. About one-third of the 1912 strikes bypassed workers' organisations. Strikers tried to avoid any kind of mediation or arbitration aimed at settling the conflicts.³ The Italian Syndical Union established in 1912 and numbering about 100,000 members, pursued a policy of revolutionary syndicalism and, in its struggle against the reformism of the CGdL and the PSI, could not counter it with a realistic programme of action. The reformists, who were still strong in the PSI and retained their influence in the parliamentary group and municipal councils, continued with their opportunist policy; they responded to decisions aimed against ministerialism and to criticism of the government's reactionary policy by accusing the

¹ See Paolo Spriano, *Storia di Torino operaia e socialista*, Giulio Einaudi editore, Torino, 1972, pp. 223-35.

² Giulio Trevisani, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

³ Adolfo Pepe, *Storia della CGdL dalla guerra di Libia all'intervento 1911-1915*, p. 156.

Revolutionary Faction, which was leading the party, of provoking bloodshed.¹

Meanwhile, the mass movement was growing, and demands were being put forward in respect of wages, unemployment, a more democratic system for Italy, the situation at enterprises, trade unions' rights, etc. Although there were fewer strikes in 1913, the number of strikers rose abruptly, and that of the man-days lost was the largest since 1900. Workers at large enterprises increasingly joined the movement. Simultaneously, the share of the agricultural proletariat decreased. The struggle was often stubborn and protracted.

As social polarisation intensified and the desire grew to rebuff the monopoly offensive, government brutality and the militarists' arbitrary action, the slogan of a general strike, which reflected mass discontent, became increasingly significant. It helped rally together different trends in the working-class and democratic movements which fought against militarism and reaction. Practicable opportunities arose for the working class to lead the struggle to preserve and expand democracy. The anti-militarist campaigns launched in connection with the Libyan War were already a step forward towards the Italian proletariat's unity of action for democracy. The mass movement itself put the general strike on the agenda. The situation became ripe for a general strike in early 1914, when the steel workers of Lombardy and Bergamo, the stonemasons of Siena, and the working people of Terni and Carrara, Fossara and Sestri rose in the struggle; the situation on the nation's railways also confirmed the possibility of a general strike.

All that came to the surface during the Red Week in June 1914. The syndicalists of Ancona planned to hold demonstrations against reaction and militarism on June 7. When the demonstration did take place in violation of the government ban, it was fired upon by the carabinieri. Two workers were killed. This triggered off anti-government action throughout the country. The PSI and the CGdL, the syndicalists and the anarchists, and the Republican Party called for struggle against militarism, for a general strike, and sent their representatives to the unity committee. The strike was combined with gigantic rallies and demonstrations, with guerrilla action; its slogans were a blend of republican and anti-war sentiment; it was supported by spontaneous action by the peasants and the urban middle strata. The strike paralysed the economies of many towns and rural areas. Shops were closed, municipal transport ceased operating, even rail services were shut down in some places. Barricades were erected in the streets of Rome, Milan, Florence and Ancona.

¹ A. Riosa, op. cit., pp. 152-54; Luigi Lotti, *La settimana rossa*, Felice Le Monnier, Firenze, 1972.

Clashes with the police and troops began. The strikers seized weapons. Government buildings were besieged. In rural areas, the hungry confiscated bread and grain stores. In Romagna and Marche, the strikes grew into uprisings, and republics were proclaimed. Red banners flew over Ravenna and Ancona. Over one million people took part in the movement. Still, deprived of revolutionary leadership, the struggle ceased after one week.¹

The Red Week, one of the largest anti-militarist actions on the eve of World War I, revealed that a great store of "inflammable material" accumulated. It indicated that a political crisis was brewing and reiterated the need for unified revolutionary leadership of the working-class movement. However, the forces that were supposed to lead the struggle lacked a clear-cut revolutionary plan and often pursued different objectives. The reformists among the CGdL leaders merely wanted a brief demonstration of protest; the anarchists and other extremists hoped to bring off a revolution at one swoop.

For all the distinctive features in the Italian situation, its working-class movement was in several ways similar to its French counterpart. The similarity was that the proletariat's hatred of its oppressors came to a head, and "peaceful" parliamentary struggle alternated with "episodes of real civil war".² The experience of such transitions, of their victories and defeats, was important for the working-class movement throughout the world. They also provided valuable negative experience by highlighting the inability of many trends, including socialist ones, to introduce socialist consciousness into the working-class movement, to ensure a revolutionary course in the overall democratic struggle with the proletariat at the helm.

THE SOCIALIST AND WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT IN MULTI-NATIONAL AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

After the upsurge of 1905-1907 the working-class movement in the Austrian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire continued to develop extensively, expanding to cover an increasing number of sections of the working people. The unremitting efforts by the Social-Democratic Party of Austria caused its membership among the workers to swell significantly. In 1913, the SDPA numbered 326,000 members (142,000 in the German-Austrian and 184,000 in the Czech branches). The trade unions allied to the party had a membership of 500,000. The party had six daily newspapers published in German, several

¹ Gaetano Arfé, *Storia del socialismo italiano...*, pp. 180-82; Luigi Lotti, *op.cit.*, pp. 68-69, 194-95, 209-10; Enzo Santarelli, *Il socialismo anarchico in Italia*, Feltrinelli Editore, Milano, 1959, pp. 29, 34, 156, 168, 173 et seq.

² V. I. Lenin, "Inflammable Material in World Politics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 187.

weeklies, and more than 50 newspapers belonging to the trade unions. Social-Democratic pamphlets were printed in more than 100,000 copies. At the very first elections after the introduction of universal suffrage in 1907 the party captured over a million votes and 87 seats in parliament (plus two more at the by-election in 1908) and became the largest political party in the Reichsrat.¹

However, that material and moral power, exceptional both in terms of the times and of the country's size, was used poorly and one-sidedly to solve the urgent issues of the working-class movement. It became especially obvious after 1907, the year which brought universal suffrage—the goal on which such great hopes had been pinned and in the name of which hundreds of meetings, rallies, demonstrations and processions and several general political strikes had been held for a decade. The Reichsrat, where Socialist members were now a powerful force, was still paralysed by the obstructionism of either Czech or German nationalists, and was unable to act constructively. Still, neither that state of affairs nor the growing mass disillusionment with the results of the suffrage reform freed the SDPA from parliamentary illusions. These were aggravated by the firm belief in the need to preserve the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, by flirting with the Hapsburgs and by the obsequiousness displayed towards Francis Joseph personally. It is noteworthy that Karl Kautsky, once active in the Austrian working-class movement, described that tactic as a “demonstration against international Social-Democracy and our republican principles”. August Bebel regarded the Austrian Social-Democratic policy as “spineless and unprincipled”.²

The position of the Austrian Social-Democrats inevitably followed from the substitution of the so-called Austro-Marxism for revolutionary Marxism. The philosophical basis of the former was an eclectic blend of Machism and neo-Kantianism disguised with Marxist phraseology. Practical reformism was masked with lip service to orthodox Marxism. The cultural-national autonomy theory expressed the SDPA leaders' concern for the preservation of the dual monarchy. Consequently, they fostered nationalist separatist sentiment in the proletarian movement and contributed to the aggravation of national contradictions between Austro-German, Czech, Southern Slav, Ukrainian and Polish workers. As a result, many political and industrial proletarian organisations, once multi-national and united, split into separate national organisations. Thus, a few years before

¹ Ludwig Brügel, *Geschichte der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie*, Fünfter Band, Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, Wien, 1925, S. 140-41.

² Victor Adler, *Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky*, Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, Wien, 1954, S. 479, 482; Julius Braunthal, *Victor und Friedrich Adler. Zwei Generationen Arbeiterbewegung*, Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, Wien, 1965, S. 168-70.

World War I, the working class of multi-national Austria lost its bearings due to the reformist policy of the Social-Democratic leadership and became fragmented organisationally.

The mass action of the Austro-Hungarian proletariat in 1908-1914 expressed its protest against the increasing oppression of the monopolies, militarism and reaction, against the growing threat of a world imperialist war, the war which the Hapsburgs did much to prepare and start. The struggle against militarism and the war threat was the salient and essentially distinguishing feature of the working-class and socialist movement in the country in the second decade of the 20th century.

In 1908, the rulers of Austria-Hungary declared Bosnia and Herzegovina, occupied in 1878, annexed—that is, “legally” an integral part of the empire. This triggered off the Bosnian crisis, which almost plunged Europe into war. At that time, the masses were already expressing their anti-war feelings unequivocally. In Prague, developments on December 2, 1908 reached the stage of such intense anti-Hapsburg manifestations that the government hastily imposed a state of emergency, followed by police and court reprisals, namely the Zagreb and other similarly framed trials, against liberation movement activists throughout the empire. In 1911-1912, increasingly widespread anti-war action was taken against the background of abruptly strained class and national contradictions and the upsurge of the working-class struggle.

The new rise in the mass movement was reflected in the greater number of strikes and demonstrations against the growing monopoly oppression, price rises, unemployment and the drop in the living standards of the working people. The most significant of the widespread action of that period included the strike of DrogoBYč workers in July 1911 against the worsening working and living conditions which culminated in a street procession and a bloody clash with the police; the strikes by Czech miners in March 1912; and mass protest demonstrations against price rises in Vienna, Prague, Lvov, Cracow and other industrial centres. The first street procession bearing the slogan of “Long Live the Social Revolution” was held in Sarajevo on May 1, 1911.¹ The authorities sent the police and army against the 100,000 working people of Vienna who took to the streets on September 17, 1911 to express their indignation at the government's policy, which had led to runaway price rises and the threat of war. In the course of the clashes, when in some suburbs of Vienna the workers erected barricades, several people were killed and about

¹ See Yu. A. Pisarev, *The Liberation Movement of the Southern Slav Peoples of Austria-Hungary in 1905-1914*, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1962, p. 242 (in Russian).

100 demonstrators were wounded. On October 29, almost 100,000 Vienna workers marched through the streets, protesting against the government policy of "war and hunger". On the next day, 14 anti-war rallies and meetings were held in Vienna's proletarian districts. The number of strikers in 1912 was 186,000 — 250 per cent more than in 1910 and 50 per cent more than in 1911. At the same time, it should be noted that during the developments of September 1911 the Social-Democrats both expressed their sympathy with the mass struggle and called for an end to demonstrations and for confidence in the party "which will do all that is necessary". SDPA leaders continued to pursue that course later, too.¹

The rise of the mass anti-militarist movement in the dual monarchy in 1911-1912 was an integral part of the action of the international proletariat, of the socialist movement. The situation in Austria-Hungary was aggravated by the new arms race and by the increasingly aggressive stand of Austro-Hungarian imperialism in the Balkans. The Basel Congress of the Second International in November 1912 imposed an obligation on the Social-Democratic parties of Austria, Hungary, Croatia and Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina to do everything possible to continue their effective action to fight aggression against Serbia. The manifesto expressed confidence that the Social-Democratic parties of Austria-Hungary would continue their struggle to assist the Southern Slav peoples in winning their "right for democratic self-government".² However, the leaders of the Austrian Socialists did not pursue a consistent anti-war policy. At a Social-Democratic rally in Vienna four days prior to the outbreak of the First Balkan War, Victor Adler denounced the government's aggressive Balkan policy and advanced the slogan "The Balkans to the Balkan Peoples", which became quite popular. However, the warning addressed to the ruling quarters to the effect that the war might easily evolve into revolution was combined with an appeal to remain calm because the party leadership would know at the necessary moment what could be done and what was not feasible.³ At the SDPA Congress in October 1912, where the question of war was the foremost item on the agenda, the resolution submitted by Adler expressed the proletariat's indignation at Austria-Hungary's intention to interfere in the Balkan War. In compliance with the

¹ Herbert Steiner, "Über die Massenkämpfe in Österreich 1907-1912". *Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung*, Hrsg. von der ITH (Internationaler Tagung der Historiker der Arbeiterbewegung), Tagungsberichte, Bd. 6, Europaverlag, Wien, 1974, S. 71-72.

² *Ausserordentlicher Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Basel am 24. und 25. November 1912*, Vorwärts, Berlin, 1912, S. 24.

³ Victor Adler, *der Parteimann. Reden und Aufsätze*, Bd. IX, Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, Wien, 1929, S. 49-53.

Second International decisions, the Congress decided to hold nationwide anti-war rallies on November 10. Party leaders did, nevertheless, underrate the danger of war. Adler did not believe that a local war could spread throughout Europe.

The rallies and manifestations held, in accordance with the Congress decision, in almost all Austrian towns on November 10 and 17 and attended by many thousands of people, and the anti-war and anti-government action in Czechia were a striking demonstration of the working-class energy and resolution to do everything possible to resist the imperialist bloodbath. This action, organised by the Social-Democratic Party, also fully revealed that the open opportunists and centrists among the party leaders were unable and unwilling to counter militarism and the war policy of the ruling classes with a truly proletarian, militant class policy. They echoed the right wing and centre in other parties of the Second International in their refusal to prepare a revolutionary struggle, a revolutionary mass political strike.¹

True, at the October 1913 Congress of the SDPA, there was condemnation of the party's insufficiently active struggle for social legislation and against the arms race. Delegates spoke of the masses' disillusionment with the party's policy and pointed to the great opportunities for further developing mass action. Significantly, however, the criticism, harshly rebuffed by the right wing, merely raised the issue of possible parliamentary obstructionist tactics. Although the Austrian left, including Leopold Winarsky, K. Krejbich and Bohumir Šmeral, reflected the militant spirit of the masses, they failed to demand a mass political strike.

The fact that there was no acute confrontation in Austria between the revolutionary and the reformist trends in the working-class movement and no polarisation between left-wing radicals and right-wing opportunists among the Social-Democrats was, to a large extent, determined by the position of Victor Adler, one of the foremost Second International leaders who enjoyed great influence and prestige with his party and the masses. In the name of preserving the unity of the socialist movement at any cost, he often agreed to unprincipled compromise with and concessions to the powerful rightist reformist wing of the Austrian Social-Democrats (Karl Leuthner, Friedrich Austerlitz, Wilhelm Ellenbogen and others) and underestimated the proletariat's revolutionary and anti-war potential. Meanwhile, the frantic haste with which the governments in both parts of the empire were preparing emergency legislation in the pre-war years, aimed first and foremost against the workers, was

¹ See V. I. Lenin to G. V. Plekhanov, November 17, 1912, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 202.

quite revealing; it was precisely the mass anti-war and anti-government movement which began in the autumn of 1912 that prompted those measures.¹

The other half of the empire, Hungary, witnessed a slump in the mass movement after the vigorous political action and full-scale economic battles of 1905-1906. Factors contributing to the slump included the settlement of the Hungarian political crisis in 1906 and of the inter-governmental conflict between Austria and Hungary in 1907. Harsh reprisals were unleashed against the working class and its organisations, spearheaded against the largest and most militant trade unions (of metal, railway and other workers). Those reprisals and sometimes the outright banning of certain trade unions reduced the number of organised workers from 130,000 in 1907 to 85,000 in 1909. The trade union movement only began to regain ground in 1910, and in 1912 the number of organised workers already exceeded 100,000.² But even during the slump the working class did not give up its struggle. In the autumn of 1908, political demonstrations broke out against the plan for a reactionary suffrage reform. From September through November tens of thousands of Budapest workers took part in demonstrations punctuated by armed clashes with the police and the army. The movement spread to the Southern Slav areas, where a general political strike was about to start in mid-November. The government responded by proposing a suffrage reform, which was quite lopsided, especially in respect of the oppressed nationalities. The Emergency Congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Hungary in December 1908 decided that political strikes, rallies and demonstrations should be organised. The Social-Democratic Party of Croatia supported that decision.³

On December 29, 1908, a one-day general strike of more than 60,000 workers was held in Budapest to protest against the rule of terror and persecution.

From 1908 onwards, the movement against militarism and the war threat began to assume growing importance. In connection with the Bosnian crisis, the working class and Social-Democrats in Hungary branded the Balkan policy of the dual monarchy as colonialist and imperialist. In December 1909, an emergency congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Hungary adopted a resolution protesting against the annexation of Turkish provinces and called for fighting the undemocratic suffrage reform with the most effective of weapons, a mass political strike.

¹ Ludwig Brügel, op. cit., Fünfter Band, S. 136.

² T. M. Islamov, *Political Struggle in Hungary on the Eve of World War I*, Nauka, Moscow, 1972, p. 339 (in Russian); Tibor Erényi, *A magyar szakszervezeti mozgalom története. 1848-1917*, Népszava, Budapest, 1956.

³ See Yu. A. Pisarev, op. cit., pp. 191-92.

After a long lull, a new rise of mass movements began in 1911. In the latter half of the year, strikes grew more numerous, aimed mostly against the worsening working and living conditions, in particular, against price rises. Hundreds of strikes and "hungry marches" were held in the Southern Slav areas. The workers of Zagreb called two general strikes in 1911 alone, one of them lasting for 42 days.¹ The struggle again centred on political issues. In November 1911 and in the spring of 1912, the Social-Democratic Party of Hungary organised several large-scale demonstrations for universal suffrage and against militarism and war.

The decisive battle between Hungarian reactionaries and the forces of democracy led by the proletariat occurred in May 1912. It was prompted by the election of Joseph Tiso, the "strong man" of the Hungarian oligarchy, as Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies in the National Assembly (parliament). The election presaged an abrupt turn towards accelerated war preparations, an offensive against democratic rights and freedoms, and use of force to suppress the opposition within parliament and outside it. On May 23, in response to an appeal by Social-Democratic leaders, orderly columns of workers marched towards the parliament building, which was patrolled by large police and army detachments. The marchers' slogans were "Long Live a People's Parliament", "Down with Class Oppression", "Down with the Aristocrats' Gang", and "Long Live Revolution". Dogged clashes broke out on the way to the parliament building, and barricades were built in outlying industrial districts. Scared by this turn of events, the reformist leaders immediately called on the workers to desist and to return to work on the following day. Still, the strike and the fighting on the barricades in some places continued into May 24. In those days, mass political strikes and demonstrations swept through Hungary, through almost all the more or less large cities—Bratislava (Pozsony), Košice (Kacsa), Arad, Timișoara (Temesvar), Miskolc, Győr, Pécs and others. May 23, 1912, or Red Thursday, was the biggest revolutionary action by the Hungarian proletariat in the pre-war period.

The bloodbath of May 23 failed to break the spirit of the proletariat. The rapidly approaching danger of the Austro-Hungarian imperialists' military ventures mobilised it to deliver a new rebuff to their aggressive schemes. Exposing the intrigues of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in the Balkans, the Social-Democrats advanced the slogan "War on War" in the autumn of 1912 and warned the monarchy's rulers that, should there be mobilisation or should a military conflict occur, the working class would counter the warlike policy of the ruling classes with "internal revolution". In early

¹ See Yu. A. Pisarev, *op. cit.*, pp 243-44

October 1912, a wave of large-scale anti-war action organised by the Social-Democratic Party swept the country. On October 30, in response to the call of the Second International, hundreds of anti-war rallies and meetings were held to express solidarity with the peoples and Socialists of the Balkan countries. The situation was strained in the Southern Slav areas. The share of draftees who failed to report for military service reached 30 per cent.

The movement against the war threat and militarism reached its peak in the middle and latter half of November. The largest demonstrations were held in Budapest and many other towns on November 17, 1912. That day a rally of Budapest workers was attended by Karl Liebknecht as a representative of the Second International. Resolutions adopted at rallies and meetings solemnly swore to mobilise all forces against war. The anti-monarchist and republican sentiments of the masses were becoming increasingly obvious. There were repeated calls of "Long Live the Republic" at rallies and meetings in 1912, especially after May 23. This cry greeted Emperor Francis Joseph when he arrived in Budapest on November 4. A demonstration held on November 24 added a new slogan: "Down with the Dynasty". That day, when "the republican idea was baptised in blood", demonstrators were again attacked by the police and the army; hundreds of people were wounded. The Second International Congress in session in Basel at the time declared that the entire international proletariat indignantly protested against the brutal reprisals against workers in the Hungarian capital and expressed solidarity with the struggle of Hungary's working class.

Meanwhile, the Social-Democratic leadership refused to admit that the anti-war movement had a significance of its own and subordinated it and other topical proletarian issues to the sole task of securing universal suffrage. The left opposition, including Gyla Alpári, Jenő László, Béla Vágó, László Rudas and others, persistently fought against the reformist course of the party elite, for an organisational restructuring of the party and for more effective forms of struggle. Nevertheless, although the left wing did secure the support of some trade union and local Social-Democratic organisations, it was still weak and could not defeat the opportunists.

The opportunists expected the bourgeois opposition in parliament to support the struggle for a suffrage reform. But the opposition, heterogeneous both socially and politically, even though agreeing to form an alliance with the Social-Democratic leadership and support the proletariat's struggle for universal suffrage, pursued very limited goals. It wanted to bring pressure to bear on the monarch and thus remove Tiso's clique from power. But the active involvement of the popular masses in politics was the last thing the opposition wanted.

Tiso, however, greatly fearing a mass movement, acted swiftly to catch the opposition unawares. He used the police to remove the more active oppositioners from parliament and forced a positive vote on "emergency legislation". The government was given a free hand in case there was an "immediate danger" of war. Simultaneously, in order to split the ranks of the opposition, the government submitted a fairly moderate suffrage reform to parliament.

An emergency congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Hungary was convened in January 1913 to discuss the situation. While it was being prepared, the course pursued by the party leadership was criticised, and there were widespread proposals on countering the reactionary offensive with the proletarian weapon of a general political strike. Taking into consideration the militant spirit of the masses, the congress charged the party's leadership with calling an all-Hungary mass political strike at the right moment, but, unlike the previous years, it was to last until victory was secured and not for just one day.

Preparations for the decisive battle spread throughout the country, but reaction was getting ready for it, too. On March 1, the Budapest police department banned all demonstrations and street assemblies. By March 5, when the Chamber of Deputies was to vote on the government-submitted draft suffrage reform, numerous police and army contingents were stationed in the largest cities. The opposition lost the "war of the nerves" and, having lodged a formal protest against the government's intentions, left the assembly hall. The reformist leadership of the Social-Democratic Party of Hungary and of the trade unions followed suit. Instead of the expected call for action, the Social-Democratic leaders issued a manifesto with an appeal to give up the struggle, maintaining that a street revolution not supported by a revolution in parliament would lead to pointless bloodshed. The refusal to call a general strike, the retreat without a fight evoked profound disappointment in the party and in the working class. Essentially, in March 1913 the Hungarian proletariat irretrievably lost its struggle against war. The mass movement subsided abruptly, and soon the Hungarian working class was drawn into the slaughterhouse of World War I.

THE PROLETARIAT OF THE BALCAN COUNTRIES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY, PEACE AND NATIONAL LIBERATION

For all the distinctive character of each country, the working-class movement in the Balkans had certain features in common. The peoples of the peninsula faced the complex tasks of fighting for democ-

racy, liberation from Turkish and Austro-Hungarian national oppression, and from the feudal yoke. These tasks were to be accomplished in countries where the proletariat, especially industrial proletariat, was not at all numerous.

The working class of the Balkan countries was engaged in active economic and political struggle. That struggle was led by Marxist proletarian organisations: the Bulgarian Labour Social-Democratic Party (Tesnyaks) and the Serbian Social-Democratic Party in which Dimiter Tutzowicz again assumed the post of Secretary in 1908. In Bulgaria, the General Labour Syndical Union (GLSU), which numbered 8,500 members in 1912, acted in close collaboration with the Tesnyaks. Georgi Kirkov, Secretary of the BLSDP(T) Central Committee, played an important part in the Union's leadership, as did Georgi Dimitrov, member of the Tesnyak Central Committee, elected as Secretary of the Union. GLSU affiliates organised mutual assistance, carried on extensive educational work and were foremost in organising strikes. The strengthening of the GLSU positions won over members from the Free General Labour Syndical Union (FGLSU), influenced by reformists ("Broad Socialists").¹ In Serbia, the General Labour Union (GLU), which united the country's trade unions, was also guided by the Social-Democrats, but it did not join them, as was the case, for example, in Croatia and Slovenia. In 1911-1912, the GLU numbered over 8,000 members.² In 1909-1911, the GLSU and the Serbian trade unions concluded agreements on mutual assistance and cooperation in the strike struggle, against strike-breaking, etc.³

From 1908, a new rise in the strike movement began in *Bulgaria*. In February, 3,600 Pernik miners went on strike demanding an eight-hour working-day and the right to organise. The workers of Sliven fought for over two months against the lockout declared by the textile cartel. In 1909-1910, strikes broke out in almost all of the country's industrial centres. The number of strikes in 1910 was almost double the highest 1906 level and almost three times the 1908 figure. The workers at a match factory owned by a Belgian company were on strike for 133 days, from July to December 1909. The BLSDP(T) and the GLSU held 145 meetings among the strikers over that period. Simultaneously, mass political campaigns and demonstrations were organised demanding more democratic labour legislation and advancing the proletariat's class objectives; large-scale action was scheduled for May Day and other holidays. Over 1910, five such campaigns

¹ *История на профсъюзното движение в България*, София, 1973, стр. 196-204.

² *Синдикални покрет у Србији*, стр. 447-50, 480, 481.

³ *История на профсъюзното движение в България*, стр. 209.

conducted by the BLSDP(T) involved more than 100,000 people. The December action alone involved 40,000 people.¹

In *Serbia*, the proletariat was opposed by cartels of workshop owners, and unions and strikes were banned in the mining industry. After 1908 the number of strikes rose abruptly and doubled by 1911. However, there were few large-scale strikes like that of the Belgrade metal workers; they were mostly small strikes at enterprises of the handicraft type and the workers there also championed their rights to establish their own organisations. Strikers were increasingly on the offensive and in most cases they won. The trade unions were growing stronger and becoming more numerous.²

The struggle for the right to organise and to strike, and for new labour legislation was turning political and brought success. In 1910-1912, legislation was passed and implemented on a ten-hour working-day, on shorter working days for teenagers and women, on the workers' right to unite to protect their economic interests and to strike. That struggle was combined with an increasingly broad movement for universal suffrage, conducted under the slogans of the Serbian Social-Democratic Party. Still, in 1910-1912, the mass movement did not fit the pattern laid down by the national leadership of the GWU.³

The mass struggle opportunities of the proletariat of *Romania* were severely restricted by the reactionary policy of the ruling quarters which intensified after the suppression of the 1907 peasant uprising. In late 1909, the government passed legislation depriving 60,000 hired workers at government enterprises, including the railwaymen, their militant vanguard, of the right to be organised into trade unions and to strike. Still, in 1908-1909, Romania's strikers were often on the offensive already, and their demands reflected both immediate economic needs and their desire to resist violations of the law and the employers' arbitrary actions; the struggle continued against uniting the workers with the employers into the so-called corporations. The autumn of 1909 brought large-scale mass political action to defend working-class activists from unlawful persecution by the authorities.⁴

¹ See *A History of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Politizdat, Moscow 1971, pp. 123-24 (in Russian); В. Хаджиниколов и др., *Стачните борби на работническата класа в България*, Профиздат, София, 1960, стр. 125-64.

² *Синдикални покрет у Србији*, стр. 272, 480-81.

³ *Историјски архив Комунистичке партије Југославије*, т. III, Београд, 1950, стр. 89; *A History of Yugoslavia*, Vol. I, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1963, pp. 506-07 (in Russian).

⁴ See A. K. Moshanu, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-58, 168-72.

The strike movement continued to rise in 1910-1912. As many as 126 strikes were held over that period, and the number of strikers (up to mid-1912) exceeded 35,000.¹ Strike action increased in scale. In 1910-1912, general strikes, which generated a nationwide response, were held in Braila and Ploesti. Strikes were combined with other types of action. Workers in industrial centres conducted protest campaigns to support peasants and agricultural workers. In late 1911, an increasingly political movement was started for social insurance and more democratic labour legislation. For the first time since the turn of the century, May Day 1912 was marked with street demonstrations. The Social-Democratic Party of Romania, re-established in 1910, and the trade unions that joined it (the General Association of Romanian Trade Unions, which numbered from 4,000 to 10,000 members in different years of the period under review) consolidated their positions, although the strengthening of the left-wing trend was accompanied by indications of reformist policies.²

In 1910-1911, in Greece there was a wave of strikes in Piraeus, in Peloponnesus and in the mines of Laurium. Mass May Day action was led by Federasion, a socialist organisation.³

Of particular importance for the development of the working-class movement in the Balkans was the fact that national liberation tasks had not been fully accomplished there. The imperialist policy of the great powers brought new forms of oppression to the Balkan peoples, fostered chauvinism, national strife, and the threat of war. Nevertheless, the ruling quarters and the bourgeoisie of the Balkan countries preached annexation in the guise of national liberation.

The 1908 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary sharply aggravated all those problems. The Serbian SDP under Dimitar Tutzowicz and the BLSDP(T) under Dimitar Blagoev advocated a democratic solution to the Balkan national question through the creation of a Balkan Federal Republic.⁴ In December 1909 (January 1910), on Serbian SDP and Tesnyak initiative, the first Balkan Social-Democratic Conference was convened in Belgrade. It was attended by representatives of the Serbian SDP, the BLSDP(T), the Social-Democratic Parties of Croatia and Slavonia,

¹ *Documente din istoria mişcării muncitoreşti din România. 1910-1915*, Editura politică, Bucureşti, 1968, pp. 346, 575, 576, 577.

² For details see A. K. Moshanu, op. cit., pp. 206, 228, 245, 263.

³ See *Lenin and the Emergence of Communist Parties in Central and Southeast European Countries*, Nauka, Moscow, 1973, pp. 436-37 (in Russian).

⁴ See *A History of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, pp. 136-38; T. Y. Zyuzuykina, "The Serbian Social-Democratic Party on the National Question During the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina", *Balkan Slavonic Studies. Historiography and Sources*, Nauka, Moscow, 1972, pp. 161-87 (in Russian).

Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Southern Slav Social-Democratic Party, and Montenegrin, Greek, Macedonian and Turkish Social-Democratic organisations. Romanian Social-Democrats, who were unable to attend the conference, were represented by a Serbian Socialist. A total of 32 delegates from ten countries were present. The Conference resolution condemned the intrigues of the imperialist powers and the reactionary policy of the Balkan royal dynasties, stressed the justice of the Balkan peoples' struggle against oppression, national fragmentation and the foreign yoke. It also noted the historical necessity for the unification of the Balkan peoples, for the establishment of a single union of equal Balkan peoples—that is, a Balkan Federal Republic—based on comprehensive self-government in each country. The Conference specially stressed the class objectives of the proletariat and Social-Democrats in the struggle for peace and the unity of the Balkan peoples, for their national liberation and social emancipation. It was decided to strengthen the ties among Balkan Socialists, draw up a joint programme of action and establish a Balkan Social-Democratic Federation.

Subsequently, the slogan of a Balkan Federal Republic was widely advertised both in the Balkans and elsewhere. It countered the chauvinism of the ruling classes with the proletariat's struggle for an internationalist solution of the national question, helped enhance the unity and solidarity of the proletariat of the Balkan countries, and opened up the prospects for solving the general anti-feudal, anti-monarchist and anti-war issues. Lenin wrote: "The class-conscious workers of the Balkan countries are the first to put forward the slogan of a consistently democratic solution of the national problem in the Balkans. That slogan calls for a Balkan federal republic."¹

Still, on the issue of a Balkan Federal Republic, the position of the BLSDP(T) and the revolutionary forces in the Social-Democratic parties of Serbia and Romania was not sufficiently clear-cut and consistent; the struggle under that slogan was not used to win broad popular masses, above all the peasants, over to the side of the proletariat, to aim at the overthrow of the monarchy and the emancipation of the peasants. Meanwhile, Lenin stressed that the freedom of the Balkan peoples "can be ensured *only* by complete liberty inside *every* country and by a federation of completely and thoroughly democratic states"²; "if the tyranny of the landlords and the Balkan monarchies over the peoples remains, national oppression, too, is

¹ V. I. Lenin, "A New Chapter of World History", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 368.

² V. I. Lenin, "A Disgraceful Resolution", *Collected Works* Vol. 18, p. 353.

bound to persist in some measure or another"¹. Generally, the Social Democrats' internationalist position was supported by mass actions of the working people of the Balkan countries in 1909-1912, by their protest against imperialist policy and national oppression.

Since the liberation of the Balkan peoples began not with a democratic revolution, but in the course of the First Balkan War against Turkey (October 1912-March 1913), led by the royal dynasties, the bourgeoisie and the landowners, the working-class movement in the Balkan countries was especially handicapped. These difficulties exacerbated further during the Second Balkan War fought among the Balkan states themselves in the summer of 1913.

In those difficult years, however, the revolutionary Social-Democrats of the Balkan countries courageously opposed widespread nationalist and chauvinist sentiment and pursued an internationalist anti-war policy. A month before the First Balkan War broke out, the 19th Congress of the BLSDP(T) denounced the "treacherous policy of the ruling classes and dynasties in the Balkan countries" and exposed the course taken by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties, "which foment chauvinist hysteria among the more backward workers and popular masses, prodding them towards war". The party called on the working class to rally around the Social-Democratic banner and to wage an independent class struggle for a Balkan Federal Republic, which would ensure independence for the Balkan peoples, clear the way for their social advancement, give a new impetus to the class struggle and bring the victory of socialism closer.² On August 25 (September 7), 1912, the Central Committee of the BLSDP(T) issued a *Manifesto to the Working Class of Bulgaria* which exposed the policy of the bourgeoisie. On August 27 (September 9), mass anti-war action was started throughout the country. The Serbian Social-Democrats were also engaged in a vigorous anti-militarist campaign. On August 26 (September 8), at a Belgrade rally attended by many thousands of people, Tutzowicz harshly criticised militarism and chauvinism and called for the establishment of a federation of Balkan republics. The leaders of the Serbian SDP condemned Serbia's entry into the war; the Social-Democratic members in the National Assembly protested against the war and called for a democratic revolution and a Balkan Federation.³

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Social Significance of the Serbo-Bulgarian Victories", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 398.

² Българската комунистическа партия в резолюции и решения на конгресите, конференциите и пленумите на ЦК, том I, Издателство на Българската комунистическа партия, София, 1957, стр. 288-89.

³ Исторически архив Комунистичке партије Југославије, т. III, стр. 257; for details see M. A. Birman, "Serbia During the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913", *USSR Academy of Sciences Slavonic Studies Institute. Brief Reports*, No. 32, Moscow, 1961 (in Russian).

F. Filipović gave a Marxist interpretation of the Balkan developments in Bolshevik *Pravda*.

In October and December 1912, the Executive Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Romania called for a campaign against war, for a Balkan Federation, for democracy and universal suffrage, but its course was not consistent enough. The attempt by Stefan Gheorghiu, a left-winger, to demand more resolute anti-war action, disobedience and refusal to be mobilised, in the manifesto *War on War*, was tinged with anarcho-syndicalism. Gheorghiu's group was harshly criticised by the party leadership and persecuted by the government.¹ In September 1912, a mass anti-war campaign started in Romania; it was especially widespread in October and November.

When in the spring of 1913 the Balkans faced the threat of a new war, the Central Committee of the BLSDP(T) published a *Manifesto to the Working Class of Bulgaria* on April 17 (30), 1913, signed by Dimiter Blagoev, Kabakchiev and Georgi Dimitrov and condemning the fratricidal war, for which preparations were being made. On May Day, the workers voiced their anti-war feelings at rallies and meetings. The anti-war movement was joined by soldiers from combat units. The Tesnyaks did not confine their activities to propaganda and exposure of government policy in the army; they also took a direct part in the soldiers' anti-war action. Thousands of servicemen were court-martialled for joining the active anti-war struggle, for violating military discipline. Later, Lenin paid close attention to a report on the soldiers' action during the Balkan War, to the Bulgarian experience of revolutionary work in the army.

May Day celebrations in Serbia were marked with anti-war slogans. On the eve of the Second Balkan War the Social-Democrats spoke out against nationalist hysteria and demanded that the army be demobilised.² Federasion, a Greek socialist organisation, denounced the war policy, "the madness of the Balkan bourgeoisie".³ Romania's Socialists condemned the "acquisitions" their country had made in the war.

To sum up, the finest leaders of the working class of the belligerent Balkan countries succeeded in rousing part of the proletariat to the anti-war struggle and in gaining its confidence. The policy of the revolutionary Social-Democrats in the Balkans won the respect of the working people and led to success at the elections held after the Balkan wars. The working-class movement was on the rise again.

¹ *DIMMR, 1910-1915*, pp. 422-24; A. K. Moshanu, op. cit., pp. 281-82.

² *Историјски архив Комунистичке партије Југославије*, т. III, стр. 268-71.

³ See *Lenin and the Emergence of Communist Parties in the Central and South-east European Countries*, p. 439.

THE MAIN TRENDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT

The working-class movement was on the rise everywhere in the pre-war years. It brought an unprecedented general upsurge of the strike movement, mass action by the working people, sometimes exceptionally intense, and a powerful international anti-militarist movement. Examples include the mass revolutionary political strikes in Russia in 1912-1914, action on a giant scale by the miners of Britain and Germany, Italy's "Red Week", Hungary's "Red Thursday", the 1913 general strike of 425,000 people in Belgium,¹ and the "Tragic Week" in Spain in 1909, when a powerful anti-war drive in Catalonia led to an uprising with fighting on the barricades under the slogans of a republic which was actually proclaimed in several towns²; in 1911, Spain was again shaken by a large-scale anti-war strike. In Austria, where the reformists expected the introduction of universal suffrage and the Social-Democrats' success at the 1907 elections to ensure peaceful evolution and compliance by the working class, there was stubborn street fighting between the workers and the police and troops in Vienna in 1911. The 1909 events in Sweden reverberated throughout the world; a lockout by the employers touched off a month-long strike of 300,000 workers. As a result, mostly in the course of the strike, over 11 million working-days were lost. Lenin described the Swedish strike as "one of the biggest general strikes of the recent period".³ In Australia, the struggle of the workers against the employers in Broken Hill, which lasted for several months in 1909, set off a chain of far-reaching strikes, culminating in the Brisbane general strike of 1912, supported by railwaymen, miners and seamen; during that five-week strike strikers patrolled the streets and nobody, not even government employees, could work without permission from the strike committee.⁴

The working-class movement could not, and was not, uniform or homogeneous either on the international or on the national level. In different countries it reached its peak at different times, upsurges alternated with slumps within one and the same country, different outbreaks had different objectives and slogans. Alongside the short outbreaks lasting for a few days or even hours, alongside powerful

¹ Claude Renard, *La conquête du suffrage universel en Belgique*, Éditions de la fondation Jacques Jacquemotte, Bruxelles, 1966, pp. 273-74.

² Jaime Castiñeiras Muñoz, Javier Domínguez Martín-Sánchez, *Un siglo de lucha obrera en España*, pp. 165-67.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Eleventh Session of the International Socialist Bureau", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 141; for details see *A History of Sweden*, Nauka, Moscow, 1974, pp. 414-15 (in Russian).

⁴ Joe Harris, *The Bitter Fight. A Pictorial History of the Australian Labor Movement*, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1970, pp. 185-212.

explosions of popular wrath, there was the protracted and exhausting strike struggle of the working class which lasted for months and even years, like the miners' strike in Canada in 1912-1914.¹ The alternation of upsurges and slumps in the strike movement was sometimes gradual and sometimes abrupt. In Denmark, the number of working-days lost through industrial conflicts was ten times the 1910 level in 1911, then dropped to almost one-thirteenth of that in 1912, and then again rose almost eight-fold in 1913.² Still, there were no countries where the class struggle, after seemingly coming to a standstill, did not pick up again. In Japan, in spite of government reprisals and the split among the Socialists and the reformist trade unions imposed from above, the working-class movement grew from 11 strikes by 310 people in 1909 to 50 strikes by almost 8,000 people in 1914.³ In Portugal, in the first half of 1910, there were 85 strikes, almost equalling the total number of the previous 60 years. After the 1910 revolution which disappointed popular expectations, more than 100 strikes were held in October 1911 alone. The working class began to advance its own economic and political demands. Anti-government action mounted still further in 1913.⁴ An overall picture of the strike movement in the pre-war years is presented in Table 3.

For all the uneven and heterogeneous nature of the working-class movement in the period under review, it also revealed certain common features and trends in it. These include the intensifying confrontation between the working class and other strata of the population on the one hand and, on the other, the monopoly bourgeoisie and other ruling classes who were searching for new ways of consolidating their rule; the growing influence of socialist ideas among the proletariat and non-proletarian strata; and the increasing working-class trend to "lead the whole mass of working and exploited people towards the revolutionary overthrow of capital in general".⁵

Lenin noted in 1908 that "the sharpening of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie" was a common feature in all the

¹ Charles Lipton, *The Trade Union Movement of Canada. 1827-1959*, Canadian Social Publications, Montreal, 1966, pp. 107-08.

² Erling Olsen, *Danmarks økonomiske historie siden 1750*, G.E.C. Gads Forlag, København, 1962.

³ See *Rodo kumiai shobi rodo sogi tokei* (Statistics on Trade Unions and Labour Conflicts), Tokyo, 1933, pp. 32-40 (in Japanese).

⁴ See Yu. M. Kukushkin, "The Main Stages of the Working-Class and Democratic Movement in Portugal", *Modern History*, No. 6, 1974, p. 46 (in Russian); N. V. Yefimov, "The 1910 Revolution in Portugal", *Modern History*, No. 4, 1976, pp. 58-59 (in Russian).

⁵ V. I. Lenin, "Original Version of the Article 'The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 216.

advanced capitalist countries.¹ Still rising in the years that followed, it came to the surface not only in the countries where the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie was making the situation ripe for a socialist revolution, but also in the countries where a bourgeois-democratic revolution was still to occur, specifically in Russia, whose working class was fighting for revolutionary democratic transformations, for the evolution of a bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist one.

General democratic demands were becoming increasingly important everywhere. Old contradictions, generated by the still unresolved problems of capitalist development, blended with new, imperialist contradictions, exacerbating the situation to a great extent. That was also true of countries where bourgeois-democratic revolutions had been mostly completed—here, the struggle intensified for democratic rights which were infringed and sometimes grossly violated by the imperialist bourgeoisie. The policy of the ruling quarters who attempted to use bourgeois reformism to consolidate “national forces” did not rule out and, conversely, even strengthened their readiness to resort to extreme measures without any regard for the existing standards of bourgeois law.²

The issues of militarism and war emerged as foremost in the political struggle in all countries. The anti-war movement united broad sections of the working class, often irrespective of their party and trade union affiliation and despite efforts by the leaders of some workers’ parties and organisations. That, for example, was typical of anti-war action in France in 1912-1913. In Italy, the struggle against militarism and war in 1911-1912 spread to the non-proletarian sections of the population. Despite persecution by the authorities, the anti-militarist speeches of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg generated a widespread public response, even among German soldiers.³

In the pre-war period, the proletariat’s economic struggle increasingly intertwined with its political struggle, the latter’s extra-parliamentary forms were growing in scope and significance, revolutionary parliamentarianism was beginning to develop, and the mass

¹ V. I. Lenin, “Inflammable Material in World Politics”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 186.

² See I. A. Belyavskaya, “Lenin on Bourgeois Reformism in the United States and Western Europe”, *The American Yearbook 1971*, Nauka, Moscow, 1971, pp. 5-28 (in Russian).

³ *Rosa Luxemburg im Kampf gegen den deutschen Militarismus. Prozessberichte und Materialien aus den Jahren 1913 bis 1915*, S. 183-94; Heinz Wohlgemuth, *Karl Liebknecht. Eine Biographie*, S. 211-34.

Table 3

The Strike Movement

Countries	1908			1909			1910		
	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
Austria-Hungary:									
Austria	721	79	1,011	580	62	729	657	55	1,129
Hungary	251	19	410	181	13	419	162	21	368
Belgium	101	14	—	119	11	—	108	26	—
Bulgaria	80	—	—	146	—	—	218	—	—
Canada ¹	76	26	704	90	18	881	101	22	731
France	1,073	99	1,721	1,025	167	3,560	1,502	281	4,830
Germany	1,347	76	2,259	1,537	107	2,813	2,113	168	4,582
Great Britain ²	399	296	10,834	436	301	2,774	531	515	9,895
Italy ³	1,703	371	2,202	1,063	188	1,674	1,118	199	3,019
Japan ¹	13	0.8	—	11	0.3	—	10	2.9	—
Romania ⁴	42	—	—	34	—	—	168	35	530
Russia ⁵	892	176	865	340	64	418	222	47	256
Serbia	19	1.5	60	47	1.2	45	47	1	53
Spain ¹	182	13	—	147	7	—	246	36	1,409
Sweden ¹	302	40	1,842	138	302	11,800	76	4	40
United States ¹	1,957	209	—	2,425	452	—	3,334	824	—

Notes:

I is the number of strikes; II, of strikers (in thousands); III, of man-days of strikes; official statistics of Belgium, Japan and the United States.

¹ The indicated number of strikers and man-days corresponds to the

² Strikes and lockouts.

³ Number of man-days in industry.

⁴ The 1910 column gives the number of strikes for 1910-1912 and that of

⁵ Industrial Monitoring Commission figures.

* Figures calculated from official strike statistics. For Bulgaria, B. Хад-А. К. Мoшану, op. cit.; for Serbia, *Синдикални покрет у Србији*; for the New York, 1935;

in 1908-1914 *

1911			1912			1913			1914		
I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
706	122	1,710	761	186	1,862	438	40	409	260	33	264
232	28	488	244	18	248	177	34	437	—	—	—
156	55	—	202	61	—	162	16	—	—	—	—
165	—	—	80	—	—	13	—	—	70	—	—
100	29	1,821	181	43	1,136	152	41	1,036	63	10	491
1,471	231	4,096	1,116	268	2,318	1,073	220	2,224	672	161	2,192
2,566	238	7,731	2,510	417	7,712	2,127	266	8,819	1,115	61	1,715
903	962	10,320	857	1,463	40,915	1,497	689	11,631	972	447	9,878
1,255	385	2,623	1,090	240	2,078	907	465	3,978	907	221	2,176
23	2.1	—	49	5.7	—	47	5.2	—	50	7.9	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
466	105	791	2,032	725	2,376	2,404	887	3,863	3,534	1,337	5,755
78	2.8	107	53	2.5	60	7	0.9	6	—	—	—
311	22	364	279	36	1,156	284	84	2,258	212	49	1,018
98	21	570	116	10	290	119	10	303	115	14	620
2,565	373	—	3,053	972	—	3,574	997	—	2,736	627	—

days (in thousands). No information on man-days for that period in the

following number of strikes:

1908	1909	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914
127	78	151	118	171	201	140

strikers and man-days, for the period from 1910 through the first half of 1912.

ЖИНИКОЛОВ и др., *Стачните борби...*; for Romania, DIMMR, 1910-1915; United States, J. I. Griffin, *Strikes. A Study in Quantitative Economics*,

movement was overcoming its old framework. This applied to the political action by the Russian proletariat, to the drive for more democratic suffrage in Prussia, to the 1913 general strike by Belgian workers who wanted a revised constitution, and to the Hungarian workers' struggle for universal suffrage.

The working-class movement grew significantly in scope, both on a national and an international level; proletarian solidarity became stronger; feelings and demands began to be expressed which, originally expressing the workers' narrow interests, led them to an understanding of an entire system of problems connected with the position of the working class in bourgeois society. That facilitated unity of different working-class contingents and helped them in staging large-scale joint action. Developments in Britain were a case in point, when the demand for a minimum wage was the direct cause of the biggest general strike by British miners in the pre-war years. The working class took mass action which spread throughout, and beyond, whole industries. Besides, such demands as the establishment of the minimum wage or the introduction of a progressive social insurance system were often addressed by all the workers to all the capitalists (at least in a given industry) and envisaged their implementation by government legislative measures.

The first ever attempts at concerted international strikes by the workers of one or several industries were a salient feature of the pre-war period. For example, in June 1911, there was an international merchant marine strike by the seamen of Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands (German, Danish and Norwegian seamen were also supposed to take part). Two years later, the Dublin strike and the 1913 lockout gave rise to a broad solidarity movement in Britain—fund raising, food shipments, etc.—and solidarity strikes; there were demands for a general strike to support the Irish.

The proletariat became better organised. In 1914, workers' parties numbered over 4,200,000 members. The influence they commanded was borne out by the 10,500,000 votes the Social-Democrats won at elections and the 646 seats in the parliaments of 14 countries, and by the more than 22,000 seats they won in the local representative bodies of 12 countries. Over 200,000 women took part in the Social-Democratic movement; socialist youth organisations boasted a membership of over 180,000. By 1914, trade union membership had reached 14 to 16 million. Almost 20 million people were members of consumer cooperatives in 23 countries.

But there were also common difficulties on an international and a national levels. Amid the growing ideological pressure by the bourgeoisie and its attempts to impose an openly imperialist, chauvinist or a bourgeois-reformist spirit on the working class, the latter's parties had to step up their struggle against bourgeois ideolo-

gy. Besides, the revolutionary forces had to fight both against right-wing opportunists and their Centrist allies and against anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism.

The joining of the struggle by new proletarian masses inevitably strengthened elements of spontaneity in the working-class movement which presented a certain danger for its further development. Still, Lenin noted, "the spontaneity of the movement is proof that it is deeply rooted in the masses, that its roots are firm and that it is inevitable".¹ Besides, in the specific conditions obtaining on the eve of World War I, spontaneity often expressed the reaction of the masses to the type of "organisation", deeply ingrained in Social-Democratic parties and trade unions, which sometimes ceased to be a means of advancing the working-class movement and impeded its progress instead. A conflict emerged between the official Social-Democratic and trade union "organisation" and the mounting mass movement which did not fit the pre-set patterns.

The Bolshevik Party led by Lenin consistently pursued a proletarian revolutionary policy. The experience of the Russian working-class movement was especially valuable because history itself placed it in the vanguard of the world proletarian struggle and also because it was led by the Bolshevik Party which used the entire diversity of forms and methods of the working-class struggle. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks paid close attention to the experience accumulated by the working class of different countries. Lenin formulated the task of using all that was valuable in the German Social-Democratic experience.² He stressed the need to learn from unfortunate experience, from the mistakes and flaws of other parties, clearly identifying what aspects in the proletarian movement of a foreign country should not be imitated.³

The international working-class movement on the eve of World War I assimilated the Russian experience of the mass revolutionary strike combined with other forms and methods of struggle, both parliamentary and non-parliamentary, the experience of the Bolshevik Party, which managed against extreme odds to lead the people along the correct road. An important ingredient in the experience accumulated by the international working class was the lesson of the unprecedented upsurge in the mass struggle of British and

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Russian Revolution and Civil War. They Are Trying to Frighten Us with Civil War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 31.

² See V. I. Lenin to Inessa Armand, April 1914, *Collected Works*, Vol. 43, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 397.

³ See V. I. Lenin, "What Should Not Be Copied from the German Labour Movement", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 256-58.

US workers which broke through the old trade-unionist framework. The German working-class movement, which gained valuable experience in mass organisation, also made its contribution. The revolutionary wing of the SPD firmly upheld Marxist positions, which became especially important later on during the coming war. The fine traditions of the Paris Commune and the Garibaldi movement lived on in the democratic struggle of the working class of France and Italy. The Socialists of the Balkans displayed international proletarian solidarity in tackling national liberation tasks. The proletarians of all countries further developed the traditions of the anti-war movement which assumed particular importance in that period.

An objective basis was emerging everywhere for the stronger revolutionary role of the proletariat, opportunities increased for its further struggle for socialism, provided that anti-imperialist and other general democratic demands were properly formulated and actively pursued.

At the same time, the pre-war years laid increasingly bare the flaws and weaknesses of the workers' and socialist movement: the growth of reformism and centrism, the persistence of anarchist and syndicalist trends, and the relative weakness of revolutionary Social-Democracy in most countries. All that could not fail to affect the way the mass struggle developed as the crucial ingredient of the ripening revolutionary situation and the latter's development into revolution. The revolutionary Social-Democrats' break with the openly opportunist and Centrist forces in the international working-class movement was becoming historically inevitable. World War I, started by the imperialists, revealed new processes with particular clarity.

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Chapter 8

THE WORKING CLASS
AND ITS MOVEMENT IN COLONIAL
AND DEPENDENT COUNTRIES
IN THE EARLY 20th CENTURY

As the mass working-class movement in developed capitalist countries moved inexorably closer to the decisive battle for socialism, in colonial and dependent countries the proletariat continued to grow and took new and increasingly noticeable steps to become united and well organised.

The shaping and struggle of the proletariat of Latin America, Asia and Africa occurred in the complex situation when imperialist domination, supported by local reactionaries and feudal-monarchist regimes, was intensifying and at the same time the national liberation movement, which had received a powerful impetus from the Russian revolution of 1905-1907, was experiencing an upsurge. The growing anti-imperialist movement in Latin America, Asia and Africa was among the factors presaging a new era in world history which combined, as Lenin foresaw, "civil war by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries and a *whole series* of democratic and revolutionary movements, including the national liberation movement, in the undeveloped, backward and oppressed nations".¹

The development of the proletarian movement was also linked with the nationwide struggle for national liberation in colonial and dependent countries. The manner in which the proletariat was taking shape and the degree of maturity it achieved differed from region to region and from country to country.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p. 60.

LATIN AMERICA: THE GROWTH OF THE PROLETARIAT'S ORGANISED STRUGGLE

IMPERIALIST EXPANSION AND THE WORKING CLASS

In the first decade of the 20th century, foreign capital, mostly US monopolies which were pushing aside their British, French and German rivals, continued to consolidate its positions in Latin America. This considerably slowed down the development of indigenous, national capitalism. Backward economies adversely affected by world market fluctuations and the low living standards of the popular masses ensued from the sway of foreign capital.

Before World War I, even in the more developed Latin American countries the material and technical basis of industry was extremely poor; small enterprises predominated, and even large-scale production mostly used cheap manual labour. In Brazil, the working class was scattered among thousands of petty workshops of a purely handicraft type. The situation was similar in Chile, where 74,618 workers were engaged at 5,722 industrial enterprises in 1910. In Argentina, 3,000 small-scale iron-and-steel and mechanical workshops employed 29,000 workers.¹ Manual labour was used at the largest tobacco factories in Mexico, too, three of them employing 3,000 people.²

At the start of the second decade of the 20th century and especially during World War I, new factories, ports, roads and municipal facilities were being rapidly constructed in Latin America. Large-scale modern industries emerged. For example, the Buenos Aires footwear factory, equipped with the latest machinery, employed 850 workers.³ Manufactories and handicraft shops were being turned into small factories and mechanical workshops. The first factories appeared in Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, and other countries. For example, in Colombia, the first textile factory, employing 500 workers, was built in 1909. During World War I, in several countries motor vehicle, locomotive and railway car assembly workshops were set up by foreign monopolies to serve the war requirements of the imperialist powers.

Capitalism increasingly developed in Latin American agriculture, too. It did not, however, do away with the large landed estates or with the dominant pre-capitalist forms of exploitation. On the

¹ Jaime Fuchs, *Argentina: su desarrollo capitalista*, Editorial Cartago, Buenos Aires, 1969, p. 121.

² See Yu. I. Vizgunova, *The Working Class of Contemporary Mexico*, Nauka, Moscow, 1973, p. 18 (in Russian).

³ *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), May 25, 1910, p. 262.

contrary, operating alongside them, it increased the use of hired labour; masses of poor peasants came to form the rural proletariat and semi-proletariat.

Industrial growth and capitalist penetration of agriculture enlarged the working class. While the number of wage workers in Latin America was about 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 at the start of the century, by 1917 it had already reached 3 to 4 million¹; in Argentina, this number had doubled by 1914 compared to the late 19th century. The proletariat and semi-proletariat numbered 1,780,000 people—more than half the entire able-bodied population—including 600,000 agricultural and 410,000 industrial workers. In Brazil, the number of industrial workers also increased rapidly. From 1900 to 1920, it grew several times over and reached 410,000 people; the figure for the manufacturing industry rose from 151,800 to 275,500 between 1907 and 1920. Significantly, by the end of the second decade of the 20th century, the number of factory workers in the country was double that of handicraft workshop workers.² Of these, 1,500,000 were urban workers and agricultural labourers. In Cuba, the number of wage workers reached 950,000 by that time; 300,000 of them worked in agriculture, and 126,000 in municipal services and transport. In Mexico, the industrial proletariat numbered about 300,000 people in 1910, while the total number of the employed was 5,581,000. Up to 90,000 people worked in the mines, 74,000 in the construction industry, over 50,000 on the railways, and 32,000 at textile mills. Two-thirds of all the urban proletariat were employed at enterprises of the handicraft type.³ In Chile, about 1 million of the 1,250,000 employed were wage workers in 1907. That figure included 300,000 industrial workers,⁴ 220,000 agricultural workers and 240,000 workers on short-term contracts in various industries. In Peru, at the beginning of the century the manufacturing industry employed 10,000 wage workers; in 1919, the figure rose to 76,000.⁵

To sum up, the proletariat was growing in the more developed Latin American countries and already included a sizable group of factory workers.

The influx of immigrants from Europe was one of the factors contributing to this growth. In such countries as Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Cuba, Chile and Mexico, this helped to make the struggle of the Latin American proletariat more vigorous

¹ *The Proletariat of Latin America*, Mysl, Moscow, 1968, pp. 16-17 (in Russian).

² See B. I. Koval, *A History of the Brazilian Proletariat*, Nauka, Moscow, 1968, pp. 52, 98; *Brazil*, Moscow, 1963, pp. 92, 96 (both in Russian).

³ Yu. I. Vizgunova, *op. cit.*, pp. 17, 18.

⁴ See *Essays on Chilean History*, Nauka, Moscow, 1967, pp. 214-15 (in Russian).

⁵ Jorge del Prado, *40 años de lucha*, Lima, 1968, pp. 5-6.

and class-conscious; it was not accidental that the employers tried to foment discord and strife among workers of different ethnic groups.

In Colombia, Paraguay, Venezuela and Ecuador the proletariat in the making was represented by relatively small groups of transport, dock, and construction workers and those working at small handicraft workshops and municipal facilities. In Central America, plantation workers formed the core of the emergent proletariat.

The poorly developed indigeneous capitalism, the sway of the latifundistas and especially the domination of foreign capital in Latin America made the condition of the proletariat extremely difficult. In Mexico, for example, the average nominal wage of industrial workers rose by 17 per cent compared to 1910, while prices increased 70 per cent over the same period.¹ In Argentina, according to official statistics, the workers' wages increased by 35 to 40 per cent from 1910 to 1919, while the cost of living rose by 86 per cent. The wages of even the narrow section of skilled workers were smaller than the officially established subsistence minimum.² In backward areas and countries with large black and Indian populations, where pre-capitalist relations were still strong, foreign monopolies widely resorted to various types of forced labour, especially in agriculture. Plantations employed mostly free wage workers. But they were paid in kind or in coupons which were only valid on the given plantation and this tied the worker to his job. Apart from that, workers became the employer's slaves because their meagre pay forced them to take foodstuffs on credit.³

The foreign monopoly oppression was combined with growing pressure exerted by local capital in the hope of making its goods more competitive. Therefore, the condition of the workers employed at small handicraft workshops was extremely difficult. Before World War I, there was hardly any labour legislation in Latin America, working hours were not limited, wages were fixed arbitrarily by the employers themselves, social security was non-existent, trade unions were powerless, and so on.

The working class was deprived of political rights and suffered from the repressive, and anti-labour domestic social policy, from the militarisation of the economy and the incessant rivalry among all kinds of ruling-class cliques.

¹ N. M. Lavrov, *The Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917*, Nauka, Moscow, 1972, p. 48 (in Russian).

² See *Essays on Argentinian History*, Sotsekgiz, Moscow, 1961, p. 254 (in Russian).

³ See Federico Brito Figueroa, *Venezuela siglo XX*, Casa de las Américas, La Habana, 1967, p. 86.

THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION ON THE WORKING-CLASS
AND ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

The Russian revolution of 1905-1907 gave rise to a period of "great world storms"¹ and helped completely awaken the masses not only in Asia but also in Latin America. The Russian revolution brought changes to the Latin American liberation movement and led to the upsurge of proletarian solidarity. It set an inspiring example to the progressive forces in Latin America where national liberation and democratic movements continued to develop in the early 20th century. The aggressive ventures of US imperialism and the growing enslavement of the Latin American countries by foreign monopolies produced indignation among the popular masses and increasingly attracted their attention to Russia, where the people rose to fight autocracy and despotism.

Progressive Latin American public opinion was outraged to learn of the massacre of a peaceful demonstration in St. Petersburg, of hundreds of people being killed and thousands wounded.² The press daily published detailed reports from Russia³ which evoked a widespread public response. Russia's minister in Brazil reported to St. Petersburg in March 1905 that in Latin America "most organs of the press were publishing numerous attacks on the Russian Government" and "the most hostile are ... organs of the Socialist Party".⁴

Right from the start of the 1905 revolution, progressive forces in Latin America focussed their attention on the Russian working class. The first reports in the Latin American press already brought news of numerous strikes. The prominent propagandist of Marxism Carlos Baliño wrote in his article "Strikes in Russia" in the Cuban labour newspaper *La Voz Obrera*: "Politically conscious workers will not cease to follow, with great sympathy and hope, the developments threatening the crown and the life of the Russian autocrat. Let the exploiters fall and the exploited triumph."⁵ A tumultous meeting of workers in the wood-working, footwear, baking and leather-working industries and of employees of a number of newspapers, cafes, restaurants and hotels was held in Havana to mark

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, 1973, p. 584.

² "Archivo Nacional de Cuba", *La Lucha*, January 24, 1905.

³ See, for example, N. M. Lavrov, op. cit., pp. 46-48.

⁴ Russian Foreign Policy Archives (hereafter RFPA), f. Chancellery 1905, f. 103, pp. 39-40 (in Russian).

⁵ *La Voz Obrera*, February 17, 1905.

the 1905 Bloody Sunday. Representatives of workers' organisations both from the capital and from the provinces attended. The press noted that Cuban workers displayed "enthusiasm for the emancipation objectives for which the victims of Russian despotism have paid with their blood". Since the meeting was a great success, it was decided to hold an assembly of workers representing various areas of the republic in one of Havana's theatres, "so that the unanimity of the Cuban proletariat's class consciousness could be seen outside Cuba".¹

Reports in the Cuban newspaper *La Lucha* are typical in this respect. They concentrated on the struggle of the Russian working class and on the way the popular revolution was developing, including peasant uprisings and the national liberation movement of the peoples of Russia, particularly in the Caucasus.²

In Uruguay, a socialist rally was held in Montevideo in late January to express solidarity with the mounting Russian revolution. A Russian diplomat observed that attendance by several thousand demonstrators testified to the fact that sympathy for the Russian revolution was spreading beyond the Socialist Party. "Moreover," he added, "there were banners with outrageous inscriptions which the demonstrators carried about the city without any hindrance on the part of the authorities."³

In summing up the initial diplomatic reports from Latin America, the Russian Foreign Ministry noted: "The reports of strikes in St. Petersburg and the events of January 9 brought forth a movement hostile to the Imperial Government in the South American republics."⁴

That was an accurate assessment. The Russian revolution generated a wave of revolutionary enthusiasm in many Latin American countries, especially Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico and Cuba. Jesús Romero Flores, a veteran of the Mexican revolutionary movement, recalled: "We were inspired by the revolutionary storm in Russia in 1905. The struggle that developed in Russia was our guiding star."⁵ News of the Russian revolution and the solidarity movement in Western Europe and North America helped step up the struggle against dictatorship in Mexico. As the Russian charge d'affaires in Argentina reported on May 31, 1905, news of the revolutionary struggle in Russia caused "disturbances" in Buenos Aires

¹ "Archivo Nacional de Cuba", *La Lucha*, February 7, 1905.

² See "Archivo Nacional de Cuba", *La Lucha*, January 23-26, February 5, 8, 19, 20, September 15, October 2, 11, 13, 15, 16, 26, 30, November 23, 1905.

³ *RFPA*, f. Chancellery, 1905, f. 103, pp. 39-40.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁵ *La Voz de México*, November 14, 1955.

and Montevideo where "a demonstration began to be prepared" and strikes broke out. The Argentinian Cabinet even declared a state of emergency and announced its intention to "do everything possible" to prevent "the planned manifestation against the Imperial Government". Still, in spite of the state of emergency, the Socialist Party staged a rally in Buenos Aires in May 1905; there were anti-government demonstrations and clashes with the police "because of red flags raised on sticks and poles".¹ The Chilean workers' papers (*El Proletario*, *La Reforma* and others) noted that the Chilean proletariat shared the ideas of the Russian revolution; they raised funds to support it which, as *El Proletario* said, were to add further fuel to the flames engulfing the tsar's throne.²

A Russian diplomat reported that in Rio de Janeiro, capital of Brazil, a mass rally was held in March 1905 attended by "about 500 socialist workers". The rally discussed "the appeal of the Russian proletariat", its request for "moral support from its brothers throughout the world" and adopted the "text of an answer".³ The Brazilian newspapers *Novo Rumo* and *Terra Levre*, published by the anarchists in São Paulo, called on the workers to contribute one day's wages to support the Russian socialists.⁴ In that same city, socialists and anarchists held a mass rally, which adopted a special resolution proclaiming that "the Russian revolutionaries' struggle for freedom and human dignity is the cause of all mankind". It also protested against brutal tsarist reprisals.⁵ The Brazilian revolutionary democrat Euclides da Cunha wrote that revolutionary Russia would be the invincible sentinel of the whole of European civilization.

As the prominent scholar José L. Franco, a veteran of the Cuban revolutionary struggle, recalled, "anything in any way connected with the heroic struggle of the revolutionary proletariat in faraway Russia generated great interest in Cuba. Never before had the Cuban people felt so concerned about any social battle of humanity as then, in 1904-1905".⁶

Significantly, the participants in the 1906 uprising against the pro-US Cuban government called the Cuban Minister of the Interior a "Russian tsar" or a Trepov, government troops were nicknamed

¹ *RFPA*, f. Chancellery, 1905, f. 103, pp. 39-40, 87-89.

² *El Partido Comunista de Chile y el movimiento comunista internacional. Documentos e informes emanados de plenos y congresos del Partido Comunista de Chile*, Santiago de Chile, s.a., p. 98.

³ *RFPA*, f. Chancellery, 1905, f. 103, p. 68.

⁴ *Revista brasiliense* (Rio de Janeiro), No. 1, 1955, p. 73.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ José L. Franco, "The Echo of the First Russian Revolution in Cuba", *Novaya i Noveishaya istoriya*, No. 5, 1965, p. 89 (in Russian).

Cossacks,¹ and the actions of the rural guard were likened to the punitive operations of "the tsar's soldiers".²

The impact of the Russian revolution of 1905-1907 was so great that the authorities had every reason for regarding even revolutionary outbreaks that occurred in Latin America a few years after 1905 as a direct echo of the Russian upheaval. For example, in 1908 the First Congress of Brazilian Workers adopted a resolution of solidarity with the Russian revolution, although by that time the revolution had been replaced by a period of extreme reaction. In 1910 in the Argentinian province of Pampa Central there was unrest among immigrant colonists whose position was aggravated by crop failures and famine. The Russian charge d'affaires believed that the colonists' demands were satisfied precisely because the authorities were "haunted by the spectre of an agrarian pogrom Russian style".³

The Russian revolution contributed to the upsurge of the mass working-class and liberation movement in Latin American countries and perceptibly influenced the shaping of the proletariat's class consciousness and the growing interest in scientific socialism.

IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL TRENDS AND ORGANISATIONS IN THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT. THE RISE OF THE PROLETARIAT'S STRUGGLE

In the early 20th century the Latin American proletariat stepped up its struggle to improve its economic and political position, the network of trade unions expanded and the socialist movement grew stronger. The Argentinian Socialists, who had established their party back in the 19th century, even had a small group in parliament (eight to ten seats). In 1907, the Socialist Party of Argentina operated and enjoyed great influence in 14 various organisations in the capital (political, cooperative, educational and others) and in 20 provincial organisations.

A Socialist Party was formed in 1910 in Uruguay and in 1912 in Chile. Although neither was numerous, both played an important part in their countries' working-class movement. Small and short-lived political socialist groups with little influence existed in Brazil and Mexico. Still, the socialist movement was growing and becoming an increasingly noticeable factor in the politics of many Latin American countries.

¹ D. A. Lockmiller, *Magoon in Cuba*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1938, pp. 28-30; Rafael Martínez Ortiz, *Cuba. Los primeros años de independencia*, vol. II, Paris, 1921.

² Archivo histórico provincial de Oriente, Fondo Gobierno provincial, legajo 1905, número 119. Partido Socialista. Manifiesto *A las clases productoras, obreros, artesanos y agricultores de Oriente*.

³ RFPA, f. Chancellery, 1911, f. 15, pp. 48-54.

Immigrants from Europe played an important part. Latin American Socialists established comprehensive ties with the European working-class movement and its leaders, specifically with the Spanish socialist leaders Pablo Iglesias and Largo Caballero, and subscribed to foreign socialist newspapers—*L'Humanité* from France and *El Socialista* from Spain.¹

The Socialists set up workers' universities and educational societies, disseminated the idea that the emancipation of the working people was their own class job, championed the economic interests of industrial workers, handicraftsmen, peasants and all persons "engaged in heavy manual labour", established consumer and production cooperatives, vigorously opposed clericalism, demanded democratic reforms, participated in elections, and set up workers' libraries.

Socialist parties and organisations helped to disseminate certain Marxist ideas. Even in the Province of Oriente, an outlying area of Cuba, the local Socialist Party issued a 1908 election manifesto declaring its support for the ideas of "the eminent sociologist Karl Marx" who had proven that the emancipation of the working class was the mission of the working class itself and that "the worker's subjection to capital is the source of all political, moral and material enslavement".²

Still, Latin American Socialists often had rather vague notions of socialism. While setting great store by Marx's theory of surplus value, they maintained that "all that is fundamental to Marx's economic theory ... has already been set forth in John Stuart Mill's *Principles of Political Economy*".³ Reformist and utopian ideas were also quite widespread among Socialists. The workers' press also praised the advice of "the great Spencer" who saw education, moderation and economy as "the road to the emancipation" of the working people.⁴ The Socialist Party of Cuba proclaimed its foremost goals to include securing the right to "participate in national government", "ensuring relative well-being", the slow and gradual transformation of society in the name of creating "a new, socialist state which will introduce equality, fraternity and justice", and municipal autonomy.⁵

¹ See Ernesto Palacio, *Historia de la Argentina, 1515-1957*, tomo II, A. Peña Lillo, Buenos Aires, 1957, pp. 312-13.

² Archivo histórico provincial de Oriente, Fondo Gobierno provincial, legajo 1905, número 119. Partido Socialista. Manifiesto *A las clases productoras y a los obreros en general de la ciudad de Santiago de Cuba*.

³ *El municipio y las clases obreras. Estudio de filosofía social*, La Habana, 1904, p. 12.

⁴ *La prensa obrera en Chile*, Universidad de Chile, 1970, p. 97.

⁵ Archivo histórico provincial de Oriente, Fondo Gobierno provincial, legajo 1905, número 119. Manifiesto *Al Pueblo Socialista*.

In their efforts to effectively uphold the interests of the working people, the left-wing elements in the socialist parties stressed that there should be no merging with liberal parties and trends "because there are considerable differences between the doctrines and trends of the liberal bourgeoisie and Socialist Party principles".¹ Meanwhile, sectarian trends were also widespread among Socialists. Immigrant socialist sections stood in isolation, mostly as petty-bourgeois organisations of intellectuals, reformism typical of their activities. True, the prominent Argentinian Socialist Juan B. Justo resolutely rebuffed the ruling classes' attempts at proving that socialism had no future in Argentina and that the class struggle was imported to Latin America from Europe and would cease as soon as European immigrant workers were deported.² The leaders of the Argentinian and Uruguayan socialist parties were directly influenced by the right wing of the Second International. Justo himself and other Argentinian socialist leaders idealised parliamentarianism. Relying chiefly on parliamentary and educational work, Argentinian and Uruguayan socialist leaders merely temporised and passively watched the working class wage its mass struggle. For example, they tried not to be involved in the organisation of strikes and only assisted when the strikes became inevitable. It was also popular to regard the state as a non-class entity. For example, Justo maintained that the working class "sees the state as a power coordinating and regulating the relations of persons involved in production", and that, when the proletariat secured a dominant role through general elections, "the state will lose its function of policeman and governor".³

Not all of such notions were accepted by the majority of party members. For example, Justo's claim that "the United States is a school of freedom and democracy" was constantly criticised.⁴ De Leon observed that Justo was recognised as a reformist in the Second International.⁵ The report he prepared for the 1913 Session of the International Socialist Bureau was described as "disappointing".⁶ Opposition groups sprang up within the Socialist Party of Argentina. In 1912, the young left Argentinian Socialists led by Victorio Codo-villa, Rodolfo Ghioldi, and others set up a centre to study the works

¹ Archivo histórico provincial de Oriente, Fondo Gobierno provincial. Legajo 1905, número 119. El Comité de propaganda del Partido Socialista.

² See Rodolfo Ghioldi, *Lenin y el pensamiento contemporáneo*, Editorial Anteo, Buenos Aires, 1972, p. 38.

³ Juan B. Justo, *Discursos y escritos políticos*, Buenos Aires, 1933, pp. 129-30.

⁴ *Izquierdas y derechas en América Latina. Documentos, Selección y comentarios* por Carlos Machado, Patria Grande, Montevideo, 1968, p. 51.

⁵ Daniel de Leon, *Flashlights of the Amsterdam Congress*, New York Labor News Co., New York, 1929, p. 91.

⁶ Georges Haupt, *Socialism and the Great War. The Collapse of the Second International*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, p. 143.

of Marx. For two years that group published the newspaper *Palabra Socialista*, which accused Justo and his supporters of dragging the party into the quagmire of opportunism. The left Socialists declared that, in the struggle against the influence of "practical revisionism", one must advocate "Karl Marx's integral, pure and majestic in their logic socialist concepts".¹ They established a Trade Union Propaganda Committee to overcome the policy pursued by the party's leaders who disdained the mass working-class and trade union movement. The committee managed to achieve certain positive results in pursuing a course of common struggle with the syndicalists. Subsequently, however, the party leadership disbanded the committee on the pretext that a party "fighting exclusively for political goals should not have any direct or close ties with it".²

In Chile, the Socialist Party was more proletarian in its composition and more revolutionary, although a reformist trend did exist in it. Even before the party was established, leaders of the working-class movement were active in organising class education for the workers, directed strikes and political demonstrations, and used the parliament in the interest of the proletariat. The work of the prominent revolutionary Luis Emilio Recabárren was of paramount importance, and not only for Chile. A printing worker, organiser of the proletarian press and propagandist of Marxism, he was elected to Congress in 1906. This was the first time that a worker had become a member of parliament in Latin America. In parliament, Recabárren acted as a true revolutionary, championed the rights of the working class and exposed the class nature of the state and its policy. For this he was soon driven out of Congress by the reactionary majority. In 1906-1912, Recabárren worked hard to establish a truly workers' party. In 1906, he organised the Democratic Party which was essentially Social-Democratic; in 1908, it was admitted to the Second International.

In 1912, the group of revolutionary socialists led by Recabárren formed the Socialist Labour Party. Recabárren tried to direct its efforts into strengthening the existing trade union organisations, expanding the proletariat's struggle for its immediate economic demands, and educating the working class as a political force capable of performing its historical mission. That year *El Despertar de los Trabajadores*, a socialist national labour newspaper, appeared which educated and organised the Chilean proletariat for several years. Socialist newspapers published in different areas of the country

¹ Leonardo Paso, *Historia del origen de los partidos políticos en la Argentina (1810-1918)*, Ediciones Centro de estudios, Buenos Aires, 1972, p. 491.

² *Esbozo de historia del Partido Comunista de la Argentina*, Editorial Anteo, Buenos Aires, 1948, p. 17.

engaged in the propaganda of the class struggle and supervised the preparations for strikes, demonstrations and elections.

In 1905, the Cuban Labour Party, established with the active participation of Carlos Baliño, proclaimed Marxism its doctrine and declared its acceptance of the programme of the Second International. The party disseminated socialist ideas and the experience of the European working-class movement, and opposed anarchism. Although a small and purely propagandist organisation, its creation was a definite step towards setting up a class proletarian party.

An incessant struggle was going on between revisionists and centrists, on the one hand, and the revolutionary wing, on the other, in the socialist parties of Latin America, just as in the working-class movement elsewhere. Socialist parties formed close ties and actively exchanged experience. That was facilitated by traditions of solidarity, similar social and political conditions and the emigration, because of reprisals, of several socialist leaders (Justo, Recabárren, Emilio Frugoni) to other countries in Latin America with more democratic regimes. The socialist parties of Uruguay and Argentina, the first to be established, influenced the development of the working-class and socialist movement in Bolivia, Venezuela, Paraguay, and other countries of that continent. The first attempts at forming socialist associations in Bolivia (1914) were directly linked with the efforts of the Chilean Socialist Recabárren.

In countries where there were no socialist organisations, the working class was greatly influenced by bourgeois-radical and revolutionary-democratic parties and ideas. The impact of the revolutionary democratic movement was especially pronounced in countries with a predominantly Indian population, where capitalism had developed slowly and there were no sizable groups of European immigrants among the workers. Rejecting the principles of bourgeois society, calling for revolution, including a proletarian revolution, revolutionary democrats, for example, González Prada of Peru, did not connect such a revolution with the struggle of the working class and with its party. They regarded revolution as the mission of individual intellectuals, allegedly capable of generating popular revolutionary unrest through education. They saw their chief task in involving the Indian masses in revolution. Although many of their ideas were utopian and their practical activity was tinged with anarchism, it was to the revolutionary democrats' credit that they drew the attention of the working class and other progressive sections of society to the ethnic question, to the plight of the most backward and oppressed group in Latin American society, the Indian peasants.

Some revolutionary democrats were acquainted with Marxism. For example, Euclides da Cunha, Silvio Romero, Tavares Bastos

and others in Brazil when speaking out against imperialism and in support of humanism and social justice, disseminated certain concepts of scientific socialism. The author da Cunha noted that scientific socialism did not speak a firm, comprehensible and positive language until Karl Marx's works appeared, Marxism attracted da Cunha by the way it exposed the exploiter nature of society's economic organisation, by its orderly analysis of objective reality and its irrefutable logic. Da Cunha championed revolution and believed it could be attained by raising the proletariat's political consciousness, through the political and economic unification of the working people.¹

Anarchism continued to seriously affect the Latin American working-class movement, although some proletarian leaders had already lost faith in it. For example, Recabárren wrote in the newspaper *Marítimo*: "It is no longer the bourgeoisie that deals us insults and blows, but the anarchists, too, who should have been by our side, our brothers, had they the same goals as we do".

However, the young working class of Latin America often upheld anarchist principles due to its political inexperience. Juan Corona, one of the older generation leaders of Chilean Communists, recalled: "For a long time, possibly due to anarchist influence, I saw revolutionary struggle as an individual mission of each man. I did not grasp ... the meaning of social phenomena, I only knew what I myself experienced or saw around me.... I fought without thinking, intuitively, as a scholar might put it, without following any definite principles. I could read but I read little. At any rate, I read one book which impressed me. That was Kropotkin's *The Winning of Bread*, the anarchist Bible." Generally, Pyotr Kropotkin's ideas of "communism without rule" were quite popular in Latin America. Kropotkin himself actively corresponded with his supporters in Argentina, Brazil and elsewhere.

Anarcho-syndicalism was also widespread in Latin America. Unlike many socialists, the syndicalists waged a vigorous struggle and advanced concrete slogans, which militant workers understood. Large proletarian masses supported the syndicalist idea that the main force of the working class was the syndicate, a militant mass trade union organisation, and not a small political party. The negative approach to political struggle on the part of most of the workers was rooted in the fact that the socialist parties of the time were weak, irresolute and opportunist. But the view that reformism and collaboration were inevitable concomitants of party political activity was fallacious and harmful.

Heated debates in the trade unions between anarcho-syndicalists and Socialists usually ended to the advantage of the former. Reso-

¹ Euclides da Cunha, *Contrastes e confrontos*, Lello e Irmão Editores, Lisboa, 1907, p. 237.

lutions were passed demanding renunciation of any political slogans, of participation in elections, etc., and advocating the proletariat's economic struggle by "direct action" against capital.

Ultra-leftist views were typical of anarcho-syndicalism and anarchism in Latin America. Anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists preached the idea of the working class being "uninterested" in politics unless the latter was aimed directly against the rule of capital, at the "destruction of the state" and establishment of "communism without rule". Nevertheless, economic strikes in which syndicalists participated often turned into demonstrations and clashes with the police and objectively acquired political significance. Syndicalists also took part in May Day rallies and joined anti-war campaigns. Thus, their practical activity contradicted their doctrine.

Generally, although theoretically fallacious and anarchist, syndicalism played a positive and even revolutionary role in the working-class movement of Latin America at that time because it opposed right-wing reformism and helped advance the proletariat's strike movement. One can therefore say that, to a certain extent, a distinctly Latin American trend emerged in the working-class movement—revolutionary syndicalism. Its representatives took a militant, anti-capitalist stand. However, their anarchist leanings offered no positive or meaningful way out of the situation obtaining. The syndicalists' principles, specifically their rejection of the need for political parties to lead the revolutionary proletarian movement inevitably led them into an impasse.

The struggle over the issue of political activity and political organisation was of vital importance for the working-class movement throughout Latin America, for the proletariat's ideological and political development depended on its outcome. That struggle was especially pronounced in the trade union movement.

The membership of trade union organisations continued to swell in the early 20th century, and their influence increased. They began to emerge in such countries as Colombia, Bolivia, Paraguay and Venezuela, and in Central America. In Colombia, the Labour Union was established in 1913 comprising several trade unions, although they included craftsmen and workshop owners¹ as well as industrial workers. In Paraguay, a Regional Labour Federation was formed in 1906, uniting small groups of workers from small workshops. That year, the handicraftsmen of Bolivia organised a Social Labour Centre in La Paz.² Many similar working people's organisations in Venezuela, the Dominican Republic and some other Latin American

¹ Edgar Caicedo, *Historia de las luchas sindicales en Colombia*, Ediciones Suramérica, Bogotá, 1974, pp. 14, 49.

² R. Iscaro, *Historia del movimiento sindical*, t. 2, Buenos Aires 1974, pp. 78, 64.

countries were merely mutual aid societies. On the whole, however, the Latin American trade union movement remained weak. Even in developed countries, trade unions only included an insignificant part of the workers. There were no uniform organisational principles: some unions were set up at individual enterprises, others spread to include an entire industry, still others united the workers of a given territory; hence the motley composition of national centres. They included cooperative associations, educational societies, mutual aid funds, etc. European immigrants introduced the Latin American trade union movement to the experience of the labour organisations in the advanced capitalist countries; this contributed to the diversity of forms and principles underlying the creation of trade union associations. National trade union centres usually comprised only union associations in large cities. They had no roots in the provinces, let alone in rural areas.

Governments brutally persecuted trade union organisations. The mounting rivalry between the anarcho-syndicalist and socialist trends in the working-class movement also produced difficulties. Some trade unions split into smaller organisations, others disintegrated by themselves, still others were banned by the authorities. For example, the railway workers' union, the largest in Uruguay, was destroyed in the course of the reprisals to put down the 1908 general strike, when lack of unity prevented workers of other industries from supporting the railway workers.¹

In *Argentina*, two trade union centres were active by 1904: the socialist-led General Union of Workers with 7,400 members and the anarcho-syndicalist-dominated Regional Labour Federation of Argentina comprising 15,200 members. There were serious differences between the two. The Federation's leaders, proceeding from anarcho-syndicalist principles,² opposed parliamentary struggle, even struggle for progressive labour legislation, and the Socialists' attempts at setting up consumer and production cooperatives. Even when socialist and anarcho-syndicalist leaders of the trade union movement took part in the same action, they were unable to reach an agreement. The "peaceful" socialist course collided with the "rebellious spirit" of the anarcho-syndicalists who often drove unarmed strikers to clashes with the armed police. The 1909 general strike in Argentina was a case in point.

In 1909, after protracted negotiations and painstaking effort, a single trade union centre was established in Argentina—the Argen-

¹ Francisco R. Pintos, *Historia del movimiento obrero del Uruguay*, Montevideo, 1960, p. 85.

² Diego Abad de Santillán, *La F.O.R.A. Ideología y trayectoria del movimiento obrero revolucionario en la Argentina*, Edición Nervio, Buenos Aires, 1933, p. 103.

tinian Regional Labour Confederation. The anarcho-syndicalists managed to preserve their autonomy within this centre and soon they dominated the entire trade union movement throughout the country. In 1917, the anarcho-syndicalist Argentinian Labour Federation comprised 199 trade unions with a total membership of 143,928.

There was also rivalry between the two trends in the trade union movement of *Uruguay*. Some members of the Regional Federation of Uruguayan Workers left it soon after it was established in 1905 and formed the socialist-led General Working People's Organisation. Most workers, however, still followed the anarcho-syndicalists whose Federation numbered 7,000 members in 1911.

In *Brazil*, the anarcho-syndicalists proclaimed the establishment of a Workers' Confederation in 1906, although it actually became operational in 1908. In 1910, the country had 433 individual trade union organisations with a total of 55,136 members.

In 1909, the revolutionary Socialists set up the Labour Federation of *Chile* which later became a powerful trade union centre for the whole of the Chilean proletariat.¹

In *Mexico*, the first workers' association was the anarcho-syndicalist-led World Worker House, established in 1912. Apart from this, there were also industrial and territorial trade unions. In the difficult period of the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917, trade unions were disbanded, split up and banned by the authorities. In 1916, the first national Labour Congress was convened. It set up a single national centre which mainly pursued the anarcho-syndicalist course of direct action outside politics.² In 1916, the authorities closed down the World Worker House. That same year, the Labour Confederation of the Mexican Region was founded. Although proclaiming itself to be an organisation of the class struggle and supporting the socialisation of the means of production, it was essentially the source of bourgeois reformism in the working-class movement.

In their attempts at dominating the growing proletarian movement, governments tried to establish labour centres under their own control. For example, in 1908 the Cuban government set up the short-timed so-called Workers' Federation of Cuba which instigated clashes between different sections of the proletariat, disorganised strikers, and so on.

The American Federation of Labor, the reformist trade union association of the United States, began to influence Latin American trade unions through its envoys in the second decade of the 20th

¹ See R. Iscaro, op. cit., t. 1, pp. 233, 268.

² See Severo Iglesias, *Sindicalismo y socialismo en México*, Editorial Grijalbo, S. A., México, 1970, pp. 37-39.

century. In 1915, under pressure from the American Federation of Labor, national trade union associations of Latin America decided to establish the Pan-American Federation of Labor. However, when the first Pan-American Federation of Labor conference was held in the United States two years later, it was not attended by Latin American trade union representatives.¹

The conflicting trends in the Latin American working-class movement, above all the clash between Socialists and anarcho-syndicalists, affected the mass struggle of the working class throughout its development.

At the end of the first and during the second decade of the 20th century, such contingents of the working class as dockers, railwaymen, and seamen emerged in the foreground of the strike movement, especially in the more developed countries such as Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico.

The numerous workers of the mining industry, usually local inhabitants and mostly Indians, comprised the less class-conscious sections of the working class. They used obsolete forms of struggle against capital. Miners' communities were located far from cultural centres. That, and the draconian regulations imposed by the management meant that, as a rule, miners had no organisations of their own. Throughout the first two decades of the 20th century, their action, especially in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and also Chile and Mexico, sometimes resembled disorganised riots, at times even displaying Luddite-like features².

The strike movement gained in strength in 1906-1907, owing to the symptoms of a world economic crisis. There were 460 strikes in Argentina in two years.³ The Chilean transport workers' movement was on the rise in 1907. Dockers in Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Cuba staged strikes. Large-scale workers' action was taken in Mexico in those years: there was the 1906 miners' strike in Cananea and the 1907 textile workers' strike in Rio Blanca, the latter staged to protest the employers' intention to ban meetings at enterprises and newspapers.

On the whole, the strikers were becoming more resolute and stubborn. Sometimes the strikes were accompanied by mass, essentially political demonstrations, and at times they became veritable battles with the police and the army. Strikers' demands in-

¹ M. V. Danilevich, *The Condition and Struggle of the Working Class in Latin American Countries*, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1953, p. 193 (in Russian).

² See V. I. Yermolayev and Yu. N. Korolev, *Recabárren, a Great Citizen of Chile*, Mysl, Moscow, 1973, pp. 65-67 (in Russian).

³ *Historia del sindicalismo: los obreros, la economía, la política*, Buenos Aires, 1967, p. 66.

creased. Frequently individual action culminated in general strikes in a certain city or a certain industry in several cities or areas. Even though the Latin American working class was poorly organised and trade union membership was confined to insignificant sections of the working people, recognition of class solidarity and unity was growing among various contingents of the working class.

As a rule, general strikes occurred spontaneously when the workers of some industries abruptly stepped up their struggle or when the strikers' demands reflected the interests of large sections of the proletariat. Solidarity movements sprang up to support the strikers and, aided by trade union centres, the strikes became general. The first citywide general strike in Latin America took place in *Chile* in October 1905. As many as 30,000 workers in Santiago de Chile protested against price rises and marched on the presidential palace to demand better living conditions, but they were driven back by the police. On the following day, a general strike by the city's workers broke out. Strikers stormed shops, many public buildings, and police stations. Seventy people were killed and 300 wounded in clashes with the police. The lack of organisation and any plan of action doomed the strike to failure. It was put down by army and police detachments.¹

In 1907, there was a general strike by the workers of Iquique (Chile). A total of 15,000 dockers, transport workers, miners, building and municipal workers took part, mostly demanding higher wages. The bourgeoisie could not bear to see the town "turn red" and clamoured for reprisals. As many as 2,000 people were killed in clashes with the police, and many were arrested and subsequently shot.² In May 1907, the workers of Santiago de Cuba started a general strike.³ Short-term, transport and mechanical workshop workers struck for a week; their chief demand was an eight-hour working-day. The strikers failed to act in concert, and the struggle ended in agreements between workers at individual enterprises and the owners and management.

In *Argentina*, where the working class was particularly well organised and politically conscious, general strikes were especially numerous.

In September 1905, dockers struck in Buenos Aires. Thanks to assistance from the trade union centres the strike spread to include all of the city's workers. Their demands for higher wages and better working conditions were supported by the dockers throughout the country; they were soon joined by railway freight, metal and print-

¹ *Historia del movimiento obrero*, t. 34, Centro editor de América Latina, Buenos Aires, 1974, p. 586.

² *Ibid.*

³ *La Independencia* (Santiago de Cuba), May 21-29, 1907.

ing workers. The Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of Argentina appealed to the leaders of the Second International to support the dockers by declaring solidarity strikes in the ports of Europe, but the request failed.¹ Several general strikes in Argentina in 1907-1909 were directly aimed against the government's anti-labour policy. On July 23, 1907, a two-day strike was launched to protest against the police firing upon a workers' meeting in Bahia Blanca. In 1909, a general strike was held in Buenos Aires to condemn the shooting of May Day demonstrators. The strike of some 200,000 workers was called the Bloody Week and ended in victory for the strikers. Those arrested were released, trade union premises were restored to the unions, and some laws envisaging punishment for taking part in strikes were repealed.² General strikes recurred in Argentina in 1911 and 1914.

Over that same period, two general strikes were staged in *Uruguay*. In *Mexico*, the first general strike by the workers of several cities broke out in the summer of 1916, as the democratic revolution developed. The strikers demanded effective measures to fight famine and soaring prices, and to introduce an eight-hour working-day. The government responded in August 1916 with a presidential decree of capital punishment for those accused of encroachments on private property or calling for the destruction of enterprises, fighting strike-breakers, collecting signatures under petitions, and so on. In 1908-1912, in *Paraguay*, for the first time in Latin America, joint action was taken by peasants, factory and office workers, and urban workers' solidarity strikes took place in support of peasants driven from their land. In their turn, the peasants assisted striking workers.³

A remarkable trend in the strike movement was the workers' transition from action advancing partial demands to the struggle for a comparatively broad socio-economic programme. For example, there were cases when strikers demanded not only higher wages, but also a guaranteed minimum wage, not only assistance to industrial accident victims but also the introduction of mandatory social insurance and social security contributed to by the state, the employers and the workers themselves.

The strike movement was becoming an increasingly important social phenomenon in Latin America. There were numerous press reports on strikes. Many governments began to adopt measures which, although somewhat improving the working people's position, were designed to dampen their discontent. Various institutions were founded for that purpose—departments, ministries and commissions,

¹ See *Essays on Argentinian History*, p. 257 (in Russian).

² *Esbozo de historia del Partido Comunista de la Argentina*, pp. 12, 15.

³ R. Francisco Gaona, *Introducción a la historia gremial y social del Paraguay*, ed. Arandu, Buenos Aires, 1967, p. 132.

which undertook to act as mediators in relations between the capitalists and the workers. For example, in August 1914, the government of Cuba distributed an urgent directive asking the provincial authorities to carry out a survey of the working people's condition in all provinces and municipalities with a view to taking immediate steps to prevent possible conflicts.¹

THE WORKING CLASS IN THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE

The working class played an increasingly significant part in the anti-imperialist struggle, which was emerging as an important factor in Latin America's social development.

The anti-imperialist struggle in Latin America was stimulated by indignation and protests against the US imperialist "big stick" policy and "dollar diplomacy", against efforts to implement Theodore Roosevelt's doctrine proclaiming the United States the "policeman of the Western hemisphere", against the growing enslavement of Latin American countries by North American and European monopoly capital, against repeated armed intervention—in the Dominican Republic in 1905 and 1916, in Cuba in 1906-1909, 1912 and 1917, in Haiti in 1905 and 1915, in Mexico in 1914 and 1916, and in Central America—and against interference in the affairs of other Latin American countries.

Among the founding fathers of the Latin American anti-imperialist movement were the great Cuban revolutionary José Martí, the prominent Cuban public figures Enrique José Varona and Cisneros Betancourt, the Uruguayan literary critic and philosopher José Enrique Rodo, the Argentinian author and public figure Manuel Ugarte, the Nicaraguan poet Rubén Darío, and the Brazilian author and philosopher Euclides da Cunha. They exposed aggression by the United States and other powers, denounced the view that Latin America was destined to become a US protectorate, and championed the cultural emancipation of Latin America and its democratic national culture. Although they only criticised imperialism from humanitarian positions, they objectively contributed to the emergence of anti-capitalist trends and to the strengthening of the anti-imperialist struggle in Latin America. Specifically, an important factor was the drive to oppose Pan-Americanism with appeals to establish a "Latin or Iberoamerican union". The Mexican newspaper *El País* wrote that "the ideal of Latin American union bears within it the widely popular idea of anti-Yankeeism", widespread throughout Latin America and, in part, reflecting Latin American patriotism.²

¹ Archivo histórico provincial de Oriente, Fondo Gobierno provincial, legajo 743, número 130.

² *El País* (Mexico), January 30, 1912.

Protest was also mounting against the sway of British capital, the increasing penetration of the continent by German capital, and the expansion of France, Italy, Belgium, and Japan.

The spontaneous anti-imperialist movement included representatives of different social strata: progressive intellectuals, middle strata, part of the national bourgeoisie, workers, and peasants.¹

The role of the working class in the liberation movement was becoming increasingly pronounced. However, the workers were not yet capable of mass, organised action. They did not yet realise the great importance of the struggle against imperialist oppression and concentrated their efforts on protecting their economic interests from encroachments by the immediate enemy—the employer, “their own capitalist”.

In Chile, although the labour press protested against imperialist expansion, it succumbed to anarchist influence and disregarded the patriotic traditions of the Latin American peoples.² Many labour leaders were unable to understand the dependent status of Latin American capitalism and the importance of the pre-capitalist relations, which were still strong in the socio-economic structure of Latin American countries. Even Recabarren and Brazilian and Cuban Socialists believed that society was divided into just two “classes”: the capitalists (landowners were also included in that category) and the working people (workers and peasants).³ The working class, while taking part in the general democratic movement for national liberation, still failed to grasp the importance of anti-imperialist struggle and relegated it to the background. Conversely, the petty-bourgeois revolutionary democrats and progressive intellectuals underrated the role of the proletariat’s class struggle and reduced everything to an issue of national independence. For example, the Argentinian Socialist Manuel Ugarte, one of the foremost ideologists of the anti-imperialist movement, believed it possible to subordinate all proletarian action to the objectives of the anti-imperialist struggle and bourgeois nationalism.⁴

In their turn, the reformist leaders of the socialist parties, specifically Justo, defended the “civilising expeditions” of the European colonialists. Criticising Argentinian socialist leaders for their

¹ Manuel Ugarte, *The Destiny of a Continent*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1929; *La Información*, April 30, 1912, May 3, 1912; *El Republicano*, April 30, 1912; *La Prensa libre*, April 30, 1912; *La República*, May 16, 1912.

² *La prensa obrera en Chile*, pp. 25, 28, 190.

³ Cuban Socialists believed that the worker category included all those who “plough the land, plant tobacco, raise crops, smelt steel, work lumber ... who erect brick walls, work stone, make shoes and mine minerals deep underground.” (Archivo histórico provincial de Oriente. Fondo Gobierno provincial, legajo 1905, número 119, 1908. Partido Socialista. Directorio Provincial).

⁴ Manuel Ugarte, *La Patria Grande*, Santiago de Chile, 1939.

refusal to recognise the importance of the anti-imperialist struggle, Ugarte wrote: "In standing up against imperialism, and checking the activity of the conquering oligarchies, socialism was sacrificing no principle."¹ He was one of the first to counter Pan-Americanism with the unity of the Latin American peoples in the defence of the sovereignty of Latin American countries. At the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International in 1907, Ugarte voted, on behalf of his party, together with Lenin and other left Social-Democrats against colonialism.² However, his party comrades failed to appreciate his position. In 1912, the party newspaper *La Vanguardia* described Ugarte's anti-imperialist programme as an attempt at diverting attention from the struggle for socialism.³ In 1911, the Uruguayan socialist newspaper *El Socialista* noted with satisfaction the allegedly unanimous silence of all socialist parties concerning the Mexican anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution, which began in 1910.⁴

However, life itself daily caused the workers to become involved in the national liberation struggle. Even the proletariat's economic action was objectively anti-imperialist since the leading industries where its strongest forces were concentrated, were controlled by foreign capital. That was also true of the action taken against reactionary dictatorships connected with the imperialist quarters.

The strike of 10,000 Mexican miners, which broke out at the US-owned copper mines at Cananea in June 1906 was a landmark in the anti-imperialist struggle. The strike's chief causes were rooted in the discontent with the privileged position of foreign workers and the discriminatory wages paid to Mexican workers. The strike practically turned into anti-imperialist action. The strikers elected an organising committee and issued a manifesto. They demanded an end to the discriminatory hiring and the wage system, and a ratio of 75 per cent of Mexican workers to 25 per cent of foreign workers in the mines. The miners declared: "In the name of justice it would be better for Mexicans to be led by their countrymen, rationally elected and capable of guaranteeing our future."⁵ There were also demands

¹ Manuel Ugarte, *The Destiny of a Continent*, p. 217.

² J. Abelardo Ramos, *El Marxismo de Indias*, Barcelona, 1973, p. 222.

³ *Izquierdas y derechos en América Latina. Documentos...*, p. 52.

⁴ *Las clases sociales en América Latina*, Documentos, selección y comentarios por Carlos Machado, Montevideo, 1969, p. 115.

Contemporary reactionary historians approve of the approach taken by the reformist leadership of the Socialist Party of Argentina to workers' participation in the national liberation movement, regarding the underestimation of the anti-imperialist movement as a "purely proletarian conception of anti-imperialism". (See Victor Alba, *The Politics and the Labor Movement in Latin America*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Cal., 1968, p. 76.)

⁵ See *América Latina. Anuario. Estudios latinoamericanos*, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, 1972, pp. 157-58; *Historia del movimiento obrero*, t. 29, p. 438.

for an eight-hour working day, a ban on child labour, better working conditions, an end to the system of fines, and the introduction of a minimum wage. In the course of the strike, the workers attempted to set up a trade union.

Troops arrived from the United States to put down the strike. The strikers' arrests and executions by the US punitive expedition outraged Mexican public opinion. The Cananea miners' action marked the beginning of the working-class movement's transformation into an integral part of the nationwide struggle against the Mexican dictatorial regime, it was the first indication of the approaching revolution. The strike showed that the anti-imperialist struggle of the working class not only dealt blows at the domination of foreign capital, but also strengthened the political aspect of the working-class movement.

The workers of Cuba took part in the mass uprising of 1906, organised and led by the Liberal Party, which aimed to seize power from the conservative pro-US government. Although the Liberals were not anti-imperialist, the uprising was objectively directed against the sway of foreign capital. The United States responded by once again invading and occupying Cuba in 1906-1909. Still, the strike movement was growing in the country. There were strikes by cigar factory and post office workers, railwaymen and bricklayers. Of special significance was the 145-day strike by the tobacco workers of an Anglo-American trust in February-July 1907. There were disturbances among agricultural workers at the US-owned plantations in Santa Clara, Cienfuegos and Matanzas.¹ People reacted with indignation to the outrages committed by the US occupying forces. Popular demands that the latter be withdrawn, that Cuba should be granted "immediate and complete independence" and US imperialist aggression should be brought to an end, were becoming increasingly frequent and more clearly pronounced.² Those outbreaks contributed greatly to the collapse of US annexationist schemes and helped make the socialist movement noticeably more active. Even a US bourgeois newspaper admitted that socialist ideas were rapidly winning over Cuban workers.³ It was in 1906 that the clandestine Socialist Party of Oriente Province under Agustín Martín Véloz was formed in Manzanillo and won great popularity with the workers. In 1907, the Labour Federation of Manzanillo was formed in which both the Socialist Party and the anarcho-syndicalists partici-

¹ *The New York Herald*, March 30, 1907.

² *The New York Herald*, April 4, 1907; Archivo Nacional de Cuba. Fondo de la Academia de Historia, caja 498, signatura 560. *Manifiesto A Los Cubanos* (octubre 1908); *La ciudadanía adoptiva*, La Habana, 1916.

³ *The New York Herald*, October 4, 1907.

pated. In 1908, the Socialists of Manzanillo joined the Socialist Party of Cuba.

The anti-imperialist struggle rallied together the workers, progressive intellectuals, the middle strata and peasants of different Latin American countries. In 1912, there was joint anti-US action by workers and student organisations in Chile and Argentina. It was the first time that Chileans sang the Argentinian national anthem in the streets of Santiago de Chile.¹

The highest point of the anti-imperialist movement in Latin America in the early 20th century was the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917. It was a profoundly popular revolution against the oligarchic dictatorship of the biggest landowners and the big bourgeoisie in banking, commerce and industry connected with imperialism, above all that of the United States.

Although the working-class action was spontaneous, together with the struggle by the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie it helped bring the revolutionary situation and revolutionary-democratic sentiment to a head, to the revolutionary explosion of 1910-1917. A few days before the revolution broke out, the Russian minister in Mexico City reported demonstrations in the capital and other cities and added: "The Mexican people harbour so much hatred for the citizens of their powerful neighbour!"²

As the revolution gathered momentum, armed workers' detachments took an active part in military operations against the imperialist-backed dictatorship. At the initial stage of the revolution, that struggle was led by Francisco Indalecio Madero, leader of the bourgeois and landowner opposition.³ The fall of the dictatorship in May 1911 gave an impetus to the working-class movement: strikes became more frequent, especially in the textile industry; new trade unions sprang up.

To offset the blow to its rule in Mexico, the United States supported the counter-revolutionary coup by the local reactionaries led by Victoriano Huerta (in 1913), and then twice sent troops into Mexico—in 1914 and 1916. But this intervention by the United States merely caused the intensification of the mass anti-imperialist struggle, in which the working class played a major part.

In 1914, the dockers of Veracruz were among the first Mexicans to resist the US invasion of the city, and the Americans were forced to withdraw. The second US incursion was also driven back. Workers also played an active part in the mass action against Huerta's coun-

¹ See Manuel Ugarte, *The Destiny of a Continent*, p. 204.

² RFPA, f. Chancellery 1910, f. 96, pp. 25-26 (in Russian).

³ Madero's conspiracy, the Russian diplomat in Mexico City reported, was welcomed by the workers (See *ibid.*, pp. 28-29).

ter-revolutionary regime. Of particular importance was the 20,000-strong proletarian demonstration on May 1, 1913.

However, the fact that the anarcho-syndicalists and their World Worker House led the working-class movement at the time was clearly felt in the way it developed: the proletariat failed to act as leader of the peasants, the main motive force of the revolution. It failed to support the armies of the popular peasant leaders Emiliano Zapata and Francisco Villa.

The bourgeois and landowner government that came to power in August 1914 succeeded in setting part of the proletariat against the peasants. Turning to its advantage the anti-imperialist course it proclaimed, the government reached agreement with the anarcho-syndicalist leaders. In return for a promise of better conditions for workers, World Worker House leaders sanctioned the formation of proletarian "red battalions" which the government sent against Villa's and Zapata's detachments. Although part of the trade unions refused to support that action and some revolutionary workers even contacted peasant detachments, the revolutionary peasant armies were defeated. The anarcho-syndicalists tried to present it as a victory of the working class, but in actual fact it was a triumph of the bourgeois and landowner bloc.

Breaking its promises to provide better conditions for the workers, the government disbanded the "red battalions" and introduced the death penalty as the punishment for strikes. At the final stage of the revolution, the bloc of the national bourgeoisie and liberal landowners managed to suppress the struggle of the revolutionary peasants and the proletariat. Still, the 1917 Constitution reflected a number of important working-class demands. Labour legislation was adopted comprising laws on an eight-hour working-day, a minimum wage, the right to strike and to establish trade unions, and so on. But those rights mostly remained on paper. Specifically, the Constitution, proceeding from the inviolability of private property, only permitted strikes to achieve "harmony between labour and capital".

The working class, which acted as one of the revolution's motive forces together with the peasants and the petty urban and national bourgeoisie, distinctly influenced the way the revolution developed and the results it achieved. However, the national bourgeoisie emerged as the dominant force; the revolution laid bare the proletariat's low-level development as a class, and the ideological weakness and the immaturity of the working-class movement. The movement was the prisoner of anarcho-syndicalism with its sectarian philosophy and lack of understanding of general democratic, anti-imperialist objectives; that led to the direct assistance to the government and the destruction of anarcho-syndicalist organisations themselves, including the World Worker House.

Some working-class activists—for example, Ricardo Flores Magón—while remaining anarchists on issues of theory and tactics, were in practice pursuing a revolutionary-democratic course in the Mexican revolution, expressed the interests of the working classes, their hostility to and distrust of the bourgeoisie. Those activists sincerely wished to lead the revolution towards an open class struggle and not collaboration with the national bourgeoisie. While the anarcho-syndicalist refusal to form a united front with other social forces, with the peasants who took part in the revolution, not only isolated the proletariat but also led to the defeat of the peasant revolutionary detachments, the strength of the revolutionary-democratic wing of the revolution lay in the fact that it championed the interests of the working people and saw the policy of the bourgeoisie as narrowly egoistical and anti-popular.¹ For all their eminently active part in the revolution, however, these people's efforts failed to turn the tide in favour of the popular masses.

Anti-militarism played an important part in the development of the anti-imperialist movement in Latin America in the early 20th century. Militarism was regarded as a synonym of tyranny and despotism.² The war, for which preparations were in progress, "born of the expansion of imperialistic capitalism", gave rise to protests in the labour press.³ The Brazilian syndicalists played a major role in the struggle of the left internationalist forces against the growing war threat and then against the world war. The first workers' congress in 1906 assumed an anti-militarist position and came out vigorously against imperialist wars. In 1914, the Socialist Labour Party of Chile, led by Recabárren, condemned the world war as imperialist. The party called on the working people to fight for "a new, socialist civilisation", which would implement universal disarmament and bring peace to the world. Recabárren and some other left members of socialist parties supported those who demanded a withdrawal from the war through the socialist revolution, admired

¹ The complex developments of the Mexican revolution are distorted by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois historians who try to belittle the active role the proletariat and the popular masses played in the anti-imperialist struggle (See Emilio Portes Gil, *Autobiografía de la Revolución Mexicana*, Editado por el Instituto mexicano de cultura, México, 1964). On the other hand, today's ultra-left Mexican sociologists completely deny that the revolution produced any positive social effect; they thereby obliterate a most important stage of the proletariat's anti-imperialist struggle (See José Revueltas, *México: una democracia bárbara*, Ediciones Anteo México, D.F., 1958; José Revueltas, *Ensayo sobre un proletariado sin cabeza*, México, D.F., 1962; Juan Ortega Arenas, *México a la luz del pensamiento obrero. 1910*, México, D.F., 1959).

² Archivo Nacional de Cuba. Fondo de la Academia de Historia, caja 497, signatura 531. Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, *A mis compañeros los Veteranos, a la Prensa y a los Cubanos en general*, La Habana, 1912.

³ *La prensa obrera en Chile*, p. 96.

Karl Liebknecht's speeches against military credits, exposed the treachery of the Second International, denounced chauvinism and upheld the principles of proletarian internationalism. In 1914, Esteban Peña, a delegate at the Cuban Workers' Congress, said: "The Cuban working classes condemn war as an enemy of civilisation, believe that imperialism is a social disease, and raise their voices in favour of peace in the world and above all in Cuba, as the basis of our culture and of strengthening the republic."¹

The anti-war struggle of the Brazilian syndicalists also evolved into an organised nationwide movement. Mass anti-war demonstrations in August 1914, an anti-war conference of representatives of workers' syndicates, federations and newspapers in March 1915, the activities of the International Anti-War Commission established in 1915 and calling for the solidarity of the working people of different countries and for mass anti-war action, an All-Brazil Anti-War Congress held in Rio de Janeiro in October 1915 and attended by delegates from Argentina, Portugal and Spain, a conference held in April 1917, at the time the United States joined the hostilities, calling for Brazil's non-involvement—all this proved that it was precisely the upswing of the mass anti-imperialist, anti-war movement and the active part the proletariat played in it which helped prevent Brazil from joining the war until October 1917.²

Although most leaders of the Socialist Party of Argentina supported the militarist course of the bourgeoisie during World War I, left groups did emerge in the party, which pursued an internationalist line and opposed the chauvinism of the revisionist leadership. The left were led by Victorio Codovilla, Rodolfo Ghioldi, August Kühn and others. The left wing of the Socialist Party of Argentina adhered to the principles of proletarian internationalism and supported the Bolsheviks at the Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences. The left Socialists waged anti-war propaganda in the labour press. Thanks to the efforts of left groups, an extraordinary party congress convened in April 1917 adopted an anti-war resolution. The left launched their newspaper *La Internacional* in April 1917. The left wing of the Socialist Party of Argentina shared the Bolsheviks' views on war, peace and revolution and, on the eve of the October Revolution, supported Lenin's course aimed at the revolutionary transformation of Russia.

Shortly before the October Revolution, when the socialist members of parliament in Argentina approached the imperialist war from openly chauvinist positions, Recabárren, Codovilla, Ghioldi

¹ Evelio Tellería Toca, *Congresos obreros en Cuba*, Editorial de Arte y Literatura, La Habana, 1973, p. 68.

² See B. I. Koval, op. cit., pp. 91-93.

and other members of the opposition declared: "Drop the socialism of traitors and form a proletarian revolutionary party against war."¹

The upsurge of the working-class movement in Latin America in 1905-1917 formed an important stage in the shaping of the Latin American proletariat, of its class consciousness, in the emergence of its trade unions and political parties. In contradistinction to the socialist opportunist wing, a left socialist movement was emerging and overcoming anarchist influence. In that period, a new important step was taken to involve the working class in the anti-imperialist democratic movement. The proletariat's internationalist solidarity was growing stronger. The 1905-1917 experience of political and economic struggle contributed greatly to the preparation of the following stage in the development of the Latin American working-class movement.

ASIA: NATIONAL LIBERATION REVOLUTIONS AND THE WORKING CLASS

ASIA AWAKENING

"World capitalism and the 1905 movement in Russia," Lenin wrote, "have finally aroused Asia. Hundreds of millions of the down-trodden and benighted have awakened from medieval stagnation to a new life and are rising to fight for elementary human rights and democracy."²

Having subjugated the Asian countries and drawn them into the orbit of the international capitalist economy, world capitalism thus enhanced the growth of protest in them. Despite their relatively small size, the new social classes and strata—the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the urban petty bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeois intellectuals—emerged as the most vigorous elements in the liberation struggle against imperialism and the feudal monarchist regimes that supported it. The young national bourgeoisie led the movement everywhere.

The Russian revolution of 1905 was another factor that finally awakened Asia. It made a particular impact on the national liberation movement which had started back in the 19th century and which in countries bordering on Russia (semi-colonies) grew into revolutions against the local feudal monarchist regimes, the mainstays of foreign imperialist domination, and in other countries

¹ Orlando Millas, "The Communist Party of Chile: the Embattled Fifty Years", *World Marxist Review*, No. 1, 1972, p. 9.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Awakening of Asia", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1963, p. 86.

(colonies) turned into a powerful upsurge of the nationwide struggle for national independence. The impact of that factor was especially pronounced because, Lenin observed, "geographically, economically and historically, Russia belongs not only to Europe, but also to Asia".¹

The influence of the 1905-1907 revolution on the liberation movement in Asia was determined by a number of factors. First, the Russian revolution dealt a powerful blow at tsarism, an active participant in colonial exploitation, thereby stimulating and facilitating the struggle of the peoples of the East against colonial rule. Second, the ideologues, leaders and many activists of national movements in the East who had been following the swift growth of the revolutionary struggle in Russia since the turn of the century, felt that colonial countries and the oppressed peoples of Russia were faced with similar tasks. The 1905-1907 developments showed them that the struggle against oppression was common to both sides, and that the national liberation movement did, therefore, have a reliable ally, the international proletariat, on whose support one could and must count. Third, the geography of the Russian Empire was such that many nationals of Iran, Turkey, China and even India came there, mostly looking for jobs as migrant workers. Those people witnessed and sometimes participated in the struggle of the Russian proletariat (in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Russia's Far East) and, after returning to their countries, they disseminated ideas of fighting despotism and oppression. Fourth, the Bolsheviks, who worked among the people of Russia's outlying regions, extended their revolutionising influence to the nationals of foreign Asian countries and developed the class consciousness of immigrant workers.

At that time, however, the movement of the Asian proletariat still lacked its own political organisations and was therefore unable to consciously absorb the experience of the Russian workers' struggle. That was why it felt the revolutionising impact of Russian developments not so much directly as through the national liberation movement, in the midst of which it emerged and developed and whose integral part it was.

Political parties of the national bourgeoisie, already existing in several Eastern countries, and especially their democratic factions, closely followed the Russian revolution. For example, *Minbao*, a Chinese revolutionary-democratic periodical run by the great revolutionary Sun Yatsen, wrote about the 1905 revolution in Russia: "The Russian people have only two ways of influencing their

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 251.

government: revolution and petitions. The degree to which petitions are granted depends on the degree to which revolution advances...."¹

In its efforts to convince the revolutionaries that one could not rely on the promises made by the Manchu dynasty, *Minbao* pointed to the example of the Russian proletariat which, despite the manifesto the tsar "graciously granted" in October 1905, continued and intensified the revolutionary struggle. China's democrats urged that lessons were to be learned from the Russian methods of revolutionary struggle. "If the Russian method is applied on Chinese soil," *Minbao* wrote, "the effect will be incomparable and the success fabulous."²

The Russian revolution aroused a considerable response in Turkey.

The Young Turks, Turkey's bourgeois revolutionaries, saw it as a promise of success in their struggle against the sultan's regime, for their country's independence. In their message to the sister and son of Lieutenant Schmidt, who led the Sevastopol mutiny in 1905 and was executed by the tsarist government, a group of Turkish officers said: "In our hearts the lieutenant will for ever remain a great fighter and martyr for human rights. Our descendants will learn from him.... We swear ... to the great citizen Schmidt ... that we will fight to the last drop of our blood for that sacred civil liberty for which many of our finest citizens have died. We also swear that we will do our utmost to inform the Turkish people of the developments in Russia, so as to win, by combined effort, the right to live as befits human beings."³

The newspaper *Türk*, published by Turkish bourgeois revolutionary emigres in Egypt, urged that "the example of the fine ideas of the Russian revolution should be followed" and expressed the hope that a new Russia "will be a guardian of freedom and a champion of those peoples who have been deprived of their liberty by force".⁴

The Russian revolution of 1905-1907 greatly influenced public opinion in Iran, too. An eyewitness reported: "The Russian revolution has produced an extremely amazing effect here. Russian developments are being followed very closely, and it seems that a new spirit is about to engulf the people. They are tormented by their rulers and, following the Russian example, have concluded that

¹ Quoted from: Li Shu, "The First Russian Revolution and China", *The First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 and the International Revolutionary Movement*, Part II, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1956, p. 360 (in Russian).

² Quoted from: A. G. Krymov, *Social Thought and Ideological Struggle in China (1900-1917)*, Nauka, Moscow, 1972, p. 78 (in Russian).

³ Quoted from: A. F. Miller, "The Young Turks' Revolution", *The First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 and the International Revolutionary Movement*, Part II, p. 329.

⁴ Ibidem.

they can have a different, better form of government.”¹ The Iranian revolution that followed bore out that observation.

As to India, in their analysis of the Russian events, the most far-sighted national movement leaders recognised the significance of the working-class experience for the development of the liberation struggle. For example, in 1905 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi stressed the special importance of the October All-Russia Political Strike, called it “a great lesson for us” and wrote, “We, too, can resort to the Russian remedy against tyranny.” He foresaw that “if the Russian people succeed, this revolution in Russia will be regarded as the greatest victory, the greatest event of the present century”.²

Another Indian radical national leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak, “discoursed on Russian methods of agitation” at meetings in 1906 and said that since the government was resorting to reprisals just like Russia’s tsarist regime, the Indian British subjects “cannot do better than learn from Russia what to do”.³ The Governor of Bombay reported that Tilak “might have succeeded in promoting a ‘general strike’, which is one of the Russian methods”.⁴ In 1907, progressive national leaders in Bengal called on the workers to declare a general strike.⁵

The awakening of Asia was marked by bourgeois revolutions in Iran, Turkey and China, and an upsurge of the national anti-imperialist movement in India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other countries.

In *Iran*, the impact of the first Russian revolution was felt sooner and more markedly than in other Asian countries. That was due to the close links between the democratic movement in Iran and revolutionary Russia, to the widespread contacts between progressive intellectuals in both countries and especially to the mass migration of Iranians in search of jobs to Transcaucasia and Central Asia. The Bolsheviks were assiduous in propagating their ideas among those workers. When they returned to their own country, the Iranians took with them the progressive ideas of fighting autocracy and experience of class battles. In the autumn of 1905, the Baku authorities began to deport migrant workers, fearing that they might

¹ Quoted from: R. A. Seidov, *The Iranian Bourgeoisie in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries*, Nauka, Moscow, 1974, p. 196 (in Russian).

² *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. V, Navagivan Trust, Ahmedabad, 1961, pp. 131, 132, 413.

³ *Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement in India (Collected from Bombay Government Records)*, Vol. II, 1958, Government Printing, Publications and Stationery, Bombay, pp. 219-20.

⁴ D. V. Tabmankar, *Lokamanya Tilak. Father of Indian Unrest and Maker of Modern India*, John Murray, London, 1956, pp. 184-85.

⁵ *Times of India* (Bombay), July 28, 1906; September 30, 1907.

become involved in the Russian revolution. But that only helped step up the liberation struggle in Iran. The Iranian developments advanced slogans of a democratic political system (grant a constitution and convene a parliament). Mass action broke out, especially in Teheran, Kerman, Tabriz, and Shiraz (market places closed, the clergy using their right of immunity, the British Shah-in-Shah Bank boycotted, etc.). On August 5, 1906, the Shah was forced to adopt a decree introducing a constitution and setting up a parliament, the Majlis. In the course of the movement, revolutionary local self-government bodies were set up, called *enjumens*, which greatly assisted the struggle. Although led by the bourgeoisie, they often included representatives of the workers and craftsmen, and other democratic strata of the population. Those democratic forces made a considerable contribution to the Iranian revolution.

After the March 1906 agrarian unrest in Iranian Azerbaijan, the most populated and developed part of the country, the social forces of the liberation movement split. The big merchants and the comprador bourgeoisie, the liberal landowners and the clergy believed that, having wrung concessions from the Shah, the revolution had completed its tasks. The revolutionary democratic petty-bourgeois forces, which acquired their own political organisation in 1905, the Modjahed¹ Society, demanded, meanwhile, that the revolution be continued. The Society did, to a large extent, consist of wage workers who provided mass support for it. The Modjahed headquarters was in Transcaucasia and was strongly influenced by the Bolsheviks. The Society's programme demanded democratic rights, civil liberties and agrarian reform. The Modjaheds were the most active elements in the revolution. They formed voluntary *feday* detachments, which emerged as the armed force of the revolution.

In June 1908, the Shah and the Iranian reactionaries, supported by British imperialism, used the Shah's Cossack brigade to bring off a counter-revolutionary coup (the constitution was abolished and the Majlis dissolved). That triggered a new revolutionary explosion which reached its peak in armed uprisings. In those, the democratic strata played an active and sometimes leading role (the Tabriz uprising of 1908-1909). As a result, Shah Mohammed Ali was deposed in July 1909, his son ascended the throne, and the constitution was restored. However, the liberal landowners and the big commercial comprador bourgeoisie seized power and turned the success of the democratic struggle to their own advantage. Their policy of complicity with the imperialists and concessions to the feudal lords galvanised the reactionaries who tried to restore the old ways but were

¹ "Modjahed" means warrior fighting for a holy cause; in this case, for the revolution.

rebuffed by the popular masses. That caused the abrupt intensification of armed intervention: the British invaded Iran from the south and tsarist Russia, from the north. Combined with the efforts by the reactionaries at home, the intervention suppressed the revolution. In December 1911, the Majlis and the enjumens were dissolved and the feday detachments were disbanded. The constitution was virtually suspended.

The revolution failed to seriously change the social structure and the class nature of the regime in Iran and to undermine the imperialists' positions in the country. It did reveal, however, the people's anti-imperialist and anti-feudal potential, it weakened the ruling dynasty and ensured the subsequent restoration of the constitution and the Majlis.

In *Turkey*, the objective goals of the approaching revolution were the following: ending the country's semi-colonial dependence on imperialism; destroying the feudal-absolutist despotism of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II; ensuring Turkey's capitalist development; and liberating the oppressed peoples of the Ottoman Empire. Unlike Iran, however, where the petty-bourgeois revolutionary democrats emerged ideologically and politically organised ahead of all other movements, quite moderate national bourgeois forces came to the fore in Turkey, represented by the Unity and Progress Party, the Young Turks. Having proclaimed the demands of "equality, fraternity and freedom", they assumed the leading role in the emancipation movement throughout the country, including the oppressed people's drive for independence. In fact, however, the Young Turks confined themselves to the struggle for a constitutional monarchy. Their foremost demand was the restoration of the 1876 Constitution. The party completely ignored the interests of the peasants and workers, and it virtually did not oppose the sway of the great powers, maintaining that national independence could be ensured through internal reforms. As to the oppressed peoples, the Young Turks proclaimed all Ottoman subjects equal in rights, and tried to preserve the empire's territorial integrity.

In 1907, the Young Turks planned to stage an armed uprising against the sultan in the summer of 1909. But they were forced to act sooner. The struggle against Turkish oppression was mounting rapidly in the non-Turkish parts of the Ottoman Empire—the Balkans and Arab countries. In Syria, Lebanon and Iraq a bourgeois-nationalist movement for autonomy and even secession and Arab independence from the Ottoman oppression was developing. Ideas were spreading about the possible restoration of the Arab Caliphate by uniting Moslem countries around the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The prominent advocates of bourgeois enlightenment, ardent supporters and propagandists of that idea were

Sabouji, al-Kawakibi and Al-Azm¹ (all three born in Syria). The liberation movement was especially widespread in Macedonia and Albania, where guerrillas took to armed action. Spontaneous anti-government outbreaks began in the provinces, and there were army and navy mutinies there. The Young Turks, who feared the popular masses, made the army their mainstay, and it emerged as the leading political force in the Turkish revolution.

The revolution was sparked off by the mutiny of an army company in the small Macedonian town of Resen on July 28, 1908. Many army detachments joined the insurgents and their ranks swelled rapidly. On July 24, scared by these developments, Abdul-Hamid II declared that parliament would be convened. "In Turkey," Lenin wrote, "the revolutionary movement in the army, led by the Young Turks, has achieved victory. True, it is only half a victory, or even less, since Turkey's Nicholas II has so far managed to get away with a promise to restore the celebrated Turkish constitution."² In late 1908, parliament was convened, with the Young Turks winning a majority. In 1909, a bourgeois government was formed which followed the half-hearted directives of its party unwaveringly. The Young Turks' government policy earned praise from the imperialists. In this connection, Lenin observed: "The Young Turks are praised for their moderation and restraint, i.e., the Turkish revolution is being praised because it is weak, because it is not rousing the popular masses to really independent action, because it is hostile to the proletarian struggle beginning in the Ottoman Empire—and at the same time the plunder of Turkey continues."³

The revolution undermined the complete sway of the feudal aristocracy and brought about a certain shift towards bourgeois development. But the prospects for national capitalism remained limited, Turkey's stand in the international scene was slipping, and imperialist domination was intensifying. On the nationalities question, the Young Turks were extremely chauvinist and forced assimilation on the Arab and other non-Turkish peoples. Consequently, in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in Asia, where the national bourgeoisie and landowners at first enthusiastically supported the Young Turks' slogans of freedom, equality and fraternity, those same quarters gradually took the road of an increasingly resolute struggle for national liberation after the Young Turks came to

¹ See Z. I. Levin, *The Development of Major Trends in the Socio-Political Thought of Syria and Egypt*, Nauka, Moscow, 1972, pp. 121-25; *Modern Asian and African History*, Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1971, pp. 528, 535, etc. (both in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, "Inflammable Material in World Politics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, 1977, p. 183.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Events in the Balkans and in Persia", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15 p. 222.

power. Numerous Arab organisations sprang up: the clandestine and more radical among them demanded complete secession of the Arab countries, while the legal and moderate ones aimed at autonomy.¹

A strained situation developed in *China* in the early 1900s. The country had completely become a semi-colony of the imperialist powers which acted through the ruling Qing dynasty. Simultaneously, national capitalism was growing. Two trends emerged among China's bourgeoisie—the liberal and the revolutionary. While the liberal bourgeoisie painstakingly tried to convince the government that reforms and a constitutional monarchy were imperative, the revolutionary wing of the Chinese national bourgeois movement led by Sun Yatsen and his Consolidated Union advanced a radical national and social programme which envisaged national independence, a republic and a solution of the agrarian question by organised compensation for land and the latter's subsequent transfer to the government. Anti-government and anti-imperialist popular action was building up.

In 1905, a campaign of boycotting foreign goods was staged in China, and in 1905-1908, the country was swept by riots against taxes and famine. Peasants, soldiers, workers, and the urban poor rose against the Qing dynasty.

Continuous popular uprisings forced the imperial government to promise a constitution, but that failed to affect the situation in the country to any significant extent. Distrust of the government was becoming universal.

New uprisings were touched off by the government's anti-patriotic decision taken on May 9, 1911, to hand over the construction of the Huguang Railways to foreign powers, although the railways had been initially planned as a purely national project. A "Defend the Railways" movement was launched in response, which grew into an uprising in Sichuan (September 1911). That was the revolution's prologue.² October 10, 1911 is considered as the starting-point of the revolution, when revolutionary troops in Wuchang mutinied and, supported by the rest of the garrison, captured the city. Uprisings engulfed all the central and southern regions of China within one month. In November, 15 provinces refused to submit to the Qings. The chief fighting and organised force of the revolution was the New Army,³ led by members of the Consolidated Union and other revolutionary organisations.

¹ See Z. I. Levin, op. cit., pp. 131-40; *Modern Asian and African History*, pp. 534-36.

² See *The Xinhai Revolution of 1911-1913*, Nauka, Moscow, 1968 (in Russian).

³ The new regular army, equipped with modern weapons and recruited mostly from among the middle peasants, was set up by imperial decree in 1901. It was to replace the medieval eight-standard army. Chinese revolutionaries

However, the liberals were better organised and better prepared. They had their own institutions—consultative commissions—in many provinces, and they seized power. When, on January 1, 1912, the Chinese Republic was inaugurated and Sun Yat-sen was made its first President, actual power was in the hands of the liberal bourgeoisie, which relied, moreover, on the support of the imperialist powers. Thus, soon after the emperor abdicated, Sun Yat-sen tendered his resignation on February 13, 1912. Yuan Shikai's dictatorship, always ready to do the bidding of the imperialist powers, tightened its grip on China.

As Asia awakened, the upsurge of the national movement spread to colonial countries, too.

The national liberation movement in *India* reached its peak in 1905-1908. In 1905, the colonial authorities decided to divide Bengal into two provinces (mostly according to religious affiliation) so as to undermine the national movement which was especially active there. In fact, however, the division triggered a nationwide upswing of the anti-colonial struggle.¹

The boycott of foreign goods and the Swadeshi Movement (for producing and consuming domestic goods only) emerged as the major forms of the anti-imperialist drive. Widespread propaganda by progressive national intellectuals helped shape India's national self-awareness. That propaganda spread from the cities to the towns, and in Bengal and Punjab, to the rural areas, too. Mass action directly opposed to the colonial authorities' policy was taken everywhere. All sections of the population joined the struggle; workers and peasants were active and they were often attacked by the army and the police.

In 1905-1908, India's national movement split into two trends—the moderate and the radical—whose rivalry went on mostly in the Indian National Congress. The moderates wanted dominion status or swaraj (self-government within the British Empire) with British colonial rule intact. This objective was supposed to be achieved solely by peaceful and legal means. The moderates refused to expand the national movement by involving the popular masses in it. The radicals, led by Bal Gangadhar Tilak, wanted independence and a break with the British Empire. That was how they interpreted swa-

actively infiltrated the New Army, aiming at making it their mainstay (See *China from Ancient Times Till the Present Day*, Nauka, Moscow, 1974, p. 241, in Russian).

¹ See E. N. Komarov, "On the History of the National Liberation Movement and Social Thought in Bengal in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries", *The Indian National Liberation Movement and B. G. Tilak's Activities*, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1958 (in Russian); S. Sarkar, *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908*, People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1973.

raj. Holding that it would be impossible to achieve the national objective without the involvement of the popular masses, they assiduously propagated their ideas, specifically among the workers, sometimes leading in mass actions. Some of the radicals did not in principle reject revolutionary methods of struggle.¹

Although the radicals were outnumbered in the Indian National Congress, they actively influenced its decisions. In 1906, at its Calcutta session, for the first time the Indian National Congress adopted a resolution demanding swaraj from Britain, although interpreting it as self-government. In 1907, the radicals left the Indian National Congress, refusing to submit to the majority decision demanding that they give up their slogans and methods of struggle.

India's colonial authorities were alarmed to the point of panic at the upsurge of the national movement. They tried to suppress it, mainly by fomenting religious strife between Hindus and Moslems and by reprisals coupled with insignificant concessions to the bourgeoisie.

Asia's awakening also meant that the national liberation movement began to spread rapidly in other colonial countries in the region, such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Ceylon and the Philippines. Here, as in China, Turkey and India, the national bourgeoisie formed its own political organisations, which led the anti-imperialist struggle.

In 1908, Budi Utomo (The Wonderful Aspiration),² the first national organisation, was established in Indonesia, followed by the creation in 1911 of Sarekat Dagang Islam (Union of Moslem Merchants), to be renamed Sarekat Islam (Moslem Union) in 1912. In 1904-1912, Vietnamese national political organisations appeared—the Vietnam Renovation Society, the Vietnam Resurrection Society, etc.³ In 1905, the Ceylon Social Reform Society was established; other bourgeois organisations also functioned there.⁴ From 1902, the drive for national independence brought forth political parties in the Philippines which were later to lead the mass national movement.

To sum up, the objectively anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutions in the semi-colonies openly opposed only feudalism and the ruling dynasties. They delivered an indirect blow at imperialism,

¹ For details see B. G. Tilak, *His Writings and Speeches*, Ganesh and Co., Madras, 1919; N. M. Goldberg, "Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Leader of the Democratic Wing of the National Movement in Maharashtra", *The Indian National Liberation Movement and B. G. Tilak's Activities; Modern Indian History*, Oriental Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1961, pp. 546-53 (in Russian).

² For details see A. B. Belenky, *The National Awakening of Indonesia*, Nauka, Moscow, 1965, pp. 135-235 (in Russian).

³ For details see S. A. Mkhitaryan, *The Working-Class and the National Liberation Movement in Vietnam*, Nauka, Moscow, 1967 (in Russian).

⁴ See E. D. Talmud, *A History of Ceylon. 1795-1965*, Nauka, Moscow, 1973, pp. 103-14 (in Russian).

because they undermined the feudal-monarchist basis of its domination over those countries. The struggle against imperialist colonial rule was only direct in the colonies. Although neither the revolutions nor the national movements in the period of Asia's awakening succeeded in liberating their countries from feudal and colonial oppression, they were of the utmost importance: from then on, the national liberation movement became a foremost factor in the development of all the colonial and dependent countries in Asia. In 1913, Lenin wrote: "Everywhere in Asia a mighty democratic movement is growing, spreading and gaining in strength. The bourgeoisie there is *as yet* siding with the people against reaction. *Hundreds* of millions of people are awakening to life, light and freedom."¹

THE GROWTH OF THE PROLETARIAT

In the first two decades of the 20th century, the working class of the Asian colonial and dependent countries was emerging in a situation where those countries had largely become the targets of increasing capital investment by the colonial powers, the suppliers of raw materials to them and the markets for their goods. By 1915, in India, British capital completely controlled the jute industry and all the port facilities; it dominated the coal mining and paper industries, plantation agriculture and several other branches of the economy.² In China, foreign capital held sway in the steel, coal mining, textile, electric power, and some other industries.³ In Indonesia, by the turn of the century the foreign bourgeoisie almost completely controlled all industrial production.⁴ In Turkey, industry, consisting of a few score small enterprises, and the country's railways (their construction and operation), was also in the hands of foreign capital.⁵ Foreign capital dominated the Asian Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, too. The national industries of Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, represented by handicraft workshops and scattered manufactories owned by the national bourgeoisie mostly processed agricultural raw materials. In Syria and Lebanon, there were only 10 or 12 relatively large enterprises (employing a little over 100 workers each) in the early 1900s, but they belonged to foreign owners. The imperialist

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Backward Europe and Advanced Asia", *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 99-100.

² See A. I. Levkovsky, *Specific Features of Capitalist Development in India*, Oriental Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1963, p. 58 (in Russian).

³ See *A History of China's Economic Development (1840-1948)*. Foreign Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1958, pp. 101, 134 (in Russian).

⁴ See Ye. P. Zakaznikova, *The Working-Class and the National Liberation Movement in Indonesia*, Nauka, Moscow, 1971, pp. 8, 11 (in Russian).

⁵ See G. Z. Aliyev, *Turkey Under the Young Turks (1908-1918)*, Nauka, Moscow, 1972, p. 24 (in Russian).

powers were rapidly subjugating Iraq. British and German capitalists assumed control of its maritime and river transport, railway construction, banks, foreign trade and local industries.¹

In 1913, 80 per cent of Korea's industrial output belonged to Japanese capital.² Burma's oil industry, the most modern industry in the country, was almost wholly owned by British capital, which also dominated the tin and tungsten mining industries.³

Foreign-owned enterprises were much larger and incomparably better equipped, and they suppressed the national industry. National capital's attempts at setting up its own factories usually failed. As a result, the first decades of the 20th century saw the national production in, say, Iran still remaining on the manufactory and handicraft level. Of all the nationally-owned factories only the silk mills in Gilan, employing 150 workers, was comparatively stable economically. Foreign capital only developed industrial production in the oil and oil-processing industries (the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.) and in Lianozov's fishing concession in the Caspian Sea.

On the whole, however, national enterprise in Asian countries was expanding considerably. Even in Iran, national industrial production began to develop to a certain extent during the revolution of 1905-1911.⁴ In India and China, national capital was mostly concentrated in the cotton industry. In India, the number of enterprises in this industry grew by almost 50 per cent from 1905 to 1913.⁵ Indian cotton manufacturers actually became strong enough to vigorously compete with the British textile industry for "their own" market. India's national capital also dominated and developed in a number of mostly traditional industries, especially in the food and other industries that served the population's everyday needs.⁶ National capital owned the Tata steel works put into operation in 1907-1911. In China, 386 factories and mines were opened in the first decade of the 20th century, completely or partly controlled by national capital. From 1904 to 1918, the number of spindles at Chinese-owned cotton mills almost doubled.⁷

¹ See *Modern Asian and African History*, pp. 534-37; *The Emergence of the Working Class in Asian and African Countries*, A Collection of Articles, Nauka, Moscow, 1971, pp. 38-39 (in Russian).

² See G. F. Kim, *On the Initial Stage of the Emergence of the Korean Proletariat*, Nauka, Moscow, 1963, p. 6 (in Russian).

³ See S. M. Makarova, *Burma: Capitalist Development in Industry*, Nauka, Moscow, 1968, p. 60 (in Russian).

⁴ See Z. Z. Abdullayev, *Industry and the Birth of the Iranian Working Class in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries*, Azerbaijani SSR Academy of Sciences Press, Baku, 1963, pp. 138-39 (in Russian).

⁵ See A. I. Levkovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 58.

⁷ See *A History of China's Economic Development (1840-1948)*, pp. 142-43, 104; *China from Ancient Times Till the Present Day*, p. 232.

During World War I, the belligerents shifted a considerable part of the war burden on to the oppressed peoples of Asia. At the same time, the war impeded foreign monopoly competition. This and war-time commissions helped speed up the development of national capital. In China, the number of national industrial enterprises grew by 150 per cent from 1913 to 1920.¹ In India, the textile output by local manufacturers increased by one third over the war years.² In Burma and Thailand, the number of rice mills, saw mills and oil mills almost doubled. By the end of the war, Burma was producing one third of the world tungsten ore output and 13,500 tons of crude oil annually.³

The gradual industrial development in Asian countries caused an increase in the mass of wage workers and the proletariat itself. The shaping of the proletariat in the oppressed Asian countries, begun in the latter half of the 19th century, was far from complete by the end of the second decade of the 20th century. That was true both of the more developed countries—like India, China, Turkey and the Philippines—and, all the more so, of those that were still at a lower level of development—Iran, Indonesia, Korea, Burma, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. As to the third group of countries—Nepal, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia—where feudal and tribal relations were dominant, there the emergence of wage labour was either just beginning or was as yet non-existent.

By the start of World War I, the national bourgeoisie of the more developed and even some of the less developed Asian countries had already largely taken shape as a class. But this was not true of the proletariat, although it had appeared here before the bourgeoisie.

The long, complex emergence of the Asian proletariat was impeded by colonial rule, the sway of feudal relations and the persistence of numerous conservative traditions of Oriental society. All the salient features of the Asian proletariat stemming from those factors and typical of its initial stage remained in force throughout the first two decades of the 20th century. The proletariat in most of the oppressed Asian countries remained fragmented by ethnic and language barriers. This impeded its organisation and unification. Most workers were still firmly tied to their villages, and that was largely the reason for the high labour turnover, the persistence of the prole-

¹ See *Materials on the History of the Modern Industry in China*, Vol. I, Beijing, 1957, pp. 55-56 (in Chinese).

² See A. I. Levkovsky, op. cit., pp. 98, 99, 104.

³ See E. O. Berzin, *A History of Thailand*, Nauka, Moscow, 1973, pp. 211-12 (in Russian); S. M. Makarova, op. cit., p. 71; I. V. Mozheiko, A. N. Uzyanov, *A History of Burma*, Nauka, Moscow, 1973, p. 184 (all in Russian).

tariat's petty-bourgeois mentality, traditional customs, prejudices and dedication to religion.¹

As Asia awakened, and then during World War I, the numerical strength and share of the proletariat in the population of several countries grew. In China, the number of workers at factories, on railways and in other spheres of the economy grew from 250,000 in 1904 to almost 1,500,000—and, according to a different source, to 2,500,000 or 3,000,000—in 1919.² In India, the number of industrial workers—minus those employed in the mining industry and transport—more than doubled from 1904 to 1919 and reached 1,367,000. By 1921, there was a total of over 2,681,000 industrial workers in India.³

In the moderately developed Asian countries, the growth in the numbers of manufactory and handicraft workers was accompanied by the more rapid formation of the factory proletariat. In Iran, 7,000 to 8,000 workers were employed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1918 (as against only 200 workers in 1908-1909), and about 4,000 Iranian workers held jobs at Lianozov's Caspian fishing concession.⁴

Russia played a special part in the shaping of the Iranian proletariat: industrial enterprises in the south of Russia, including the Baku oilfields, employed about 200,000 Iranian migrant workers.⁵ There they absorbed proletarian ways of thinking and came in contact with socialist ideas. True, after returning to Iran, most of them lost their proletarian status because jobs at industrial enterprises were very scarce. By the end of World War I, there were over 120,000 workers in Iran.⁶

There was a striking growth in the industrial proletariat in Indonesia. Although still non-existent by the turn of the century, in 1916 it already numbered 126,000 factory workers and an additional 100,000 railway and mining workers.⁷ Syria and Lebanon were different: there were very few wage workers there. Prior to World War I, industrial production employed 30,000 people, including handicrafts-

¹ For details see Vol. 2, Chapter 9, of this edition.

² See *Materials on the History of the Modern Industry in China*, Vol. I, pp. 55-56; *May 4, 1919, in China*, Moscow, 1968, p. 102 (in Russian); *A Modern History of China*, Oriental Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1972, p. 569 (in Russian).

³ See I. Khashimov, L. Shaposhnikova, *On the History of the Working-Class Movement in India*, Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Press, Tashkent, 1961, pp. 23, 24 (in Russian); A. I. Levkovsky, op. cit., p. 100.

⁴ Z. Z. Abdullayev, op. cit., pp. 199, 212.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 189.

⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 211.

⁷ See A. B. Belenky, op. cit., p. 31; Ye. P. Zakaznikova, op. cit., p. 11; *The National Liberation Movement in Indonesia (1942-1965)*, Nauka, Moscow, 1970, p. 12 (in Russian).

men and even their dependents.¹ Apparently, the number of workers was no greater in Iraq, either.²

The proletariat began to emerge in Vietnam and Malaya right from the beginning of the 20th century. In Vietnam, the number of industrial workers increased from 1905 to 1914 and reached 55,000. During World War I, the construction of railways, ports, etc., provided jobs for up to 300,000 workers.³ In Malaya, where feudalism and a natural economy impeded the creation of an indigenous labour force, the working class was formed by immigrants from China, India and Indonesia. The indigenous proletariat was mostly employed on plantations. The number of workers in the major rubber plantation areas grew from 57,000 in 1908 to 202,000 in 1918. In 1913, the tin mining industry employed 225,000 workers.⁴

To sum up, the total number of the Asian proletariat greatly increased in the years of Asia's awakening and during World War I. 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 workers were employed at factories alone.

The numerical growth of the proletariat in the oppressed Asian countries was accompanied by its further geographical and industrial concentration. Practically the entire Chinese proletariat was concentrated in just six areas and several large cities, especially Shanghai, where up to 300,000 workers lived in 1914, i.e., about 20 per cent of the country's industrial proletariat. About one-eighth of these workers were employed at the 67 largest enterprises, each providing over 1,000 and some even 2,000 to 3,000 jobs. In 1916, the Hanyeping iron-and-steel works employed 20,000 workers. In India, most industries and about 80 per cent of the proletariat were concentrated in three or four areas around Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. The eight new factories that started operating in Bombay between 1905 and 1915 employed 19,000 workers, and the 72 British-owned jute factories, employed about 251,000 in 1915.⁵ In the less developed Asian countries, the proletariat was as yet concentrating only geographically, and its development was much slower.

Proletarian centres were still isolated from one another, and that impeded the workers' contacts and unification. Besides, the number of workers at factories and similar enterprises was quite small compared to that of wage workers at small handicraft workshops and

¹ See V. F. Kiselev, "On the History of the Emergence of the Proletariat in Countries of the Arab East", *The Arab Countries. A History*, Nauka, Moscow, 1963, p. 11 (in Russian).

² See *ibid.*, p. 14; *The Emergence of the Working Class in Asian and African Countries*, p. 38.

³ See S. A. Mkhitarian, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁴ See: V. A. Zherebilov, *The Working Class of Malaya*, Oriental Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1962, pp. 75, 80, etc. (in Russian).

⁵ See I. Khashimov, L. Shaposhnikova, *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 25; A. I. Levkovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 58, 70.

manufactories. According to one estimate, the Indian proletariat employed at factories numbered almost 2,600,000 people in the early 1920s, and apparently made up no more than 25 per cent of all wage workers.¹ In China, according to the figures of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, of the 12,000,000 wage workers only about 2,000,000 were employed at factories in 1918.² In Iran, the proletariat at factories accounted for hardly more than 10 per cent of all the workers in 1918.³ In the early 1920s, of the 484,000 industrial workers only 87,000 were employed at factories in Burma.⁴ The situation was similar in other countries of the intermediate group, too.

Just as in the late 19th century, the proletariat of oppressed Asia continued to take shape above all in the light industry, mostly in its textile branch, and in the mining industry and on railways. However, by the start of the second decade of the 20th century, national iron-and-steel industries began to grow rapidly in the more developed Asian countries. In China and India, for example, many thousands of metallurgical workers appeared.

A cadre of permanent workers was gradually taking shape in large cities in India, China, Indonesia and the Philippines during the first two decades of the 20th century. These workers' ties with the villages still remained but were no longer as important as before. Asian workers were acquiring a new qualitative feature: they were turning into a social force capable not only of active participation in the liberation struggle but also of taking the first steps towards forming their own class-conscious movement. That became expressly clear in the course of their struggle to improve their extremely poor living and working conditions.

Where colonial rule predominated and feudal and various other obsolete institutions persisted, capitalism conserved the worst forms of exploitation of wage labour. There were still mediators between the workers and the employers. These mediators often acted as recruiting agents, overseers and even usurers. The worker was completely dependent on the mediator, paid him regularly for his "services" and was constantly in debt to him.

The working-day was exhausting. Even in India, where legislation was adopted in 1906 and 1911 stipulating a 12-hour limit for factories, the working-day lasted at least 13.5 hours and often much longer.⁵ The hours became especially long during World War I.

¹ See P. A. Wadia and K. T. Merchant, *Our Economic Problem*, New Book Company, Bombay, 1954, p. 454.

² See *Modern Chinese History*, p. 589.

³ See Z. Z. Abdullayev, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

⁴ S. M. Makarova, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

⁵ See I. Khashimov, L. Shaposhnikova, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43; A. I. Levkovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

As a rule, there were no paid days off in the week, and even the lunch break was not fixed. Safety measures and medical care were non-existent, and the industrial accident rate ran extremely high. Wages were so low that they could not enable the worker to restore his working capacity or keep a family. Everywhere in the Asian colonies and dependent countries workers lived in ramshackle huts, barracks and even pits.¹ Disease, including occupational disease, was rampant, and the deathrate was high. Low-paid female and child labour often predominated, especially at textile mills. In China, children who were considered apprentices and for three to four years worked only for food and a place to sleep sometimes accounted for up to 75 per cent of all the workers.

The existence of a very large and permanent reserve labour army aggravated the severe capitalist exploitation which robbed the workers of their vital forces in Asia's dependent and colonial countries.

The situation of the Asian proletariat deteriorated still further during World War I. The colonial peoples had to pay for the expanded armies of the imperialist powers. The colonial powers began to strip the colonies especially ruthlessly of strategic raw materials and other products needed in the war, at arbitrarily lowered prices. Simultaneously, retail prices rose everywhere because of consumer goods shortages and widespread profiteering. The influx into cities of dispossessed peasants increased. The reserve labour army of the unemployed grew significantly. Labour became more intensive at industrial enterprises during the war. All these factors outweighed the modest wartime increase in the nominal wage in some Asian countries.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE WORKING CLASS

In the period of bourgeois revolutions and the upsurge of the national liberation movement in Asia, strike action intensified considerably. In India, strikes were a permanent feature almost everywhere in 1905-1908; they grew perceptibly more frequent in China in 1905-1911 and in Turkey in 1908; and they began in some of the less developed Asian countries, such as Iran (1905-1911) and Indonesia (1909-1913).

That is borne out even by the fragmentary and incomplete information that is available today. For example, there were 91 strikes in China in 1895-1911; 55 of them were staged during the pre-revolutionary upsurge of 1905-1911, and 24 over the following two years of the Xinhai revolution (1911-1912).² In India, the strike movement

¹ See Z. Z. Abdullayev, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

² See Zhao Qin, "The Working-Class Movement Before and After the Xinhai Revolution", *Li shi yanjiu*, No. 2, 1959, pp. 2-4 (in Chinese).

forged ahead both in the number of strikes and in their intensity after 1905. In late 1905 and in 1906, the strike movement became more vigorous in Bengal. There were strikes by factory, railway, printing, telegraph and postal workers, porters, dustmen, etc. In 1908, proletarian strikes spread to all India's major industries.¹ In the Philippines, strikes ceased to be a rare phenomenon; in 1909-1913, 55 strikes were held,² about 11 each year; later, their number almost doubled. In Korea, over 2,000 workers took part in 11 conflicts with employers and contractors in 1912-1914.³ The number of strikes by the workers in Ceylon and Vietnam employed at foreign-owned enterprises grew considerably. Still, the workers' strike movement developed relatively little in Burma, Malaya, Nepal and most of the Arab countries in Asia.

As in the preceding period, even strikes essentially confined to mostly economic demands objectively emerged as an integral element of the general struggle against feudal monarchist regimes and against imperialism, enhanced by strikes held at enterprises owned by the national bourgeoisie. Those strikes prodded it to come out against the sway of foreign competitors. A new and highly important feature of the working-class movement was that the proletariat began to participate directly in mass political action led by revolutionary bourgeois-democratic organisations and aimed against colonial rule and monarchist regimes. That factor was especially pronounced in the Iranian revolution, where hired workers provided mass support for the Modjahed Party, which represented the more progressive trend, and were members of the enjumens set up throughout the country, and even in many villages. Action by the Iranian proletariat formed an important part of the anti-imperialist trend in the 1905-1911 revolution.

The first strikes were staged in January and October 1906. When Russian workers struck to protest against the contractors' arbitrary action at Lianozov's fishing concession in Enzeli, Iranian workers followed their example and demanded higher wages. In May 1907, strikes again broke out in Enzeli, this time by Iranian fishermen and dockers. For two days they marched around the city, carrying red flags and made shop-owners close their shops. In the spring of 1907, strikes spread to Teheran, too,—in March by telegraph workers and in April by printing workers. In December 1907, the workers and employees of the horse-tramway in the capital staged a successful 12-day strike. Strike action continued to mount in subse-

¹ See I. Khashimov, L. Shaposhnikova, op. cit., pp. 83-88.

² See G. I. Levinson, *The Philippines on the Road to Independence (1901-1946)*, Nauka, Moscow, 1972, p. 77 (in Russian).

³ See *A History of Korea*, Vol. I, Oriental Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1974, p. 428 (in Russian).

quent years, too. Workers took part in mass action and armed uprisings led by the Modjahed Party and other revolutionary organisations.

The Tabriz armed uprising of 1908-1909 which advanced slogans of restoring the constitution and convening parliament, was the most remarkable event in the Iranian revolution. The democratic strata of the population, including workers, took part in, and led, the uprising. Prior to the revolution, Sattar-khan, a peasant, had long worked in Transcaucasia building railways, then at brick-works, and then, for five years, at the Baku oilfields. As a worker, he took part in the struggle of the proletariat in Transcaucasia and was even a member of the Hummet organisation, influenced by the Bolsheviks of Baku. After returning to Iran, he commanded the feday detachments that waged guerrilla warfare against the Shah's authorities. Baghir-khan, another prominent leader of the Tabriz insurgents, was a stone-worker. Ali Kerbelai Mos'yu, yet another Tabriz leader, headed the local Social-Democratic group.

In the North of Iran, the struggle by construction workers, dockers, seamen, and other groups was spearheaded against Russian imperialists. On December 6, 1911, a general strike of boatmen and dockers was launched in the port of Enzeli. They were joined by the city's tradesmen. The latter closed the markets, refused to sell rice to Russian merchants and boycotted their goods. The strike, which lasted for over a week, was put down by tsarist troops. Eight strikers were killed and 18 wounded.¹ In central and southern Iran, the struggle was directed against the British.

The Young Turks' revolution did not give rise to a movement as widespread as that in Iran. Still, the victory of the revolution and the restoration of the constitution generated popular enthusiasm and stepped up the workers' struggle for their demands, mostly for a shorter working-day and higher wages. Lenin wrote at that time about the proletarian struggle that was beginning in the Ottoman Empire.² August and September 1908 alone saw 30 strikes in the country by the workers of Istanbul, the port of Izmir, the lead miners of the British concession in Baliya-Karayidin and by railway workers; there were strikes in Izmir, Eskişehir and Macedonian industrial centres. The Istanbul correspondent of the French magazine *L'Illustration* reported in October 1908: "Turkey's era of liberty has been marked by strikes from the very first days: a strike by port workers, a strike by tramcar employees, a strike by Constantinople

¹ See M. S. Ivanov, *The Iranian Revolution of 1905-1911*, Institute of International Relations Press, Moscow, 1957, pp. 82-84, 289, 293, 312, etc. (in Russian); Z. Z. Abdullayev, op. cit., pp. 242, 253-54.

² See V. I. Lenin, "Events in the Balkans and in Persia", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 222.

bakers, a strike on the Anatolian Railway... One is barely over when another begins."¹ The workers provided mass support for the Young Turks and considered themselves part of their movement, even called themselves Young Turks, and regarded the Unity and Progress organisation as their party.² However, the Young Turks feared the popular masses. That was why before they joined the government they had insisted on a partial ban on strikes. Subsequently, their anti-labour policy became more pronounced.

During the revolutionary upsurge, China's workers were also active in national anti-imperialist struggle launched by the Consolidated Union and its various constituent organisations. Some contingents and sections of the Chinese proletariat fought under the slogans of a republic, freedom and equality against the Manchu monarchy and the imperialists. In April 1905, workers' disturbances broke out at two foreign-owned Shanghai textile mills. Soon a campaign was launched in Shanghai and Guangzhou to boycott American goods, protesting, among other things, against the degrading oppression of Chinese workers in the United States. The boycott campaign was also joined by the workers of Nanking and Wuhan. From November 1906 to January 1907, 3,000 mine workers from the districts of Pingxiang, Liuyang and Liling joined peasants, craftsmen and soldiers in an uprising against the ruling dynasty in the provinces of Jiangxi and Hunan, organised by the Consolidated Union.³ The seamen and dockers of Shantou, the workers of the Hanyang Armoury and the railwaymen of Central China took part in the 1911 revolution itself.

The 1905-1908 upsurge of the national movement in India was also marked by considerable working-class political action against colonial rule and racial discrimination, almost unprecedented in the past. Besides, that ran counter to the wishes of the moderate leadership of the Indian National Congress which opposed the involvement of workers in mass forms of political struggle.

In 1905, the printers of Calcutta held several strikes in support of the demand for the swadeshi and political demonstrations whose participants sang the national anthem. In 1906, a large-scale strike directly linked with the national liberation movement was held for over a week on the Bengal section of the East Indian Railway. There was picketing against strike-breakers and demonstrations were organised. Propagandists representing the radical patriotic forces toured railway stations, urging a general strike by Hindus

¹ *L'Illustration*, October 17, 1908, p. 264.

² See G. Z. Aliyev, op. cit., p. 168.

³ See S. L. Tikhvinsky, *Sun Yatsen. His Foreign Policy Views and Measures* Nauka, Moscow, 1964, p. 106 (in Russian); *Modern Chinese History*, pp. 410-12 *Contemporary Chinese History. 1917-1970*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 19-20 (in Russian)

and Moslems. The workers demanded not only higher wages and better working conditions, but also equal status with the British personnel and that the insulting official term "native" be replaced by "Indian". Although the strike was suppressed, it was a graphic example of the workers' conscious participation in the national movement and showed the proletariat's desire to organise its forces. That same year, 1,000 workers at a jute factory near Calcutta also protested against the insulting treatment of Indians by the management. There was an intense and stubborn strike at two other British-owned jute factories. At one of these, 4,000 workers went on strike.¹ Punjab workers took remarkable anti-British action in 1907: railwaymen refused to transport the punitive expedition against the peasant insurgents who had captured Rawalpindi. But the most striking example of the involvement by the Asian proletariat in the national struggle against imperialism, and the peak of the revolutionary upsurge in India was the 1908 political strike in Bombay, at that time India's second largest city (about 300,000 workers, including 180,000 to 200,000 factory workers, out of a total population of about one million).² The strike was called in response to the colonial court's sentence on Bal Gangadhar Tilak, an outstanding leader of the radical wing of the national movement, who worked among the proletariat. As the Indian Communist newspaper *New Age* says, "the tremendous striking power of the working class was realised by only one outstanding leader ... and that was Lokmanya Tilak".³

Tilak's arrest and the subsequent preparations for his trial caused quite a stir throughout the country and gave rise to workers' protests. The workers of Bombay, actively aided by the radicals, began preparing for a mass political strike. It began simultaneously with the trial, on July 13. Several factories struck and were joined by more and more enterprises. Demonstrations and workers' meetings were held. On July 23, the day after the sentence was passed, the strike became general. Over 100,000 workers struck for six days, each day symbolising one year of the hard labour to which Tilak had been sentenced. Actually, however, the strike went on for more than two weeks and was accompanied by serious clashes with the police and even the army. People were killed and wounded. The workers acted tenaciously, effectively and in concert; they were intransigent with regard to strike-breakers and produced skilful leaders.⁴ The 1908

¹ See I. Khashimov, L. Shaposhnikova, op. cit., pp. 83-88.

² For details see L. A. Gordon, "The Economic Situation of the Bombay Working Class on the Eve of the 1908 Strike", *The Indian National Liberation Movement and B. G. Tilak's Activities*, pp. 431-35 (in Russian).

³ See *New Age*, New Delhi, August 13, 1972.

⁴ See A. I. Chicherov, "The Tilak Trial in July 1908 and the Bombay Strike", *The Indian National Liberation Movement and B. G. Tilak's Activities*, pp. 496-561.

Bombay strike was the first and largest political action to be taken by the proletariat not only in India but in Asia as a whole: it was the peak and culmination of the revolutionary upsurge of the Indian national movement in 1905-1908. Lenin wrote in this connection that "in India, too, the proletariat has already developed to conscious political mass struggle".¹

In Indonesia, one of the first strikes occurred in 1912, on the Krapjak plantation, where most workers were members of the Sarekat Islam national organisation. Sarekat Islam played a particularly important part in organising the first action by the Indonesian industrial proletariat in 1913. The workers of the Dutch-owned Junge mechanical works struck because the management refused to grant them a Moslem holiday on Fridays. Attempts at undermining the strikers' unity by bribes failed. Only arrests broke the strike.²

The spirit of national awakening also marked the action by the first proletarian groups in Ceylon which were mostly represented by Indian immigrants. The 1906 strike by the carters of Colombo was remarkable. As many as 5,000 carters struck in response to a city hall decision about new rules for draying which gave the British police a free hand in imposing fines and other penalties. The carters were supported by workers of other trades, and then by the rest of the city's population and by national public opinion. The strikers won. A successful strike by railwaymen in 1912 was especially large-scale and noteworthy. It paralysed the whole of the island's transport network and became an event of nationwide significance. Although they admitted that the strikers' demands were just, the moderate elements in the national movement thought it harmful to undermine British rule and urged the workers to return to their jobs. The radicals welcomed the strike as a sign of the emergence of national self-awareness.³

In 1909-1912, when bourgeois revolutions in the semi-colonial countries were drawing to a close and the national liberation movements in the colonies were waning, the scope of the workers' strikes for immediate economic demands remained high and even grew in some countries. In China, for example, after the 1911 revolution the strike movement not only failed to slip but even intensified due to the deteriorating working and living conditions caused by World War I. In 1912, there were 14 strikes in China; in 1913, 11; in 1914 also 11; in 1915, eight, in 1916, 17; and in 1917, 23.⁴

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Inflammable Material in World Politics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 184.

² See A. B. Belenky, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-82, 199-200.

³ V. K. Jayawardena, *The Rise of the Labour Movement in Ceylon*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1972, pp. 151-62.

⁴ See *General History of the New Democratic Revolution in China*, Vol. I, Peking, 1959, p. 30 (in Chinese).

Throughout 1909, the economic struggle of the Indian working class continued on the high level of the revolutionary upsurge period. In 1910, the number of large-scale strikes decreased. In 1911, the wave of strikes ebbed perceptibly, but rose again in 1912. Specifically, the struggle began to spread among miners. Strikes by the Indian proletariat grew considerably in intensity and scope during World War I.¹

The Korean proletariat also stepped up its struggle in that period. Compared to 1912-1914, the average number of conflicts annually and of participants in them grew almost five-fold.²

The strike movement was also on the rise in the Philippines. In 1914-1917, the average annual number of strikes was about 22, double the 1909-1913 figure.³ In Turkey, the workers' struggle took a long time to subside after the 1908 revolution, but during the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 and World War I it was strangled by the Young Turks. In Iran, the strike movement diminished but still went on in the war years: in 1914 it was joined by the workers of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Their general strike, called in response to the management's refusal to meet their economic demands, was only put down by the colonialists' use of armed force.⁴

Generally, Asian strikers demanded, as before, higher wages and shorter working hours: the working day was inhumanly long. The strikes of 1905-1917 were unprecedented in the militant, offensive spirit they displayed, in the proletariat's considerably greater unity and solidarity, in the economic struggle for better conditions. This was borne out by the action taken by even the most backward sections of the proletariat which had never before taken part in strikes (plantation workers, carters, coolies, street sweepers, and others). The fact that the workers favoured unity and joint action was not only evident at individual enterprises, but sometimes within an entire industry, district, city, railway, etc. Examples of that were provided by the proletariat of Turkey, India and other countries.

Still, Asian workers were, as a rule, defeated. For example, in China, of the 72 strikes staged over the 1895-1913 period, only nine achieved partial success; 38 of them were complete or almost complete failures (the outcome of 25 strikes has not been found out). The struggle of the proletariat was impeded by its fragmentation (places where workers were concentrated were few and isolated from one another) and by ethnic, tribal, caste and religious heterogeneity. The authorities and employers did their utmost to foment discord among the various groups of workers and often wrecked strikes.

¹ See I. Khashimov, L. Shaposhnikova, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

² See *A History of Korea*, p. 428.

³ See G. I. Levinson, op. cit., p. 77.

⁴ See Z. Z. Abdullayev, op. cit., p. 260.

Another factor that hampered proletarian unity was the high labour turnover. The Asian workers, usually newcomers to the proletariat, were illiterate and ignorant prisoners of religious, caste and other traditional prejudices. It is no accident that their action often took the form of spontaneous riots, which subsided as quickly as they arose. In China, the "Dashang" Luddite-like action continued in 1905-1918 too.

The advancement of the Asian workers' struggle was also impeded by the draconian measures taken by the colonial authorities and the local governments which used force to suppress strikes. In 1913, for example, the initiators of strikes at the Hanyang Armoury and the leaders of the Peking postal workers' strike were executed. Similar action was taken in Indonesia, Korea, India, and other countries. The Young Turks' government also took great pains to pursue an anti-labour policy. The 1909 legislation, actually in effect since 1908, banned not only strikes, but also demonstrations, rallies and any efforts to keep strike-breakers from work, allowed the use of armed force against strikers, and so on and so forth.¹

Gradually, successful strikes by Asian workers ceased to be rare; their number increased. Specifically, we have noted that the British authorities in India were forced by the pressure of the working-class movement to pass labour legislation in 1911 which established a 12-hour limit for the factory working-day. It was a considerable accomplishment in those years. In 1917, strikes by Indian workers forced the annual national wage up 10 to 30 per cent.² Similar gains, although not so spectacular, reflected the greater efficiency of the proletarian struggle in the Philippines, Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Ceylon and other countries.

To sum up, in the course of the national liberation movement during the period of Asia's awakening, the workers had already reached the stage of political action for their countries' liberation, for human dignity, against racial and national discrimination. The method used was the strike—a distinctly proletarian form of struggle. In some countries, such as Iran, Turkey and India, it was also used by the non-proletarian population.

THE EMERGENCE OF TRADE UNION ORGANISATIONS

Although in most cases proletarian action in the period of Asia's awakening and in the years that followed remained spontaneous, the workers' growing interest in organised action became increasingly

¹ See A. D. Novichev, "The Origin of the Working-Class and Socialist Movements in Turkey", *Academic Papers of Leningrad State University*, No. 304, Issue 14, Leningrad University Press, 1962, p. 10 (in Russian).

² A. F. Levkovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

important. Bourgeois-democratic national parties used that factor, often assuming the leadership of strikes and other proletarian action.

When strikes sometimes gave rise to organisations similar to trade unions, they were usually created on the initiative of radical national movement activists who were looking for mass support. These people tried to neutralise the class content of the strike movement and to replace the nascent proletarian consciousness with a narrow nationalist philosophy. Nevertheless, the first proletarian organisations, which had appeared back in the late 19th century in some countries, now began to spring up in all Asian countries where the working-class movement existed or was just being born. For example, traditional craft and guild corporations and brotherhoods in China were gradually evolving into more modern organisations. They were created by the national bourgeoisie in the name of unity with the workers for the sake of developing an indigenous Chinese industry.

Independent proletarian organisations of the trade union type were emerging at the same time. Trade unions and mutual assistance societies which approached the status of the former actually appeared on the basis of mixed bourgeois-proletarian entities. For example, such was the Guangdong Society in China that later became the core of the mechanical workers' union in that province. Trade unions and mutual assistance societies also sprang up independently. In 1906, a postal workers' club started functioning in Guangzhou; in 1913, a smelters' federation was set up at the Hanyang Steel Works and a printing workers' society in Changsha. In 1918, the latter joined the newly established Hunan Printers' union. That and several other unions were the first provincial workers' associations. In 1912 and 1914 several seamen's mutual assistance societies appeared, later to become militant trade union organisations.

In India, workers' unions usually sprang up in the course of strikes, often on the initiative of radicals in the Indian National Congress. In 1905, the Bombay workers' drive in rejection of longer working hours gave rise to the Union of Maratha with a Single Wish. Although its founders planned it as a society for educating workers, it actually emerged as organiser of proletarian action against employers. Workers' unions were also set up on the railways. For example, in the course of a 1906 strike at the East India Railway the railwaymen's union was set up which staged the Jamalpur workshops strike. A union of Calcutta printing workers was also established in 1906. Several unions were created in connection with the workers' struggle at the Bengal jute factories. The Seamen's Union was set up in Calcutta in early 1908.

The Printers' Union, set up by the workers of the Kucheki Printers in Teheran in 1907, was the first trade union in Iran. Special

working people's enjumens—for example the enjumen of tramcar workers, of unemployed servants and others—often performed trade union functions in defending the interests of Iranian workers and craftsmen.¹ Trade union-like organisations also appeared in Ceylon—the Printers' Union and Carters' Union. The latter was set up during the 1906 strike of Colombo carters.²

The 1908 upsurge of the strike movement in Turkey gave rise to several unions. The Ottoman Type-Setters' Union was among the first, followed by the unions of Istanbul dockers and tramcar workers and the workers of the Eastern and Anatolian Railways. The Ottoman Workers' Society, banned by the authorities, was re-established as the Ottoman Industrial Progress Society.³ Apparently, Turkey's bourgeois intellectuals played an important part in that union and in other workers' organisations. In 1912, organisations of Istanbul tailors, cabinet-makers, book-binders, millers and brewery workers were set up.

The trade union movement in Indonesia began with the setting up of a union of state railway employees in Semarang (Java) of which only skilled Dutch workers were members. Many similar employees' associations followed: a postal workers' union in 1905, a Java sugar industry workers' union in 1907, a commercial employees' union in 1909, etc. The trade union movement which included Indonesian workers too began with the setting up in Semarang in 1908 of the Railway and Tramcar Workers' Union which comprised factory and office workers, both Dutch and Indonesian.⁴ Gradually, the union became a mass organisation of the Indonesian proletariat. In 1908, it numbered 200 European and Indoeuropean and only 10 Indonesian members; in 1917, it comprised 3,000 Indonesian factory and office workers and only 700 Europeans.⁵

A Philippine national trade union centre, the Labour Union of the Philippines, began operating early in the 20th century. However, influenced by the American Federation of Labor's conciliatory policy, it aimed at ensuring "cordial cooperation" between labour and capital. As a result, it lost the workers' support and disintegrated in 1907. But on May 1, 1913, Philippine trade union leaders in close contact with the Nationalist Party established a new trade union centre, the Workers' Congress of the Philippines, which soon united 36 proletarian organisations. At the same time, some of

¹ See Z. Z. Abdullayev, op. cit., pp. 244-46.

² V. K. Jayawardena, op. cit., p. 127.

³ See A. D. Novichev, op. cit., pp. 8-9, 28.

⁴ See A. B. Belenky, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

⁵ See *The First Congress of Far Eastern Revolutionary Organisations*, Comintern Executive Committee Publishing House, Petrograd, 1922, p. 285 (in Russian).

the older trade unions continued to exist and grow stronger—for example, the printers' and tobacco workers' unions which rejected the craft unionist approach and restructured themselves on the basis of industrial principles in 1906-1909. Philippine trade union leaders were greatly influenced by the Nationalist Party, and their views combined Marxist elements with Proudhon's concepts.¹

Workers' unions were usually established among the skilled workers who made up comparatively stable groups. They were mostly narrow trade and local entities, uniting part of the workers at one or several neighbouring enterprises of a similar type, sometimes on one railway or even on a section of it. Those organisations were still unstable, their influence marginal, and they sometimes fell apart quite soon. Trade unions were affected by national isolation and by fragmentation according to ethnic, religious and regional affiliation (in China, India and other countries). European workers usually set up their own separate trade unions. Asian immigrant workers often followed suit (for example, the Chinese in Indonesia).

This is what the trade unions were like, which marked the outset of the organised working-class movement in Asia.

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT'S FIRST STEPS

The growth of the Asian working-class movement was stimulated by contacts with the proletariat of advanced bourgeois countries. Among other things, these contacts were due to the widespread migration of Asian workers to capitalist countries in search of jobs. For example, the emigration to Russia of hundreds of thousands of Iranian, Chinese and Korean workers was of paramount importance, and also the Chinese migration to France, Germany, the United States and other countries. For instance, more than 111,000 Chinese, mostly workers, lived in Russia's Far East in 1910.² During World War I 200,000 Chinese worked in France, and thousands provided services for the British and US troops stationed in Europe. In 1911, 193,000 people left Iran for Russia, and about the same number of earlier immigrants returned to Iran.³

The migration of "redundant" workers from capitalist countries to Asia also exerted a revolutionising influence on the working-class movement in the East. For example, many thousands of Russian workers were employed at the tsarist concessions in Manchuria, mostly on the Chinese Eastern Railway. In 1903, about 30,000 Russians lived in Harbin alone. Subsequently, their numbers continued

¹ See G. I. Levinson, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

² See M. Tutayev, *Sources of Russo-Chinese Revolutionary Ties*, Tatar Book Publishing House, Kazan, 1961, pp. 46, 47 (in Russian).

³ See Z. Z. Abdullayev, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

to grow.¹ Over 5,000 Russian workers were employed at Lianozov's fishing concessions and other Russian capitalist enterprises in Iran on the eve of World War I.² Many Dutch workers had jobs at foreign-owned enterprises in Indonesia. The same was true of British workers in India and other Asian countries.

As a result, Asian workers sometimes took joint action with French, Russian, Dutch or British workers. A well-known case in point was the 1907 general ten-day strike on the East Bengal Railway which began with joint action by Indian and British engine drivers.³ Iranian workers took part in the strikes of the Russian proletariat in Baku and many other places. Russian workers frequently acted together with Chinese and Korean workers at timber and mining concessions in Manchuria. During the Russian revolution of 1905-1907, the Bolsheviks led important joint strikes, rallies and demonstrations of Russian and Chinese Eastern Railway workers, especially those employed at the Harbin workshops and depots.⁴ Joint struggle fostered the internationalist spirit of the emergent Asian working class.

The influence and active assistance of the Social-Democrats throughout the world, especially their revolutionary wing, greatly helped the Asian working-class movement to develop an independent class position.

Led by Lenin, the revolutionary Social-Democrats' struggle against opportunism made a sizable contribution to that end: the 1907 Stuttgart Congress of the Second International adopted an anti-colonialist resolution. The denunciation of colonial rule and the proclamation of the nations' right to self-determination by the Second International attracted the attention of the more radical members of the Asian national liberation movement. That was of great significance for the advancement of the struggle for independence and the emergence of interest in socialist ideas in Asia.

Some Social-Democratic parties of the Second International and sometimes their individual members contributed to the establishment of contacts with the Asian national liberation movement. So, the Dutch Social-Democrats living in Indonesia were not only active in its liberation movement but also did much to pave the way for a party of the Indonesian working class. In 1908-1911, the Socialists of the Balkan countries were active in Turkey, where the first socialist organisations were emerging at that time.

¹ See M. Tutayev, op. cit., p. 61.

² See Z. Z. Abdullayev, op. cit., pp. 240-41.

³ See E. N. Komarov, *On the History of the National Liberation Movement and Social Thought in Bengal*, pp. 257-58.

⁴ See M. Tutayev, op. cit., pp. 65-79.

Of special significance was the consistent and vigorous policy pursued by the Bolshevik Party to aid and support the national liberation and socialist movements in the East. Iran was a graphic example. Already in 1905 N. Narimanov, M. Azizbekov and other Bolsheviks from Transcaucasia helped set up the first Social-Democratic cell among the Iranian migrant workers at the Baku oil-fields. Close contact with the Bolsheviks led many Iranian revolutionary democrats to Marxism. For example, Mohammed oglu Haydar-khan Amu, influenced by the Bolsheviks of Tiflis (now Tbilisi), began to study Marxism and later, after the October Revolution, became a Communist, one of the leaders of the Communist Party of Iran. In 1905-1911, the Tiflis and Baku Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party committees established committees to assist the Iranian revolution which offered it comprehensive practical support. That great internationalist effort was led by the Bolsheviks—Sergo Orjonikidze, Narimanov, Azizbekov and others.¹

Financial contributions, weapons and ammunition, printing equipment, medical supplies and literature were sent to Iran from Russia. Hundreds of volunteers, mostly Social-Democrats, went to help the revolution. Many of them took part in the armed struggle, and over 50 sacrificed their lives for the cause.² Sergo Orjonikidze commanded one of the volunteer detachments in Iran.

Lenin accorded great importance to that sphere of Bolshevik activity and widely publicised it among foreign Social-Democrats.³ The Bolsheviks' struggle against the annexationist, counter-revolutionary policy of Russian tsarism and international imperialism in China, Korea, Iran and Turkey greatly supported the Asian revolutions. Lenin and the Bolsheviks exposed the conspiracy of the great powers against the Iranian and Turkish revolutions and resolutely condemned the armed intervention by Russia and Britain in Iran. Propaganda to that effect was waged among the troops sent to suppress the Iranian revolution. Bolshevik slogans called on Russia's workers and peasants to fight against the annexationist policy, for the overthrow of tsarism and for unification with the proletariat of other countries and the oppressed peoples of the East. The Sixth (Prague) Conference of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in 1912 adopted a special resolution "The Russian Government's Attack on Persia", drafted by Lenin, expressing "unqualified sym-

¹ See F. B. Bebel'yubsky, N. K. Belova, "The First Socialist Contacts with the National Liberation Movement", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1970, pp. 51-54 (in Russian).

² See *Lenin in the Struggle for a Revolutionary International*, Nauka, Moscow, 1970, p. 279 (in Russian).

³ See *ibid.*, p. 283; V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, pp. 428, 432 (in Russian).

pathy for the struggle waged by the Persian people" and protesting against the predatory policy of the tsarist clique, which conspired with the British Government against the liberation struggle of the Iranian people. In a special decision on the Chinese revolution, also drafted by Lenin, the Conference recognised that revolution's world-wide significance, expressed the Russian proletariat's great sympathy towards it and protested against the tsarist annexationist policy in China.¹

In their turn, the champions of Asian national liberation saw the international proletariat as their reliable defender and ally. An appeal by Iranian revolutionaries, published in the September 1911 issue of *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the central RSDLP organ, in connection with the preparations for a new act of imperialist invasion of revolutionary Iran, said: "In these days of trial, who can we look up to, in the hope of sympathy and appealing for support? Of course, to the European socialist proletariat. To workers throughout the world, and to them only—to those true and sincere friends of the oppressed... to the fighters for freedom and fraternity among all nations..."²

National liberation activists increasingly turned to the leaders and parties of the Second International in search of support in the struggle against colonial rule. For several years Sun Yat-sen maintained contacts with the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International. He counted on its effective support in the drive for international recognition of the first Chinese republican government he led.³ More and more national revolutionaries were attracted to the socialist doctrine. An interesting example was the Tabriz revolutionaries' inquiry addressed in 1908 first to Karl Kautsky and then to Georgy Plekhanov as to whether it was feasible to create a Social-Democratic party in Iran, where a modern proletariat was still non-existent. Many national revolutionaries who were later to share communist ideas began by establishing contacts with the Second International and its parties. In 1910, the Indian revolutionary Bhikajee Kama and the prominent national revolutionary democrat Virendranath Chattopadhyaya, later to become a Communist, joined the French Socialist Party. Mustafa Subhi, the future leader of Turkish Communists, first learned about the socialist doctrine in Paris, where he was in contact with French socialists and International Socialist Bureau members.⁴

¹ See *The CPSU in the Resolutions...*, Vol., 1, p. 344; V. I. Lenin, "The Sixth (Prague) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.", *Collected Works*, Vol., 17, 1968, pp. 466, 484, 485.

² *Sotsial-Demokrat*, September 1 (14), 1911.

³ See F. B. Belelyubsky, N. K. Belova, op. cit., p. 46.

⁴ See *A Life of Struggle*, Nauka, Moscow, 1966, p. 493 (in Russian).

Sun Yatsen contributed to the European socialist press. Specifically, one of his articles was published in the Bolshevik newspaper *Nevskaya Zvezda* on July 15, 1912. Lenin commented on it and observed that Sun Yatsen's platform was permeated with a militant and sincere democratic spirit, combined "with socialist dreams, with hopes of China avoiding the capitalist path...".¹ Investigating the genesis of socialist ideas on the pre-capitalist Chinese soil, Lenin noted that the Chinese democrats' sympathies for socialism, their "*subjective* socialism" were inevitable because the overthrow of the old system in their country only became possible due to the revolutionary upsurge of the oppressed masses who were supported by the democrats, too. Lenin said that the Chinese borrowed their emancipation ideas from Europe and America, where emancipation from the bourgeoisie, i.e., socialism, was on the agenda.² Lenin's comment holds true for some of the revolutionary democrats everywhere in Asia, those who, influenced by the happenings of 1905 in Russia, took the path of national liberation revolutions and turned to socialist ideas.

The popular masses' drive for national liberation and the workers' struggle for their distinct demands were the fertile soil from which the socialist movement in Asia sprang up. Logically, the spread of Marxism and sometimes the establishment of Social-Democratic organisations in Iran, Turkey, China and Indonesia began precisely at the time of Asia's awakening. In 1906, Iranian revolutionaries, aided by the Bolsheviks, established a Social-Democratic organisation in Baku which propagated its ideas among Iranian migrant workers. Simultaneously, individual Social-Democratic groups began to appear in Iranian cities. Mohammed oglu Haudar-khan Amu formed a group of this type in Teheran.

During the Tabriz uprising in 1908 a group of intellectuals studying in Russia also established a Social-Democratic organisation, which proceeded from the RSDLP Programme translated into Persian by Iranian Social-Democrats in Baku, considered it its programme of action and aimed at "disseminating Marxist ideas". Tabriz activists managed to set up three groups among workers and spread Social-Democratic propaganda to some of the handicraft workers. They tried to lead the struggle of the city's workers. In the course of a strike by the workers of three tanneries, Social-Democrats helped them draw up their demands: higher wages, hiring and dismissal only on agreement with workers' representatives, better working conditions, less overtime and with double pay, half pay for sick leave, and back pay for forced absence from work during a strike.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Democracy and Narodism in China", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 165.

² See *ibid.*, p. 166.

The workers warned the management that strikers should not be dismissed or strike-breakers hired.¹ Tabriz workers, perhaps for the first time in Asia, raised the issue of the workers' collective rights and set up a commission to negotiate with the employers. Social-Democratic leadership made the strike possible and ensured its success.

In 1909-1910, a Social-Democratic group led by Sergo Orjonikidze was formed in Rasht. Its members translated part of the *Communist Manifesto* and organised deliveries of Bolshevik literature from abroad which was distributed among Iran's workers and other democratic sections of the population.

The social composition of Iranian Social-Democratic groups was quite heterogeneous. Together with migrant workers from Baku, they comprised petty-bourgeois elements such as craftsmen, tradesmen and junior clergy. The first Social-Democratic organisations were ineffectual and unstable, often resorted to petty-bourgeois tactics, including terrorist acts against individuals, and were contaminated with sectarian views. Their influence was weak and they did not last long. But the very fact that they appeared pointed to the existence of a socialist trend, which grew increasingly stronger from then on. In 1916, another Social-Democratic group sprang up among Iranian oil workers in Baku, led by Asadollah Gafar-zadeh. In May 1917, it served as the nucleus of a new party, called Adalat (Justice). Its branches were mostly active among Iranian migrant workers in Baku and other Azerbaijanian towns, in Central Asia, Astrakhan and also in North Iranian towns.² In 1920 Adalat was renamed the Communist Party of Iran.

During the Turkish revolution, independent socialist groups, each uniting workers of one distinct nationality, already existed in Salonika. In 1909, the Socialist Federation was formed which was to play a noticeable part in the Greek working-class movement, too. Its programme envisaged the establishment of the proletariat's political rule and of collective ownership of the means of production. The Socialists tried to lead the trade union movement in their province, waged propaganda among Istanbul workers, helped them organise and stage militant action. The Federation was a member of the Second International and published a *Workers' Paper* in Turkish, Greek, Bulgarian, and Hebrew.

In September 1910, the Ottoman Socialist Party was established in Istanbul, led by Turkish journalists and Socialists from Greece and the Caucasus. Mustafa Subhi was prominent among the party's

¹ See M. S. Ivanov, "New Data on the Tabriz Social-Democratic Group in 1908", *Problemy vostokovedeniya*, No. 5, 1959, pp. 180-82 (in Russian).

² See M. S. Ivanov, *The Working Class of Contemporary Iran*, Nauka, Moscow, 1969, pp. 194-97 (in Russian).

activists. The party published the newspaper *Ishtirak*, and several other periodicals. The leadership maintained close ties with the leaders of the Second International. In November 1910, the party programme was published, proclaiming that the party's objectives were prosperity and political rights for the workers and population groups close to them. Consequently, the programme advanced demands for direct suffrage, freedom of the press and assemblies, equal rights for all imperial subjects, etc. Special emphasis was laid on the labour question. The programme demanded the repeal of the anti-labour legislation, an eight-hour working day, leaves and days off for the workers. The economic objectives included an end to the sway of foreign capital by nationalising foreign-controlled enterprises, railways, banks, and insurance companies. On the whole, the programme was that of bourgeois-democratic reforms and not of the socialist transformation of society. Right from the start the party emerged as a social-reformist organisation, and it failed to become a genuine leader of the working class. Nevertheless, the very fact that a Socialist Party was formed in Turkey, and also its activities to benefit workers were of great progressive significance. The party's leaders and activists, including its Chairman, Husein Hilmi-bey, were persecuted by the Young Turks' government. *Ishtirak* was closed.

But that failed to prevent Turkey's Socialists from continuing with their work. From then on it was carried on mostly in parliament. Socialists often criticised the reactionary policy of the Young Turks, especially in respect of the labour question. They submitted draft legislation to ban the use of the labour of children under 14 and senior citizens over 70, proposed an eight-hour working day, etc. They also publicised their draft legislation among the workers, but failed to have it discussed in parliament.

During the Italo-Turkish War the Socialists initiated workers' anti-war rallies, which condemned the militarist policies of the Turkish and Italian governments and expressed sympathy for the anti-war action taken by Italian workers. The Ottoman Socialist Party ceased functioning at the outset of World War I and with the establishment of the terrorist dictatorship by the Young Turkish triumvirate.¹

In the first decade of the 20th century, adherents of socialism also appeared among the progressive intellectuals of Turkey's Arab provinces: Shibli Shumayyil and Farah Antun of Lebanon. Although their views were simply egalitarian and humanitarian notions of a

¹ See A. D. Novichev, "The Emergence of the Working-Class and Socialist Movement in Turkey", *Uchyonye zapiski LGU*, Issue 14, No. 304, pp. 9-10, pp. 15-28; G. Z. Aliyev, op. cit., pp. 171-78.

society without oppression, they proved that interest in socialist ideas was spreading even in the backward Arab countries.¹

In Indonesia, the Social-Democratic movement was initiated by Dutch Social-Democrats, the most prominent of whom was Hendricus Sneevliet, an engineer at one of the commercial enterprises. He became active in the Railwaymen's and Tramcar Workers' Union, disseminated socialist ideas among its members and organised the struggle for the rights of the low-paid Indonesian employees. The work of Sneevliet and other Social-Democrats rapidly helped to make the union more radical and to draw Indonesian workers in its ranks.

In May 1914, on Sneevliet's initiative, a group of less than 100 Socialists formed the East Indies Social-Democratic Federation (ISDF) in Surabaya.² It worked out a programme and launched its own publication. Two ideologically rival trends, Marxist and the revisionist, immediately emerged within the ISDF.

The right wing regarded the association merely as an academic club to study Indonesia's economic and political situation. They resolutely opposed ISDF ties with the mass working-class or national liberation movements claiming that the Indonesian worker was not mature enough to grasp socialist ideas, all the more so to take socialist action. Maintaining that the Indonesians were not yet ready for self-government, the right wing virtually justified Dutch colonial rule and intended to introduce the indigenous population to Western civilisation, dismissing, in a sectarian gesture, the national liberation movement as essentially bourgeois. Left leaders (Sneevliet, and Adolf Baars) tried to turn the organisation into a militant socialist party, to evoke interest in socialism among the Indonesians, and to ensure that Indonesians themselves should lead the party. The left constantly exposed colonial policies, especially Dutch, and advocated joint struggle with the Indonesians against imperialism, for the country's liberation from foreign domination. The left emerged victorious in the rivalry. From 1915 the ISDF published the newspaper *Het vrije woord* and from 1916, *Soeara Merdeka* in Malay which exposed colonial policies and disseminated socialist ideas.

Gradually, a group of young Indonesian patriots rallied around the ISDF. Relying on their support, the left expanded its activities among the Indonesian masses. In 1916, the association's leadership already included several young Indonesians—Semaoen, Marko, Kartodikromo (later to become prominent Communists) and others; and in early 1917, the Social-Democrats opened an Indonesian

¹ See Z. I. Levin, op. cit., pp. 235-40.

² See A. B. Belenky, op. cit., pp. 245-46, etc.; Ye. P. Zakaznikova, op. cit., p. 32; *The Trade Union Movement in Indonesia*, Profizdat, Moscow, 1961, p. 28 (in Russian).

branch—called Sama-Rata (Equality)—in Surabaya which soon numbered 120 members.

The left exerted great influence on the trade unions, worked to make them strong and capable of defending the proletariat's interests, and fought for joint organisations of Indonesian and European workers. On the initiative of the left, the ISDF established relations with the country's national organisations in order to ensure closer contacts with the population. The ISDF's cooperation with Sarekat Islam, which numbered 360,000 members in 1916, was especially successful. The ISDF tried to direct Sarekat Islam onto the path of resolute revolutionary struggle for national independence and to convince its activists that their hopes of winning self-government by "legitimate" means, all the more so, their actual begging for the right to take part in the nation's affairs from colonial rulers, led nowhere. The Social-Democrats oriented Sarekat Islam towards supporting the working people's social demands, towards cooperation with the trade union movement. That was the spirit of the speeches Semaoen and Mohammed Yusuf of the ISDF made at the First Congress of Sarekat Islam in 1916. The ISDF was the first Marxist organisation not only in Indonesia but in the whole of oppressed Asia, in fact.

At the very end of 1911, the Chinese Socialist Party was established. Jiang Kanghu, its founder, educated as an engineer, was apparently aiming not so much at disseminating socialist ideas as at securing support for his election to the National Assembly. Nevertheless, it showed that there were people interested in socialism in China. The party grew rapidly. Li Dazhao, later to become one of the founders of the Communist Party of China, was a member. The Chinese Socialist Party programme envisaged the endorsement of a republic, the assimilation of national minorities, the repeal of the inheritance system, the spread of education among the masses, the development of profitable trades and industrial production, the abolition of all taxes except the land tax, etc. That programme, as Lenin put it, "has *nothing at all* to do with socialism",¹ it only comprised modest bourgeois-democratic demands. Soon a strong anarchist group appeared within the party which left the Chinese Socialist Party and formed the so-called Pure Socialist Party. In August 1913, however, both organisations were dissolved and banned. Some of the leaders were executed on charges of "fomenting internal unrest" and cooperating "with Russian Nihilists to bring about a world revolution".²

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Regenerated China", *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 401.

² See A. G. Krymov, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-62; K. V. Shevelev, *The Emergence of the Communist Party of China (1917-1921)* (Candidate of Sciences Thesis), Moscow, 1975, pp. 40-42 (in Russian).

Some interest in socialism and Marxism were evident in India, too. That was borne out by the publication of Karl Marx's biography in Malayalam. The author, Krishna Pillai, a radical journalist and staunch fighter against colonial rule, tried to explain and disseminate Marx's ideas. He also published a series of articles on the history of socialism in different countries, on Owen, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Louis Blanc, Proudhon, and Lassalle, and tried to evaluate the influence of socialist ideas on Western social development.¹ In 1916, articles on socialism appeared in Gujarati.

One of the first Philippine propagators of socialism was Isabelo de los Reyes who had spent long years in Spain as an emigré and been closely connected with the Spanish anarcho-syndicalists. After returning to the Philippines, he began to acquaint the leaders of workers' organisations with the works of Marx and Engels and of Proudhon, Bakunin, Danton, and Marat. Lope C. Santos was another prominent propagator of socialist ideas. In his novel *The Ray of the Rising Sun*, written in Tagalog and published as a book in 1906, he tried, albeit naively and not always correctly, to explain the essence of socialism as a doctrine of justice. The novel was a success and sold 3,000 copies, at that time, an unprecedented amount.²

To sum up, under the influence of the 1905-1907 Russian revolution and the activities of the Bolsheviks and the revolutionary left wing of the Social-Democrats in different countries, direct contacts began to form between the national liberation, including the working-class, movement of the Asian countries with the international proletariat. The first, although fairly ineffectual, socialist organisations appeared. They were of considerable assistance to future generations of revolutionaries, to the cause of an independent working-class movement.

AFRICA: THE CONDITION AND STRUGGLE OF THE WORKING PEOPLE

In the first decades of the 20th century, the army of wage labour continued to take shape in Africa. As the national liberation movement intensified, the initial forms in the struggle of the proletariat and the semi-proletarian masses were coming into being. These processes had distinctive features of their own in northern, southern and tropical Africa with the regional differences among them, which had begun to appear earlier, deepening.

¹ See *New Age*, June 17, 1975.

² See G. I. Levinson, op. cit., pp. 74-77.

DISTINCTIVE FEATURES IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND STRUGGLE
OF THE WORKING CLASS IN NORTH AFRICA

Intense capital investment on the part of the imperialist countries affected the economic development of the North Africa countries. Consequently, the demand for wage workers grew rapidly. The pool of wage labour was created by expropriating land and handing it over to Europeans, destroying communal land tenure, increasing the tax burden, etc. The emergent proletariat also absorbed craftsmen who went bankrupt because their products could not compete with European industrial goods. So, no more than 70 looms remained in Asyut (Egypt) by 1910, while just a few years earlier their number had amounted to 300.¹ The situation was typical of other traditional craft centres, too.

On the eve of World War I, pauperisation of those directly engaged in production was especially widespread in North Africa. But that process was much more rapid than the transformation of destitute working people into proletarians. Those deprived of their means of production in rural areas often failed to become wage workers even when they moved to the city; instead, they became persons without any definite occupation. They made up the so-called marginal strata, which made their living from peddling, providing small services, and from meagre and irregular payments for odd jobs. Since most processing industry enterprises depended on agricultural raw materials and offered only seasonal jobs, workers were mostly day and seasonal labourers with firm ties with the village.

In 1911-1918, the total number of workers in North African countries was about 1,500,000, with at least 50 per cent employed in agriculture.² The nascent proletariat was rapidly augmented by the

¹ Gabriel Baer, *Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969, p. 153.

² Calculated from figures quoted in the following works: L. A. Friedman, *Egypt in 1882-1952. The Rural Socio-Economic Structure*, Nauka, Moscow, 1973, p. 232 (in Russian); F. M. Atsamba, *The Formation and Economic Condition of the Working Class in Egypt*, Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1960, p. 88 (in Russian); N. A. Ivanov, "The Emergence of the National Working-Class Movement in Tunisia (1924-1925)", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1966, p. 45 (in Russian); Charles-Robert Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans et la France (1871-1919)*, Vol. 2, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1968, p. 826; Tayeb Belloula, *Les Algériens en France*, Éditions Nationales Algériennes, Alger, 1965; Augustin Bernard, *L'Afrique du Nord pendant la guerre*, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1926, p. 11; N. S. Lutsкая, *Essays on Contemporary Moroccan History*, Nauka, Moscow, 1973, p. 73 (in Russian); A. Yash, *Morocco. A Case of Colonial Rule and Its Outcome*, Foreign Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1958, p. 339 (in Russian); Mark I. Cohen and Loran Hahn, *Morocco. Old Land, New Nation*, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1966, p. 25; Charles F. Stewart, *The Economy of Morocco 1912-1962*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1964, p. 65.

influx of European immigrants. By the end of the second decade of the 20th century, 116,000 European workers had jobs in Algeria and Tunisia alone. Apart from the French, they included many Italian, Spanish, Maltese, and other workers.

There was no "colour bar" in North Africa to reserve solely skilled jobs for Europeans: the latter comprised part of both skilled and unskilled workers' groups.¹ Their working conditions differed but little from those of Arabs. The Europeans' wages, while considerably higher than those of Arab workers, were, as a rule, even below the official subsistence minimum. Usually, unskilled Europeans were deep in debt to shopkeepers and bar owners. Nothing came of their hopes to save enough money to return home, open their own business or buy a plot of land. Nevertheless, the socio-economic position of some of the European workers meant that they were turning into a labour aristocracy. That trend was already in evidence and was growing stronger with every passing year.

Arab workers were much worse off. On European-owned farms where they worked from dawn till dusk for a pittance, their diet was usually one kilogram of bread per day, and two litres of olive oil and a few kilograms of figs and cereals a month.² Seasonal workers were usually not provided with quarters and had to sleep in the open. Unable to withstand such working and living conditions for long, Arab workers returned to their villages. Only a desperate situation and the fear of starving to death forced peasants to work on the settlers' farms, on transport and in the mines.

Most workers got deep into debt. The employers themselves often acted as moneylenders, providing workers with an advance. The capitalists widely used a system of fines and various deductions. In Egypt, for example, "legitimate" deductions alone made up from 7 to 13 per cent of the wage. Besides, the middlemen, the raises, who often acted as overseers, usually pocketed part of the workers' wage.

The first signs of labour legislation, which only appeared in North Africa in the early 20th century, virtually failed to limit the employers' arbitrary action.

The socio-economic immaturity of the Arab proletariat and the almost complete lack of factory workers largely explained the weakness of the working-class movement. At the same time, the comparatively large mass of European workers who failed to join the labour aristocracy and continued in the traditions of advanced anti-capital-

¹ See, for example, M. F. Vidyasova, *The Working Class in the Social Structure of Tunisia*, Nauka, Moscow, 1975, p. 148 (in Russian); R. Bernard, C. Aymard, *L'oeuvre française au Maroc*, Paris, 1914, p. 93.

² *Traité pratique d'agriculture pour le Nord de l'Afrique*, Vol. 2, Paris, 1929, p. 344.

ist struggle, and the territorial proximity of the international working-class movement centres helped the emergent Arab proletariat to learn advanced forms and methods of anti-capitalist struggle. It was precisely European workers who emerged as initiators of the strike movement and trade union organisations, as propagators of socialist ideas.

The action taken in North Africa by the European workers, who retained organisational and political links with proletarian and socialist organisations in their home countries, intensified under the impact of the first Russian revolution and the upsurge of the mass movement by the working people in Western Europe. After 1905, strikes by European workers in Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, previously mostly sporadic, became a regular phenomenon, increasingly joined by Arab workers. There were, for example, 83 strikes in Tunisia in 1904-1913.¹

Strikers' demands were usually economic: better working conditions, higher wages, shorter working hours, etc. But occasionally, there were cases of political action: the 1905 and 1906 May Day demonstrations in Algiers, the 1907 demonstrations in Alexandria and Cairo to protest against the deportation of Russian revolutionaries, the 1911 anti-imperialist demonstration by dockers and other workers in Alexandria and the 1912 strike by tramcar workers in Tunis, both protesting against Italian aggression in Libya.

In their struggle against the mounting movement of the emergent proletariat, the colonial authorities widely used bans and reprisals. In 1905, a decree was issued in Tunisia banning trade unions and demonstrations. Special permits were required to hold meetings. During the 1906 May Day demonstration in Algiers, troops patrolled city streets to intimidate the demonstrators. By the start of World War I, many workers with revolutionary leanings had been dismissed from their jobs. Their leaders were subjected to various kinds of persecution or were offered government jobs as bribes.²

Despite reprisals by the authorities, the movement gradually gathered strength. The growth of trade unions was one of the signs. A dockers' union was set up in Egypt in 1905, and a union of tobacco workers and a union of banking and commercial employees in 1906. The first trade unions were almost exclusively European.³ In Tunisia, the workers' struggle maintained trade unions in violation of

¹ *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, IX, 1970, Éditions du Centre National de la recherche scientifique, Paris, 1971, p. 946.

² See Sh. A. Al-Shafy, *The Development of the National Liberation Movement in Egypt, 1882-1956*, Foreign Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1961, p. 47 (in Russian).

³ See Ye. Veit, *Egypt*, Moskovsky Rabochy, Moscow, Leningrad, 1928, p. 80 (in Russian).

the official ban. In 1911, a branch of the French General Confederation of Labour was established there. Trade union organisations staged strikes, advanced their demands and published many newspapers, although short-lived and with small circulations. From 1905, *La Voix de l'ouvrier*, a revolutionary-syndicalist newspaper was published in Tunisia. The periodical *Le Syndicalisme*, published in 1905-1906, was politically close to the former. There were the newspapers *Le Prolétaire* (1808) and, from May 1910, *La Voix de cheminots*, the latter published by the railwaymen of North Africa, etc.¹ Trade unions set up by European immigrants usually admitted native workers and tried to rouse them to joint struggle against capital. That, however, did not rule out the fact that some sections of the European workers were indifferent to the needs of the nascent Arab proletariat, and some of them even held racist views. Still, there was an obvious trend towards establishing joint mass organisations and taking joint action.

Another trend that emerged was the coming into being of the indigenous workers' trade unions. For example, in 1909 a manual workers' trade union was formed in Egypt, apparently, one of the first exclusively Arab trade unions in North Africa, with branches in Alexandria, Ismailia, and Port Said. During World War I, Arab railwaymen established their own mutual aid fund in Tunisia. Tobacco workers followed suit and set up an organisation separate from the French one. The growth of Arab trade unions helped involve masses of the nationally oppressed population in the class struggle, thus creating the prerequisites for the subsequent emergence of a qualitatively new unity of the European and Arab proletariat on the basis of the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle.

In the period under review, the socialist movement in North Africa was active almost exclusively among European workers. In Algeria and Tunisia, there were socialist workers' federations, branches of the SFIO. In 1918, the Tunisian federation alone numbered 34,000 members. These organisations' objectives can be seen from some of the points of the Algerian Socialist Workers' Federation programme: 1) To establish links with all Algerian workers and to support, by every means available, their demands and protests for the defence of common interests...; 3) to take part in ... all election campaigns; 4) to safeguard the interests of the workers, to ensure strict compliance with the laws and decrees in force, and to wage active propaganda for the improvement of the existing legislation; 5) to take all the necessary measures for the complete emancipation of the workers without distinction as to their race or sex; 6) to encourage by every possible means the creation and development of workers'

¹ *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, IX, 1970, pp. 937-41.

production and consumer cooperatives on a socialist or communist basis.¹

A distinct socialist trend was represented in Egypt by the Arab petty-bourgeois Socialists Shumeili, Salam Mussa, Mustafa el-Mansouri and others who made an abortive attempt to establish a Socialist Party in 1908. The programme published by Shumeili envisaged a number of bourgeois-democratic reforms.²

The shaping of the first Arab Socialists' outlook was greatly influenced by opportunist elements in the Second International; they advocated peaceful and gradual "socialist" transformations through administrative reform. The historical contribution of the then Arab socialists is that they not only helped build up national self-awareness by demanding national independence, but also drew the attention of Arab public to Marxism. Specifically, el-Mansouri's book *Tarikh al-mathahib al-Ishtirakiya* (A History of Socialist Doctrines), based mostly on Engels's *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* was the first systematic exposition of the fundamentals of Marxism and its history, in Arabic.

An important, distinctive feature of the working-class movement in North Africa was that it developed amidst the general upsurge of the national liberation struggle, intensified by the impact of the first Russian revolution. It was then that the bourgeois-democratic Watani Party was formed in Egypt, with national independence as its objective. The bourgeois nationalist movement of Young Tunisians and Young Algerians emerged in Tunisia and Algeria. Its members mostly aimed at equal rights for the Arab and French population, at improved education for the indigenous population, at the government-assisted introduction of modern land cultivation techniques, etc. But they did not raise the issue of national independence for their countries.³

The influence of the bourgeois-national opposition in Tunisia and Algeria on the working-class movement was marginal. Only in 1912 the Young Tunisians supported an anti-imperialist strike by tramcar workers. The situation was different in Egypt, where the Watani Party paid close attention to the labour question. Muhammed Farid who assumed party leadership after the death of Mustafa Kamel said: "Educate the worker, lead him from darkness to light, tell him about the situation of his brothers in Europe, about the relative happiness they have achieved thanks to knowledge, unity and solidarity."⁴

¹ *La Deuxième Internationale et l'Orient*. Sous la direction de Georges Haupt et Madeleine Reberieux, Éditions Cujas, Paris, 1967, pp. 444-45.

² See Z. I. Levin, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

³ W. Knapp, *Tunisia*, London, 1970, pp. 121-22.

⁴ Quoted from: Sh. A. Al-Shafy, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

On the initiative of Watanists evening classes for workers were started and a manual workers' trade union was set up. Its Charter said that the union's goals included better material conditions and the encouragement of the cultural development of its members: free legal and medical aid, benefits to the unemployed, assistance in technical training, and the establishment of production and consumer cooperatives.¹ However, union activity was not only confined to that. Specifically, the union helped Cairo's railwaymen when they struck in 1910. The Watanists exerted a certain influence on the workers, especially on those who were active in the anti-colonial struggle. Workers took part in all large mass urban action organised by the party.

The Watani Party established contacts with the Second International. Muhammed Farid attended all the international socialist congresses and worked there to ensure the adoption of documents supporting the demands for Egyptian independence. The Watani Party helped to awaken the Egyptian proletariat politically, fostered the growth of its anti-imperialist sentiment and assisted in establishing contacts between the national liberation movement and the proletarian struggle in the developed capitalist countries.

On the eve of World War I, the working-class and national liberation movement in North Africa suffered from increased persecution. In Egypt and Tunisia, there were mass arrests among workers and leaders of the national liberation movement; many of them were deported or forced to emigrate. In Morocco and Libya, where French and Italian oppressors waged hostilities accompanied with terrible atrocities, all kinds of reprisals were unleashed against the Arab population. But the decline of the national liberation movement in that period only brought a temporary respite to the colonial regimes. World War I severely aggravated all the social contradictions in the North African colonies. The experience gained in earlier struggles was not wasted either. All those factors later emerged as underlying elements of a new revolutionary upsurge, greatly enhanced by the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia.

THE PROLETARIAT AND THE WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH OF AFRICA

Foreign-owned enterprises continued to be the formative basis of the proletariat in the South of Africa. In 1918, the part of the region that made up the Union of South Africa employed 1,060,000 people

¹ See R. Al-Barawi and M. Uleish, *The Economic Development of Egypt in the Modern Times*, Moscow, 1954, p. 239 (in Russian).

at colonial enterprises. About 350,000 Africans, Indians and coloureds held jobs in industry and 450,000 in agriculture,¹ mostly migrant workers. Their numbers grew rapidly, spurred on by the quickly expanding gold and diamond mining and related industries. Non-economic pressure was widely used to make Africans leave their native lands in search of jobs. The pass system restricted the Africans' freedom of movement and made it possible to regulate their influx and to retain those who had already signed up for work.² In conditions of extremely high manpower turnover and exploitation which fully exhausted the worker, when the entire personnel sometimes changed several times a year, migrant African labour from the neighbouring colonies—Basutoland, Swaziland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Mozambique—was widely used.³ The Chamber of Mines, an employers' association, acted as a supplier of manpower and established a uniform labour and wages regime at all times. That made it possible to maintain wages at a very low level and to force them down even further. Africans, recruited by merchant middlemen, usually ended up being tied to their jobs by their debts.

Unskilled African labour formed the basis of the Union of South Africa's colonial economy. At the same time, in the early 20th century many native workers had already learned, through long practice, to handle many jobs that had previously been regarded as exclusively European. Wages were extremely low. The working day lasted for 10 to 12 hours, often without Sundays off or payment for overtime. If quotas were not met, no payment was forthcoming at all.⁴ Even the Africans who lived with their families in the cities suffered from malnutrition and hopelessly bad conditions.⁵ African miners were quartered in overcrowded barracks, behind barbed wire and watched by armed guards. Disease and industrial accidents killed 5,000 Africans annually at the Transvaal mines. Scurvy and malnutrition casualties ran so high that in 1906 the authorities were forced to establish a meagre minimum rations level for African miners.

The situation among African farm workers was especially hard. Wages were usually paid in kind. The 1913 Native Land Act reserved

¹ See N. Petrov, "The National Question and the Working-Class Movement in South Africa", *The Communist International*, No. 11, 1925, p. 150 (in Russian).

² S. Van der Horst, *Native Labour in South Africa*, London, 1971, p. 205.

³ In 1903-1905, migrant workers from British South Africa (Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland Protectorate) made up 25 per cent of the total number of African wage workers. (D. Hobart Houghton and Jennifer Dagut, *Source Material on the South African Economy: 1860-1970*, Vol. 2, 1899-1919, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1972, p. 92).

⁴ E. S. Sachs, *The Anatomy of Apartheid*, Collet's, London, 1965, p. 141.

⁵ L. Oliver, *The Anatomy of African Misery*, New York, 1969, p. 162.

only 7 per cent of the country's territory for the African population and placed numerous restrictions on Africans renting land from Europeans for payment in kind and money, previously a widespread practice; this increasingly caused Africans to become landless and tenant labourers. The final transition to the capitalist methods of exploitation of the European sector of agriculture was being made ever more rapidly.

Besides Africans, about 260,000 European workers were employed in the Union of South Africa; most of them, working in industry and on the railways, were immigrants. They usually held skilled jobs.¹

Bankrupt Boer farmers, the so-called Afrikaners, also joined the ranks of the European proletariat. Some of them held well-paid jobs as overseers. The ratio of Europeans and Africans was about one to ten in the mining industry² and one to two in the manufacturing industry. As early as the first decades of the 20th century, most European workers formed a labour aristocracy, fed by the employers at the expense of the huge profits they made by exploiting Africans. The living standard of skilled European workers was comparatively high, and their wages were about level with the real wage of US workers³, although labour productivity in South Africa was lower. The gap between the wages of Europeans and Africans kept growing and reached a ratio of 11.7 : 1.⁴ Still, the socio-political privileges of European workers were not legally formalised. The monopolies reduced their wages and replaced them with Africans. That encouraged European workers to take action against the capitalists.

The first decades of the 20th century in South Africa witnessed an unprecedented upsurge of the working-class movement which further developed not only the forms and methods of the strike movement, but also the nature of the demands advanced. That was facilitated by the impact of the 1905-1907 Russian revolution which greatly influenced South African political life. In 1905, meetings and rallies by workers and democratic intellectuals were held in the cities to protest against Bloody Sunday and to support Russian revolutionaries; a Friends of Russia Society was even set up. Revolutionary-democratic sentiment ran high. A letter by O. D. Schreiner, the son of W. P. Schreiner, a prominent South African author, was typical. Published in *The South African News* on February 16, 1905, it

¹ *The Oxford History of South Africa*, Edited by Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson, Vol. II, *South Africa, 1870-1966*. The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, p. 21.

² C. W. De Kiewiet, *A History of South Africa, Social and Economic*, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1942, p. 164.

³ S. Van der Horst, op. cit., p. 256.

⁴ Francis Wilson, *Labour in the South African Gold Mines. 1911-1969*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972, p. 45.

expressed solidarity with the Russian strike movement and described the Russian revolution as the greatest event in the history of mankind over the last centuries.¹

In that period the first massive action was taken by European workers against mine owners. In May 1907, about half the Europeans working underground at the Rand Mines called a strike in response to the call by the craft trade union of blasters. The strike was against the 15 per cent reduction in wages and the increased number of functions performed by European foremen to monitor the drills operated by Africans.

There were pickets against strike-breakers. A march of 300 workers to Pretoria was organised to hand in the strikers' demands to the authorities. The government responded by stationing two British regiments at the mines. The employers locked the strikers out and began replacing them with Boers who agreed to work for lower wages. The strike lasted for almost three months and was defeated. Members of the union's executive committee and the strikers' leaders were purged, and the number of European mineworkers dropped by 10 per cent.² The strike was defeated mainly because neither European drill operators nor African workers supported it.

The strike's lessons stimulated the preparations for a workers' party. Local Labour Party organisations already existed in some areas of the country, for example, in the Cape Colony from May 1905 and in Transvaal since May 1906. In January 1910 those organisations merged to form the South African Labour Party which numbered 16,000 due-paying members in 1914.

Besides the demands for better living and working conditions for white workers, the party Manifesto held forth about the need for "the protection of Western standards against the encroachment of Asiatic competition and generous financial provision to encourage Asiatic emigration from the country", for "the discouragement of the movement of Natives to the European centres and the encouragement of the development of the Natives in suitable Native reserves".³ The party pursued a policy of racial exclusiveness and narrow craft unionism. It viewed the advantages of inter-racial class solidarity as something remote and doubtful; the opportunity to win tangible and immediate advantages with the help of the white workers' solidarity was much more attractive.⁴ The pri-

¹ P. Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa. The African National Congress, 1912-1952*, C. Hurst and Co., London, 1970, p. 98.

² H. J. and R. E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1969, pp. 166-68.

³ *South African Parties and Policies, 1910-1960*, ed. by D. W. Krüger, Bowes and Bowes, London, 1960, p. 73.

⁴ H. J. and R. E. Simons, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

vileged economic position of European workers prodded them to confine themselves to the narrow framework of a trade unionist and essentially bourgeois policy.

Safeguarding the privileges of European workers in their struggle against mining tycoons, Labourites allied themselves with the Boer Agrarians. Supported by the Labour Party, the Agrarians secured the adoption of disgraceful legislation against non-European wage workers. In 1911, the Mines and Works Act was promulgated, establishing a "colour bar" for mine workers for the first time in South African history. It reserved 32 types of jobs exclusively for whites. That same year the Native Labour Regulation Act was adopted which legally sanctioned the existing system of racial discrimination against African workers. Specifically, penalties were envisaged for workers who deserted from their employers or failed to fulfil their contracts. Africans were prohibited from cancelling contracts or taking part in strikes.¹

Racial prejudice made itself felt in trade union activity too, enhanced by the influx of Boers into trade unions after the 1907 strike was defeated. In Cape Province alone, where African wage workers were few, coloureds could join trade unions.

Trade unions did not encompass all European workers by any means. Their membership in 1910 was only 10,000.² A trend towards greater centralisation led to the establishment of trade union associations. In 1911, the Transvaal Federation of Trade Unions was formed and in 1913, the Cape Federation of Labour Unions.

Neither the South African government nor the Chamber of Mines, nor many employers officially recognised trade unions. Nevertheless, their activities expanded and considerably influenced the strike movement. Strikes became such a regular feature that Johannesburg house-owners usually stored candles and water as insurance against strikes. The most remarkable in the prewar period was the eight-week strike by printing workers in 1911. Strikes were on the rise in 1913 and 1914, when the drive for trade union recognition began.

In May 1913, four European miners were dismissed for refusing to work overtime at the New Kleinfontein mine. The mineworkers' union demanded their reinstatement, but the owners refused to have anything to do with a workers' organisation. The latter called a general strike by European workers.³ The strike involved 18,000 and was quite militant. The strike committee called on the workers to come to the general meeting armed. The strike advanced both economic and political demands; rallies were held in defence of

¹ Muriel Horrell, *Racialism and the Trade Unions*, South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1959, p. 1.

² S. Van der Horst, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

³ See E. Katz, *A Trade Union Aristocracy*, Johannesburg, 1976.

freedom of speech and assembly. In Johannesburg, the strike committee became an unofficial government body. The city's owners of property went to the committee for protection. The Committee's permits were needed for the city to be supplied with water, power and sanitary services.¹

The government resolutely sided with the mine owners against Labour Party members who appealed for its assistance. Police and army detachments were sent to put down the strike. Over 100 strikers were killed or wounded. The funeral procession turned into a political anti-government demonstration attended by 70,000 people.²

The government was forced to open negotiations with the strikers' representatives. The Carlton Hotel where the talks were held was surrounded by outraged workers who demanded that the authorities satisfy their demands. The government gave in, promised to reinstate those dismissed, recompence those who were not able to return to their duties because of injuries, not to prosecute strikers, inquire into their grievances and look after the families of those killed. Finally, the government and the Chamber of Mines agreed to recognize the Mine Workers' Union.³

At that time, it was the greatest victory of labour over capital in South Africa. In late 1913, inspired by that success, European miners in Natal struck. They demanded higher wages, a reduction in the 60-hour working week, payment of 150 per cent for overtime and reinstatement of those dismissed.⁴ The miners were joined by railwaymen, who were outraged at the management's steps to economise at their expense. The Transvaal Federation of Trade Unions called a general strike by mineworkers to express solidarity with the strikers. In early 1914, 20,000 European workers staged a simultaneous nationwide walkout.

The government proclaimed a state of emergency. A total of 70,000 troops were sent against the workers—army and commando detachments recruited among Boer farmers. The troops surrounded the Trade Union House in Johannesburg where the strikers' leaders were gathered and forced them to surrender under the threat of artillery fire. Some of the leaders were arrested, and nine secretly deported. Deprived of their leaders and confused by press reports of the strike

¹ L. C. A. Knowles and C. M. Knowles, *The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire*, Vol. 3, *The Union of South Africa*, George Routledge and Sons, London, 1936, p. 244.

² See A. B. Davidson, *South Africa. The Emergence of Protest*, Nauka, Moscow, 1972, p. 286 (in Russian).

³ However, a number of terms remained unfulfilled. Specifically, the Chamber of Mines did not recognise the union (D. W. Krüger, *The Making of a Nation. A History of the Union of South Africa, 1910-1961*, Macmillan, London, 1969, pp. 73-74).

⁴ H. J. and R. E. Simons, op. cit., p. 167.

being called off in some places and of the threat of layoffs, strikers began to return to work.

After that, in 1914, legislation was adopted to prevent trade unions from involving new members and to prohibit strikes at government enterprises. The police was empowered under "emergency situation" in the name of "public peace" to prohibit public meetings, arrest their participants (especially speakers) and even open fire.¹ But even that failed to break the will of European workers. In 1914, they voted against the Nationalist Party candidates. As a result, the Labour Party, which said it was "fighting against capitalism and its ally, the coloured population", won in the Transvaal elections and Cape by-elections. Having won power in two provinces, the party immediately began to implement its racist principles.

The outbreak of World War I put a stop to strikes by European workers. In 1915, the Chamber of Mines officially recognized trade unions. That were the years that European trade unions became truly mass organisations. Their membership grew from 10,500 in 1915 to 78,000 in 1918.² Industrial unions tended to become more prominent than craft ones; some of the newly established organisations began to admit non-European members.³ At the same time, the Chamber of Mines satisfied the European trade unions' demands that the practice of entrusting skilled jobs to Africans be not extended.⁴

Although European workers were hostile to workers of other races, their battles with the employers served as an example of active, concerted and organised struggle against capital for the African proletariat. That helped in the rapid transition from passive forms of resistance—anti-tax riots and desertion from employers—to strikes and the establishment of their own workers' organisations. From the second decade of the 20th century onwards, strikes became an important form of struggle for native workers against employers in the South of Africa. For example, in January 1911 a strike was called by the African workers of the Dutoitspan, Voorspoed and Village Deep mines. Only brutal reprisals by the police and white overseers forced the strikers to resume work. Many were imprisoned under the Native Labour Regulation Act.

In the course of the May 1913 general strike by European workers African miners were called to walk out, too. In July, Africans struck at several mines, demanding higher wages and abolition of the "colour

¹ Eric A. Walker, *A History of Southern Africa*, Longman, Green and Co., London, 1957, p. 555.

² I. Davies, *African Trade Unions*, Harmondsworth, 1966, p. 56.

³ Muriel Horrell, *South African Trade Unionism*, Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1961, p. 5.

⁴ F. Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

bar". In the summer of 1913, African and European workers failed to act simultaneously, but in December 1913, Africans struck at the same time as European miners. As South African Communists observed later, the 1913 strikes demonstrated the Africans' considerable revolutionary potential. "From that time," declared Ivon Jones, "there has been a growing minority of white workers who realised that the emancipation of the whites can be achieved only by solidarity with the native working masses."¹

While remaining independent, the African workers' movement grew increasingly close to that of the European workers. An economic commission to investigate the causes of strikes by Africans in 1914 cited the following evidence by a Johannesburg judge: the natives "believed that the white men had by force of arms obtained their demands, and they said to themselves, 'why should not we do the same'... All tribal divisions were thrust on one side, and they were perfectly prepared to fight the police; the only thing that cowed them was the soldiers with fixed bayonets." He went on to say: "What they learnt in a week last July might in the ordinary way have taken them fifteen years to learn."² Strikes by Africans continued during World War I, too.

In the period that followed 1905, European workers and intellectuals brought the first knowledge of Marxism to South Africa.

The first propagandists of socialism in South Africa were not proletarian revolutionaries but essentially petty-bourgeois radicals. Many of them were members of the Social Democratic Federation established in Cape Town in 1902. The federation proclaimed socialisation of the means of production in the interests of the people as its goal. Its members were quite active in disseminating certain Marxist concepts, though some of them advocated evangelical socialism; others, economic determinism; still others, the concepts of the English democrat William Morris, etc.

As revolutionary-democratic sentiment rose, the Social Democratic Federation became increasingly vigorous. It held over 100 public meetings in six months in 1907. In 1908, to counter the Labour Party newspaper *Worker* which preached racism, the newspaper *Voice of Labour* was started which regularly published excerpts from Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, the US socialist leaders de Leon, Debs, and others.

The federation opposed racial prejudice but did not call for struggle against national oppression. Its members regarded the objectives of socialising the means of production in isolation from the prospects for liberating the native population from colonial oppression.³

¹ H. J. and R. E. Simons, op. cit., p. 159.

² D. Hobart Houghton and Jennifer Dagut, op. cit., p. 180.

³ H. J. and R. E. Simons, op. cit., pp 141, 155.

In 1910-1912, besides the Cape Town Social Democratic Federation, socialist organisations existed in Pietermaritzburg, Pretoria, Johannesburg and Durban. An attempt was made at merging them into a single socialist party in 1912. After the inaugural conference, however, each group continued to go its own way. Many Socialists were Labour Party members.

The war brought polarisation to the working-class movement. While the Labour Party supported the government's war policy, the Socialists, who had united in the International Socialist League in 1915, declared war on war. True, League members were not quite consistent in their anti-war policy. They did not aim at turning the imperialist war into a civil war. Initially the League merely attempted to mobilise public opinion against the war, appealing to the European population which had the right to vote. That failed to produce results, but brought about an abrupt turn in the views and activities of the League's revolutionary core. These people began to realise that the struggle against the imperialist war, as well as the solution of other proletarian tasks, was impossible without the involvement of the native proletarian masses.

The League's leaders established ties with the Zimmerwald movement and advocated a new international organisation of the revolutionary proletariat.¹

As a rule, workers' action in South Africa was not directly connected with the national liberation movement, although there was already a tendency for that movement to merge with the struggle of some of the contingents of the proletariat.

The national liberation movement held a prominent place in South Africa's social development: racist and colonial oppression was directed against more than four million Africans, hundreds of thousands of coloured (mixed race) South Africans, about 100,000 immigrants from India, and others. From 1906, after the defeat of the heroic Zulu uprising led by Chief Bambatha, the focal point of the liberation movement completely shifted from rural to urban areas, where it was led by the bourgeois sections of the African population—clergymen, teachers, small tradesmen and businessmen. Initially, African democrats were organised in the native congresses of Natal, Transvaal, the Cape and Orange River provinces. The congresses mostly dealt with local issues concerning the Africans' education, participation in industry and commerce, wages, with racial restrictions, etc. An impetus towards the unification of that movement was provided by the striving of South African racists to ensure the adoption of their own draft constitution of the Union of South Africa,

¹ For details see A. B. Davidson, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-45.

then in the making. The Union's formation in 1910, on the basis of a law that completely ignored the Africans' wishes, helped make the African democrats' action more concerted. In January 1912, the South African Native National Congress was established in Bloemfontein, the first political party of the native African population south of the Sahara. The party was to be "an open society without sinister motives" and seeking positive action with assistance from the government. The leaders hoped to enlist Britain's support and solve the "native question" by cooperating with the Union government. The party disassociated itself from the miners' class struggle and swore to seek redress through non-violent and constitutional means.¹ Although the public meetings and petitions it organised did play a certain positive role in mobilising public opinion, the Congress's activities were doomed to failure without support by a mass movement.

The mainly coloured African People's Organisation, initiated in 1902, was quite close to the South African Native National Congress in the forms and methods of its activities. Since 1894, the Indian National Congress was active in South Africa. It advanced bourgeois-democratic demands and, unlike the other two organisations, relied on mass action. The Congress was led by Mohandas K. Gandhi, the future leader of the national liberation movement in India, who lived in South Africa from 1893 to 1914.

The struggle of South African Indians was influenced by the 1905-1907 Russian revolution; its ideas, as reflected in Leo Tolstoy's views, and its peasant democratic spirit played an important part in the shaping of Gandhi's philosophy.

Gandhi drew up and assiduously implemented the tactics of Satyagraha (non-violent struggle) in South Africa in the early 20th century, when all attempts at overthrowing foreign rule by precapitalist methods of armed struggle inevitably failed, and it was as yet impossible to fight colonial rulers with weapons on a par with those they used. Satyagraha was a progressive phenomenon because it awakened the masses to political action and rallied them together in the struggle against national oppression.

In the course of the Satyagraha campaigns held in 1907-1914, South African Indians expressed their protest by boycotting mandatory registration, publicly burning their passbooks, violating various rules and regulations, and finally, staging a general strike by Indian workers in November 1913. Strikers included Indian workers at Natal coalmines, on plantations, railways, at factories, workshops, and offices. At the turn of 1913 and 1914, 50,000 Indian work-

¹ Peter Walshe, *op. cit.*, pp. 37, 49.

ers struck simultaneously in South Africa.¹ That was the first strike in Africa south of the Sahara led by the national liberation movement. But the Indian National Congress, acting in isolation from other racial groups, failed to force the government to abandon racial discrimination. As a result, compromise emerged as the only way out. In July 1914, after holding talks with Gandhi, the South African parliament, while retaining the old legislation discriminating against Indians, adopted a law that somewhat eased their plight.

That was the first case of a national liberation movement in which workers actively forced a concession from the colonial authorities in that part of Africa. Non-violent resistance was widely used by national liberation activities in many parts of Africa. At the same time, Gandhi's nationalism and fear of exceeding non-violent limits greatly curtailed the efficiency of the mass political campaigns organised by the Indian National Congress. Even when Durban socialists supported the Indians' struggle and the railwaymen who struck in early 1914 proposed that they act jointly, Gandhi categorically refused and declared that Indian Satyagraha had nothing to do with the struggle of white workers. In respect of Africans, Gandhi regarded them as primitive peasants corrupted by civilisation, and believed that no good would come out of contact with them.

Such views and practices divided the South African national liberation and working-class movement along racial lines. Colonial rulers skilfully used that factor to strengthen their hold on the country.

PROTEST BY THE WORKING PEOPLE IN TROPICAL AFRICA

In the early 20th century, far-reaching qualitative changes occurred in the economy of Tropical Africa, due to the growing influx of foreign capital. In 1913, the total sum of foreign investment was nine times the 1909 figure.² While in the early 1900s capital mostly plundered timber and ivory, by the start of World War I its major effort was spearheaded at producing raw materials for the imperialist powers. That was the underlying basis of plantation economies in Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Tanganyika and in prewar Kenya and the Congo, and of the mining industry in the Gold Coast, Nigeria, the Congo, and Southern Rhodesia. A monetary taxation system which had spread almost everywhere by the start of World War I was used to provide those economies with a continuous influx of workers. In colonies where small peasant farms produced most

¹ D. M. Mukhamedova, *On the History of the Racial Discrimination Against Indians in South Africa*, Nauka, Tashkent, 1965, p. 102 (in Russian).

² Calculated from figures in: S. Herbert Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa. Its Course and Effects*, Oxford University Press, London, 1938, pp. 150-51.

of the goods for export, various types of labour conscription were employed to provide colonial enterprises with manpower. In Uganda, for example, any African who unless employed for a period of three months was required to perform a month's unpaid labour for communal purposes building or repairing roads, etc., and for an additional 60 days for pay.¹ The forced annexation by Europeans of vast tracts of land meant that tens of thousands of African peasants were becoming migrant workers at an increasingly rapid pace. As a result, their farms' output decreased² and the road was paved for wages emerging as one of the sources of living for the worker.

The first workers who had to rely on their subsistence exclusively on wages were mostly those who held semi-skilled and skilled jobs. But such workers were very few among the native population.

Migrant African labour was cheaper than that of career workers: the African's village assumed virtually all the costs of maintaining his family or himself in case of injury or sickness. Fluctuation of labour power was extremely high; labour was supplied by recruiting agencies set up with the assistance of the colonial administration and by private recruiters.

In 1910-1917, the total number of Africans whom capitalism forced to offer their labour for hire was about 1,300,000 in Tropical Africa (excluding the Mozambique migrant workers in the Union of South Africa).³

The nascent African proletarian south of the Sahara made up just 8 per cent of the able-bodied male population. The corresponding average figure for the entire continent was about 14 per cent, and about 30 per cent for Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and French Morocco.⁴

Plantation workers engaged in virtually compulsory labour comprised most of the up-and-coming proletariat. Their wages were extremely low, sometimes paid in cotton fabrics, sometimes delay-

¹ Raymond Leslie Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, Vol. 1, the Macmillan Company, New York, 1928, p. 567.

² William Allan, *Studies in African Land Usage in Northern Rhodesia*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1949, p. 36.

³ Calculated from figures in: H. Deutschland, *Trailblazers. Struggles and Organisations of African Workers Before 1945*, Berlin, 1970, pp. 8, 177; Raymond Leslie Buell, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 224, 496, 675, 825; L. H. Gann, *The Birth of a Plural Society. The Development of Northern Rhodesia under the British South Africa Company*, the University Press, Manchester, 1958, p. 86; Yu. I. Komar, *The Working Class of the Republic of Zaire*, Nauka, Moscow, 1974, p. 33 (in Russian); *Africa in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries*, Nauka, Moscow, 1967 (in Russian).

⁴ Calculated from data on the numbers of wage workers (see p. 450, footnote 2; p. 456, footnote 1 of this volume) and from figures in: *Annuaire statistique de la Société des Nations*, Série des publications de la Société des Nations, Paris, 1926; Raymond Leslie Buell, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 346.

ed, even for a year, and sometimes not paid at all.¹ The number of Africans employed in Tropical Africa's mining industry reached about 100,000 in the second decade of the 20th century—8 per cent of the entire nascent working class. As a rule, miners were also migrant peasants but, unlike plantation workers, they usually worked together and lived in settlements close to the mines. That explained the fact that they were better organised and soon developed a proletarian awareness. They began to stage strikes ahead of the plantation workers.

The working and living conditions of African miners were extremely bad. Frequent disease, epidemics and backbreaking work kept the mortality rate very high. Specifically, in 1906, 150 of every 1,000 workers died at Union Minière construction sites in the Congo; the corresponding figure for Southern Rhodesia mines was about 50 in 1910.² The meagre wages were mostly paid in kind as room and food; the money that the miners received was barely enough to pay taxes and do some scant shopping.

The wages of Africans holding skilled jobs (masons, carpenters, lathe operators, mechanics) were 10 to 12 times what unskilled urban workers earned.³ But the status of even skilled workers differed little from that of the rest of the population under colonial rule. Colonialists treated all Africans unhumanely. At any time, they could be humiliated, insulted or beaten. The labour legislation sanctioned the worker's lack of rights.

Colonial exploitation boosted the national liberation struggle, which changed perceptibly in the first decades of the 20th century. Messianic sentiment rooted in Christianity grew stronger, paving the way for the transition of mass anti-colonial movements to bourgeois nationalism. Simultaneously, the bourgeois-nationalist ideology of the liberation struggle emerged in West African cities. Edward Wilmot Blyden, an African clergyman and educator, was among the first of its proponents. He formulated the fundamentals of African "cultural nationalism", which later evolved into Pan-Africanism.

Because of the as yet indistinct class differentiation of society and the immaturity of the proletariat, which had still not broken away from the peasants, the working-class movement in Tropical Africa was at its earliest stage of development. Preproletarian methods of

¹ George Simeon Mwase, *Strike a Blow and Die. A Narrative of Race Relations in Colonial Africa*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1967, pp. 29-30.

² Yu. I. Komar, op. cit., p. 27; Raymond Leslie Buell, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 561.

³ V. A. Subbotin, *French Colonies in 1870-1918*, Nauka, Moscow, 1973, p. 275 (in Russian).

struggle were typical: desertion from jobs, assassination of recruiters, refusal to pay taxes, etc.

However, new, proletarian forms of protest, strikes, were beginning to be staged, demanding higher wages and better working conditions. For example, miners already struck in Southern Rhodesia in 1906 and again in 1912; railwaymen struck in Nigeria in 1912, postal workers in French West Africa in 1914, and drivers in the Gold Coast in 1915.

Since different ethnic groups specialised in different occupations, workers from a particular tribe usually made up most of the strikers. For example, during the 1912 strike at the Wankie Mine in Southern Rhodesia, lozi tribesmen demanded that policemen known for their brutality be dismissed. Still, workers from other tribes sometimes joined strikers. That meant that a trend towards new social relations, based on the realisation of extra-tribal interests, were emerging.

The demands and methods of struggle of the first African strikers reflected the initial stage of their class consciousness. The workers rejected only some of the forms and methods of colonial exploitation that were particularly exacting and unacceptable, rather than the system as a whole.¹ Tribal mutual assistance, cultural, educational and religious organisations which existed in many West African towns did, to a certain extent, conform to that stage in the development of the African proletariat when its awareness did not rise above the tribal level.

The first African trade unions in Tropical Africa appeared in the British West African colonies. Their activities were obviously influenced by the general socio-political upsurge in the capitals of Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria in the early 20th century. Some of the unions were established after successful strikes. That was the way a railwaymen's trade union came into being in Southern Nigeria in 1912. A strike by Accra drivers to protest against wage cuts gave rise to a Gold Coast drivers' association. However, the generally still low level of socio-economic development in Tropical Africa and the region's relative isolation from the progressive ideas of the time meant that the first action and organisations of the nascent proletariat were rudimentary and immature.

When staging strikes, the proletariat acted, as a rule, in isolation; its action did not yet merge with the mounting national liberation movement. However, the emergent proletariat even advancing mostly economic demands, objectively opposed the imperialist system of colonial exploitation. That served as a basis for its sub-

¹ See Charles van Onselen, *Chibaro, African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933*, Pluto Press, London, 1976.

sequent merger with the national liberation movement, in which the workers' objectives converged with the goals advanced by revolutionary democrats in the struggle for independence.

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The working-class movement in the colonial and dependent countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa was at different stages of social and political development.

In Latin America, the proletarian movement began to emerge as a politically independent force. Workers' action was becoming better organised, class solidarity between different contingents of the proletariat was growing. General strikes were frequent. The trade union and socialist movements were widespread.

In the oppressed Asian countries the workers' struggle remained part of the national liberation movement and was largely spontaneous. But proletarian action became more stubborn, individual strikes often turned into general ones, and were ever more frequently accompanied by demonstrations and rallies, which displayed greater proletarian unity, and sometimes rose to the level of political struggle for national liberation. Socialist organisations appeared.

In Africa, the nascent native proletariat gradually began to turn from spontaneous riots, mass escapes from colonial enterprises, etc., to strikes. That process was greatly enhanced by the example set by European workers in their struggle.

Despite the great diversity in the levels and methods of the proletariat's struggle in different continents, it emerged as an increasingly important factor in the oppressed nation's liberation movement everywhere. The young working class of Latin America, Asia and Africa was becoming more and more active in the international working-class movement and was exerting a growing influence on the anti-imperialist struggle on those continents. Developments in each of the three regions brought closer the age when the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie in developed countries merged with the national liberation movements of the imperialist-oppressed peoples and countries.

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Chapter 9

THE REVOLUTIONARY AND OPPORTUNIST TRENDS CONTENDING IN THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL

TWO APPROACHES TO THE ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL PROLETARIAN UNITY

In the early 20th century there was a growing need for the greater international unity of the working-class movement, rooted mostly in the fact that, despite the increasingly uneven economic and political development of capitalist countries, history was giving rise to quite important factors common to them all. The direct preparation of the proletariat for revolutions became the foremost task facing the Social-Democrats. More and more problems were arising that required "uniform, principled decisions in different countries".¹

The greater scope of the proletariat's international tasks was explained by the need to resist international capital—monopolist collusions, imperialist military and political alliances, increased militarism, annexationist wars, mounting colonial plunder, nationalism and chauvinism. The bourgeoisie used the latter to divide and subjugate the working people.

Besides, the need for greater unity of the international working-class movement stemmed from the considerable expansion in the activities of workers' organisations. Unlike the late 19th century, by 1914, the membership of Social-Democratic parties, trade union, cooperative, youth and other proletarian organisations, and the numbers of their unorganised supporters amounted to many millions.

The increasingly greater mutual internationalist assistance among the working people and their highly coordinated action in different countries conditioned the development of the international working-class movement and were an important factor of its success. The new historical situation and the new tasks facing the proletariat have

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 75.

made it imperative to raise proletarian internationalist unity to a higher level, to expand, strengthen and improve the "loose connections, voluntary contacts supported by congresses"¹ of the International since the 19th century. That could only be achieved on the basis of Marxism's creative development, in the course of directly preparing the working class for revolution. Meanwhile, greater imperialist pressure, stepped up activities of opportunists and the rise of nationalist tendencies in virtually all, including the largest, Social-Democratic parties increasingly impeded efforts to strengthen solidarity and expand the cooperation of the proletariat in different countries. The intention to consolidate international proletarian solidarity, recorded in the International's decisions, came up against growing nationalist tendencies in that organisation. The divergence between revolutionary internationalist resolutions and opportunist practice became a typical feature, especially on the eve of World War 1.

Lenin provided the most profound Marxist analysis of the urgent objective need for strengthening and developing the international unity of the working-class movement.² He led the Bolsheviks' consistent struggle against attempts at weakening that unity and guided their efforts to improve the efficiency of the proletariat's mutual support throughout the world.

Lenin aimed at solving those tasks on the basis of creative Marxism. This stemmed from the principles of the proletarian party of a new type which emerged as the vanguard of the revolutionary trend in the working-class movement. Lenin's development of the Marxist doctrine of the revolution, of the working-class party of a new type, of the proletariat's allies; the search for ways of solving the democratic and socialist, national and international tasks of the working people throughout the world; the struggle to overthrow the existing system, against reformism and leftist excesses; the entire international activity of the Bolsheviks—was the foremost contribution to consolidating the core of the world proletariat.

Revolutionary Social-Democrats in different countries worked to strengthen the international unity of the working-class movement. August Bebel, a tireless champion of international solidarity, upheld its Marxist principles, and especially the need for more concerted proletarian action throughout the world against militarism and the threat of war. Karl Liebknecht regarded the workers' class solidarity as the basis for the cooperation among the anti-imperialist forces

¹ Friedrich Engels, "Schlußrede auf dem Internationalen Sozialistischen Arbeiterkongreß in Zurich", Marx/Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 22, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1963, S. 409.

² For more details, see: N. F. Sheetov, *Lenin's Development of the Proletarian Internationalism Ideology and Policy*, Mysl, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian).

of all nations.¹ Rosa Luxemburg, who contributed greatly to the solidarity of revolutionary forces, especially in Poland, Russia and Germany, repeatedly stressed that the internationalist tasks of the proletariat should be extended and that there should be greater unity of the international working-class movement.² Paul Lafargue and Jules Guesde steadily advocated a common policy by the Socialists of all nations. The Bulgarian Tesnyaks, led by Dimitr Blagoev, and the revolutionary Social-Democrats of Serbia and Romania were insistent in their efforts to achieve the broader solidarity of the working people, especially in the Balkan countries, and to combat the policy of the imperialist powers and local reactionaries. The Hungarian, Czech and Austrian left-wing Social-Democrats connected the strengthening of the international solidarity of the working-class movement with the development of new tactics and the organisation of mass action. The revolutionary Social-Democrats of Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and Japan advocated unity in the working-class struggle, especially against colonial rule and predatory wars.

Despite differences between the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary Social-Democrats on certain issues, all of them, forming a united front, upheld the international unity of the proletarian movement on the basis of a Marxist solution of the new tasks facing the proletariat. They worked to develop a common revolutionary political line for the workers' parties and to ensure its implementation by the joint action of the proletariat throughout the world.

Opportunists resisted that policy. Growing imperialist pressure on the working-class movement galvanised their activities. Anti-Marxist trends were hostile to proletarian internationalism. Revisionists and other right-wing Social-Democrats tried to impose upon the working people pseudo-patriotism and notions of "universal brotherhood" and the solidarity of all classes; they attempted to reconcile workers' organisations with the foreign policy pursued by the imperialists of their countries, to justify and support colonial rule, militarism and agreements on the division of the world among the imperialists. Right-wing Social-Democrats supported the centrifugal trends in the International that were fed by nationalist sentiment, justifying them by references to the national peculiarities in the working-class movements of different countries. These people hampered a Marxist solution of urgent issues and the working out of a common Marxist policy on the part of Social-Democrats throughout the world. Right-wing Social-Democrats adamantly opposed "the

¹ Karl Liebknecht, *Gesammelte Reden und Schriften*, Bd. V, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1963, S. 405-06.

² Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 2, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1972, S. 203-04.

international rules of socialist tactics"¹ and the Marxist principles of the proletarian parties' policy. That was true of Eduard Bernstein, Philipp Scheidemann and their supporters in Germany, Alexandre Millerand, Alexandre Varenne and their ilk in France, the Mensheviks in Russia, Ivanoe Bonomi, Leonida Bissolati and Filippo Turati and other social reformists in Italy, Wilhelm Ellenbogen, Anton Nemec, Ernő Garami and other right-wing Social-Democrats in Austria-Hungary, Louis Bertrand, Emile Vandervelde and other like-minded persons in Belgium, Henry Hyndman in Britain, Victor Berger in the United States, etc.

Centrism, a new version of opportunism which emerged by the end of the first decade of the 20th century, also impeded further consolidation of the international working-class movement. Prominent Centrist leaders—Kautsky, Bauer, Huysmans, Hillquit, Trotsky and others—were essentially beginning to abandon the Marxist concept of internationalism.

Anarcho-syndicalists, too, hampered the strengthening of genuine unity in the international working-class movement. Making use of the International Anti-Militarist League, they established in 1904, and the so-called Anarchist International, which functioned until 1910, they confused part of the proletariat and thus chipped away at its solidarity. The anarcho-syndicalists tried to impose a platform on the working-class movement which would actually undermine its international unity. On many important issues, anarcho-syndicalists often allied themselves with revisionists and jointly opposed Marxists.

The contention between the two radically different approaches to the international unity of the working-class movement was especially pronounced at congresses of the Second International and in its various bodies. "The International," *Proletarskaya Pravda* justly observed in 1913, "unites the entire socialist movement of the proletariat, and not only its Marxist vanguard; it comprises not only straightforward Marxists but also those vacillating, those who are obvious opportunists and some of the more backward contingents of the international working-class movement which stray in a liberal direction."²

Each new shift in the alignment of forces between the revolutionary and the opportunist trends in the national sections and various working organisations was reflected in the activities of the International, too. German Social-Democrats, prior to the 20th century, the mainstay of the revolutionary trend, proved to be "unstable, or

¹ *International Sozialisten-Kongress zu Amsterdam. 14. bis 20. August 1904, Expedition der Buchhandlung Vorwärts, Berlin, 1904, S. 31.*

² *Proletarskaya Pravda*, December 7, 1913.

took an opportunist stand"¹ from the early 1900s. In 1910, Lenin noted that "the Germans are incapable of pursuing a consistent line of principle at International Congresses and the hegemony in the International often slips from their hands".²

Protracted coexistence with opportunists also prevented French Marxists from upholding in the International the spirit that Guesde's action had appeared to herald in the early years of the century. Jaures, who enjoyed considerable prestige, pursued an inconsistent and, on the whole, social-reformist policy. Neither the Austrian followers of Victor Adler, nor British representatives who were mostly social-reformist were capable of becoming a revolutionary vanguard.

Meanwhile, despite numerous obstacles, the ideological and political role of comparatively small workers' parties was growing—the Social-Democrats of Serbia, the Bulgarian Tesnyaks, the Social-Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. They opposed revisionism and found Marxist solutions to some of the new tasks facing the proletariat.

The Bolsheviks had come to play the foremost part in the International's activities. They were the first revolutionary workers' party of a new type which, guided by Lenin, consistently developed Marxism and fought against all varieties of opportunism. The Bolshevik Party was the vanguard, the centre of attraction for all revolutionary Social-Democrats.

At the Stuttgart Congress of the International in 1907, of the 20 votes to which the Russian section was entitled, 10 belonged to the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), including 4.5—to the Bolsheviks. Largely due to their initiative and influence, "the socialists of Russia," Lenin observed, "*all* voted unanimously on *all* questions in a revolutionary spirit".³ The Bolsheviks established close contacts with the left wing of the German, Polish, Dutch, Serbian and Bulgarian working-class movement. Lenin took part in a conference of revolutionary Social-Democrats which was held during the Congress to discuss issues on which they disagreed with opportunists. Lenin handed over his notes to Rosa Luxemburg who substantiated the joint proposals of the Russian and Polish delegations regarding the struggle against militarism and the threat of war.⁴

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 85.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Question of Co-operative Societies at the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 281.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 86.

⁴ V. I. Lenin in the *Struggle for a Revolutionary International*, Nauka, Moscow, 1970, pp. 135-44; *Lenin and the International Working-Class Move-*

In 1910, at the Copenhagen Congress of the International, the positions of the Bolshevik members of the Russian delegation were firmer than at Stuttgart. Led by Lenin, they acted as the vanguard and the centre of cohesion of all those forces in the International which favoured preparing the masses for revolution and for the struggle against militarism and the threat of war. The report on RSDLP activities summed up the experience of revolutionary struggle in Russia and disproved Menshevik misinformation.¹ On Lenin's initiative, a conference of revolutionary Social-Democrats and their sympathisers among the delegates was held. The participants included Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Marchlewski, Braun, Wurm, de Brouckère, Blagoev, Guesde, Rappoport, Iglesias, Plekhanov, Ryazanov, and possibly Kolarov, Kirkov, Kabakchiev, David Wijnkoop, W. van Ravesteijn, and others. Most of them supported Lenin's ideas and declared that opportunists should be rebuffed. Although no decisions were taken and some participants in the conference soon drifted closer to revisionists and acted as opportunists, on the whole the conference helped consolidate the revolutionary wing and make it more active.²

Although Lenin could not attend personally the 1912 Basel Congress of the International which he considered very important, he guided the activities of RSDLP delegates. The RSDLP delegation helped draft the Congress manifesto on the struggle of the working-class against the threat of war and war itself in a revolutionary and not a pacifist spirit.³

The Bolsheviks formed the vanguard of the revolutionary Social-Democrats who strove to find Marxist solutions of the proletariat's new tasks and to rebuff opportunism at international socialist congresses. That was also the stand taken by the Serbian workers' delegates, the Bulgarian Tesnyaks, the Polish Social-Democrats, and part of the Social-Democratic delegates from Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, France, Italy, Britain, Japan, Norway and Sweden. Their efforts ensured or at least contributed towards the further development and strengthening of the international unity of the working-class movement and a correct and principled solution by the International of some of the new problems facing the proletariat.

ment, Mysl, Moscow, 1969, pp. 117-31; *A History of the Second International*, Vol. 2, Nauka, Moscow, 1966, pp. 204-17; I. M. Krivoguz, *The Second International, 1889-1914*, Mysl, Moscow, 1964, pp. 299-301, 315-23 (all in Russian).

¹ *Report of the RSDLP to the Eighth International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen*, Gosizdat, Moscow-Petrograd, 1923 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin in the *Struggle for a Revolutionary International*, pp. 170-86; *Lenin and the International Working-Class Movement*, pp. 149-51; *A History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 2, Politizdat, Moscow, 1966, pp. 309-11; I. M. Krivoguz, op. cit., pp. 404-28 (all in Russian).

³ For more details, see: I. M. Krivoguz, op. cit., pp. 303, 306, 313-14, etc.

TWO TRENDS AT THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONGRESSES

The furthering of the international unity of the working-class movement was, to a large extent, connected with international socialist congresses at which sharp ideological disputes arose during regular discussions of urgent issues of great importance to sum up the experience of the proletariat's class struggle and to consolidate the vanguard of the working class throughout the world.

The issues of strengthening the International organisationally as one of the forms of further developing international working-class solidarity were an important subject at these congresses.

The Stuttgart Congress endorsed the Rules which strengthened and finally formalised the International's structure. This meant that its ideological and political level was, to a certain extent, raised. Lenin said that the Congress "marked the final consolidation of the Second International and the transformation of international congresses into businesslike meetings which exercise very considerable influence on the nature and direction of socialist activities throughout the world".¹

Under the Rules, all the organisations that "uphold essential socialist principles, the socialisation of the means of production and exchange, the international unity and action of the working people, the socialist conquest of public power by the proletariat organised in a class party" could be admitted to the International.² Trade unions adhering to the tenet of class struggle and recognizing the need for political action even though not directly participating in it could also be admitted to the International. Some delegates tried to prevent any admission requirements from being adopted and demanded that all organisations wishing to join the International be permitted to do so. Such attempts were unsuccessful.³

The Rules' requirements to workers' parties were not fully consonant with the proletariat's new tasks, but still they helped strengthen international unity. They opened up additional opportunities for fighting to raise the ideological and political level of workers' organisations.

The strengthening of international solidarity and the organisation of the working class helped enhance the role of international socialist congresses, whose decisions, Lenin observed in 1907, "are not binding on the individual nations, but their moral significance is such that the non-observance of decisions is, in fact, an exception which is

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 82.

² *Bureau Socialiste International. Comptes rendus...*, Vol. 1, p. 199.

³ *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart. 18. bis 24. August 1907*, Buchhandlung Vorwärts Verlag, Berlin, 1907, S. 22.

rarer than the non-observance by the individual parties of the decisions of their own congresses".¹

As the working-class movement grew and the International expanded, congresses became more representative. The 1907 Stuttgart Congress was attended by delegates from 25 countries, including three American, two Asian, and one Australian. The number of organisations represented also increased.

In 1907, the International's Rules altered the distribution of votes among the sections participating in the congresses. Each received from two to 20 votes depending on the population and importance of the country, on the size and political influence of the Socialist party and on the strength of other workers' organisations.² The German, Austrian (including Czech), French, Russian, and British sections received 20 votes each; Italy—15; the United States—14; Belgium—12, Denmark, Poland (all Polish territories) and Switzerland—8 each; Spain, Hungary and Norway—6 each; the rest—4 each; and Luxembourg—2 votes. With slight modifications, that pattern remained in force throughout the International's existence. It facilitated the delimitation of different trends within the national sections and helped the supporters of each trend to come closer together at international socialist congresses, helped reveal the differences between the revolutionary and the opportunist trends and to determine their balance of forces in the International. At the same time, the new voting pattern potentially strengthened the opportunists in the International, since far from all mass organisations of the larger sections were firmly Marxist and consistently championed the workers' fundamental interests.

The exacerbation of the battles between the trends in the International heightened the role of the committees set up at congresses to draft resolutions on important issues. Each section could send representatives to all committees; from 1907, every section was entitled to four votes in each. Committees often established subcommittees comprising the most active and competent spokesmen of different trends. That helped make the discussion of each issue broader and more comprehensive, assisted in bringing to light differences and in searching for common solution. Conferences of individual sections and meetings of delegates from individual organisations which were held during congresses became increasingly important.

The International's organisational consolidation and development in a Marxist direction was opposed by revisionists and other right-wing Social-Democrats. They tried to turn the workers' striv-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, pp. 82-83.

² *Bureau Socialiste International. Comptes rendus....* Vol. 1, pp. 122-24, 200.

ing for unity and the International's expansion to preserve and strengthen their own positions there. Moreover, by preaching social reformism, all right-wing Social-Democrats weakened the ideological and political basis underlying the unity of the international working-class movement and undermined proletarian internationalism.

Centrists were drifting closer to the right. In 1910, many of them joined the revisionists in proclaiming: "We consider the organisation of international solidarity an utopian proposal."¹ The centrists increasingly viewed the International not as a body coordinating the proletariat's class struggle, but merely as "a vehicle of moral protest and the assertion of humanistic principles".²

Revolutionary Social-Democrats in all countries, above all the Bolsheviks, insisted on the International becoming an effective organisational form of international proletarian unity. They fought for consistent observance of the Marxist resolutions adopted by the congresses, which summed up the wealth of experience accumulated by the working-class movement, and offered correct solutions to many important questions. But it was increasingly difficult to implement such resolutions due to the growing resistance by the right-wing Social-Democrats, centrists and anarcho-syndicalists. In some of the largest workers' parties led by the rightists and the centrists violations of the International's Marxist decisions gradually became a rule at the start of the second decade of the 20th century.

The issues of interpreting and implementing international working-class solidarity also emerged as pivotal during debates on immigration at Second International congresses. Some Socialists from the United States, Australia and the Netherlands favoured efforts to restrict immigration to the more developed countries, defending the egoistic interests of "workers in some of the 'civilised' countries, who derive certain advantages from their privileged position, and are, therefore, inclined to forget the need for international class solidarity".³ At the 1907 Stuttgart Congress, Rappoport and Ury of France, Hammer of the United States, Kahan of Britain, Dier of Hungary and Kato of Japan spoke out against the racial approach, against violation of principles of internationalism, and urged Socialists to "embrace these poor brothers, help them, and fight capitalism together with them".⁴ A decision was adopted by the overwhelming majority, making it incumbent on Socialists to fight against immigration restrictions, to oppose the importation of strike-breakers, to involve im-

¹ *Periodical Bulletin of the International Socialist Bureau*, No. 5, p. 172.

² Carl E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905-1917*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, (Mass.), 1955, p. 209.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 79.

⁴ *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart...*, S. 117.

migrants in the working-class movement and to work to improve their position. That document, Lenin observed, "fully meets the demands of revolutionary Social-Democracy".¹

A resolution on international solidarity adopted by the Copenhagen Congress reiterated and concretised the principles of proletarian internationalism. The resolution stressed the need for constant cooperation among trade unions throughout the world, for rapid and effective assistance to action taken by foreign workers, and for expanding the international ties of the socialist press, especially to provide information on mass proletarian struggle. In the course of debates on that issue many delegates harshly criticised the trade union leaders of Britain and France who had done virtually nothing to assist Swedish workers when they had staged a general strike in 1909. AFL leaders were resolutely condemned for the fact that they had practically abandoned proletarian solidarity.

Prompted by the upsurge of the revolutionary movement, the International's congresses expressed solidarity with the massive action taken by the proletariat in some countries more often than in the preceding decade. For example, the Stuttgart Congress adopted a resolution expressing its "brotherly greetings to the heroic fighters and the revolutionary proletariat of Russia's towns and villages".² The Copenhagen Congress condemned tsarist attempts at depriving the people of Finland of democratic freedoms and stressed the need for joint struggle by the Finnish and Russian proletariat. The Congress also denounced the colonial policy of the great powers in the Balkans and the anti-labour policy of the Young Turks. It connected the demand for the independence of the Balkan countries with the struggle for their democratisation, although it failed to support the slogan of "a free federation of all the Balkan republics",³ on which Kolarov insisted at the Congress on behalf of the Bulgarian and Serbian revolutionary Social-Democrats. The Copenhagen Congress also welcomed mass action by the working people of Spain against the Spanish ruling quarters' colonial venture in Morocco.

Thus, the congresses contributed significantly to strengthening the international unity of the working-class movement. Still, they failed to do everything possible and necessary to overcome revisionism and growing nationalism, to implement the Marxist decisions they themselves adopted. On the revolutionaries' initiative, the Copenhagen Congress stressed the need for strict implementation of all the resolutions of international socialist congresses. But a revi-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 79.

² *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart...*, S. 71.

³ *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Kopenhagen. 28. August bis 3. September 1910*, Vorwärts, Berlin, 1910, S. 27.

sionist proposal adopted in Copenhagen allowed workers' parties themselves to decide, in the name of their "sovereignty", when and how these decisions were to be implemented. This made it possible to ignore the International's decisions by and large.

The congresses paid great attention to the strengthening of workers' parties and other proletarian organisations and to the improvement of their relationships.

Increased splits in workers' parties forced the Copenhagen Congress to return to the issue of unity of national sections. However, the committee entrusted with this task and its rapporteur Wilhelm Ellenbogen of Austria refused to assess the opposing trends and ignored the ideological and political meaning of those splits. The draft resolution recalled the decision of the 1904 Amsterdam Congress of the International, said that each section of the International must "overcome internal dissent in the interests of the working class in each country and throughout the world"¹ as soon as possible, and urged the International Socialist Bureau to aid the sections. The "theory and practice of international socialism"² were proclaimed to be the basis of unity. That vague formula fully suited the right wing and the centre, who used the striving for unity to tie the hands of revolutionary Social-Democrats, hamper their break with opportunists, impede the unification of the working class, and prevent the creative development of Marxism and revolutionary practice. Despite protests by the left Social-Democrats of Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania who declared that they would continue to fight opportunism, most of the Congress delegates voted in favour of that resolution, including many left Social-Democrats who hoped to use the resolution to consolidate workers on a revolutionary basis.

Congresses held in the early 20th century failed to meet new historical requirements as far as the strengthening of the workers' parties was concerned. They were a far cry from Lenin's course aimed at creating revolutionary workers' parties of a new type which met the needs of the time. Congress resolutions on the unity of sections were merely concerned with the scope of that unity, but lost sight of its ideological and political basis, of the need for a break with the opportunists.

Resolutions on trade unions and cooperatives had a different and clearly positive significance for the revolutionary trend. These were drawn up due to the growth of those mass organisations and the need, brought about by the changing situation, to specify their place in the class struggle and their relations with the workers' parties. At the Stuttgart Congress, debates on the "neutrality of the trade

¹ Ibid., S. 16.

² Ibid., S. 26.

unions or their still closer alignment with the Party?"¹ were especially important. Most of those who agreed with trade union neutrality supported the draft resolution submitted by Jaurès and Vaillant and proceeding from the view that the political and the trade union struggle were two completely isolated courses.

The draft proposed by the Belgian Labour Party delegation offered the definite and resolute opposition to the former. The Belgian draft stressed the need for joint participation by the workers' parties and the trade unions in the political and economic struggle and the desirability of their joint action. Explaining the draft, de Brouckère said that "socialism must become a decisive power, both in the trade unions and in political organisations...".² The Bolsheviks supported the Belgian draft. Lenin contributed greatly to the elaboration of the trade union question. He directed Anatoli Lunacharsky's activities in the committee discussing that issue. The committee's decisions reflected the position of the Bolsheviks and the left Social-Democrats.

Most delegates opposed trade union neutrality but some of them did not accept the organisational unity of the workers' parties and the trade unions. Therefore the committee recommended for adoption the draft resolution submitted by Heinrich Beer of Austria. That draft did not call for such organisational unity, but it expressly stated the need for close ties between the party and the trade unions because the latter would be able to discharge their duty in the emancipation struggle of the proletariat only "if they proceed in all their actions from a socialist spirit".³ Despite the opposition offered by the anarcho-syndicalists and some right-wing Social-Democrats, the Congress adopted a resolution based on Beer's draft. It considerably helped revolutionary Social-Democrats in preparing the proletariat for revolutions and, Lenin observed, correctly solved the question of the party's attitude towards the trade unions.⁴

A different aspect of the trade union question was discussed at the Copenhagen Congress. The debate was prompted by the split of the trade union movement in Austria. Nemec and other nationalist leaders tried to justify the isolation and "national separatism" of the Czech trade unions, citing the defence of small nations' rights as an excuse. Most speakers in the committee and at the Congress rebuffed nationalist trends. The resolution adopted emphasised the need for trade union unity in each country and condemned their

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 87.

² *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart...*, S. 105.

³ *Ibid.*, S. 106.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Preface to the Pamphlet by Voinov (A. V. Lunacharsky) on the Attitude of the Party Towards the Trade Unions", "Trade Union Neutrality", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, pp. 163, 460-62.

break up along national lines as contradicting the Stuttgart Congress decisions and weakening the working-class movement. The International Socialist Bureau and the International Trade Union Secretariat were entrusted with the task of settling the conflict in the trade union movement of Austria in the spirit of "socialist brotherhood". Thus, the resolution reiterated the need to develop the trade union movement on the basis of proletarian internationalism under the leadership of workers' parties. Still, the issue of overcoming "nationalist separatism" in the Austrian socialist movement itself was not raised.

Revolutionary and opportunist trends were also opposed to one another in the Copenhagen Congress committee dealing with the draft resolution on cooperatives. The draft submitted by Jaurès and Thomas described cooperatives as an element of "social transformation" in the spirit of petty bourgeois "cooperative socialism" and proclaimed their neutrality vis-à-vis socialist parties. That approach was even more pronounced in the views advocated by Adolf von Elm of Germany who called cooperatives a means of democratisation and socialisation of society and stressed their neutrality towards workers' parties. His demand that predominantly proletarian consumer cooperatives merge with marketing and producer cooperatives might increase bourgeois influence in the cooperative movement.

The Bolsheviks led by Lenin firmly opposed that petty-bourgeois approach. Lenin criticised the opportunists in the committee. The Bolsheviks submitted a draft precisely describing the role consumer cooperatives played in the proletarian struggle: they improved the situation of the working people but were incapable of radically changing it. The draft rejected reformist illusions, underlined the need for the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, and called on the Socialists to step up their work in consumer cooperatives, wage socialist propaganda in them, and ensure "the fullest possible co-operation between all forms of the labour movement".¹ The Bolshevik draft strengthened the proletarian approach to the cooperative issue, expressed less firmly and with certain flaws by the Belgian delegation and the Guesdists. Committee sessions showed that most supporters of the proletarian line were ready to support the Belgian draft as amended by Benno Karpeles of Austria. Striving to defeat the petty-bourgeois trend, Lenin also supported the Belgian-Austrian draft and helped prevent opportunist amendments by von Elm and Jaurès being introduced. Revolutionary Social-Democrats could not safeguard the Belgian-Austrian draft from being weakened by amendments, or to improve it, but opportunists failed to push their decision through either.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Question of Co-operative Societies at the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 279.

At the discussion of the committee proposals at the Congress session, revolutionary Social-Democrats tried to correct the flaws in the Belgian-Austrian draft, to delete the revisionist reference to "co-operative socialism" from it. In this they failed, but the left wing at the Congress decided not to vote against, because of one phrase, the whole draft which provided, "in essentials, a correct definition of the tasks of the proletarian co-operative societies".¹ Revolutionary Social-Democrats, with Lenin in the lead, frustrated opportunist attempts at forcing the Congress to adopt a petty-bourgeois approach to cooperatives and secured a Marxist, in the main, solution of that important issue.

Congresses paid much attention to drawing up immediate demands aimed at improving the political and economic position of the working people. Among the crucial demands was that of political rights, specifically that of universal suffrage. At the Stuttgart Congress differences surfaced on women's suffrage. The opportunists—Adelheid Popp of Austria, some British delegates and others—thought it possible to demand only partial suffrage for women; they were even prepared to give up the struggle for universal suffrage altogether. They were supported by Victor Adler. But Clara Zetkin and other revolutionary Social-Democrats firmly opposed that. As a result, the committee rejected opportunist proposals.

Clara Zetkin was the rapporteur at the plenary session of the Congress. She viewed the struggle for women's suffrage as linked with the new conditions and tasks facing the working-class movement. Describing the coming proletarian struggle as a period of mass revolutionary action, she proceeded from the record of the Russian revolution to prove that the workers' success would be impossible "without active assistance by proletarian women".² Urging the involvement of women workers in the class struggle, Clara Zetkin explained that their suffrage should be seen as "a vital stage in the struggle for our end goal".³ By an overwhelming majority, the Congress adopted a resolution making it the duty of the socialist parties of all countries to work vigorously for universal women's suffrage; socialist women's organisations were to "do their utmost"⁴ in that struggle. Both parliamentary and non-parliamentary action was envisaged. The resolution was expressly spearheaded against opportunism.

Resolutions of the Copenhagen Congress, demanding the preservation of democratic freedoms in Finland and respect for the workers' rights in Spain, Turkey, Persia, and Morocco, were also aimed at

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Question of Cooperative Societies at the International Socialist Congress in Copenhagen", *Collected Works*, vol. 16, p. 283.

² *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart...*, S. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, S. 41.

⁴ *Ibid.*, S. 40.

strengthening and expanding the political rights of the working people. The Congress demanded the observance of the right to political asylum to revolutionaries and the abolition of capital punishment as "a barbarous vestige of the Middle Ages".¹ The International urged workers throughout the world to support these demands with vigorous mass action.

Congresses discussed and recommended ways in which the Social-Democrats could make use of the political rights already secured by the working people, specifically the right to be represented in parliament and in local government bodies. The Stuttgart Congress approved the statute of the Interparliamentary Socialist Commission aimed at making more effective the actions of the Social-Democratic members of parliament to protect the working people. Congresses laid down the principles of revolutionary parliamentarianism directed against the opportunist practice and social-reformist ideas of achieving socialism through parliamentary activity alone.

The defence and extension of the working people's political rights were organically linked with the struggle for their improved socio-economic position.

The significance and intensity of that struggle were growing, and the Copenhagen Congress made a special effort to work out issues regarding assistance to the unemployed and labour protection. The committee formed to draw up a draft resolution stressed that unemployment was "inseparable from the capitalist mode of production"² and, noting rising unemployment, proposed a concrete programme of assistance to the unemployed. The resolution, supported by most delegates, suggested demanding legislation in respect of such assistance at the expense of the government and the employers, and the creation of special aid organisations to be monitored and regulated by the trade unions. In the interests of the unemployed, the resolution recommended action to reduce the workday, to organise public works, to preserve all the civil rights of the unemployed, etc. Although the document said nothing about organising the jobless or about a course leading towards revolution, it proceeded from the view that unemployment could only be eliminated together with capitalism. The decision pointed to concrete ways and methods of ensuring greater mass activity and enhancing the role of the trade unions, and it helped expand the proletariat's struggle against the bourgeoisie.

Two trends clearly emerged in the discussion of the draft resolution on labour protection: revolutionary Social-Democrats tried to connect the issues under discussion with the preparations for revolution, and opportunists advocated a settlement through cooperation

¹ *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Kopenhagen...*, S. 16.

² *Ibid.*, S. 107.

between workers and employers. Therefore revolutionary Social-Democrats stressed the importance of a vigorous joint economic and political struggle by the proletarian parties and the trade unions; opportunists, especially H. Molkenbuhr of the SPD appealed to the bourgeoisie, arguing that money invested in labour protection would rapidly show profit. The Congress resolution condemned the bourgeoisie's resistance to the demands advanced by previous congresses of the International—regarding the introduction of an eight-hour working-day, a ban on child labour, recognition of the workers' right to set up unions, monitoring of labour protection jointly with workers, etc. The Congress stressed that as the exploitation of the workers mounted, the significance of fighting for labour protection legislation would increase. The resolution said that only greater pressure by the workers on the ruling classes could ensure such legislation. The Congress urged efforts "for effective labour protection by unswerving propaganda and the active establishment of class-conscious organisations in the political and economic spheres".¹

The agenda of the International's congresses included issues of anti-imperialist policy and tactics. Revolutionary Social-Democrats managed to overcome opportunist resistance and secure the adoption of decisions that showed the working class the way to fight such dangerous forms of monopoly domination as the growing trend towards colonial rule, militarism, and predatory wars.

Revolutionary Social-Democrats and revisionists clashed over the colonial issue at the Stuttgart Congress.

Van Kol of the Netherlands, rapporteur at the plenary session, and other right-wing Social-Democrats argued that a capitalist stage was inevitable for all nations and that it was beneficial for colonies. These people divided all nations into those capable and incapable of civilisation, and concluded that colonial peoples would be unable to survive without colonial rule; they praised the influence exerted by the metropolitan countries on their colonies, and even called for the suppression of the natives' resistance to "civilisation", and for "going there armed".² For the more distant future they envisaged a "socialist colonial policy". Their lip service to the need for a certain improvement in the situation of colonial peoples did in fact mean solidarity with imperialism.

Revolutionary Social-Democrats and some other prominent activists of the International—Marchlewski, Quelch, Georg Ledebour, Kautsky—firmly opposed that chauvinist stand. They argued that capitalist stage was not absolutely inevitable for all peoples, opposed the division of peoples into "superior" and "inferior", and exposed

¹ *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Kopenhagen...*, S. 57.

² *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart...*, S. 37.

the racist imperialist essence of the revisionists' speeches. They rejected the notion of a "socialist colonial policy", stressed the incompatibility of democracy, all the more so socialism, with colonialism, and maintained that the colonialists' withdrawal from colonies would enable their peoples to develop comprehensively. "We see the socialist system," the opponents of revisionism declared, "as a brotherhood of nations and races..."¹ Marxists said that Social-Democrats' task in the colonies was to "protect the popular masses from capitalist exploitation, from oppression by bureaucracy and militarism, that is, in pursuing a social and democratic policy".² They were supported by Kama, a representative of the Indian National Congress. She went even further and demanded self-determination for the peoples of India.

Despite the fact that revolutionary Social-Democrats were in minority, they managed to secure a majority decision by the Congress (127 in favour to 108 against with 10 abstentions) which added certain provisions comprising Marxist anti-colonial principles to the rather moderate programme of action. The stubborn resistance by a sizeable chauvinist part of the delegates prevented the Congress from going farther, from developing a broad programme of joint action by the proletariat and the colonial peoples against colonial rule, a programme that would meet the new historical conditions.

Revolutionary Social-Democrats were more successful in developing at congresses an international programme for the proletariat's struggle against militarism and predatory wars and against the imminent world imperialist war.

The increasingly strained international situation required a fuller and more specific anti-militarist policy of the working class, the crucial force opposing militarism and wars. The Stuttgart Congress took up that task. Its largest committee was that entrusted with drawing up a draft resolution on militarism and international conflicts. Participants included Lenin, Bebel, Luxemburg, Guesde, Marchlewski, Adler, Jaurès and many other prominent figures in the International. Four draft resolutions were discussed and 28 speakers took the floor. The draft submitted by Bebel indicated that wars were a product of capitalism and would be ended with the victory of socialism. Bebel saw the working class as the main anti-imperialist force and called on it to use every means available to it to prevent war. However, that draft "failed to indicate the active tasks of the proletariat".³ In substantiating his proposals, Bebel failed to break away from the right-wing Social-Democrats who denied

¹ Ibid., S. 35.

² Ibid., S. 34.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 80.

that Germany's ruling quarters were aggressive. He held that even in new conditions wars should still be divided into offensive and defensive.

Guesde's draft also reiterated the general Marxist approach to militarism and war, but listed no new means of struggle and ignored the need for special anti-militarist activities.

The draft sponsored by Vaillant and Jaurès failed to reveal the ties between militarism and wars and capitalism and between anti-militarism and the struggle for socialism, or to take into account the peculiarities of imperialist wars. Vaillant's and Jaurès' proposals could mislead the workers because they urged them in any case to defend the country that was attacked. A positive factor, however, was that the draft referred to the anti-war aspect of the 1905-1907 Russian revolution, advanced the slogan of arming the proletariat and spoke of organising mass anti-war action.

Hervé proposed a draft which condemned bourgeois patriotism and chauvinism, but failed to disclose the causes of wars. He was justified in maintaining the need for mass anti-war action and for greater proletarian solidarity but, ignoring the diversity of the specific conditions in which the workers had to struggle, demanded that "any declaration of war, no matter from which state it might come, should be answered with a war strike and an uprising".¹ In defending his draft, Hervé revealed "frivolity, superficiality, and infatuation with rhetorical phrases".²

Almost all the delegates condemned Hervé's dangerous extremism. Most right-wing Social-Democrats, however, were resolutely against special anti-militarist activities by Socialists, against anti-war propaganda in the army, and against mass anti-war action by the proletariat. They denied that the drive for peace and the struggle for socialism were connected, urged rejection of the slogan about arming the people, and tried to uphold bourgeois patriotism. Unlike these rightists, Jaurès, Vaillant and even Vandervelde argued for the need to carry out special anti-militarist activities and to take most effective mass anti-war action.

The Marxist solution of that extremely important issue was the exclusive credit of revolutionary Social-Democrats. On Lenin's initiative and despite resistance by Trotsky and Plekhanov, the RSDLP and the SPKPL delegations proposed four amendments to Bebel's draft. The first was to reiterate anti-militarist action resolutions adopted at previous congresses and to note that militarism was a weapon of the bourgeoisie's class domination and oppression of the proletariat. The second condemned chauvinism from the view-

¹ *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart...*, S. 87.

² V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 91.

point of the proletariat's class objectives and international solidarity; the third urged the stepping up of youth education in the spirit of socialism and internationalism so as to prevent the ruling classes from using the younger generation against the proletariat; and the fourth was to commit on Socialists to try and prevent war by every means possible depending on the situation and to use the crisis the war would generate to involve the popular masses in political struggle and "hasten the overthrow of the bourgeoisie".¹

In her speech on behalf of a conference of revolutionary Social-Democrats, Rosa Luxemburg used many arguments advanced by Lenin to reject, as contrary to the interests of the working class, the views of Vollmar and other revisionists who proceeded from nationalist positions to deny the need for the principles of the struggle against militarism and war, common to all Socialists. She criticised Bebel and Guesde for their reluctance to develop Marxist policy in line with the requirements of the new international situation, for their attempt at "rendering to the Marxist world outlook some dry and fatalist form".² Urging that the new methods of struggle tried and tested in the Russian revolution be used, she proposed "giving more force to Bebel's draft", going further than Jaurès and Vaillant and including a provision on using war to hasten the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Rosa Luxemburg was supported by Liebknecht and Roland-Holst. Lenin took part in the negotiations with Bebel in which, with the help of Jaurès, an acceptable formula was found: the draft resolution noted "historical examples of proletarian action against war, from the demonstrations in Europe to the revolution in Russia".³ With these additions Bebel's draft became "an altogether different resolution".⁴ First the committee and then the Congress as a whole voted in favour of it.

Thus, Lenin and other revolutionary Social-Democrats ensured that the Congress took an important step forward: it laid down a consistent anti-militarist policy, which met the new historical requirements. The resolution bluntly opposed the views of revisionists and anarcho-syndicalists. "The clear realisation that the social revolution is inevitable," Lenin observed, "the firm determination to fight to the end, the readiness to adopt the most revolutionary methods of struggle—that is the significance of the resolution of the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart on the question of militarism."⁵

¹ Ibid., p. 80.

² *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart...*, S. 97.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart", *Collected Works*, Vol. 13, p. 81.

⁴ Ibid., p. 92.

⁵ Ibid., p. 93.

Growing international tensions kept the issue of the proletariat's struggle against militarism and wars on the agenda of subsequent congresses, too. But right-wing Social-Democrats, trying to evade the Stuttgart resolution and reduce the struggle against militarism and wars to speeches for peace in parliament and to a demand for agreement among the imperialist powers, succeeded in having the anti-militarist problem discussed at the Copenhagen Congress solely as the question of arbitration courts and disarmament. The right wing was supported by the centre who entertained the illusory hope that peaceful diplomatic agreements among the imperialist powers would be sufficient to avert a confrontation. At committee sessions in Copenhagen the right wing tried to impose a pacifist programme on the Congress, the centre advocated unity of revolutionary anti-militarism with pacifism; anarcho-syndicalists countered that with demands of a general strike to avert war. Revolutionary Social-Democrats upheld the Stuttgart resolution. Protesting against concessions to the chauvinists and "curtailment" of slogans, they stressed the importance of mass anti-militarist action, proposed ways and means of stepping up revolutionary anti-war propaganda in the armed forces, of organising mass political strikes, etc. The left argued that courts of arbitration and other agreements "will in no way lead to the elimination of conflicts that really threaten with war".¹

The discussion ended by approving a draft which reiterated and recapitulated the basic provisions of the Stuttgart resolution, including the duty to use the crisis created by the war to hasten the revolution. Noting that the war danger was growing, the resolution obliged Social-Democrats to protest against war allocations, demand universal disarmament, settlement of international disputes by courts of arbitration, an end to secret diplomacy, self-determination for all peoples, and limitation of naval armaments and the abolition of the naval prize law. It was necessary to secure those demands not only in parliament but also by organising mass action.

Still, the resolution said nothing about the need to arm the whole people—about militia—or mass political strikes, or anti-war revolutionary propaganda in the armed forces. It failed to indicate how the demands for arbitration courts, disarmament, etc., were to be used in the interests of revolutionary propaganda. The resolution did not do everything possible or necessary to consistently follow up the course mapped out by the Stuttgart Congress. Thus, right-wing Social-Democrats were granted the concession centrists insisted on. Still, the right wing failed to secure the most important gain: the resolution unanimously approved in Copenhagen reiterated and even somewhat furthered the anti-militarist decisions adopted in Stuttgart.

¹ *Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Kopenhagen...*, S. 30.

Two years later, in connection with the armed conflict in the Balkans and the immediate threat of a world war, the Extraordinary International Socialist Congress was convened. It was held in Basel in November 1912, at the height of the most powerful wave of mass anti-war action since the turn of the century. This affected the atmosphere and the results of the Congress.

The intention to organise an impressive demonstration of the unity and resolution of the entire International, and to oppose war-mongers, was dominant at the Congress. Unanimity, however, was confined to the wish to prevent a world war, but opinions differed as to how that should be done. Although there were no open acute disputes at meetings, representatives of opposing trends spoke each in his own vein. Clara Zetkin and Bebel connected the mass peace drive with the struggle to overthrow the bourgeoisie. Vaillant also maintained that resolute mass action was necessary. Jaurès and even Victor Adler referred to that action to scare the imperialists and at the same time called on all trends in the working-class movement to reconcile their differences. James Keir Hardie spoke in the anarcho-syndicalist spirit, proposing that a global strike should be staged the moment war started. There were also pacifist speeches and attempts at finding some sort of a middle course in the anti-war struggle. Revolutionary Social-Democrats saw that the sentiment and action of the masses would frustrate efforts aimed at diverting the movement away from the course developed in Stuttgart. That was why they refrained from criticising opportunism and advocated concrete decisions in the committee set up to draft the manifesto.

On the basis of 13 drafts, the committee drew up a manifesto which upheld the spirit of the Stuttgart resolution and took into account new proposals by several workers' parties, including the SFIO.

The Congress unanimously approved the manifesto, which described the impending world war as predatory and alien to the interests of the proletariat. The document exposed the imperialists as warmongers and pointed to the grave consequences of the arms race and war itself for the working people. The Congress declared that the workers will regard criminal any shooting each other down. The manifesto said that Socialists countered the "capitalist world of exploitation and mass destruction" with the "proletarian world of agreement and unity among peoples".¹

Stressing the leading role of the proletariat in the anti-war movement, the Congress proclaimed that the world war could be averted and called on Socialists to mobilise all their forces and employ every possible means to achieve that goal, to do their utmost to strengthen

¹ *Außerordentlicher Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Basel am 24. und 25. November 1912. Vorwärts, Berlin, 1912, S. 2.*

the international unity of the working class. The International Socialist Bureau was to coordinate anti-war action in different countries. The manifesto set forth the immediate anti-war objectives for the workers' parties of Germany, France, Britain, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Balkan countries. Each party was to select its own means and the time they would use them to achieve that goal. The manifesto included the greatly important Stuttgart Congress directive to the effect that in case of war Socialists were duty bound to use the crisis it caused to hasten capitalism's downfall.¹

The situation at the Congress affected the manifesto: there were flaws and not quite correct definitions. On the whole, however, the Basel Manifesto developed the ideas of the Stuttgart Congress anti-militarist resolution and was an important gain of the revolutionary trend.

Lenin valued the manifesto as a summing-up of the Second International's experience and, above all, as a document which laid down "the tactics of the workers' revolutionary struggle on an international scale against their governments, the tactics of proletarian revolution". He commended it for its clear and precise assessment of exactly those rapidly aggravating contradictions, which led to an imperialist war.² Having received a copy of the Basel Manifesto, Lenin said: "We have been given a promissory note: we'll see how it's paid off!"

The Basel Manifesto helped enhance the struggle of the working class against militarism and the imminent world war. "The Basel Congress," the Bolshevik *Pravda* wrote, "has shown the entire world yet again what energy, solidarity and resolution workers in all countries display in their drive to preserve peace."³ The Marxist solutions that the congresses of the Second International offered to the problems of fighting against militarism and predatory wars—problems that had become increasingly urgent in the early 20th century—were an important achievement of the international working-class movement, a considerable gain of revolutionary Social-Democrats, led by the Bolsheviks, by Lenin.

Drawing up the fundamentals of the workers' parties joint policy in the struggle for power and the emancipation of the working class, and preparing recommendations to the proletariat of new ways of waging that struggle were among the most important tasks the International was to solve in the new historical situation.

Overcoming opportunist resistance, the International's congresses held in the period under review took, on the initiative of revolutionary Social-Democrats, several important decisions, which met

¹ *Außerordentlicher Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Basel...* S. 23.

² V. I. Lenin, "Socialism and War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, 1974, p. 307.

³ *Pravda*, November 18 (December 1), 1912.

some of the new requirements the working class was facing. A new approach was worked out to strengthen the international unity of the working-class movement, consolidate mass organisations of the working people and their ties with the workers' parties, defend the proletariat's immediate interests, and fight against colonialism, militarism and predatory wars. New forms of working-class action were recommended. Despite revisionist forays, congresses reiterated the ideas of proletarian internationalism and the general Marxist principles of the policy of the workers' parties.

However, due to the resistance by right-wing Social-Democrats and centrists and to the lack of profound theoretical knowledge among some revolutionary Social-Democrats, congresses failed to produce comprehensive and consistent Marxist solutions to some of the crucial issues that the new historical situation had brought to the fore. No guidelines were laid down as to the forms and methods of directly preparing the working class for revolutions; no new ways of restructuring workers' parties or enhancing their ideological and political fighting ability were mapped out; nor were methods of winning the support of the proletariat's allies, gaining power and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat suggested.

Still, these congresses contributed to the growth and strengthening of the international working-class movement. That was why right-wing Social-Democrats mostly resorted to open or disguised refusal to observe congress decisions based on Marxist principles. At the end of the first decade of the 20th century they acted with the connivance of or in alliance with the centrists. As a result, the discrepancy between word—speeches and resolutions—and deed—the refusal to act on them—was growing. The opportunists pushed socialist parties towards abandoning Marxism as far as the theory and practice of the working-class movement were concerned. That highlighted the deepening crisis of the Second International preceding its collapse.

**THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL.
THE CRISIS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR I**

In the period under review, the work of the International Socialist Bureau (ISB) was also quite important for strengthening the international links and joint action of the working class. The same was true of the Interparliamentary Socialist Commission (ISC), of the international socialist women's, youth and journalists' conferences and their permanent international centres. Those objectives were

also served by regional conferences of workers' organisations, joint mass action by the workers of various countries, international meetings and solidarity drives, especially those to support Russian revolutionaries.

The International Socialist Bureau was to play a prominent part in the international working-class movement in the interim between congresses of the International. The Rules, approved in 1907, formalised the International Socialist Bureau's functions which it had performed since its inception, including the one of representing the International between its congresses. The International Socialist Bureau also was to a certain extent responsible for monitoring the work of other international organisations of the Second International. It regularly published reports of its sessions, appeals and statements, distributed circular letters among the workers' parties and organisations, and launched a periodical bulletin in 1909.¹ Still, the International Socialist Bureau failed to live up to the role it was expected to play in strengthening the International, although it was not merely a "post-office box", as Robert Grimm and some others called it.

Under the Rules, the International Socialist Bureau consisted of delegates from all national sections, each entitled to two votes. The sections also financed its budget. In 1907, the workers' parties agreed on the amount regularly contributed by each section—from 100 to 2,500 francs annually. The German section paid the largest share, the Russian section, the second largest—1,500 francs.²

The International Socialist Bureau grew more representative, although not all sections sent their delegates to its sessions—either because they underestimated its role or due to various difficulties. Compared to the summer of 1903, when representatives of 10 sections took part in its work,³ after 1907, its delegates represented 14 to 18 sections out of 25 to 27 International's sections.⁴ Outstanding activists in the working-class movement were usually spokesmen for national sections in the International Socialist Bureau. At different times, they included Bebel, Paul Singer and Kautsky of the German section, Quelch and Hyndman of Britain, Vaillant and Jaurès of France, Iglesias of Spain, Victor Adler of the Austrian section, Rosa Luxemburg of the Polish section, and others. The two votes of the Russian section were divided between the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Social-Democrats. Lenin represented the

¹ See *Bulletin périodique du Bureau Socialiste International* (hereafter *Bulletin du BSI*).

² *Bureau Socialiste International, Comptes rendus...*, Vol. 1, p. 205.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁴ *Bulletin du BSI*, No. 2, pp. 33, 34; *Supplement du Bulletin*, No. 11, p. 3; *L'Humanité*, October 29, 1912.

Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party since 1905. After 1912, the Bolshevik Party also maintained contact with the International Socialist Bureau through Maxim Litvinov and Ivan Popov. Bebel enjoyed great prestige in it. After his death, Victor Adler, Kautsky and Jaurès each tried to become the ISB unofficial leader. Still, none of them could fill the role of Bebel's successor, mostly because they were not as revolutionary as he had been nor were they trusted as readily by revolutionary Social-Democrats or the workers.

The composition of the International Socialist Bureau, whose members were appointed by the governing bodies of the workers' parties, was rather motley from the very beginning. These people mostly supported revisionism or other right-wing trends among the Social-Democrats; for example, they made up almost 50 per cent of the International Socialist Bureau session delegates in June 1907.¹ After those Marxists who, reluctant to oppose revisionists, had become centrists, opportunists in the International Socialist Bureau secured a firm majority.

Right-wing Social-Democrats in the Bureau aimed at lowering the International's ideological and political requirements made on workers' organisations seeking admission, preached profoundly opportunist ideas—specifically, those justifying colonial rule—and worked to deprive the International Socialist Bureau statements on crucial issues of the concrete approach and vitality they needed.

Those members who generally tried to expand its activities and use the Bureau for consolidating the working-class movement often strayed away from Marxism, were ready to compromise with the right wing and opposed revolutionary Social-Democrats. That made some International Socialist Bureau actions less precise and less efficient. By 1913-1914, the bloc of the right wing with the centre had paralysed the Bureau.

Revolutionary Social-Democrats, a minority in the International Socialist Bureau, worked to strengthen the International's platform on a Marxist basis. Rebuffing revisionist forays and the centrist readiness to yield, they tried to turn the International Socialist Bureau into the organiser of workers' solidarity and unity throughout the world, into the leader of their international action. The revolutionary representatives of the RSDLP—the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin—made a particularly important contribution to reaching that objective. Taking part in International Socialist Bureau sessions in 1908-1911 personally and through his party comrades, Lenin uncompromisingly fought for the internationalist solidarity of the proletariat, for greater international workers' support for the Russian revolutionary movement. He advocated broader representation

¹ *Bureau Socialiste International. Comptes rendus...*, Vol. 1, p. 272.

in the International coupled with stricter entrance qualifications for its constituent workers' organisations. He protested against admitting anti-Marxist groups to the International and fought opportunist forays against the Bolsheviks and revolutionary Social-Democrats from Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and other countries. He also paid close attention to providing truthful information to the International Socialist Bureau and thus to the entire international working-class movement about the development of the revolutionary struggle in Russia, especially about Bolshevik activities. He firmly rebuffed opportunist misinformation and attacks.¹

Bebel, Lafargue, Luxemburg, de Brouckère, Avramoff, Ledebour, Herman Gorter and others aimed at enhancing the International Socialist Bureau's role as organiser of proletarian international unity of action on a Marxist basis. They were often supported by Vaillant. But those revolutionary Social-Democrats were not always consistent. Bebel, and then Ledebour and de Brouckère tended to make concessions to the opportunists. Avramoff incorrectly assessed the national liberation struggle of the Balkan peoples and easily slipped into sectarianism. All that weakened the revolutionary Social-Democrats' influence on the International Socialist Bureau and played into the hands of the opportunists.

Right from the very start, the International Socialist Bureau was the battleground where Marxists fought against revisionists and later, revolutionary Social-Democrats clashed with all kinds of opportunists. Having gained the upper hand, the opportunists infringed on the rights of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, especially if representatives of the latter were not well known. After investigating the situation in the International Socialist Bureau, Maxim Litvinov wrote to Lenin in 1913: "There is no equality among B[ureau] members. What one is allowed to do, another is forbidden to do, personal likes and dislikes play their part. Of all the Bolsheviks, you alone could wield influence in the Bureau."²

The Bureau's Executive Committee and Secretariat did much to shape its activities. The post of Chairman of the Executive Committee was filled by Emile Vandervelde, a revisionist sympathiser. Manoeuvring skilfully and keeping a watch on the mood of the major

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, 1977, pp. 233-38, 246; V. I. Lenin, "The Eleventh Session of the International Socialist Bureau", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 142; V. I. Lenin, "Report to the International Socialist Bureau, 'Elections to the Fourth Duma'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, pp. 267-71; *V. I. Lenin in the Struggle for a Revolutionary International*, pp. 155-60, etc.; *Lenin and the International Working-Class Movement*, pp. 138-44, etc.; G. Kuranov, "V. I. Lenin's Fight Against the Reformists in the International Socialist Bureau (1905-1914)", *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya*, No. 4, 1963 (in Russian).

² Quoted from I. M. Krivoguz, *op. cit.*, p. 455.

rity, he aimed not at turning the revolutionary Social-Democrats away but at making them submit to the opportunists. From 1905, Camille Huysmans was in charge of the Secretariat. He advocated unity of the international working-class movement on the broadest possible basis and later joined the Centrists.

Upon approval by the largest sections of the International, the Executive Committee issued statements and appeals on behalf of the International Socialist Bureau on many international questions—to support revolutionary movements in individual countries, against reactionary and colonialist crimes, on May Day action, against militarism and predatory wars, etc. The Secretariat disseminated information, took care of publishing the International's documents and establishing archives of the international working-class movement, dealt with financial questions and performed other similar functions.

The Bureau's plenary sessions, usually convened once a year (there were two such sessions in 1906 and two in 1907; the total for 1905-1914 was eleven), discussed the more important issues: those concerning the admission of new members to the International, its Rules, the agenda of the coming congress, joint action by workers' parties, representation of sections, disputes among them, etc. The Russian revolution, the upsurge of the workers' struggle in other countries, anti-imperialist action by colonial peoples, the rise of the mass anti-war movement led the International Socialist Bureau to deal with urgent issues much more often than before. After the Stuttgart Congress, the Austrian *Arbeiter-Zeitung* described the Bureau as "a centre of socialist life which is throbbing with ever greater force in all countries".¹ Still, even at that time many Bureau resolutions were adopted "thanks to the support of the opportunist olla podrida"² and some resembled "one of those good wishes which are not considered really important but which you cannot argue against much".³

The Bureau paid considerable attention to enlarging Second International membership and to drafting its Rules, which were approved in March 1906. On that occasion, the revolutionary Social-Democrats frustrated right-wing demands that the number of seats in parliament secured by a particular section be regarded as the foremost criterion of its power. The revolutionary Social-Democrats insisted on rejecting the British ILP's proposal about opening the doors of congresses to trade unions which did not adhere to class struggle principles.

¹ *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, August 25, 1907.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Eleventh Session of the International Socialist Bureau", *Collected Works*, Vol. 16, p. 144.

³ *Iskra*, No. 31, January 1, 1903.

The right-wing and some other delegates in the International Socialist Bureau often distorted the principle of the unity of the international working-class movement and failed to demand that organisations applying for membership meet the necessary ideological and political requirements, even those listed in the Rules. That was how the Socialist-Revolutionary Party and later Dashnaksutyun, an Armenian nationalist party, were admitted to the International, in spite of the protests of the Russian Social-Democrats. In 1908, a majority in the Bureau agreed to admit the British Labour Party to the International, without requiring its recognition of the class struggle. While condemning sectarian views, Lenin, too, voted for admitting the Labour Party, but he maintained the decision on this question was to urge them "to conscious class policy". Lenin and some other revolutionary Social-Democrats argued in vain for that condition which would make "hundreds of thousands of British workers, who undoubtedly respect the decisions of the International but have not yet become full Socialists, ponder once again over the question why they are regarded as having taken only the *first* step, and what the *next* steps along this road should be".¹ At that Bureau session, the bourgeois-nationalist Zionist Socialist Party was denied admission due to Lenin's vigorous protests.²

The International Socialist Bureau majority favoured unity for the working-class movement but cared nothing about a Marxist basis for that unity. For example, acting in the spirit of the Amsterdam Congress resolution, the International Socialist Bureau helped merge the French Socialist parties, but did not require that the joint party follow Marxist principles. While approving the talks on the merger of the Socialist Party and the Socialist Labour Party in the United States, the Bureau did nothing to ensure a clearly Marxist basis for the unification platform. In 1913, in its efforts to unite British workers' organisations, the Bureau recommended that the British Socialist Party join the British Labour Party and, together with the ILP and the Fabians, set up a United Socialist Council. Under certain conditions this could have helped disseminate Marxism, but they were never identified. The International Socialist Bureau tried to preserve the unity of the Hungarian Social-Democrats from whom Croatian Social-Democrats ceded but it was reluctant to condemn the principle of splitting a workers' party in any country along national lines. Avoiding a principled assessment of the essence of differ-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 236.

² *Compte-rendu Officiel de la 10-me séance de Bureau Socialiste International (11 octobre 1908)*, Gand, Société coopérative "Volksdrukkerij", 1909, pp. 59-66; see also V. I. Lenin, "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 242-43.

ences in the Dutch working-class movement, a majority in the Bureau overruled protests by Lenin and other revolutionary Social-Democrats and demanded, citing the need for greater unity of the working-class movement, that the Social-Democratic Party (the Tribunists) rejoin the Social-Democratic Workers' Party—in other words, that Marxists submit to revisionists.¹ Similar attempts by the Bureau majority at using the Amsterdam Congress resolution on unity in that vein were also undertaken against the Bulgarian Tsenyaks, so as to unite them with the "Broad Socialists", and against the Bolshevik Party, to ensure its unprincipled merger with the liquidationists.

Unable to understand the internationally historical significance of the creation of the Bolshevik Party, the International Socialist Bureau Executive Committee helped centrists and the SPD leadership in their attempts at forcing the Bolsheviks to concede to the liquidationists. In the autumn of 1912, the unity of all Social-Democrats in Russia was discussed at a Bureau plenary session, while the Bolsheviks were never even informed of the fact. Some Bureau members tried to blame them for the split in the Russian working-class movement. The International Socialist Bureau Secretariat tried to force an unacceptable mediator on the Bolsheviks for talks with the liquidationists. Lenin provided detailed information to the Bureau about the state of affairs in Russia's Social-Democratic movement and about Bolshevik activities. Without objecting to the International Socialist Bureau dealing with Russian Social-Democratic matters, he tried to ensure that such efforts would help rally the Social-Democrats on a Marxist basis instead of leading them to unprincipled compromise with opportunists. However, both the right wing and the centre favoured the liquidationists. At a 1913 Bureau session Kautsky maintained that the RSDLP had broken up. He recommended that it be restored at a unification conference aided by the Executive Committee, but failed to lay down a clear-cut unity platform. The Bolsheviks protested against Kautsky's attacks and invited Vandervelde to come and see for himself how influential the RSDLP was in Russia. Having arrived in St. Petersburg at the height of mass proletarian action led by the Bolsheviks, who were followed by 80 per cent of the country's organised labour force, Vandervelde told Martov: "I sympathise with your trend but I cannot express that."² At the so-called unification conference of 11 different Social-Democratic organisations of Russia, convened by the Bureau's Executive Committee in Brussels in July 1914, opportunists again

¹ *Bulletin du BSI*, No. 2, pp. 33-42.

² *Materials on the History of the Russian Revolutionary Movement*, Vol. 1, Berlin, 1924, p. 290.

tried to impose minority views on the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks frustrated those attempts and countered them with Lenin's plan for unity based on a Marxist programme and tactics. Defending the Marxist course, the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, prepared for confrontation with opportunists at the coming congress of the International.

The stubborn efforts by the Bureau majority aimed at preventing a break with the opportunists, at making the revolutionary forces in some countries submit to the opportunists in the name of strengthening Social-Democratic unity, seriously hampered the development of the international working-class movement and the cohesion of the proletariat on a Marxist basis.

The International Socialist Bureau was instrumental in preparing international socialist congresses. Draft agendas were discussed in detail at its plenary sessions; at these, right-wing Social-Democrats were clearly seeking to achieve two objectives: first, to strengthen their superiority, taking detailed advance decisions in the Bureau on everything that was yet to be decided at congresses; second, to curtail their mandate by excluding certain important issues from their agenda. For example, in 1909, the right wing succeeded in having the agrarian question, never discussed at congresses since the beginning of the century, removed from the agenda of the Copenhagen Congress. They also tried to remove from the agenda the item on cooperatives so as to prevent its discussion and the adoption of a Marxist resolution. The right were often supported by the centrists in their desire to narrow down the issues to be discussed and to delay debates on important but controversial issues. Thus, of all the more important problems to be discussed at a congress planned for 1914, only imperialism, high prices and unemployment were included on the agenda. The International Socialist Bureau majority refused to support proposals about discussing strikes, May Day action, ministerialism, militarism, the national liberation movement, and the agrarian question. The most significant and urgent problems of the working-class movement—concerning socialist tactics, the general strike, the struggle against colonial rule, militarism, and wars, trade unions and cooperatives—were put on the agendas of congresses at the insistence of the revolutionary Social-Democrats.

Support for the revolutionary movement in Russia emerged as an important aspect of Bureau's activities. In 1905-1906, the Bureau issued 14 statements of support for the Russian revolution and held fund-raising campaigns. The International Socialist Bureau welcomed the "heroic Russian colleagues"¹ and said that "the proletariat is ... the supreme hope of the Revolution".² Subsequently, the Bureau

¹ *Bureau Socialiste International. Comptes rendus...*, Vol. 1, p. 298.

² *Ibid.*, p. 208.

repeatedly denounced tsarist reprisals against revolutionaries and called for protest demonstrations during the tsar's visit to Western Europe and for solidarity with the Russian proletariat. However, right-wing Social-Democrats regarded such action as a mere formality and opposed effective measures.

On the initiative of the Marxists, the Bureau supported the rise of the working-class and national liberation movements in the Philippines, China, Finland, South Africa, America, Macedonia, Romania, Mexico, Argentina, Spain, and other countries. It summed up the record of proletarian struggle for social, political and economic demands. Its annual May Day appeals stressed the need to combine the struggle for better material conditions of the working people with the struggle for an eight-hour working day and for greater political rights, against militarism and wars, for international peace and social justice. There were calls on the working class to stage simultaneous mass action in different countries, to strengthen effective solidarity.

Still, the International Socialist Bureau was far from doing all that was possible and necessary to aid the mass proletarian movement. Action by the Spanish working people and the general strike in Sweden failed to receive the support they deserved; hardly anything was done to aid the Iranian people in their struggle against the Anglo-Russian intervention; the national liberation struggle of the Balkan peoples was assessed incorrectly and deprived of support, and so on. That bore out the growing influence of revisionists and centrists, their disdain for mass action.

Another important function of the Bureau was the organisation of action to protest against the arms build-up, colonial annexations, international conflicts, predatory wars, for peace among nations. In 1905, the International Socialist Bureau called on Socialists throughout the world to take effective action so as to stop the predatory Russo-Japanese war, and expressed the hope that united revolutionary forces would succeed in ending it. In 1906, it was decided that in case there was a threat of war direct contacts should be established among the workers' parties in the countries which might be involved in the hostilities, joint action by those parties organised, and a Bureau session convened to map out the course for the whole of the organised proletariat.

In 1908-1909, on the initiative of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, the Bureau organised an exchange of views among Socialists in different countries on ways of preserving peace in the Balkans and of resisting the aggression by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At a 1908 Bureau session, the right wing, supported by Victor Adler, declared that only the form in which Austria-Hungary had annexed-Bosnia and Herzegovina and not the annexation itself could be con

demned. They proposed that complete independence for Bulgaria be regarded as a threat to peace. If adopted, these proposals would have essentially impeded the national liberation movement and led the workers' parties away from actively fighting imperialist aggression. Supported by Vaillant, revolutionary Social-Democrats rebuffed revisionists. True, the International Socialist Bureau condemned Bulgarian independence (even the Tesnyaks mistakenly described it as a "harmful escapade"), but it called on the socialists to heighten their vigilance, find the necessary means and work out measures both "national and international" to prevent war. In 1909, the Bureau recommended the staging of meetings and demonstrations to protest against the warmongers' forays. In several countries, Socialists did organise such mass action.

In the autumn of 1910 and in early 1911, a wave of Bureau-initiated meetings and demonstrations by the working people swept through Europe to protest against militarism, against potentially explosive conflicts among European powers, and against the aggression in Morocco. From mid-1911 the Moroccan crisis and the start of the Italo-Turkish War prompted the Bureau to hold several international anti-war rallies in Paris, Toulouse, Madrid, London, Berlin, and other cities. At these meetings, Socialists declared "war on war" and said they would resist war "by any means at their disposal".¹ As the war danger increased, the right wing tried to violate congress resolutions and Bureau decisions by hampering the convening of the Bureau plenary session. Still, revolutionary Social-Democrats in the International Socialist Bureau succeeded in having it held in September 1911. A lengthy and bitter debate ensued, in which Lenin supported Rosa Luxemburg, who criticised the revisionists and conciliators in the SPD. A resolution was adopted stressing the proletariat's leading role in the struggle against warmongers. It was recommended that Socialists organise mass anti-war action everywhere and protest against colonial wars. The International Socialist Bureau described Italy's attack against Turkey as a "bandit policy". "The international proletariat," the Bureau appeal said, "is duty-bound to counter this brutal and violent policy with absolutely all the forces it can muster."²

The response was a wave of mass anti-war demonstrations and strikes which swept through practically all European countries in early November 1911. The Bureau Secretariat noted that "the entire International has made perceptible progress in the struggle against militarism by organising numerous demonstrations and impressive rallies, at which public resolutions were adopted."³

¹ *L'Humanité*, August 5, 1911.

² *Vorwärts*, November 2, 1911.

³ See *Archives of Plekhanov House*, N. 13, 87 (in Russian).

In October 1912, in connection with the start of the First Balkan War, the Bureau convened a plenary session at which different stands clashed. Victor Adler and Jaures ignored the national liberation interests of the Balkan peoples and again assumed a pacifist position calling for the preservation of the status quo. Rosa Luxemburg and Vaillant demanded more effective mass action against the aggressors. Rosa Luxemburg said that "mere protests and manifestations cannot do much" and proposed a specific programme linking the struggle for peace with the proletariat's revolutionary tasks. The Bureau recognised the Balkan peoples' striving for independence as legitimate and condemned all imperialist schemes. Its manifesto connected the possibility of a just and durable peace with socialist principles. Still, the International Socialist Bureau failed to correctly assess the First Balkan War, opposed it from a purely pacifist standpoint, and did not uphold the right of nations to self-determination. Under the influence of nationalism differences emerged among the International's sections in their approach to the liberation struggle of the Balkan peoples. The only unanimous demand was that of non-interference by the imperialist powers in the Balkan conflict. Only the Bolsheviks took a consistent Marxist stand. The Bureau overlooked the concrete political programme suggested by Rosa Luxemburg. Nevertheless, it called on the proletariat to use "the entire might of its organisations and powerful manifestations"¹ against great-power interference in the Balkans. Socialists throughout the world responded to the appeal.

A wave of rallies and demonstrations again engulfed Europe. In November 1912, anti-war action by European workers reached its peak. On November 17, aided by the Bureau, simultaneous action against aggressive imperialist policy was staged in the capitals and large cities of all European countries. That Peace Day was a demonstration of the proletariat's strength and determination, a warning to the ruling quarters. It created an atmosphere which helped revolutionary Social-Democrats succeed at the Basel Congress of the International.

Bureau-supported mass international anti-war action continued until the summer of 1913. A "Balkan Fund" was set up to aid the Socialists of Bulgaria and Serbia. Georgi Dimitrov expressed gratitude for effective solidarity and wrote: "In these troublous times we have but one consolation and hope, and that is that we may reckon on the support of the international proletariat."²

From the latter half of 1913, however, the Bureau paid less attention to the mass anti-war movement. It's revisionist and centrist

¹ *Vorwärts*, October 31, 1912.

² *The International Socialist Review*, March 1913, No. 9, p. 694.

majority lulled the Socialists' vigilance with allegations that the ruling quarters of the imperialist powers were sensible and wanted peace. As a result, the International Socialist Bureau did nothing during the pre-war crisis of July 1914. The reason was by no means rooted in the Bureau's insufficient powers, but in the opportunist domination both in the Bureau and in the International as a whole. All that presaged the opportunists' open alliance with the imperialists of their countries and the collapse of the Second International.

The Interparliamentary Socialist Commission (ISC), established in 1904, was one of the Bureau bodies. It was to unite socialist members of parliament and organise their simultaneous action against militarism and wars, for the rights and interests of the working people. Despite right-wing Social-Democrats' demands that it be regarded as an independent centre with powers equal to those of the Bureau, the Stuttgart Congress approved the Commission's status as a body working under the guidance of the Bureau. That document also set forth the Second International's fundamental decisions on the objectives and nature of parliamentary activities to be carried out by socialists, envisaged the creation of an information bureau, the exchange of experience, and holding conferences of socialist members of parliament.

The share of right and subsequently, of centrists, in the Commission and among socialist members of parliament was even higher than in the Bureau. Nevertheless, the first Interparliamentary Socialist Commission conference, held in July 1906, declared "complete and absolute ideological unity with revolutionary Russia, with socialist workers and peasants",¹ called on the Socialists in parliaments to vigorously support the Russian revolutionary movement, oppose imperialist wars and the arms race, and step up the struggle for legislation on an eight-hour working day.

The next conference, held in the summer of 1907, was attended by socialist members of 11 parliaments. The right-wing Social-Democrats fully dominated the forum. Although the conference proclaimed solidarity with the socialist members of the Russian Duma, it mainly centred on preparing a summary of labour protection legislation and on discussing a "political system" designed to ensure capitalism's peaceful evolution into socialism through the labour unions.²

In 1908, at an Interparliamentary Socialist Commission conference, attended by Socialists from six countries and by guests, including

¹ *Die Neue Zeit*, Bd. 2, 1905/1906, No. 52, S. 876.

² *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, August 18, 1907; *Bureau Socialiste International. Comptes rendus...*, Vol. 1, pp. 296-318.

Lenin, the right tried to retaliate for their defeat at congresses on the colonial question. Van Kol maintained that "savages" were not yet ready for democratic freedoms and preached his "idea of a 'positive' colonial programme for Social-Democracy".¹ Molkenbuhr openly defended colonialism. At that time, Kautsky and Ledebour rebuffed that revisionist foray. Van Kol retracted his proposals, although it was still decided to pass them to the International Socialist Bureau.

Subsequently, the Commission confined its attention to better labour pensions, but even that issue was not linked to revolutionary propaganda.² It was only in 1914 that plans were made to discuss the anti-militarist struggle at the next session of the Commission. But as World War I began and the Second International collapsed the Commission disintegrated, too.

International conferences of socialist journalists also contributed to stronger ties and better coordination of international proletarian action. In 1907, after the Stuttgart Congress, the Second Conference of Socialist Journalists was held to discuss better contact among the socialist newspapers and periodicals of different countries. Lenin attended that Conference.

Aided by the Bureau, two more similar conferences were convened in 1908 and 1909. At the 1909 conference, Lenin reported on the creation of an organisation of socialist journalists in Russia. The conferences also discussed issues concerning the exchange of information, coverage of the proletarian struggle in foreign countries, the establishment of an international bulletin, etc. Lack of funds and revisionist resistance precluded the creation of either an international socialist press agency or a socialist information agency.³ This was offset to a certain extent by the fact that the Bureau started to publish a bulletin in three languages which considerably improved the Social-Democrats' information of the activities of workers' political parties in different countries.

International socialist youth conferences were also an organic element in the drive for the international unity of the working-class movement. The first was held in Stuttgart in 1907, attended by 20 delegates from 13 countries. On Liebknecht's suggestion the conference supported the decisions taken at the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International and, acting in accordance with these deci-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 244.

² *Periodical Bulletin of the I.S.B.*, No. 2, pp. 45-55.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Meeting of the International Socialist Bureau", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, p. 232; *Compte-rendu officiel de la 2-me réunion des Journalistes Socialistes (10 Octobre 1908)*, Gand, Société coopérative "Volksdrukkerij", 1909, pp. 9-10; *Bulletin du BSI*, No. 2, pp. 29-33.

sions, it made it incumbent on its members to wage an anti-militarist struggle and get the young people organised.¹

The conference adopted theses on the Socialist Education of Youth, formulated in a report by Roland Holst and dealing with the objectives, forms and methods of educating young workers in the socialist spirit. The document declared that such education was to concentrate on preparing young workers for the class struggle and that youth education was inseparable from practical action, although that idea was not expressed consistently enough. The conference stressed the importance of setting up independent youth organisations and the need for their close contacts with class-conscious working-class movement.²

The resolution on economic struggle, adopted from a report by Alpári, noted that the exploitation of young workers would only cease when the capitalist social system was eliminated and called on young workers to rally around the socialist banner. Immediate demands were also advanced, which were designed to considerably improve the working and leisure conditions of young workers, both men and women.³

The conference formed the International of Socialist Youth, headed by an international Bureau. Karl Liebknecht, a dedicated champion of revolutionary, anti-militarist youth education, became a member.⁴ The youth centre emerged as a mainstay of the revolutionary wing of the Second International.

The Second Conference of Socialist Youth International, held in Copenhagen in September 1910 and arranged by Liebknecht, was attended by delegates from 11 countries. Apart from the secretariat's report, the Conference discussed youth education, labour protection, the struggle against militarism, the attitude to socialist parties, to trade unions, and other issues. The delegates refused to support opportunist attempts at narrowing down the objectives of youth organisations, downgrading their role in the anti-militarist movement and pushing young people towards "neutrality" in politics. The conference noted that "the class struggle of the international proletariat is taking increasingly acute forms". It stressed the need for educating young people in the spirit of the class struggle and for maintaining the closest possible contacts between youth organisations and socialist parties and trade unions, and called on the younger generation

¹ *Compte-rendu de la Première Conférence Internationale de la Jeunesse socialiste tenue à Stuttgart les 24, 25 et 26 août 1907*, Librairie du Parti socialiste, Paris, 1907, p. 53.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 56-58.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-61.

⁴ Karl Liebknecht, *Gesammelte Reden und Schriften*, Bd. II, Berlin, 1960, S. 43-63, 74-76, 226-58.

to "unleash all its revolutionary energy" in the struggle against militarism and war.¹ The decisions taken at the conference helped strengthen international unity among the revolutionary forces of the working class. The course chosen by the leaders of the international association of socialist youth organisations alarmed the opportunists. The International Socialist Bureau helped Danneberg secure the post of Secretary in the International of Socialist Youth; he actively represented the opportunist trend at the conference. Nevertheless, the Third Conference, attended by delegates from 17 countries and held simultaneously with the 1912 Congress of the International in Basel, adopted an anti-war resolution which oriented young people towards revolutionary struggle for socialism.

International conferences of women workers were also important. The First International Socialist Women's Conference, convened in Stuttgart in 1907, began to lay the foundations for joint international action for women's suffrage. Permanent contacts among women's organisations throughout the world were also discussed, but no consensus was reached at the conference. Nevertheless, despite opportunist resistance, the majority voted for a resolution that stressed the need to demand universal suffrage for both men and women.

The conference established an International Socialist Women's Bureau, later reorganised into the International Secretariat of Socialist Women and Women's Organisations. That body was entrusted with coordinating the activities of women's Social-Democratic organisations. Led by Clara Zetkin, that international centre was another mainstay of the revolutionary trend in the International.²

About 100 delegates from 17 countries participated in the Second International Women's Conference in Copenhagen in 1910. They represented socialist parties, trade unions, various clubs, societies and women workers' unions which adhered to class principles. "Our goal," said Clara Zetkin in her inaugural speech, "is not only a free woman; more, it is a free mankind."³ The conference discussed the strengthening of ties among socialist women's organisations throughout the world as one means of stepping up the work among women, and dealt with protection of mothers. In spite of opportunist resistance, a decision was taken to fight for universal and equal suffrage for women. Demonstrations to that effect were scheduled in all countries on March 19, 1911.

The decision to mark an International Women's Day evoked widespread support among working people all over the world. On

¹ *Bulletin der Internationalen Vereinigung der sozialistischen Jugendorganisationen*, September 15, 1910.

² For more details, see: Luise Dornemann, *Clara Zetkin. Leben und Wirken*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1973, S. 210-14.

³ *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, August 29, 1910.

that day in March 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1914, mass demonstrations and rallies were held. From then on, International Women's Day became firmly established as a tradition. The International Women's Secretariat, headed by Clara Zetkin, paid particular attention to the struggle against militarism and warmongers. In the spring of 1914, it discussed measures to prevent war and recommended that the working people defy mobilisation orders and hold mass anti-war strikes.

Regional conferences of the workers' organisations in Scandinavia and the Balkans also contributed, to a certain extent, to greater unity in the international working-class movement. Held regularly since the late 19th century, the Scandinavian workers' conferences were attended by representatives of the workers' parties and trade unions of Sweden, Denmark and Norway, and, since 1911, of Finland. On major issues, these conferences usually followed the course set by international socialist congresses. By the start of the second decade of the 20th century, the Scandinavian conferences began to view the important issue of militarism and war from the standpoint of pacifism, advocated by most leaders of the workers' organisations in those countries, which had long inclined towards social-reformism.

The Balkan conferences contributed to closer ties among the Socialists of all countries in that region and helped revolutionary Social-Democrats of the Balkans to pursue a largely correct course during the Balkan wars and then during World War I.

Apart from such conferences, closer international ties and joint proletarian action were served by bilateral meetings of the leaders of workers' parties from different countries, held occasionally in the early 20th century, joint statements by several Social-Democratic parties, exchanges of letters between the governing bodies of workers' parties, and international meetings attended by prominent leaders of the working-class movement. The latter were used to support the 1905-1907 Russian revolution and to fight against militarism and war.

Of particular importance was the organisation of coordinated simultaneous strikes, May Day action, anti-tsarist demonstrations to support Russian revolutionaries, and international action against warmongers. Participation by many thousands of working people made that type of action especially impressive politically. That was precisely why revolutionary Social-Democrats throughout the world demanded its organisation, and opportunists everywhere opposed it.

The expansion and strengthening of the international unity of the working-class movement in the early 20th century should be credited to revolutionary Social-Democrats and their vanguard, the Bolsheviks. Led by Lenin, they had already worked out the theory and practice of combining the proletariat's international and national tasks to suit the new requirements. The intensification of the

class struggle and the growth of the working-class movement and its international tasks made that combination imperative. It could only be achieved by developing Marxism, and it was an integral part of the proletariat's direct preparation for the revolution. But the strengthening of the international unity of the working-class movement in the early 20th century lagged behind the requirements of the proletariat's class struggle. That was caused by the resistance of right-wing Social-Democrats and by the centrist and anarcho-syndicalist distortion of the essence of proletarian internationalism. The right either counterposed nationalism to proletarian internationalism or, in concert with other opportunists, tried to deprive the great Marxist slogan, "Workers of All Countries, Unite!", of its class, revolutionary content and substitute an apolitical call for universal brotherhood for it.

As a result, by the end of the first decade of the 20th century the Second International had increasingly deviated from the course set by the Marxists under Engels' guidance and upheld by Lenin and other revolutionary Social-Democrats. A crisis of the Second International and of the entire system of international organisations and ties in the working-class movement was growing. That crisis was rooted not in the weakness or immaturity of international ties—they expanded and grew considerably stronger in the early 20th century—but in the sway of opportunism. By the start of the second decade of the 20th century, opportunists dominated many sections of the International and, what is still more important, its largest parties.

Lenin noted that the Second International "was an international organisation of the proletarian movement whose growth proceeded in *breadth*, at the cost of a temporary ... strengthening of opportunism..."¹ Objective conditions in the late 19th century had been especially conducive to that, on the one hand, labour aristocracy and bureaucracy were growing and numerous petty-bourgeois fellow travellers joined the socialist movement; on the other hand, the use of bourgeois legality during "peaceful" capitalist development meant unquestioning acceptance of that legality. In the early 20th century, especially after 1905-1907, these trends were increasingly aggravated by the reluctance and inability to develop Marxist theory, policy and tactics to adapt them to the new situation in which the proletariat was to carry out its internationally historical function. That was the basis on which the bloc of revisionists and other right-wing Social-Democrats with centrists emerged in the leadership of some parties and of the Second International.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Third International and Its Place in History", *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, 1980, p. 306.

They were opposed by revolutionary Social-Democrats. Lenin stressed that "throughout the existence of the Second International, a struggle was raging within all the Social-Democratic parties, between their revolutionary and the opportunist wings".¹ Early 20th century developments showed that the revolutionary wing became the force behind many Second International resolutions. Opportunists rarely succeeded in having their resolutions adopted at socialist conferences and international congresses. Instead, they did all they could to impede and wreck the implementation of revolutionary objectives. As a result, most Social-Democratic parties did not follow up the Marxist resolutions adopted at congresses, specifically those on the struggle against the war threat. Opportunists paralysed the International Socialist Bureau and gained control of the Interparliamentary Socialist Commission. On the eve of World War I, especially in 1913, the Second International was deep in crisis. Like a malignant tumour, the revisionist-centrist bloc, which had taken shape in the international working-class movement by the start of the second decade of the 20th century, paralysed a living and growing body—the system of international organisation and ties in the working-class movement—and then killed the Second International.

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Additional sources on the subject: *Correspondance entre Lénine et Camille Huysmans. 1905-1914*. Paris-La Hague, 1963; G. Kuranov, "V. I. Lenin's Fight Against the Reformists in the International Socialist Bureau", *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya*, No. 4, 1963 (in Russian); K. Liebknecht, *Gesammelte Reden und Schriften*, Bd. II, Berlin, 1960; Bd. V, 1963; L. Dornemann, *Clara Zetkin. Leben und Wirken*, Berlin, 1973.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Socialism and War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 309.

Part Three

**THE PROLETARIAT DURING
THE WORLD IMPERIALIST WAR**

Chapter 10

WORLD WAR I. THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL. LENIN'S COURSE TOWARDS A REVOLUTIONARY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WAR

In August 1914, the imperialist World War I broke out, prepared for decades by the monopoly bourgeoisie, the military and the governments of rival countries. "Seizure of territory and subjugation of other nations," Lenin wrote in the autumn of 1914, "the ruining of competing nations and the plunder of their wealth, distracting the attention of the working masses from the internal political crises in Russia, Germany, Britain and other countries, disuniting and nationalist stultification of the workers, and the extermination of their vanguard so as to weaken the revolutionary movement of the proletariat—these comprise the sole actual content, importance and significance of the present war."¹

To the mobilised millions the war meant rotting in the trenches, wounds and death, to the working people on the home front—back-breaking labour at factories and fields, greater privations and hunger. The ruling quarters of the belligerent countries annulled the socioeconomic gains the working class had achieved under bourgeois democracy and largely equalised the political situation in tsarist Russia, the Kaiser's Germany and republican France: wartime legislation was enacted everywhere, rigid censorship of the press introduced, and any action against the war or the existing system was threatened with reprisals. These measures bore out the unstable position of the ruling quarters in the nations at war. The ruling classes were bound to find themselves on shaky ground when the imperialists were ready to sacrifice millions of people and whole nations for their interests. The world imperialist war aggravated the contradictions of capitalism, and that gave rise to a general crisis of it.

A new stage began in the development of the international working-class movement. The popular masses failed to grasp the true mean-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 27.

ing of events, the nature and the objectives of the war immediately. During the first weeks of the war, various manifestations and religious services were organised by government bodies, bourgeois parties and chauvinist societies in all the belligerent countries under the slogans of "loyalty to the government", "defeating the enemy", etc. That wave of hysteria temporarily engulfed a large part of the working class in many countries, too. However, subsequent developments gradually helped the masses sober up and led to nationwide political crises in most of the countries engaged in the war. The new stage in the working-class movement was one of an upsurge in the struggle of the proletariat and other strata of the working people against the imperialist war and its consequences, for democratic freedoms and national independence; that struggle evolved into revolutionary action against the existing system. At the same time, the outbreak of the world war brought about the collapse of the Second International and split the international working-class movement. The revolutionary wing broke away from the opportunist trend. There was consolidation of the revolutionary forces which prepared the ground for the emergence of the contemporary communist movement.

August 1914 did not come as a surprise to the parties of the Second International. The question of militarism, of the growing danger of an imperialist war had been among the central issues in the pre-war Social-Democratic politics. At congresses of the Second International, the left-wing forces had managed to overcome the resistance of the right-wingers and centrists and work out the basic forms of revolutionary proletarian tactics in case a war like that should break out. But when it did start, few parties and Social-Democratic leaders passed that exacting test. "The war has led to a grave crisis in the whole of international socialism," Lenin commented. "Like any other crisis, the present crisis of socialism has revealed ever more clearly the inner contradictions lying deep within it; it has torn off many a false and conventional mask, and has shown up in the sharpest light what is outmoded and rotten in socialism, and what its further growth and advance towards victory will depend on."¹

THE SPLIT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT

In July 1914, when the threat of an imperialist bloodbath overshadowed the world, differences clearly surfaced between the revolutionary and the opportunist trends in the international working-class movement on the question of the proletariat's attitude to imperialist war.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Question of the Unity of Internationalists", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 188.

Only the revolutionary Social-Democrats, above all the Bolshevik Party in Russia, remained loyal to the cause of the proletariat, to the ideals of Marxism and to the internationalist anti-war traditions. As early as mid-July 1914, Bolshevik committees staged rallies and meetings in several Russian cities to condemn aggressive tsarist designs. The Bolsheviks called on the working people to turn the entire might of their arms not against hostile armies, made up of proletarians like themselves, but against "the internal enemy—the government and the state system of the empire".¹ From July 16 to 19, during the mobilisation drive, over 64,000 anti-war pamphlets were distributed in St. Petersburg, Yekaterinoslav, Riga and other cities, and slogans "Down with the War!", "Down with the Tsarist Government!" and "Long Live the Russian Revolution!" were put out. Countering chauvinist propaganda the Bolsheviks told the working people the truth about the world imperialist war. They exposed the reactionary tsarist regime and its annexationist designs, called for international solidarity among the working people, for a resolute struggle against tsarism and the predatory war. Anti-war propaganda was also disseminated among the reserve troops.

The start of the war was preceded by an upsurge of the strike movement; barricades were erected in St. Petersburg. On July 18(31), the day that war was declared, 27,000 people (according to incomplete data) went on strike in the capital. Strikes were started in Moscow, too. Mass anti-war demonstrations were held to counter "patriotic" manifestations. In Riga, all the enterprises that could conceivably be called large stopped operating during the first days of the war. In July and August, action by workers, peasants and draftees spread in the industrial centres and many areas of the Baltic provinces, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and the Urals. Sometimes, veritable battles broke out between draftees and the police or the Cossacks. Even official figures said there were disturbances and anti-war protests in 17 gubernias and 31 uyezds; in the two weeks following the declaration of war 505 draftees and 106 officials were wounded and killed in 27 gubernias.² No other country witnessed such a wave of anti-war action, which comprised the proletariat's organised revolutionary struggle and spontaneous protest by the working people. Soon after the start of the hostilities the Commander-in-Chief was forced to order that army troops be detailed to "nip in the bud" any disturbances. Outbreaks continued in various parts of the country generally for about two weeks. They

¹ *The Bolsheviks During the Imperialist War. 1914-Feb. 1917. A Collection of Documents of Local Bolshevik Organisations*, Gospolitizdat, Leningrad, 1939, p. 185 (in Russian).

² *A History of the CPSU. Vol. 2*, Moscow, 1966, p. 486 (in Russian).

were stopped by reprisals and by the mass mobilisation of revolutionary workers.

Bolshevik members of the Duma energetically opposed the war. The Bolshevik faction sponsored an anti-war declaration and was the first to refuse to approve military appropriations. After that, it took up clandestine anti-war activities. The government brought Bolshevik Duma members to trial and exiled them. But the trial itself, with its public records including Bolshevik anti-war statements, and the protest campaign it touched off, helped step up the proletarian struggle against the war.

The left wing of the Polish working-class movement described the war from the very start as imperialist, annexationist and anti-popular. Upholding the course formalised in the resolutions of the Stuttgart and Basel Congresses of the International, it called on the proletariat to "remain an independent force in the struggle against the government, capital and nationalism", and to "follow the path of revolutionary struggle", without tying its demands to the victories of any side in the war.¹

The Social-Democrats of Serbia, the only country for which the impending conflict was not of an imperialist but of a national liberation nature, assumed a resolute anti-war stand in the pre-war July crisis. Aware that an armed conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary could lead to a world war, on July 12(25), 1914, the day mobilisation was announced, the Social-Democratic leaders decided to fight against war and spread mass anti-war propaganda by any means available. The position of the party was made more complicated by the fact that just feelings of national-patriotic protest flared up among the popular masses, and the ruling quarters duly drew upon that sentiment. The Social-Democrats countered the government's chauvinist policy with an internationalist course. On July 18(31), the Social-Democratic members of parliament came out against the path taken by the government, declared that their party was against the war and advanced the slogan of a Balkan Federation. They voted against military appropriations.²

The Bulgarian Labour Social-Democratic Party (Tesnyaks) also pursued an anti-imperialist and anti-war policy. Its congress in July 1914 denounced the annexationist schemes of the Bulgarian bourgeoisie and opposed them with a demand for a Balkan Federal Republic. Georgi Dimitrov attacked Bulgarian chauvinism in the

¹ Maria Koszutska (Wera—Kostrzewa), *Pisma i przemówienia*, T. I. Książka i wiedza, Warszawa, 1961, s. 275.

² Историјски архив Комунистичке партије Југославије, т. III, Београд, 1950, стр. 283-87; "The Serbian Social-Democratic Party During World War I", *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya*, 1962, No. 5, pp. 116-17 (in Russian).

National Assembly. In early July the BLSDP (T) staged a mass campaign against the ruling quarters' intention to push Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Triple Alliance; the Party called on the working people to be ready to fight for their country's independence and freedom, for the victory of socialism. After Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia, the Tesnyak Central Committee issued a manifesto describing the war as annexationist and imperialist.¹

On June 22, 1914, the Social-Democratic Party of Romania issued a manifesto calling for Romania's neutrality. In August, an emergency congress of the party adopted a declaration against participation in the war and advanced the slogans "Down with the War!", "For a Balkan Federal Republic!" and "For Social Revolution!"² However, the Party's left wing was not consistent, while the opportunists led by C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea supported the social-patriots, and the Centrists under Christian Racovski whitewashed opportunism.

Most Social-Democratic leaders failed to take an uncompromising stand. The leaders of the SPD, the largest and most influential party in the Second International, openly made a deal with the government. With the party leadership's approval, Albert Südekum, a far right-wing opportunist, assured Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg that the SPD would not launch strikes, sabotage or any similar action in case of war—in other words, that it would support the government. In return, the government changed its plans to arrest Social-Democratic activists if war were to be declared.³ At the same time, SPD leaders assured the workers that Germany's ruling quarters were interested in preserving peace. That course whitewashed one of the prime culprits and instigators of the imperialist war, and confused and lulled the masses. However, the subsequent deterioration of the situation and anti-war action organised by party locals forced even the SPD Board to call for mass meetings to protest against war. By late July such meetings and demonstrations had spread throughout the country; they were attended by many hundreds of thousands of workers. Manifestations were held in Berlin and several other cities under the slogan "Down with the War!"

Left-wing Social-Democrats played a leading role in the anti-war campaign, and the government stepped up its reprisals against them. The left exposed warmongers and urged a struggle for peace, for international workers' solidarity. The congress of the Social-Democrats of Württemberg, held on July 25 and 26, responded to

¹ *A History of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Moscow, 1971, pp. 165-72 (in Russian).

² *Documente din istoria mișcării muncitorești din România. 1910-1915* (hereafter DIMMR). Editura politică, București, 1968, pp. 797-801, 810-15.

³ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 2, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1966, S. 430-31.

an appeal by Clara Zetkin and unanimously approved a resolution, which pointed to the threat of a world war and pledged to "rally and educate the masses in the spirit of the revolutionary class struggle, so that they would be ready to selflessly use all their political and economic might to preserve peace". The congress sent a message of greetings to the "heroic revolutionary proletariat of Russia" which "is showing by its deeds what powerful momentum a courageous working class, undaunted by sacrifice, can gather in the struggle for freedom and peace".¹ On July 28, Rosa Luxemburg published an article urging that governments and ruling classes be shown that "those who decide to start a world war under any pretext and contrary to the will of the popular masses will risk their necks".² Resolutions in the same spirit were adopted at several mass meetings in Berlin, Bremen, Kiel, and other cities.

Meanwhile, the SPD's opportunist leadership, still protesting its loyalty to the "socialist principles of the International", tried to restrict the scope and militancy of anti-war action. The party press and meetings again voiced the view that Germany had to defend its civilisation and democracy against reactionary tsarist encroachments, against Siberian boors, wild Cossacks, etc.³

The leaders of the Austrian and Hungarian Social-Democrats did not even condemn the provocative Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia; they merely criticised its rude wording. Even before the hostilities began, the central body of the Social-Democratic Party of Austria called on all citizens not to grudge their property or blood.⁴ The leaders of both parties failed to organise mass anti-war action. Although they protested against the aggressive policy of the monarchy after the Hapsburg empire declared war on Serbia, they took great pains to justify their inaction. For example, Victor Adler said he did not believe the war could spread further.⁵

In France, Jules Guesde, one of the foremost socialist leaders, also soon joined the chauvinists who justified and supported their government's alliance with tsarist Russia against Germany. At the same time, the SFIO Congress held from July 14 to 16, 1914, passed a resolution sponsored by Vaillant and Jaurès on calling a general strike in case mobilisation was declared and an imperialist war launched. For all its flaws, that approach reflected the mass aspira-

¹ *Vorwärts*, July, 28, 1914.

² *Sozialdemokratische Korrespondenz*, August 28, 1914.

³ *Fränkische Tagespost*, July 15, 25, 27, 1914; *Vorwärts*, July 31, 1914; for more detail, see *Germany's Modern Working-Class Movement*, Nauka, Moscow, 1962, pp. 293-96 (in Russian).

⁴ *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, July 25, 1914.

⁵ G. Haupt, *Socialism and the Great War. The Collapse of the Second International*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, p. 252.

tions to resolute anti-war action. From July 27, such a campaign was begun, in response to trade union appeals, in Paris, Lyons, Dijon, Nancy, and other cities. Many thousands of people took part in manifestations, rallies and meetings at enterprises; the police attacked the gatherings and hundreds of participants were arrested. The SFIO leadership refused to expand and deepen the movement; it relied on the allegedly peaceful intentions of the government. In those days Jaurès warned that the moment was at hand when "entire Europe may be aflame, the entire world may be aflame".¹ Still hopeful that governments themselves, "the ground shaking under them", would get scared of war, he called: "The most important thing is to act persistently, to alert the awareness of the mass of workers.... This and only this is the safeguard for the future."² Meanwhile, the ruling quarters were stubbornly pushing their way toward war. The dedicated anti-militarist Jean Jaurès fell victim to their criminal aggressiveness. On July 31, on the very eve of the war, he was assassinated. That night, indignant crowds filled the centre of Paris despite the raging wave of chauvinist hysteria. Anti-war slogans were proclaimed, and there were clashes with the police. The chief of police told the Minister of the Interior: "We are facing the risk of a revolution."³ But the masses lacked revolutionary leadership, and the movement ebbed. The start of the war and the invasion by German troops fanned nationalism.

In Britain, the working people took part in numerous rallies and mass demonstrations which proclaimed the slogan "Stop the War!". But the resolutions adopted at the largest anti-war rallies in London, Manchester and Glasgow did not go beyond pacifist protest and failed to advance revolutionary tasks for the working class. Labour members of parliament assured the masses that the British government wanted peace and extolled its hypocritical diplomatic initiatives.

The situation demanded that the Second International take action. On July 29 and 30, 1914 a plenary session of the ISB was convened in Brussels,⁴ attended by prominent Second International figures, representatives of the socialist movement from the largest European countries and several other nations; Emile Vandervelde, Camille Huysmans, Karl Kautsky, Jean Jaurès, Jules Guesde, Victor and Friedrich Adler, Rosa Luxemburg, Hugo Haase, Edouard Vaillant,

¹ Jean Jaurès, *Textes choisis*, t. 1, Editions sociales, Paris, 1959, pp. 53, 229.

² Ibid., p. 236.

³ Louis-Jean Malvy, *Mon crime*, Ernest Flammarion Editeur, Paris, 1921, p. 41.

⁴ I. M. Krivoguz, *The Second International, 1889-1914*, Mysl, Moscow, 1964, pp. 470-71 (in Russian); G. Haupt, op. cit., pp. 196-205, 250-65.

James Keir Hardie, P. B. Axelrod, Pieter Troelstra, and others. Neither Lenin nor Litvinov could come. The RSDLP was represented by Ivan Popov who did not have the right to vote.

It became clear at the conference that the SDPA leadership had surrendered to the ruling quarters of the Hapsburg empire who dragged the country into the Austro-Serbian conflict. Victor Adler told the participants that his party was unable to fight against war or resist chauvinism, that in such conditions like those the foremost task was to save the party. A number of delegates expressed their doubts about that, but the question of resolutely and comprehensively implementing the proletariat's international tactics as a direct threat of a world war loomed large, was not raised. Conference participants did not believe that such a war might break out any moment. Delegates from Germany, France and Britain still counted on the peaceful intentions of their governments. True, Rosa Luxemburg tried to bring about a change in the mood. She was insisting on swift and resolute action. The ISB adopted the draft resolution she proposed which welcomed "the revolutionary attitude of the Russian proletariat" and called on it "to persevere in its heroic anti-Tsarist efforts which provide the most effective guarantee against the threat of a world war". The ISB also approved a resolution about the need not merely to continue but to intensify proletarian demonstrations "against war and for peace and for a settlement of the Austro-Serb conflict by arbitration".¹ However, the resolution did not expose the causes of the rapidly growing conflict. The ISB failed to propose any broad programme of anti-war action, to ensure joint action by the proletariat of all countries, to point out the connection between the anti-war drive and the struggle for socialism, or to say what the proletariat should do if a world war did break out. The adoption of a plan of action was put off until the regular international socialist congress, to be convened in Paris on August 9, 1914. Its draft agenda included an item on war and the proletariat. But the congress never took place.

In early August the war spread virtually throughout Europe. Most leaders of the Second International sided with "their own" imperialists. It was not that the planned congress or a session of the ISB were out of the question. The fact was that the Second International collapsed. Lenin stressed that in wartime the working class as a whole could not freely express its attitude to the war, while the Social-Democratic leaders, specifically members of parliaments, who had that opportunity, usually used it to support the imperialists in their countries. "The masses," he wrote, "were dumbfounded, panic-stricken, disunited, and crushed by the state of martial law. The

¹ G. Haupt, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

free vote was a privilege of the leaders *alone*—and they voted *for* the bourgeoisie and against the proletariat!"¹

At the critical moment, right-wing Social-Democrats and centrists, by that time entrenched in the leadership of most Second International sections, openly betrayed the interests of the working class. Instead of fighting for the overthrow of capitalism, the opportunists followed the bourgeoisie and declared that the predatory imperialist war waged by their countries was "popular", "defensive", "a war to save civilisation", even "to safeguard the gains of the working class". They preached war to the victorious end and urged that the masses should turn to "national unity" and "defence of their country".

The opportunist betrayal was highlighted by the entry of several Second International activists into wartime imperialist governments and by the policy of "civil peace" advertised and implemented by leaders of socialist parties and trade unions. That policy helped the governments of the belligerent countries to paralyse the anti-war activity of the working class. Its organisations served the bourgeoisie. They helped it disguise the imperialist war as a nationwide patriotic cause. Most Social-Democratic members of parliament approved war appropriations.

The German Social-Democratic parliamentary faction was among the first to vote, on August 4, 1914, together with bourgeois parties, in favour of financing the imperialist bloodbath. The right wing ruled unchallenged in the SPD and readily demonstrated its loyalty to the regime. The centrists supported the right wing, although sometimes reluctantly and with reservations, trying to preserve unity at all costs. True, at the preliminary sessions of the faction, 14 Social-Democratic members of parliament opposed war appropriations. But they could not bring themselves to break away from the Party's Board and the faction's majority and voted in favour. Subsequently, Karl Liebknecht managed to shake off the shackles of misconstrued party discipline and, in December 1914, refused to vote for new war appropriations and resolutely denounced the policy of German imperialism and the predatory war.

The SPD faction in the Reichstag explained its affirmative vote on war appropriations by the need to strengthen the country's defences against attack by such a reactionary regime as Russian tsarism and to safeguard the gains of the German working class.² The SPD called on the workers to cease their political and economic strug-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Opportunism, and the Collapse of the Second International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 443.

² *Verhandlungen des Reichstags. XIII. Legislaturperiode. II. Session*, Bd. 306, Verlag der Norddeutschen Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt, Berlin, 1916, S. 2, 5-7, 8-9.

gle during the war. The free trade unions gave up the protection of the workers' economic and social rights in the name of "national interests".

SFIO leaders displayed the same spirit when the war broke out: they called for "defence of the territorial integrity and independence of peaceful and republican France".¹ The Socialist parliamentary faction unanimously voted in favour of war appropriations. Soon Jules Guesde, and Marcel Sembat and later Albert Thomas joined the imperialist government. Hervé took a national-chauvinist stance.

Emile Vandervelde, leader of the Belgian Workers' Party and Chairman of the ISB, also became a minister and said in parliament: "We shall vote for all the credits the government demands to defend the nation."²

In tsarist Russia, the imperialist policy of the government was supported by the Mensheviks. Georgi Plekhanov emerged as an ideologist of social-chauvinism. "The very fact that the proletarians of all the countries attacked by Germany and Austria," he wrote, "are opposing arms in hand the exploiter designs of the Austro-German imperialists means that they are waging an international class struggle."³ Plekhanov and his allies called for class collaboration, support of the government and abandonment of any revolutionary action for the duration of the war.

True, on the day the resolution on war appropriations was to be voted on in the Duma, the Mensheviks were forced to support the anti-war declaration of the Bolsheviks. Although the Mensheviks introduced several amendments, which made it less effective, the declaration was quite important in that it openly protested against the war and its culprits. But that joint action did not prevent the Mensheviks from giving up their internationalist position. "The Chkheidze group confined itself to parliamentary action," Lenin wrote. "It did not vote for war credits, for that would have roused a storm of indignation among the workers ... neither did it utter any protest against social-chauvinism.

"Expressing the political line of our Party, the R.S.D.L. Duma group acted quite differently. It carried into the midst of the working class a protest against the war, and conducted anti-imperialist propaganda among the masses of the Russian proletarians."⁴

In Britain, the leaders of the Labour Party and its constituent trade unions began openly collaborating with the ruling quarters.

¹ *L'Humanité*, August 3, 1914.

² *The International and the World War*. A Collection by K. Grünberg, Petrograd, 1919, p. 206 (in Russian).

³ G. Plekhanov, *On War*, Petrograd, 1917, p. 69 (in Russian).

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Socialism and War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 321.

In late August 1914, the Party's Executive Committee concluded an agreement with the ruling Liberal Party jointly renouncing rivalry in parliamentary elections and in fact completely abandoned political struggle. The Labour Party Secretary Arthur Henderson joined the government, later followed by several more Labour representatives. Trade union leaders proclaimed an "industrial truce", which banned strikes in industrial conflicts for the duration of the war.

The top officials of the Austrian and Hungarian Social-Democrats also sided with the imperialists of Austria-Hungary. To be sure, the Social-Democrats of Austria did not have to vote for war appropriations because the Reichsrat was not functioning. But *Arbeiter-Zeitung* wrote gleefully about the German Social-Democrats voting in the Reichstag: "Now that the German Fatherland is in danger... Social-Democracy comes out in the defence of one's country.... Never has a political party acted as loftily as German Social-Democracy today."¹ The right-wing leaders of the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party refused to denounce the Hapsburg aggression and preached "civil peace".²

The policy of blatant social-chauvinism was theoretically justified and virtually defended by the centrists—Kautsky and Haase in Germany, Jean Longuet in France, Macdonald in Britain, Turati and Claudio Treves in Italy, Trotsky and Chkheidze in Russia, etc. Centrism was not a uniform ideological and political trend. It comprised both opportunists of long standing who, for tactical reasons, did not want to advertise their true views and sympathies, and people who did not share the social-chauvinist views but could not bring themselves to condemn or break away from them for fear of weakening the labour organisations. Some centrists had an impressive previous record as activists of the working-class movement and had taken part in proletarian action. That factor prevented many Social-Democrats from grasping the political danger of centrism. A typical feature of it was its juggling with Marxist terminology and quotations from Marx and Engels while profoundly distorting the true essence of their revolutionary doctrine. Hiding behind revolutionary rhetoric, the centrists—and above all Kautsky, their foremost ideologist—distorted the true nature of the war and the significance of the political processes and specific developments. They put off the class struggle until the war was over. Thus, they supported the tactics of overt social-chauvinists and helped force their policy on the masses of the working class.

¹ *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, August 5, 1914.

² See Dezső Nemes, *A Magyar munkásmozgalom történetéhez*, 1. köt., Kosuth könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1974.

"Kautsky, the leading authority in the Second International," Lenin wrote in *Socialism and War*, "is a most typical and striking example of how a verbal recognition of Marxism has led in practice to its conversion into 'Struivism' or into 'Brentanoism'. Another example is Plekhanov. By means of patent sophistry, Marxism is stripped of its revolutionary living spirit; *everything* is recognised in Marxism *except* the revolutionary methods of struggle, the propaganda and preparation of those methods, and the education of the masses in this direction. Kautsky 'reconciles' in an unprincipled way the fundamental idea of social-chauvinism, recognition of defence of the fatherland in the present war, with a diplomatic sham concession to the Lefts—his abstention from voting for war credits, his verbal claim to be in opposition, etc.... Kautskyism is not fortuitous; it is the social product of the contradictions within the Second International, a blend of loyalty to Marxism in word, and subordination to opportunism in deed."¹

Opportunist trends also dominated in the Social-Democratic movement of the neutral countries. For example, in Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands, most leaders of the Social-Democratic parties sided with the ruling imperialist quarters and gave up the class struggle under the pretext of preserving neutrality. The Socialist Party of the United States took a pacifist-reformist position, many of its leaders ignoring the decisions of the International's congresses and preaching restoration of peace by agreement among the imperialist powers.

Thus, most of the Social-Democratic parties found themselves divided between the two rival camps. International solidarity and ties were broken. The international bodies of the socialist movement were unable to function. After it moved to the Netherlands, the ISB Secretariat was headed by Pieter Troelstra who confused the proletariat by attempting to unite the social-chauvinists of all countries.

The national-chauvinist, pro-imperialist policy of the opportunists led to the collapse of the Second International and split the international working-class movement. An unbridgeable gulf separated those of its parties, trends and groups which remained loyal to the interests of the proletariat, to Marxism, to the revolutionary internationalist policy and the overt social-chauvinists and centrists who betrayed the proletarian cause.

As Lenin pointed out, the ideological, political and organisational collapse of the Second International was not rooted above all in the technical difficulties of maintaining international ties or in the alleged fact that the International was unfit to function in wartime.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Socialism and War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 311-12.

Those were fallacious arguments; the fact of the matter was that it succumbed to opportunism, which degenerated into social-chauvinism.

The rise of the opportunist trend in the Second International stemmed from the sell-out by the labour élite, labour aristocracy and bureaucracy, from the growth of petty-bourgeois elements in the Social-Democratic parties, from bourgeois influence on the proletariat. That trend was directly connected with the one-sided reliance on such important means in the proletarian struggle as parliamentarianism, legal mass organisations, the labour press, etc., and to the outright rejection of the clandestine and non-parliamentary forms of that struggle and, eventually, to the negation of the proletarian revolution. As the war broke out, that trend, which had been growing for decades, emerged in the overwhelming majority of Social-Democratic parties as blatant social-chauvinism. "Social-chauvinism is a consummated opportunism," Lenin wrote. "That is beyond doubt. The alliance with the bourgeoisie used to be ideological and secret. It is now public and unseemly."¹

Lenin stressed that the essence of the Second International's collapse was the outright betrayal of the interests of the working class, the alliance with the bourgeoisie in each given country, the abandonment of revolutionary ideals and proletarian internationalism, and the split of the proletariat.

LENIN AT THE HELM OF THE STRUGGLE FOR A REVOLUTIONARY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE IMPERIALIST WAR

The world imperialist war, the betrayal of the working people's interests by most Social-Democratic parties, and the collapse of the Second International put the international proletariat in a very difficult position. Most of the organised labour remained under the influence of right-wingers and centrists who still hid behind the name of the International and, calling for unity and solidarity, tried to keep the working masses within the mainstream of bourgeois politics.

The opportunists were opposed by the revolutionary Social-Democrats. The latter were a minority in the working-class movement of most countries, but they expressed the basic interests of both the working class and the overwhelming majority of the population. Their heroic struggle against imperialism and opportunism secured the future of the socialist movement. The foremost task of the revolutionary Social-Democrats in all countries was developing and

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Opportunism, and the Collapse of the Second International". *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 443.

implementing the course of the proletariat's class struggle to suit the new situation. The leading role of the Bolsheviks in that endeavour was apparent right from the very start.

Lenin was in Poronin (Galicia) when the war broke out. He followed the developments closely, especially the attitudes of the largest parties in the Second International.

At a Bolshevik meeting on one of the first days of the war Lenin expressed his conviction that the war would inevitably intensify capitalist contradictions and the class struggle in all countries, generate and aggravate a general political crisis, and thus bring closer a new revolution in Russia. He spoke about the need to find new forms and methods of party work in wartime.

The Austrian police arrested Lenin on August 8, 1914. He was imprisoned in Nowy Targ. The situation was especially dangerous because Russian troops were advancing in that region and, as it turned out later, the Russian Department of Police had asked the front commander to have the Bolshevik leader arrested and handed over to the Petrograd governor's office. The Polish Social-Democrats Jakub Hanecki and Adolf Warski, the PPS left group members Maria Koszutska and Feliks Kon took urgent steps to have Lenin released. Progressive Polish public figures, especially the prominent radical author Wladyslaw Orkan, the well-known poet Jan Kasproicz, and the Social-Democratic member of parliament Zygmunt Marek spoke out against Lenin's arrest. The Austrian Social-Democratic leader Victor Adler helped obtain the release. Lenin left for neutral Switzerland.

Immediately after his arrival there, Lenin set forth his theses *The Tasks of Revolutionary Social-Democracy in the European War* at a conference of the local Bolshevik group. Adopted as a resolution by "a group of Social-Democrats", they were soon approved by the RSDLP Central Committee abroad and in Russia. Subsequently, Lenin re-drafted them into the manifesto *The War and Russian Social-Democracy*. Published in Geneva in the newspaper *Sotzial-Demokrat* on November 1, 1914, that outstanding document soon commanded widespread attention.

The manifesto revealed the "actual content, importance and significance of the present war", described it as an imperialist war.¹ In this context, it exposed the policy of social-chauvinists, including their anarcho-syndicalist trend, and the centrists' dangerous course, and traced the causes and essence of the collapse of the Second International. The manifesto stressed that "this collapse must be frankly recognized and its causes understood" and that a resolute

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The War and Russian Social-Democracy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 27.

break with opportunism was needed to accomplish the tasks of the socialist movement, "so as to make it possible to build up a new and more lasting socialist unity of the workers of all countries",¹ a new proletarian International free from opportunism.

Lenin saw signs of the general crisis of capitalism. He concluded that "in all advanced countries the war has placed on the order of the day the slogan of socialist revolution, a slogan that is the more urgent, the more heavily the burden of war presses upon the shoulders of the proletariat, and the more active its future role must become in the re-creation of Europe, after the horrors of the present 'patriotic' barbarism in conditions of the tremendous technological progress of large-scale capitalism."² Lenin held that countries at a different level of development and with a different political system faced specific tasks: a democratic revolution in Russia, the revolutionary establishment of republics in backward monarchies, etc.

Proceeding from the record of the Paris Commune and the 1905-1907 Revolution, from "all the conditions of an imperialist war", and developing the ideas of the manifesto adopted at the 1912 Basel Congress of the Second International, Lenin's manifesto opposed the social-chauvinist appeals for "civil peace" and "defence of the country" with slogans of immense international importance: turning the imperialist war into a civil war and the defeat of "one's own" government. The political course expressed in these slogans was to use "the organisational experience and links of the working class so as to create illegal forms of struggle for socialism"; to prepare the masses to make use of the revolutionary situation by systematic, insistent and unswerving work; to bring closer a revolutionary withdrawal from the war by active mass struggle and, "in one form or another and more or less rapidly, take decisive steps towards genuine freedom for the nations and towards socialism".³

Lenin's programme on war, peace and revolution gradually emerged as a platform for the unification of all the forces that remained loyal to Marxism and proletarian internationalism. It raised as a practical issue not only the problem of ending the war in question but also of eliminating the very cause of wars, namely the capitalist system.

Specifically, Lenin's programme of turning the imperialist war into a civil one comprised the following: an unconditional refusal to cooperate with "one's own" government in any form; propaganda of the slogan about "one's own" government's defeat in the current war; a complete break with the "civil peace" policy pursued by bour-

¹ Ibid., p. 31.

² Ibid., p. 33.

³ Ibid., p. 34.

geois and social-chauvinist parties; the setting up of clandestine organisations everywhere where martial law was promulgated by the governments; using those organisations for the propaganda of revolutionary Social-Democratic slogans; spreading that propaganda among troops, including combat troops; upholding the fraternisation of hostile troops; and supporting any revolutionary action against the existing governments and against war.¹ In Lenin's view, all the anti-war work had to be permeated with revolutionary content.

The implementation of Lenin's programme of a revolutionary withdrawal from the imperialist war, of the internationalist unification of the working-class movement was inseparably linked with a resolute struggle against the opportunist distortion of Marxist theory and policy, against all types of social-chauvinism and compromise with it. In mid-October 1914, Lenin wrote: "Our task now is the unconditional and open struggle against international opportunism and those who screen it (Kautsky)... This is an international task. It devolves on us, there is no one else."²

Lenin exposed opportunist attempts at providing the bourgeois slogan of "defending the fatherland" with a "Marxist" basis by fraudulently referring to Marx's and Engels' 19th-century recommendation that support should be given to the bourgeoisie engaged in a war of national liberation to defend a more advanced social and state system against foreign oppressors. Lenin demanded that the issue of the fatherland be approached with due regard for the specific historical situation, by identifying each era's major trends and regarding "any war as the *continuation* of the politics of the powers concerned—and the *various classes* within these countries—in a definite period". An analysis of the imperialist nature of the war in question led him to conclude: "On the part of both warring groups, all talk about 'defence of the fatherland' is deception of the people by the bourgeoisie... Socialists who pursue such a policy are in fact chauvinists, social-chauvinists."³ At the same time, Lenin noted that imperialism gave rise not only to unjust, reactionary, annexationist wars, but also to just, progressive wars of liberation: democratic wars and uprisings by oppressed peoples for liberation from their oppressors, civil wars waged by the proletariat for socialism against the bourgeoisie, and defensive wars by triumphant socialism against other, bourgeois or reactionary countries. In those conditions, the

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 18, 161, 313-15.

² V. I. Lenin to A. G. Shlyapnikov, October 17, 1914, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, 1976, p. 162.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International"; "The Draft Resolution Proposed by the Left Social-Democrats to the First International Socialist Conference", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 219, 346.

"defend your country" slogan was perfectly in order. "Is a sense of national pride alien to us, Great-Russian class conscious proletarians? Certainly not!"¹ He stressed that the most important aspect in a proletarian class approach to slogans of defending one's country, of patriotism, was their organic connection with the interests and revolutionary spirit of the oppressed classes, with the principles of proletarian internationalism.

That was why, Lenin explained, in an imperialist war Socialists could not champion the slogan of disarmament: that would be tantamount to ignoring the objective course of capitalist development, to abandoning the theory of class struggle, the proletarian revolution. In the same way as the proletariat was to combat capitalist monopolies not by advocating a return to pre-monopoly capitalism but by progressing from trusts to socialism, it must fight against militarism not by renouncing armed struggle but by using the wholesale militarisation of the people caused by the war against the existing order of things.

Disarmament, Lenin emphasised, is a socialist ideal. But "disarmament" in conditions of imperialist militarism, he went on, would be an escape from loathsome reality and not a fight against it.²

The Bolshevik slogan of turning the imperialist into a civil war, the proletarian interpretation of patriotism opposed not only the official and social-chauvinist slogans of a "national war", "defence of one's country", etc. No less difficult was the task of resolutely breaking away from the growing ideology of pacifism which embodied different, often diametrically opposed class interests expressed in identical or similar slogans.

On the one hand, the popular masses increasingly favoured peace. That reflected the disillusionment with the "defend the fatherland" slogan, the growing protest against the war, and the vaguely revolutionary sentiment. But it also meant that the "desire for peace is very vague".³ Lenin urged the closest possible attention to such trends; he considered it extremely important to take into account the experience of the masses, to systematically educate them and explain to them the necessity of mass revolutionary action, to explain that "the benefits they expect from peace cannot be obtained without a series of revolutions".⁴

¹ V. I. Lenin, "On the National Pride of the Great Russians", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 103.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution"; "The 'Disarmament' Slogan", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, pp. 81, 89, 97.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Bourgeois Philanthropists and Revolutionary Social-Democracy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 193.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Question of Peace", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 292.

On the other hand, by early 1915, the more farsighted capitalists began to call for an end to the war, fearing that if continued, it would "end in revolutionary chaos".¹ In January 1917, a "turn in world politics" became apparent, brought about by the desire of the ruling élites to emerge from the war with the least possible losses, divide the spoils and peacefully disarm millions of proletarians.² Many opportunists also advanced pacifist ideas of "ending the war", concluding a "just" and "democratic" peace and so forth. Kautsky became the most typical representative of "socialist pacifism", and Trotsky took a similar stand. Accordingly, the centrists rejected Lenin's course towards the defeat of "one's own" government. They tried to counter it with their slogan of "neither victory nor defeat" which ignored the realities of the imperialist war and essentially supported social-chauvinism.

The centrists did not aim at channelling the profound mass discontent and indignation with the war towards revolutionary struggle against the ruling classes who were responsible for that bloodbath. The centrist appeals for peace were combined with preaching to the masses groundless hopes about the alleged possibility of securing peace if the existing governments listened to reason. That position, which did not go beyond bourgeois pacifism, was in its own way a defence of the capitalist system in a situation when internal political contradictions were growing. "It is useless," Lenin wrote, "to advocate a well-meaning programme of noble wishes for peace, if we do not at the same time and in the first place advocate the preaching of illegal organisation and civil war of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie."³

A thorough analysis of the international situation with emphasis on "a precise characterisation of *facts* and *trends*"⁴ was an integral element of Lenin's revolutionary programme of the working class anti-war struggle. Taking into consideration the process of the revolution's advent in all its complexity, Lenin observed in late 1916 that the revolutionary movement was growing "extremely slowly and with difficulty".⁵ In *The Collapse of the Second International* he revealed the overall relationship between the revolutionary situation and revolution itself and, continuing his pre-war theoretical studies, provided a detailed definition of the "revolutionary situation" con-

¹ *The Economist*, March 27, 1915, p. 615.

² See V. I. Lenin, "A Turn in World Politics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, pp. 262-71.

³ V. I. Lenin to Alexandra Kollontai, December 16, 1914, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, 1976, p. 177.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 213.

⁵ V. I. Lenin to Inessa Armand, December 25, 1916, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 266.

cept. Lenin pointed to three major symptoms of a revolutionary situation "(1) when it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the 'upper classes', a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for 'the lower classes not to want' to live in the old way; it is also necessary that 'the upper classes should be unable' to live in the old way; (2) when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual; (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in 'peace time', but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis *and by the 'upper classes' themselves* into independent historical action."¹ Revolutions, Lenin said, occur when all these objective changes, independent of the will of groups or parties or classes, are coupled with a subjective change—"the ability of the revolutionary *class* to take revolutionary mass action *strong* enough to break (or dislocate) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, 'falls', if it is not toppled 'over'."²

It was precisely preparing the proletariat for mass revolutionary action, the very propaganda of that action, that the opportunists impeded. Lenin rejected arguments claiming that revolutionary propaganda was "untimely" and proved that it was imperative to prepare the masses for revolution long before it began. That was to be accomplished by convincing the masses of the need for it, by offering a most practical explanation of its techniques and by setting up the necessary organisations.

Lenin's anti-war programme was difficult to implement. Supported by the social-chauvinists, the ruling quarters tried to stem the growth of mass discontent; they suppressed anti-war action and unleashed reprisals against its leaders. Meanwhile, the clear-cut, integral and consistent course with which Lenin armed the Bolsheviks was not yet known to the Social-Democrats in other countries. Initially, some of them overestimated the power of opportunism, were not aware of the prospects of a revolution and a new International, and failed to see the danger of social-pacifism. Sometimes, they underrated organisational work altogether. Still, despite persecution, revolutionary Social-Democrats everywhere started to disseminate anti-war propaganda, prepared mass anti-war action, gradually ap-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 213-14.

² *Ibid.*, p. 214.

proached Lenin's understanding of the objectives and prospects of the revolutionary movement, and expanded their influence.

The revolutionary Social-Democrats of Germany, led by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Julian Marchlewski, Julian Borchardt, Hermann Duncker, Wilhelm Pieck and others, used every available opportunity to wage a vigorous campaign against the war and social-chauvinism. Groups of left-wing Social-Democrats sprang up in Berlin, Bremen, Chemnitz, Dresden, Frankfurt-am-Main, Gotha, Hamburg, Stuttgart, and in the lower Rhein area. Since the autumn of 1914 they had set about a systematic struggle against the imperialist war. Revolutionary Social-Democratic leaders approached the war from positions similar to Lenin's.¹

Liebknecht's speech against war appropriations (December 2, 1914) evoked a widespread response.² The speech not only denounced the imperialist war but also rejected the social-chauvinist course of the SPD leadership; it was a rallying call addressed to the working masses in Germany and abroad. "It is the duty of socialists to support, extend and intensify every popular movement to end the war," Lenin wrote. "But it is actually being fulfilled only by those socialists who, like Liebknecht, in their parliamentary speeches, call upon the soldiers to lay down their arms, and preach revolution and transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war for socialism."³ In March 1915, Liebknecht again spoke in the Reichstag against war appropriations. Otto Rühle, a member of the Social-Democratic faction, voted together with him against the war.

In December 1914, Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Mehring and Clara Zetkin published letters in a British socialist newspaper exposing the betrayal of the German Social-Democratic leaders and explaining that the Second International had collapsed. They upheld the principles of proletarian internationalism and the need to restore the opportunist-destroyed International on the basis of those principles.⁴ Although the left-wing leaders merely advocated a renovation of the International, they held that its spirit was to be completely different from that of the old International. After reading those letters in *The Labour Leader*, Lenin noted with approval that they not only exposed the betrayal by the leaders of the German Social-

¹ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 2, S. 234-36, 254.

² See K. Liebknecht, *Ausgewählte Reden...*, S. 281-83; H. Wohlgemuth, *Karl Liebknecht. Eine Biographie*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1973, S. 254-66.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to the Second Socialist Conference", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, 1977, p. 176.

⁴ *Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, (hereafter DMGDA), Reihe II, Bd. 1, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1958. S. 77-84.

Democracy and some other socialist parties and Kautsky's attempts to justify it, but also called on all Socialists to defend the principles of the class struggle and international brotherhood in their own countries.¹

A left-wing group led by Julian Borchardt vehemently opposed the war and the social-chauvinism of the SPD leaders supported by Kautsky's followers. Lenin praised Borchardt's pamphlet *Before and After August 4, 1914*.² The group's periodical *Lichtstrahlen* favoured a resolute break with the advocates of war and their supporters, although it was not always consistent in advancing the tasks involved in the revolutionary anti-war struggle. Also active were the left-wing groups in Bremen, supported by *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*, and in Stuttgart.

In their attempts at stemming left-wing activity, the German authorities drafted Liebknecht into the army and imprisoned Rosa Luxemburg, but failed to prevent further consolidation of the revolutionary forces. In March 1915, a large part of the German revolutionary Social-Democrats formed the Internationale group. In April 1915, the group started the periodical *Die Internationale*. Lenin considered it important that it "began to expose the true role of the opportunists...", that it "did criticise the 'Centre', i.e., Kautskyism"; *Lichtstrahlen* and *Die Internationale*, he noted, broke with the opportunists in such a way that all types of the latter "raised a savage outcry", showing that the blows had struck home.³

While in prison, Rosa Luxemburg continued her revolutionary activity and, under the pen name of Junius, wrote the pamphlet *The Crisis of Social-Democracy*. Since it was written for a clandestine publication, the pamphlet was published only in 1916. Compared to Bolshevik documents published from September 1914 to March 1915 and commentaries to them, the arguments advanced in the pamphlet were not enough and it contained several errors. Nevertheless, Lenin said that, on the whole, it was a fine Marxist work: "Written in a very lively style, Junius's pamphlet has undoubtedly played and will continue to play an important role in the struggle against the ex-Social-Democratic Party of Germany, which has deserted to the bourgeoisie and the Junkers, and we extend our hearty greetings to the author."⁴

In May 1915, Liebknecht laid down the course of the Internationale group in the pamphlet *The Main Enemy Is in One's Own Country*.

¹ Central Party Archives, IML, Moscow, f. 2, op. 1, d. 3484, p. 1.

² V. I. Lenin, "How the Police and the Reactionaries Protect the Unity of German Social-Democracy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 130.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Junius Pamphlet", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 306; "The Collapse of Platonic Internationalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 195.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Junius Pamphlet", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 305.

Soon the group followed up the slogan and launched large-scale preparations for decisive anti-imperialist struggle.¹

The Polish labour parties, which set up an Interparty Working Council in the first days of the war, published an appeal on August 22, 1914 which advanced both the slogan of a prospective proletarian revolution and a demand for a popular republican government. That was consonant with Lenin's approach to the need for revolutionary Social-Democrats to advance the slogan of "republics in Germany, Poland, Russia, and other countries...".²

Lenin's position, set forth in the theses on the war which had been sent to Warsaw, was widely discussed in the SDKPL and PPS-Lewica. In October 1914, their joint organ *Głos Robotniczy*, published in the Dąbrowka Area, carried an article entitled "Russian Social-Democracy Against the War". It popularised Leninist views and fully justified the Bolsheviks in their voting against war appropriations in the Duma and in their resolute refusal to support tsarism. That same issue also harshly condemned social-chauvinism and expressed a hope for the forthcoming triumph of proletarian solidarity and for the resurrection of the International. The Zurich-published *Gazeta Robotnicza* of the SDKPL took the same stand. In its article "The Fall of the Second International" it condemned opportunism, defended internationalism, and urged preparation of mass revolutionary battles under the slogans of "War on War" and "For Socialism".

In June 1915, the SDKPL issued several appeals, which not only reaffirmed the idea of the decisive role played by the working class in withdrawing from the war but also observed that the only effective course would be that of a workers' revolution, the overthrow of capitalism and the winning of political power. The Polish revolutionary Social-Democrats considered it their task to organise a mass anti-war revolutionary campaign aimed not only at the struggle for peace but also at establishing a socialist system. Yet, the SDKPL position was simplified and inflexible; the Party underestimated the Bolshevik slogan of "defeating 'one's own' government". Lenin, who regarded Polish Marxists as members of the finest revolutionary and internationalist forces, also criticised them for their inconsistencies and mistakes.

The major provisions of the RSDLP Central Committee Manifesto *The War and Russian Social-Democracy*, drafted by Lenin, were also published in the newspaper of the Bulgarian Tesnyaks. Bolshevik publications, which had already begun to infiltrate Bulgaria at the

¹ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 2, S. 254-56.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of Revolutionary Social-Democracy in the European War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 18.

start of the war, played an important part in that country. The leaders of the BLSDP (T.) also maintained direct contacts with Lenin. The Tesnyaks, led by Blagoev, Kirkov, Kolarov, Kabakchiev and Dimitrov, immediately defined the war as annexationist and imperialist, fought vigorously against Bulgarian involvement in the war and exposed the social-chauvinists. The Party led the movement against the introduction of the state of emergency in Bulgaria and came out with proposals for the joint defence of the Balkan peoples against imperialist encroachment. Their resistance to Bulgaria's entry into the war (October 1915), their propaganda and votes against war appropriations won them profound respect among the revolutionary Social-Democrats. Lenin described the Tesnyaks (along with Italian Socialists) as revolutionary Marxists who "utilise parliamentarianism in order to remain revolutionary to the end, to perform their duty as socialists and internationalists even under the most difficult circumstances."¹ Aware of the fact that the current international situation was fraught with revolution, the Tesnyaks consistently pursued their internationalist course of aiding the socialist revolution in other countries. They did not connect the struggle for peace with the immediate elaboration of a policy aimed at socialist revolution in their own country, assuming that it would occur in the major capitalist countries. Nor did they advance the slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war or aim at engaging in broad clandestine party activities.²

The Tesnyaks did much to unite the revolutionary Social-Democrats in the Balkan countries. In February 1915, an all-Balkan rally was held in Sofia. In May, in Bucharest, Blagoev arrived at an agreement with the SDPR over several important issues regarding cooperation among the Balkan revolutionary Social-Democratic forces. In July, the Second Balkan Social-Democratic Conference was held in Bucharest. It condemned social-chauvinism and the policy of peace among the classes, and declared that restoration of the International was only possible on the basis of revolutionary socialism and proletarian internationalism. The Conference established the Balkan Labour Social-Democratic Federation (BLSDF), composed of the Social-Democratic parties and trade unions of Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania and Greece; it adopted the Federation's declaration of principles and a resolution on its attitude to the International and on the struggle for peace and a Balkan Federation. The Inter-Balkan Bureau, an executive body of the BLSDF, was set up. It was also decided to start a joint periodical and to participate jointly in international action. Lenin wrote with approval about the Tesnyak

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Socialism and War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 323.

² *A History of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, pp. 166, 167, 170, 177-78.

stand at the Conference.¹ Serbia's Social-Democrats acted in contact with the Tesnyaks. Their party, weakened by the war mobilisation and the death of Dimitar Tutzowicz, was not always consistent in its approach to the issues of war, peace and revolution but, up to the time the country was occupied and while legal opportunities were still available, it tried to use them to disseminate internationalist anti-war propaganda. (Dućan Popović was in charge of that) and refused to vote for war appropriations in parliament. Lenin thought highly of the way Serbia's Social-Democrats fulfilled their socialist duty during the war.²

In Britain, the chauvinist policy of the British Socialist Party leadership was opposed by Theodor Rothstein, John Askew, the Inkpin brothers, Joe Fineberg, and Edwin Fairchild. The opposition in the Socialist Labour Party was led by Thomas Bell and Arthur MacManus who proclaimed that the International was dead and that there should be no place for opportunists in the new International. A group of BSP and SLP members led by John Maclean, who exposed the imperialist nature of the war, launched revolutionary activities on the Clyde. In mid-1915 Lenin noted that internationalists comprised about three sevenths of the BSP membership, while they accounted for less than one seventh in the Labour Party, among the Fabians and in the ILP taken together.³

In France and Belgium, where the invasion by German troops particularly intensified patriotic sentiment, the social-chauvinists exploited it to preach "defence of the fatherland", and the internationalists' positions were extremely weakened. Still, there, too, voices were raised against the war. Pierre Monatte resigned from the CGT leadership and said there was no basis to the hopes that the war which France was fighting could bring freedom to Germany. Trade union activists Arthur Merrheim and Albert Bourderon also opposed the war and exposed its annexationist nature.

In the Netherlands an anti-war drive was launched by the Tribu-
nists—in Lenin's view, "among the best revolutionary and internationalist elements in international Social-Democracy".⁴ In October 1914, Anton Pannekoek wrote an article entitled "The Collapse of the International" in which he "told the workers the truth—although

¹ V. I. Lenin to David Wijnkoop, after August 15, 1915, *Collected Works*, Vol. 43, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 479; note 390, p. 700.

² See V. I. Lenin, "Speech at G. V. Plekhanov's Lecture 'On the Attitude of the Socialists to the War', September 28 (October 11), 1914", *Collected Works*, Vol., 36, 1971, p. 295.

³ See V. I. Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 244-45.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 347.

not loudly enough, and sometimes not quite skilfully".¹ In December 1914, Herman Gorter attacked the social-chauvinists and Kautsky's followers in his book *Imperialism, the World War and Social-Democracy*. *De Tribune* published a somewhat abridged version of the RSDLP Central Committee Manifesto "The War and Russian Social-Democracy". The fact that the Tribunists put forward the demobilisation slogan expressed their uncompromising rejection of the notion of "defending the fatherland" in an imperialist war. However, they did not go beyond advocating mass strike action.

In Italy, the newspaper *Avanti!*, edited by Giacinto Serrati, fought, although not always consistently, against the policy of overt social-chauvinists who had helped plunge the country into the war and against the ambiguous centrist position. In Switzerland, Fritz Platten and Wilhelm Münzenberg led the internationalist Social-Democratic youth movement. The left in Sweden, led by Carl Hoeglund, and Norway's internationalists declared their support of the Bolshevik course. In Austria-Hungary, Leopold Winarsky, Gyla Alpári, K. Krejbich, Bohumir Šmeral and others came out against the military-chauvinist hysteria and nationalism. The left wing of the SDPR, led by Alexandru Constantinescu, Ecaterina Arbore, Dimitrie Marinescu, Ion C. Frimu, Mihai Gh. Bujor and others, was searching for ways of fighting the "social peace".

In the United States, Eugene Debs declared "Down with the War and Down with the Ruling Class!" as early as 1914. Later he stressed that as a proletarian revolutionary he was against any war except a revolutionary war. Lenin closely followed Debs' speeches, filed clippings from his anti-war articles and often quoted them.² Charles Ruthenberg and other left-wing Socialists also took an internationalist stand.

The left-wing, revolutionary Social-Democratic organisations, groups and trends were united in their loyalty to Marxism, to the revolutionary traditions of the Second International and to its resolutions on using the economic and political crisis brought about by war to transform society by revolution. True, they did not immediately arrive at a correct formulation and consistent implementation of a revolutionary policy in the new historical situation arising from the war and the betrayal by most Second International leaders. Nevertheless, the left did much to develop among the masses sentiments of "hatred of capitalism, not only in general, but of *one's own* government and bourgeoisie".³ They also contributed greatly to the organisation of the anti-war movement.

¹ V. I. Lenin to A. G. Shlyapnikov, October 27, 1914, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 168.

² V. M. Bykov, *Eugene Debs—the Leader of the American Proletariat*, Mysl, Moscow, 1971, pp. 78-80 (in Russian).

³ V. I. Lenin, "May Day and the War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 327.

Lenin closely followed the activities of the internationalist forces and established contacts with them. In April 1915, he noted that two parties were taking shape everywhere, in June, that in Germany "as a matter of fact, a *new* party is growing up, gaining strength and being organised, a real workers' party, a genuinely revolutionary Social-Democratic Party".¹ At the same time, he observed that the greatest shortcoming of all revolutionary Marxism in Germany was "its lack of a compact illegal organisation that would systematically pursue its own line and educate the masses in the spirit of the new tasks", and that would be "accustomed to thinking out revolutionary slogans to their conclusion and systematically educating the masses in their spirit".² In his efforts to unite the internationalists, Lenin stressed that the Bolsheviks were not seeking to interfere in the internal affairs of their foreign comrades: "We understand that they alone are fully competent to determine their methods of combatting the opportunists, according to the conditions of time and place. Only we consider it our right and our duty to express our frank opinion on the state of affairs."³ Lenin's principled criticism of the shortcomings and mistakes of the revolutionary Social-Democrats was instrumental in their ideological, political and organisational unification, in their becoming true leaders of the mass revolutionary movement.

LENIN ANALYSING IMPERIALISM AND DEVELOPING THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION THEORY

The issue of imperialism emerged as a particularly acute problem for the international socialist movement during World War I. That issue combined major questions of war, politics and the struggle of the working class. Indeed, even recognition of the imperialist nature of the current war did not sometimes rule out the great differences in the interpretation of imperialism and the prospects for the working people's struggle. That was why the development by Lenin of a course towards a revolutionary withdrawal from the war which he undertook during World War I was organically connected with a further analysis of imperialism.

Lenin's analysis of imperialism was the summit of the theoretical work on the part of scholars—above all, Marxists—to understand the new stage of capitalism in the early 20th century. As early as 1902 the economist John Hobson, a bourgeois social reformist and

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 248.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Junius Pamphlet", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 307, 319.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Socialism and War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 326.

pacifist, published a work entitled *Imperialism* which concentrated on the financial, commercial and colonial expansion of the imperialist countries. Lenin, who translated that book into Russian, said it contained "a very good and comprehensive description of the principal specific economic and political features of imperialism".¹ Rudolf Hilferding, author of *Finance Capital* (1910), attempted a scientific explanation of new economic developments in capitalism. Hilferding concluded that "a distinctive feature of 'modern' capitalism was represented by those concentration processes which surfaced, on the one hand, in the 'elimination of free competition' via the creation of cartels and trusts, and on the other, in the increasingly close inter-connection between banking and industrial capital".² A special chapter was devoted to the export of capital and the struggle for "economic territories" as essential signs of the latest stage of capitalism. Noting the mistakes made by Hilferding who saw the basic essence of economic changes above all in the sphere of exchange and credit and his certain tendency towards conciliation with opportunism and underrating the imperialist trends towards parasitic existence and decay (in that, Hilferding took a backward step compared to Hobson's book), Lenin, in his overall description of *Finance Capital*, said it was "a very valuable theoretical analysis of 'the latest phase of capitalist development'".³

An analysis of imperialism as "a new period, marked by very strong changes in the inner structure of capitalist production and ownership relations and by a new, considerably more intensive global expansion of capital"⁴ was the subject of Julian Marchlewski's 1912 work *Imperialism or Socialism?* Unlike Hilferding, Marchlewski looked for the cause of the changes under way in production, not in circulation. Although he clearly overestimated the role protective tariffs played in the development of capitalism and sometimes interpreted imperialism as "the transformation of the capitalist state, at the expense of all other states, into a world state, an empire",⁵ he singled out the "period of imperialism" in which "capitalism has reached its highest stage" and stressed that "only the winning of political power by the proletariat can end that capitalist phase".⁶ Despite certain

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 195.

² Rudolf Hilferding, *Das Finanzkapital. Eine Studie über die jüngste Entwicklung des Kapitalismus*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1955, S. 1.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 195.

⁴ Julian Marchlewski-Karski, *Imperialismus oder Sozialismus? Arbeiten über die Entwicklung des Imperialismus und den antimonopolistischen Kampf der Arbeiterklasse 1895 bis 1919*, Verlag Marxistische Blätter, Frankfurt am Main, 1978, S. 168.

⁵ Ibid., S. 173.

⁶ Ibid., S. 185, 186.

flaws present in the book, Marchlewski's conclusions approached the thesis about the monopoly stage in capitalist development, subsequently formulated by Lenin.

Rosa Luxemburg studied the new processes in capitalist economics and politics for many years. The aggravation of contradictions among governments and the international, anti-war tasks of the working-class movement drew her attention particularly to the issue of the "imperialism of powers", to their struggle for markets, sources of raw materials and for the redivision of the world. In her *Accumulation of Capital*, Rosa Luxemburg graphically exposed the imperialist expansionist policy and the plunder of colonial and dependent nations; she revealed the causes underlying the growth of militarism and the danger of war. In her "economic explanation of imperialism" she aimed at identifying the "objective historical boundaries" of capitalism which made the socialist revolution necessary. However, she did not view imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism and, in analysing the issue of accumulation in capitalist countries, she mistakenly connected it with a necessarily non-capitalist environment, attempting to "complement" Marx's concepts of the distribution of the aggregate social product.¹

Various new capitalist developments were also analysed in many other Marxist works. Bebel, Lafargue, Liebknecht and others studied monopolies. Bebel, Mehring and Rothstein criticised the aggressive foreign policy of the great powers and examined the nature of the contradictions among them and the expansion of monopoly capital. Liebknecht and Mehring analysed the growth of militarism and its links with monopoly capital.² Other pre-war students of monopoly capital included Vorovsky, Skvortsov-Stepanov, Olminsky, Bukharin—some of the latter's mistakes were criticised by Lenin—and others.

While paying tribute to the theoretical efforts made by the Marxists of various countries who studied imperialism before Lenin and in his time one should also note that they failed to analyse the "essential properties and tendencies of imperialism, as the system of economic relations of a modern, highly developed, mature and rotten-ripe capitalism".³ Imperialism was not analysed as a distinct stage of capitalism with its typically complex, dialectically contradic-

¹ *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals oder Was die Epigonen aus der Marxschen Theorie gemacht haben. Eine Antikritik von Rosa Luxemburg*, Frankes Verlag, G.m.b.H., Leipzig, 1921, S. 115-18.

² For more detail, see: *August Bebel. Eine Biographie*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1963; J. Schleifstein, *Franz Mehring. Sein marxistisches Schaffen. 1891-1919*, Rütten und Loening, Berlin, 1959; H. Wohlgemuth, op. cit.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Preface to N. Bukharin's Pamphlet, 'Imperialism and the World Economy'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 103.

tory processes in the economy, politics and ideology. The historical place of imperialism also remained undefined; nothing was done to reveal its relation to the two major trends in the working-class movement—revolutionary and opportunist.

All that was the subject of Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*; essentially, Lenin had done the preparatory work for it during the pre-war period, and the immense amount of work during the war years was reflected in his *Notebooks on Imperialism*. However, in trying to evade the obstacles of Russian censorship, Lenin had to concentrate on economic processes in his book on imperialism, only hinting at politics by allusion. But he also turned to problems of imperialism in such clandestinely published articles as "Under a False Flag", "The Collapse of the Second International", "Socialism and War", "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe" and "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination". Especially typical in this regard was the work "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism", a concentrated summary of the fundamentals of Lenin's analysis of imperialism, with a particularly detailed explanation of those topics that could not be highlighted in the book because of tsarist censorship.

Lenin's elaboration of the theory of imperialism logically and historically continued Marx's analysis of capitalism which had shown that free competition gave rise to the concentration of production and that that concentration leads, at a certain stage, to the monopoly and requires governmental interference. Engels, who had witnessed the emergence of the monopolies in the late 19th century, had also noted that trend.¹ Lenin analysed those processes when they were more mature, he widely used the data supplied by the science and statistics of his time and critically re-evaluated works by bourgeois scholars from positions of Marxist methodology.

Lenin took the sum total of all the data on imperialism, on its distinctive features, and viewed them in their entirety, in their strict unity and logical subordination, organically connecting the processes under way in the basis of capitalist society with those occurring in its superstructure. That enabled Lenin to create a scientific theory of imperialism. He studied those capitalist trends that had led to a radically new, distinctive stage in its evolution; he revealed the system of economic relations under imperialism, its typi-

¹ Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, pp. 438-39; Frederick Engels, "Socialism :Utopian and Scientific", K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. Three, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 151; Frederick Engels, "A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891", K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. Three, pp. 431-32; V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 200-01.

cal conflicts and antagonisms, the objective and subjective conditions and trends of the inevitable revolutionary transformation of monopoly capitalism into socialism. Rejecting the bourgeois apologia of imperialism, the bourgeois-reformist plans to "improve" it, and the petty-bourgeois desire to return to pre-monopoly capitalism, he showed how opportunism merged with that bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology. He wrote that the cardinal issues in respect of one's attitude to imperialism were "whether to go forward to the further intensification and deepening of the antagonisms which it engenders, or backward, towards allaying these antagonisms".¹

Using Marx's methodology and revealing "the changing social relations of production", Lenin viewed imperialism as "the development and direct continuation of the fundamental characteristics of capitalism in general", a development when "certain of its fundamental characteristics began to change into their opposites, when the features of the epoch of transition from capitalism to a higher social and economic system had taken shape and revealed themselves in all spheres".² Paramount in Lenin's description of the highest stage of capitalism was his discovery of monopoly domination—the economic essence of imperialism permeating all spheres of social development irrespective of peculiarities in the economy, politics and state system of different capitalist countries.

When revealing the monopoly essence of imperialism, Lenin analysed the entire system and interrelationship of the major economic features of imperialism, the "*principal economic (industrial) features of imperialism*".³ Noting that all definitions were relative since they could not comprise all the features of a phenomenon throughout its development, Lenin defined the five major economic features of imperialism as follows: "(1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the basis of this 'finance capital', of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as distinct from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves, and (5) the territorial division of the world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed."⁴ Lenin also noted the processes of "advance of

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 287.

² *Ibid.*, p. 265.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Notebooks on Imperialism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 39, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1968, p. 236.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 266.

monopoly capitalism towards state capitalism", accelerated by the world war, and the emergence of state-monopoly capitalism. Working on his book, he contemplated adding another major feature of imperialism—its "alliance (connection, *merging*) of banking (finance) capital with the state machine".¹

Lenin saw the development of monopolies, the deepest economic foundation of imperialism, as the root cause of such distinguishing features of the latest type of capitalism as its decay and parasitism. The sway of the monopolies had grossly exacerbated the principal contradiction of capitalism. Production has acquired a social character to such a degree that "private economic and private property relations constitute a shell which no longer fits its contents, a shell which must inevitably decay if its removal is artificially delayed...".²

In these general conditions, the trend towards stagnation, towards a decline in the development of the productive forces, which now and then emerges on top and stays there for some time in various industries and countries, is typical of precisely the capitalist monopoly. The formation of all-powerful economic monopolies, Lenin stressed, inevitably gave rise to the typically imperialist relations of domination and consequent violence, to all-pervading political reaction and corruption assuming giant proportions. Lenin showed that monopoly domination had intensified the separation of the ownership of capital from its employment in production, the growth of the rentier category, and financial and colonial exploitation whereby the overwhelming majority of people throughout the world had been subjugated by a handful of the richest or strongest countries. Lenin pointed to the exclusively high monopoly profits, a realisation of monopoly domination, as an economic condition underlying the emergence of a privileged section of the proletariat and the strengthening of opportunism. Lenin described it all as expressing capitalism's parasitism and decay under imperialism.³

However, Lenin explained that the trend towards stagnation did not rule out rapid capitalist growth, that the two trends were in

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Notebooks on Imperialism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 39, p. 117; V. I. Lenin, "Plan for an Article 'The Lessons of the War'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 393; See also V. I. Lenin, "Theses for an Appeal to the International Socialist Committee and All Socialist Parties", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 212; V. I. Lenin, "To the Workers Who Support the Struggle Against the War and Against the Socialists Who Have Sided with Their Governments", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 230; V. I. Lenin, "A Turn in World Politics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 267.

² V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 303.

³ See V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism". *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 207, 238-39, 276-77, 300-01; V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, pp. 106-07.

contradictory combination, expressing themselves with varying degrees of strength, and that, on the whole, capitalism was growing incomparably faster than before.¹

Lenin considered it a mistake to believe that the drive towards domination, typical of monopoly capitalism, was expressed everywhere equally and in absolute form. He noted "the *possibility* of full democracy inside the richest nation *with its continued* domination over dependent nations".² More than that, in the sphere of imperialist international relations, too, "not only 'achievable', from the point of view of finance capital, but *sometimes even profitable* for the trusts, for *their* imperialist policy, for *their* imperialist war, to allow *individual* small nations as much democratic freedom as they can, right down to political independence".³ Imperialism also exerts a contradictory influence on the working-class movement, where it strengthens both major trends—revolutionary and opportunist, and intensifies "the irreconcilability between opportunism and the general and vital interests of the working-class movement".⁴

An analysis of the monopoly essence of imperialism also led Lenin to conclude that imperialism was moribund capitalism, the eve of the socialist revolution. He wrote that the "monopoly, which grows out of capitalism, is *already* dying capitalism, the beginning of its transition to socialism".⁵ He saw the development of monopolies and of their ability, "on the basis of an exact computation of mass data", to deliver resources and manufacture products on orders from "a single centre", to distribute these products "according to a single plan among tens and hundreds of millions of consumers" as immense progress in the socialisation of production".⁶ But he resolutely rejected the bourgeois-reformist assertion that monopoly or state-monopoly capitalism was no longer capitalism, that it could be described as "state socialism", etc. Lenin viewed the proximity of that capitalism to socialism as an indication of the impending socialist revolution, "and not at all as an argument for tolerating the repudiation of such a revolution and the efforts to make capitalism look more attractive, something which all reformists are trying to do".⁷

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 300.

² V. I. Lenin, "Remarks on an Article About Maximalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, p. 385.

³ V. I. Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 51.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 284.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 107.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 205, 302, 303.

⁷ V. I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, 1977, p. 448.

The emergence, already during World War I, of the initial forms of state-monopoly capitalism corroborated Lenin's conclusion about the shaping, under imperialism, of the material conditions for the new social system. His ideas about parasitism and decay also led to the conclusion about "moribund capitalism". Already before the war Lenin had noted that capitalism, while solving most difficult technological problems, at the same time obstructed the solution of the vital scientific and technological questions facing mankind. During World War I, when destruction was rampant, he wrote with indignation about the struggle of "the most reactionary finance capital ... that has exhausted and outlived itself and is heading downward towards decay", about the bourgeoisie which "from a rising and progressive class ... has turned into a declining, decadent, and reactionary class".¹

The identification of the system of development, complication and aggravation of the contradictions leading to the destruction of the capitalist system was central to Lenin's entire study of imperialism. All the stages of his analysis revealed the irreconcilable contradiction between the highly social character of production and the persisting general framework of private ownership, private economic management, private competition, between the trend towards planned production stemming from monopoly domination and the typically chaotic nature of capitalism. Lenin revealed the contradictions and conflicts stemming both from the replacement of free competition by monopolies (the struggle within the monopolies and among them, the rivalries among the supermonopolies which had divided the world, among the imperialist countries and blocs, between monopoly and non-monopoly capital, etc.) and also from the coexistence of these types of capitalist economy, which gave rise to "a number of very acute, intense antagonisms, frictions and conflicts".² Lenin laid bare the complex of contradictions between monopoly countries and the giant colonial system of imperialism. The book and related articles traced the evolution of the key class contradiction of imperialism, that between labour and capital, and the growing antagonisms between the monopolies and the proletariat, between the monopolies and the mass of the population.

The truly historical approach, which implies examination of key development trends and of the principal contradictions in a given social system as its powerful motive force, enabled Lenin to clearly and precisely define the historical place of imperialism as the eve of a new social system emerging in the course of proletarian revolu-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Under a False Flag", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 149.

² V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 266

tions. It is precisely that approach which is reflected in the following definition of imperialism drawn up by Lenin: "Imperialism is a specific historical stage of capitalism. Its specific character is threefold: imperialism is (1) monopoly capitalism; (2) parasitic, or decaying capitalism; (3) moribund capitalism."¹ Under monopoly capitalism, the objective, material conditions for the transition to a new social system, socialism, were coming into full force in the system of production; the working class, the major force to lead all the working people to the revolutionary transformation of capitalism into socialism, was developing, growing stronger and becoming more united. Imperialism greatly aggravated all the contradictions leading to the proletariat's social revolution. Working-class parties had to be fully armed to prepare for that revolution, to clearly see the path of struggle, and to have an organisation capable of leading the masses and overcoming the consequences of the collapse of the Second International. Imperialism and the opportunist-induced split of socialism were two topics organically intertwined in Lenin's analysis. While the examination of imperialism led to the conclusion about "moribund capitalism", about the fact that imperialism was the eve of the proletariat's social revolution, the study of the situation in the working-class movement produced the following conclusion: "The fight against imperialism is a sham and humbug unless it is inseparably bound up with the fight against opportunism."²

This made the specific prospect of capitalism's replacement with a new, socialist system into a cardinal issue. Open opportunists proclaimed that aid to imperialism was the "vital objective" of the Socialists, for its development was a "necessary preliminary stage of socialism".³ Kautsky also put off socialism until some indefinite future period which would, possibly, follow the so-called ultraimperialism.⁴ Criticising the "ultraimperialism" theory and exposing it as scientifically unfounded and politically reactionary, Lenin showed that of all the trends leading to "ultraimperialism" as formulated by Kautsky, only one, the growing interconnection among finance capital cliques, had anything to do with the question, was a truly universal and unquestionable trend "not during the last few years and in two countries, but throughout the whole capitalist world".⁵ However, the presence of that trend, the possibility

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism and the Split in Socialism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 105.

² V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 302.

³ See *Lenin and the International Working-Class Movement*, p. 217.

⁴ *Die Neue Zeit*, 1915, Bd. 2, No. 5, S. 144-45.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 226.

of establishing various "inter-imperialist" alliances could only lead to "ultraimperialist" conclusions about a single, internationally united capital only if one ignored the continuous aggravation of the economic and political contradictions of capitalism. Criticising Kautsky's theory of "ultraimperialism", Lenin wrote that "there is no doubt that the trend of development is *towards* a single world trust absorbing all enterprises without exception and all states without exception. But this development proceeds in such circumstances, at such a pace, through such contradictions, conflicts and upheavals—not only economic but political, national, etc.—that inevitably imperialism will burst and capitalism will be transformed into its opposite *long before* one world trust materialises, before the 'ultra-imperialist', world-wide amalgamation of national finance capitals takes place."¹

It is impossible to direct the political struggle of the proletariat without forecasting based on an in-depth analysis of the existing trends. Kautsky's theory of "ultraimperialism" was a case of forecasting isolated from actual processes. Lenin's conclusion about the possibility of the initial victory of socialism in several countries or even a single country—a conclusion taking into consideration the entire close interconnection of economic and political processes under imperialism—is an example of scientific forecasting corroborated by facts.

Proceeding from the Marxist idea about the impossibility of even evolution of capitalism and summing up the new developments at its highest stage, Lenin discovered the law of the uneven economic and political development of capitalism under imperialism; he showed that its nature had changed: the period of relatively quiet and gradual evolution and expansion of capitalism had given way to "an epoch which is relatively much more violent, spasmodic, disastrous and conflicting".² This spasmodic and conflicting character was also evident within individual countries, in their various social developments. The economic and socio-political, objective and subjective prerequisites of the social revolution varied from country to country, that is, the development of a revolutionary situation differed. As a result, the weakening of the worldwide imperialist system as a whole created favourable opportunities for breaking the chain in one or another of its weakest links.

Lenin proceeded therefrom when, in his article "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe" he drew the key conclusion that "the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capital-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Preface to N. Bukharin's Pamphlet, 'Imperialism and the World Economy'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 107.

² *Ibid.*, p. 104.

ist country alone".¹ Developing that point in his article "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", Lenin made a still more categorical statement: "Socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously *in all* countries. It will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others will for some time remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois."² Lenin replaced the previous Marxist tenet about the simultaneous victory of socialism in most capitalist countries with a radically new conclusion. That conclusion, soon to be borne out by fact, the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia, was a new discovery of Marxist science. It oriented the proletariat of each country towards vigorously resisting the war and the imperialist policy, towards decisive revolutionary action taken as soon as conditions became ripe for it in a given country. On the one hand, the "class movement of solidarity" in the countries adjacent to the first state to bring off a socialist revolution and, on the other hand, the involvement of the great powers in the "war of attrition" which had "practically exhausted the patience of the most patient peoples"—that was the basis of the assertion that the "immensely superior strength" of the capitalist powers would be unable to suppress the socialist revolution once it began in a country, and that their interference would rather be a prologue to it in other countries.³ Lenin also wrote about the need for armed resistance to attempts "on the part of the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the socialist state's victorious proletariat. In such cases a war on our part would be a legitimate and just war."⁴

Lenin opposed the erroneous assertions that the imperialist chain could be broken in the economically weakest, the least developed capitalist countries; he rejected the notion that the world revolutionary process would begin with the least advanced economic systems and that the imminence of the revolution was inversely proportional to the maturity of capitalist relations. But the presence of highly developed productive forces, of mature monopoly or state-monopoly groundwork for the replacement of capitalism with socialism was not enough either. The thing that was central to the emergence of a socialist revolution in a certain country that had reached at least a medium level of capitalist development was the concentration in it of especially acute and irreconcilable impe-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 342.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 79.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Principles Involved in the War Issue", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 158.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 79.

rialist contradictions, coupled with the presence of forces capable of solving those antagonisms in the course of a proletarian revolution. What guaranteed success was the leadership of the proletariat guided by a Marxist party capable of overcoming the opportunist course and steering the revolution.

Lenin repeatedly stressed that "it is easier for the movement to start in the countries that are not among those exploiting countries which have opportunities for easy plunder and are able to bribe the upper section of their workers".¹ It would be easier for the working class in countries at the medium level of capitalist development—like Russia—to begin a socialist revolution than for the proletariat of highly developed countries, but the former would have to traverse more stages in its transition to socialism after the revolution. "A backward country," Lenin warned, "can easily begin because its adversary has become rotten, because its bourgeoisie is not organised, but for it to continue demands of that country a hundred thousand times more circumspection, caution and endurance."²

Lenin's analysis of the conditions in which the socialist revolution would emerge and develop under imperialism was clearly based on the dialectics of the universal, the particular and the individual. Above all, Lenin proceeded from the fact that under imperialism, the world capitalist system was ripe for the socialist revolution. At the same time, he singled out large zones differing from one another as to the conditions for far-reaching revolutionary movements there. And, finally, he also singled out the countries that were the weakest link in the imperialist chain.

Lenin's approach opposed both the scholasticism of Kautsky and his followers who put off the socialist revolution until the time of some abstract "ultraimperialism" and the views of Trotsky, who made the success of the revolution in a country dependent on simultaneous action by the proletariat in neighbouring countries, and denied that such a revolution could be successful without an abstractly visualised world revolution. Lenin's creative, historically specific analysis proceeded from the entire diversity of imperialist trends. He identified the new relationship of the international and the national in the world revolutionary movement and demonstrated that a world revolution could only consist of several revolutions which would combine to form a single revolutionary stream. That stream would comprise various movements—not only by the prole-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies", *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 471-72.

² V. I. Lenin, "Session of the All-Russia C.E.C.", *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 291.

tariat but also by its allies: the peasants, the oppressed nations, etc. Thus, Lenin "radically changed the old conception of the conditions for the victory of the new system and opened a clear prospect of struggle to the Russian and international proletariat".¹

In connection with his analysis of imperialism and of the prospects of the socialist revolution, Lenin also worked on the problem of the state. That was particularly important because the opportunists had distorted or ignored the ideas of Marx and Engels, and even some of the revolutionary Social-Democrats did not understand that question sufficiently clearly. It was not, however, just a question of restoring the doctrine of the state elaborated by Marx and Engels, but also of following up the evolution of the bourgeois state from the first attempt to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and to the new battles which were to come at the close of World War I. "Changes since 1871?" Lenin wrote. "All are such, or their general character, their sum total, are such that bureaucracy *everywhere* has risen to a crazy height (both within parliamentarianism, per se—and local government, and in joint stock companies, trusts, etc.). This is first. And second: the labour 'socialist' parties have by $\frac{3}{4}$ become absorbed into *the same kind* of bureaucracy. The split between the social-patriots and the internationalists, between the reformists and the revolutionaries, has, consequently, acquired still more profound significance: reformists and social-patriots are '*improving*' the state-bureaucratic machine ... while the revolutionaries must '*smash*' it, that 'military-bureaucratic state machine', smash it, replacing it with a 'commune', a new '*semi-state*'."²

At the same time, Lenin resolutely rejected anarchist and related views about the need to "abolish", to "blow up" the state. As contrast to Bukharin who called for "emphasising its [Social-Democracy] hostility to the state in principle", Lenin, upholding the revolutionary Marxist approach to the bourgeois state, argued that the proletarian state, the dictatorship of the proletariat should be used against the bourgeoisie.³

Lenin paid particular attention to the relation of the proletarian revolution to the state in his works written in 1916 and early 1917. In order to grasp that problem, he made a thorough study of the works of Marx and Engels, and re-read books and articles by Kaut-

¹ *On the Centenary of the Birth of V. I. Lenin*. Theses of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1970, p. 14.

² V. I. Lenin, *Complete Works*, Vol. 33, pp. 229, 231 (in Russian).

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Youth International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, pp. 165-66; V. I. Lenin, "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 342-43.

sky, Pannekoek and Bernstein. The notes he made in a notebook in a blue cover and entitled *Marxism on the State* formed the basis of his future work *The State and Revolution*.

During the imperialist world war, the specific relationship between the drive for democracy and the struggle for socialism became more pronounced than before. That relationship affected the prospects of the revolutionary transformations in different countries united by the system of monopoly domination—both the oppressed and the oppressors, both advanced and backward in capitalist development, both those that had in the main carried out bourgeois-democratic transformations and those in which these transformations were yet to occur. As the revolutionary situation gradually advanced, the importance of general democratic slogans was growing, not diminishing in some of the largest belligerent countries.

A new approach to the struggle for democracy and socialism was becoming increasingly urgent because, on the one hand, the opportunists favoured "pure democracy" and opposed the struggle for democratic goals to revolutionary objectives and, on the other hand, some of the internationalists in the world working-class movement entertained erroneous, primitive ideas. These were graphically expressed in the views held by representatives of "imperialist economism" (Pyatakov, Bukharin) who, proceeding from the fact that imperialism had won, ignored questions of political democracy. In it, they resembled the late 19th- and early 20th-century Economists who denied the importance of political questions because capitalism had won in Russia.¹ Maintaining that democracy was absolutely impossible under capitalism, the theorists of "imperialist economism" held that it was pointless to fight for democratic rights or the advantages of a republican government, that parliamentary struggle had outlived its usefulness and that "only socialism" could be opposed to the imperialist war. Lenin noted similar arguments that the reliance on "the establishment of bourgeois democracy in the monopoly period" was illusory expressed by German left-wing Social-Democrats when he read Heinrich Laufenberg's and Fritz Wolffheim's *Demokratie und Organisation*.²

The dialectics of the drive for democracy and for socialism emerged as a keynote in Lenin's wartime articles and letters. Observing the ruling classes' turn towards reaction, Lenin wrote that "at the same time capitalism engenders democratic aspirations in the

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 29; V. I. Lenin, "Preface to N. Bukharin's Pamphlet, 'Imperialism and the World Economy'", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 105-06.

² H. Laufenberg, F. Wolffheim, *Demokratie und Organisation*, Druck und Verlag von H. Laufenberg, Hamburg, 1919, S. 30-31; CPA, IML, f. 2, op. 1. d. 3562, l. 17.

masses, creates democratic institutions, aggravates the antagonism between imperialism's denial of democracy and the mass striving for democracy".¹ He showed that even in countries where bourgeois-democratic transformations had in the main already been carried out, a socialist uprising against imperialism was inextricably linked to the upsurge of democratic resistance and indignation at imperialism which bared its most reactionary essence during the war. At the same time, Lenin noted that under imperialism, even the movements aimed against feudal and semi-feudal relations and institutions acquired an anti-imperialist character, for capitalism recreated old calamities "in a new guise and restores their old forms on a 'modern' basis".² That made it possible for two revolutionary movements, the socialist and the general democratic, to draw together in their drive against a common enemy, imperialism.

In analysing the historically specific relation between the drive for democracy and the struggle for socialism—in the conditions of imperialism and the world war—Lenin connected the success of the forthcoming socialist revolution to the growth of the democratic movement in capitalist society, showing that without a comprehensive revolutionary struggle for democracy, the struggle for socialism and its victory were impossible. "The proletariat," Lenin wrote in 1915, "cannot be victorious except through democracy, i.e., by giving full effect to democracy and by linking with each step of its struggle democratic demands formulated in the most resolute terms."³ In the struggle for democracy the proletariat gained political education, and, fighting for the needs of the popular masses, developed as a champion of consistent revolutionary democracy and the leading force of the liberation movement. Of paramount importance for the proletariat is its development in conditions of democracy "as a freer, wider and clearer form of class oppression and class struggle".⁴ All that prepares the working class for the struggle for socialism, helps it rally the democratic forces, and increasingly draws new sections of the population into the socialist struggle. Besides, Lenin added, "the struggle for the main thing may blaze up even though it has begun with the struggle for something partial".⁵ The socialist revolution is impossible without the

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Reply to P. Kievsky (Y. Pyatakov)", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, pp. 24-25.

² V. I. Lenin, "New Data on the Laws Governing the Development of Capitalism in Agriculture", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 95.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 408.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 145.

⁵ V. I. Lenin to Inessa Armand, December 25, 1916, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 268.

support of a mass democratic movement, without the revolutionary creative effort by the popular masses unshackled by anti-popular obstacles. That makes the revolution victorious and invincible. Lenin wrote: "socialism is impossible without democracy because: 1) the proletariat cannot perform the socialist revolution unless it prepares for it by the struggle for democracy; 2) victorious socialism cannot consolidate its victory and bring humanity to the withering away of the state without implementing full democracy".¹

At the same time, Lenin stressed that it was under democracy that imperialism further consolidated its sway by indirectly expanding the omnipotence of capital, that imperialism would avert revolutions by reforms and that "the domination of finance capital and of capital in general is not to be abolished by *any* reforms in the sphere of political democracy".²

Lenin warned against relegating the proletariat's socialist goals to the background of the general democratic movement, against reducing the socialist programme to one of immediate democratic demands. He stressed that "*never* is a 'transition to a basically different social system' achieved *either* by the definite demands of the minimum programme ... *or the sum total* of the minimum-programme demands. To think so is to move over to the reformist position in principle and to abandon the standpoint of the socialist revolution."³ In December 1916, Lenin noted: "One should know how to *combine* the struggle for democracy and the struggle for the socialist revolution, *subordinating* the first to the second. In this lies the whole difficulty; in this is the whole essence."⁴ He did not see bourgeois democracy as the acme of social politics (the way bourgeois reformers and opportunists saw it) but as a wider and freer field of struggle for the coming socialist revolution—not "into the past, to peaceful capitalism", but "into the future, to the social revolution".⁵ As regards socialism, he saw it as a tremendous expansion of democracy, as its entirely different level, when it would become genuine democracy for most of the population, for the working masses. Revealing the dialectical connection between the drive for democracy and the struggle for socialism, Lenin resolutely refuted attempts at picturing the Bolsheviks as enemies of

¹ V. I. Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 74.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 145.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Remarks on an Article about Maximalism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, pp. 384-85.

⁴ V. I. Lenin to Inessa Armand, December 25, 1916, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 267.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 18.

democratic transformations. He declared: "We are *in favour* of democratic demands, we *alone* are fighting for them *sincerely*, for because of the objective historical situation they cannot be advanced except in connection with the socialist revolution."¹

Lenin viewed the issues of national liberation movements as an integral part of the drive for democracy connected with the struggle for socialism. They were especially topical because the imperialist war exacerbated the antagonisms leading to the proletarian revolution, fomented national strife, and threatened many nations with subjugation. Meanwhile, internationalist Social-Democrats were often mistaken in their views on the prospects of national liberation wars and movements under imperialism. They opposed the proletariat's revolutionary struggle to the struggle for self-determination (Karl Radek), interpreted the demand for self-determination as a harmful, illusory utopia, and maintained that if the working class took part in solving national issues that would be distracting and extremely harmful (Pyatakov, Bosh, Bukharin). The negation of national wars under capitalism, a typical feature of Rosa Luxemburg's works, was set forth in the theses of the Internationale group as follows: "In this era of unbridled imperialism, national wars are no longer possible. The national interests only dupe the working popular masses into serving imperialism, their mortal enemy."²

That approach to national liberation movements could lead to adverse consequences, to an underestimation of the revolutionary forces, to an artificial narrowing-down of the anti-imperialist front. In his efforts to overcome such mistakes, Lenin published a series of works specially devoted to the national question as it emerged during the preparation for the proletarian revolution, the works which were later to become an integral part of the Third International platform ("The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", "The Junius Pamphlet", "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" and others). "We must strongly emphasise," he wrote, "that this is done for the sake of self-criticism, which is so necessary to Marxists, and submitting to an all-round test the views which must serve as the ideological basis of the Third International."³

Lenin showed that the mistaken ideas about the "obsolete" nature of national liberation movements under imperialism often stemmed from the long struggle conducted by, say, the Polish and Dutch Social-Democrats in their distinct national conditions—"small

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Peace Programme", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 164.

² Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 4, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1974, S. 44.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Junius Pamphlet", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 306.

nations with *centuries-old* traditions and pretensions to *Great-Power status*",¹ against the deception of the people by the nationalist bourgeoisie. Besides, one of the motives behind the rejection of the nations' self-determination by the Social-Democrats in some countries was the bourgeoisie's attempt at using that demand to justify involvement in the imperialist war. However, when that perfectly legitimate and understandable position dictated by the distinctive conditions obtaining in a country was treated as absolute, elevated to the status of a general theory, or uncritically borrowed by the Social-Democrats of other countries, it produced a fallacious concept.² Besides, Lenin explained, those mistakes reflected an abstract, non-historical notion of imperialism, a lack of understanding of the diversity of the economic, social and political processes merging and overlapped within the framework of imperialism. "National wars *against* the imperialist powers are not only possible and probable", Lenin objected to Rosa Luxemburg's reasoning, "they are inevitable, *progressive* and *revolutionary though* of course, to be *successful*, they require either the concerted effort of huge numbers of people in the oppressed countries (hundreds of millions in our example of India and China), or a *particularly* favourable conjuncture of international conditions (e.g., the fact that the imperialist powers cannot interfere, being paralysed by exhaustion, by war, by their antagonism, etc.), or the *simultaneous* uprising of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in one of the big powers (this latter eventuality holds first place as the most desirable and favourable for the victory of the proletariat)."³

The differences in the objective position of nations, some of them in the category of the oppressed and others in that of the oppressors, were reflected, Lenin explained, in the different tactics pursued by proletarian parties: the demand by the Social-Democrats in the oppressor nations of the nations' freedom to secede, and the defence by Social-Democrats in the oppressed countries of the nations' right to voluntarily join unions. There could be no other way to internationalism.⁴

Lenin's approach to the national question proceeded from the new and vitally important precept that the demand for the nations' right to self-determination was applicable not only to a bourgeois-democratic but also to a socialist revolution.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Nascent Trend of Imperialist Economism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 21.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 347-49.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Junius Pamphlet", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 312.

⁴ See V. I. Lenin, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22 pp. 346-47.

Lenin developed and specified his pre-war conclusions about the possibility and need for the proletariat to rely, in the struggle against imperialism, on the support of the national liberation movements which cleared the way for the socialist revolution, "bring it closer, extend its basis, and draw new sections of the petty bourgeoisie and the semi-proletarian masses into the socialist struggle".¹ He noted the beginning of a new stage in the development of the national liberation movements: "Imperialism is the era of the oppression of nations on a *new* historical basis."² One of the consequences of the monopoly stage of capitalism was that imperialism "accelerates capitalist development in the most backward countries, and thereby extends and intensifies the struggle against national oppression".³ The territorial division of the world, the intensification of national oppression and colonial plunder, the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for markets and spheres of influence and, finally, imperialist wars to re-divide the already divided world—all that inevitably led to the emergence of "new", in Lenin's words, "bourgeois-democratic national movements"⁴ that differed radically from the previous movements during the rise of the European bourgeoisie. In that connection Lenin argued that the national liberation movement, now aimed against imperialism, the common enemy of the working masses in the capitalist countries and of the oppressed masses in the colonies and depended countries, was an ally of the revolutionary movement of the working class.

In early 1916 Lenin wrote the theses "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" which contained a clear-cut formulation of the national question in the period preceding the proletarian revolution. It was based on the fundamentally important principle that the nations' self-determination could only be consistently implemented as a result of a victorious socialist revolution. Showing the organic connection between the national liberation struggle and the proletarian revolution Lenin stressed that increased national oppression under imperialism means that Social-Democracy "should make greater use of the conflicts that arise in this sphere, *too*, as grounds for mass action and for revolutionary attacks on the bourgeoisie".⁵

¹ V. I. Lenin, "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 339.

² V. I. Lenin, "Miscellaneous Notes. 1912-16", *Collected Works*, Vol. 39, p. 739.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 78.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Miscellaneous Notes. 1912-16", *Collected Works*, Vol. 39, p. 739.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 146.

Maintaining that "most of the countries and the majority of the world's population have not even reached, or have only just reached, the capitalist stage of development",¹ he believed it logical that various progressive social movements and revolutions should emerge, aimed against imperialism and the obsolete socio-economic structures and reactionary regimes imperialism keeps afloat. Lenin laid down the scientific basis for studying major liberation movements under imperialism; he pointed out the leading role the proletariat's revolutionary struggle played in it and showed how different sections are united in the overall anti-imperialist movement. In that connection, he concluded that "the social revolution can come only in the form of an epoch in which are combined civil war by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries and a *whole series* of democratic and revolutionary movements, including the national liberation movement, in the undeveloped, backward and oppressed nations".²

Another important contribution to the theory of socialist revolution was Lenin's wartime concept of the diversity of "*forms of democracy and... forms of transition to socialism*". Underlying it was his analysis of the common and distinguishing features of imperialism in different countries, of the differences among their trusts and banks, and of the political structures being mostly uniform. "The same variety", he wrote, "will manifest itself also in the path mankind will follow from the imperialism of today to the socialist revolution of tomorrow. All nations will arrive at socialism—this is inevitable, but all will do so in not exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its own to some form of democracy, to some variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the varying rate of socialist transformations in the different aspects of social life. There is nothing more primitive from the viewpoint of theory, or more ridiculous from that of practice, than to paint, 'in the name of historical materialism', *this* aspect of the future in the monotonous grey. The result will be nothing more than Suzdal daubing."³

Lenin could detect unity in diversity, and he did not sacrifice the latter for the sake of the former. He gave concrete meaning to the concept "the social revolution in the period of imperialism". He saw the impending revolution not as an exclusive confrontation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie but as a confrontation between the bourgeoisie and a whole group of anti-imperialist movements (proletarian, semi-proletarian, petty-bourgeois, national liberation, etc.), not as an instantaneous occurrence but as

¹ V. I. Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, pp. 58-59.

² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 69-70.

a long and very complex process of truly renovating the world. "The social revolution," he wrote in 1915, "is not a single battle, but a period covering a series of battles over all sorts of problems of economic and democratic reform, which are consummated only by the expropriation of the bourgeoisie."¹

Lenin's analysis of imperialism and his development of the theory of socialist revolution were of great ideological, theoretical and political significance for the growth of the world revolutionary movement, for the rallying of its forces on an international scale and its success in different countries, above all in Russia. He thus laid the ideological and theoretical groundwork for the Third International and for today's international communist movement.

THE ORGANISATIONAL AND POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY INTERNATIONALIST FORCES

The drive for a revolutionary withdrawal from the imperialist war required unity among the internationalists of all countries. It was all the more necessary since the opportunists, having sided with the imperialist governments, continued to play on the idea of international socialist unity. Some Socialists ignored the ideological and political collapse of the Second International and were actually trying to re-establish it on a social-nationalist basis, or even by reconciling the social-chauvinists of enemy countries. The Bolsheviks played a decisive part in consolidating the revolutionary forces of the anti-war movement. They aimed to achieve real international unity of labour and above all to consolidate the revolutionary vanguard, to unite the elements of the Third International.

While insisting on a complete break with the opportunists as a matter of principle, Lenin was aware of the considerable difficulties inherent in the implementation of that course, let alone in the formation of new, independent Marxist parties. One had to take into account the uneven development of the working-class movement in different countries, the distinct situation in each of them, their specific experience and the outlook for different parties. Lenin stressed that internationally passed resolutions could not solve issues relating to "either the speed or the concrete conditions of the struggle against social-chauvinism within the *individual* countries; in this respect, the autonomy of the various parties is beyond dispute".² As a sober and farsighted politician, he thought

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 408.

² V. I. Lenin, "On the Struggle Against Social-Chauvinism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 203.

that, perhaps, the time was not yet best for the creation of new, independent Marxist parties. "The immediate future," he wrote in July 1915, "will show whether the conditions are mature for the formation of a new and Marxist International. If they are, our Party will gladly join such a Third International, purged of opportunism and chauvinism. If they are not, then that will show that a more or less protracted period of evolution is needed for that purging to be effected. Our Party will then form the extreme opposition within the old International, pending the time when the conditions in the various countries make possible the formation of an international workingmen's association standing on the basis of revolutionary Marxism."¹ From that position, Lenin worked towards consolidation of the revolutionary Social-Democrats in the Zimmerwald Movement, named after the village of Zimmerwald in the Swiss Alps, near Bern, where the first International Socialist Conference was held in September 1915.

The idea of holding that Conference was put forward by the Italian Socialist Party. In May 1915 it decided to convene a conference of those parties and labour organisations (or their parts) which remained loyal to the principles and decisions of the International and were ready to launch a drive against the policy of "civil peace" without delay, for an immediate peace on the basis of the proletarian class struggle. Soon sponsorship passed to those favouring Centrism; they were led by Robert Grimm, Secretary of the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland and editor of the newspaper *Berner Tagwacht*.

A preparatory meeting for the Conference showed that its sponsors, ostensibly seeking to unite all the opposition groups, were planning to invite mostly centrists. They even talked of inviting social-chauvinists from the leadership of the French, Dutch and Swedish Socialist Parties. On the other hand, they rejected a proposal made on behalf of the RSDLP Central Committee about inviting representatives of the Dutch Marxists, the Bulgarian Tesnyaks, the Scandinavian leftists, the entire German left-wing group, and the Latvian Social-Democrats to take part in the preparatory meeting.² The Conference was supposed to call on the proletariat to take joint action for peace and set up a centre for that purpose, but not to establish a new International.

All that resembled the recent futile attempts at restoring international ties. International conferences—of the Italian and Swiss socialists at Lugano (September 1914), of socialists from the neutral

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Socialism and War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 330.

² *Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung. Protokolle und Korrespondenz*, Bd. 1. Hrsg. von H. Lademacher, Mouton, The Hague-Paris, 1967, S. 37-40.

countries in Copenhagen (January 1915), a socialist women's conference in March and a socialist youth conference in April 1915—all showed that their participants ignored the collapse of the Second International and the necessity to fight social-chauvinism. Therefore, even if such conferences were based on the best of intentions, "at best they were *marking time*".¹

Even the women's and youth conferences, which were attended by Bolsheviks, did not go beyond pacifist resolutions. Most delegates, including some of the left-wingers, voted in favour of decisions which appeared essentially correct, which described the war as imperialist, condemned the slogan of "defending the fatherland", called on the workers to take mass action, etc., but hinged on the hope that the existing Social-Democratic parties and their leaders were capable of changing their course. Many left-wingers failed to see that that called for unremitting struggle against social-chauvinists and their supporters. That explained why the RSDLP Central Committee delegation refused to vote in favour of the resolution adopted by the women's conference. At the youth conference, the Bolshevik delegation was not allowed to state its views fully, and walked out in protest. Only then, as a compromise solution, the Bolshevik draft resolution was published.

But no matter how greatly the broad participation in the Conference by Centrists of various hues complicated the consolidation of the left, whatever the attempts of Centrist leaders, that, Lenin maintained, was no reason for giving up the idea of a new, revolutionary International. It was very important to use that opportunity for solving the key problem on the agenda: "To rally these Marxist elements, however small their numbers may be at the outset; ... in their name, ... to call upon the workers of all lands to break with the chauvinists and rally about the old banner of Marxism...".²

Spontaneous mass feelings against the war were often tinged with pacifism and combined with Centrist sermons which offered peace slogans as a substitute for revolutionary activity. No matter what their true intentions, many honest anti-war socialists were drawn into taking that path.

That was why Lenin was especially emphatic about revolutionary Social-Democrats coming out with "a common declaration of *principle* (1) unquestionably condemning the social-chauvinists and opportunists, (2) giving a programme of revolutionary action..., (3) against the watchword of 'defence of the fatherland', etc."³

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Socialism and War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 325.

² *Ibid.*, p. 328.

³ V. I. Lenin to Alexandra Kollontai, later than July 11, 1915, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, pp. 193-94.

While discussing those issues with his party comrades, Lenin lost no time in trying to establish the necessary contacts with the revolutionaries in other countries so as to prepare a joint declaration. It could help in their ideological and, consequently, organisational cohesion. Concerned with finding a joint basis for that international declaration, Lenin specifically noted the possibility of several acceptable formulas, of concessions as regards details. Through his personal correspondence and contacts, through Karl Radek, Alexandra Kollontai and David Wijnkoop Lenin was mobilising all the left elements of the international working-class movement to work out a joint statement. An important contribution was the launching, at the time of the conference, of the Bolshevik periodical *Communist*. The first issue contained three articles by Lenin, including "The Collapse of the Second International" and the pamphlet "Socialism and War" which explained the Bolshevik resolutions on war, revolution and the International.¹

The endeavour to unite and consolidate the left and achieve their wide representation at the Conference ran into obstacles erected by its organisers. Aside from that, the theoretical and political position of several left-wing representatives was not clear-cut enough, and that was also demonstrated during the drafting of their declaration on the eve of the Conference. Lenin was looking for a clear formulation of the issue of combatting social-chauvinism. He prepared a left-wing draft resolution which upheld the Bolsheviks' fundamental policy in a way that best suited other revolutionary Social-Democrats.²

Before the Conference began, a separate meeting of revolutionary internationalists was held on Lenin's initiative. Apart from Bolsheviks and Polish Social-Democrats, it was attended, according to some sources, by Latvian Social-Democrats, left-wing internationalists from Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway, Centrist opposition activists of the French trade union movement, and Trotsky. As agreed in advance by the Russian and the Polish delegates, the meeting decided to present the Conference with a draft resolution prepared by Radek and amended by Lenin. Lenin delivered a report on the nature of the world war and the tactics of international Social-Democracy. Amended and expanded, the revolutionary Social-Democrats' draft resolution "The World War and

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Collapse of the Second International", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 205-59; "Socialism and War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 295-338.

² See V. I. Lenin, "The Draft Resolution Proposed by the Left Social-Democrats to the First International Socialist Conference", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 345-48; "The First International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, pp. 349-51.

the Tasks of Social-Democracy" generally reflected the Bolshevik view.¹

The Zimmerwald Conference was held from September 5 to 8, 1915. The composition of those in attendance was not favourable for the course Lenin had mapped out to win approval. Most of the 38 delegates from 11 countries vacillated and almost followed Kautsky. Led by Ledebour of Germany, they made up the right wing of the Conference. That right wing enjoyed the support of the so-called Zimmerwald Centre, represented primarily by Grimm, Trotsky and Roland-Holst. The group of eight left-wing internationalists was led by Lenin and represented Russian, Latvian, Polish, German, Swiss, Swedish and Norwegian Social-Democrats. Their allies, the Dutch Tribunists, were not present at the Conference but supported the Bolshevik ideological stand. Liebknecht also declared his support of the revolutionary internationalists in his letter to the Conference.²

Another reason why a consistent course was difficult to pursue at the Conference was that its right wing, which inclined towards centrism to a varying extent, included many honest Social-Democrats who simply did not understand the harm done by erroneous action and slogans or treated the peculiarities of the working-class movement in the country they knew as absolute. Lenin examined their reasoning and objections to the left-wing draft resolution, trying to find common points. In his opinion, a certain amount of compromise was possible in adopting the Conference's resolution.³

He had to reckon with the fact that by far not all the delegates were capable of seeing through the centrist assertions to the effect that the questions of overthrowing capitalism would only arise after the war. Not all realised that it would mean renouncing immediate propaganda and preparation of revolutionary action and the action itself. Lenin therefore patiently explained the link between the revolutionary situation and revolution and the tasks that entailed. Recalling that the war had given rise to an extremely acute crisis and evoked revolutionary sentiment, he wrote in the pamphlet "Socialism and War", which was distributed among Conference delegates, about the need to help that sentiment spread and develop in the proper direction. "It is impossible to foretell," Lenin stressed, "whether a powerful revolutionary movement will

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "The World War and the Tasks of Social-Democracy", *Complete Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 487-88 (in Russian).

² Karl Liebknecht, *Ausgewählte Reden...*, S. 315-17.

³ See V. I. Lenin, "Revolutionary Marxists at the International Socialist Conference, September 5-8, 1915", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 391; "The First International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, p. 355. *Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung...*, Bd. 1, S. 153-54.

flare up in connection with, during or after the first or the second imperialist war of the Great Powers; in any case it is our bounden duty to work systematically and unswervingly in this direction."¹ He believed that the question of when the proletariat would turn to revolutionary action and the ways and forms this would assume could not yet be solved definitively because the way events and the mass movement developed had not yet produced the necessary conditions. The task was to determine in general a correct political line, and to publicise it with due regard to national, local, occupational and other peculiarities.

One had to select forms of action which, without prejudice to the success of the Conference, would prevent it from leaning to the right and force certain concessions even on the extreme right wing.

The alignment of forces at the Zimmerwald Conference made it impossible for the revolutionary Social-Democrats to secure adoption of their draft resolution and manifesto which Lenin thoroughly substantiated in the course of the heated debate.² In the commission charged with drafting the Conference's general document, where he alone represented the Zimmerwald Left Wing, and at plenary sessions, Lenin had to fight against insistent right-wing attempts at drafting the manifesto in a spirit that suited the right wing. As a result, "a number of fundamental ideas of revolutionary Marxism were adopted".³

Analysing the text of the manifesto, Lenin pointed out that it, in practice, "signifies a step towards an ideological and practical break with opportunism and social-chauvinism", although it was inconsistent and not forthright enough.⁴ For example, while the manifesto included the most important points from the Zimmerwald left-wing draft resolution concerning the imperialist war, it failed to note the fact that objective conditions were ripe for socialism. While criticising the bourgeois idea of "defending the fatherland", it said nothing about the way prominent leaders and the press of the socialist movement assiduously advertised it. In time with the left-wing draft resolution, the manifesto stated that in voting for budgetary appropriations, accepting ministerial posts and recognising "civil peace" socialist and labour organisations violated their obligations stemming from decisions by Second International con-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Socialism and War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 313.

² See V. I. Lenin, "The First International Socialist Conference at Zimmerwald", *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, pp. 353-55; "Revolutionary Marxists at the International Socialist Conference, September 5-8, 1915", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 389-93.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The First Step", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 384.

⁴ See V. I. Lenin, "The First Step", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 384-85; *Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung...*, Bd. 1, S. 166-69.

gresses, that the ISB had failed to perform its duty. However, no explanation was offered on this point, and nothing was said about the opportunist-induced collapse of the Second International. The manifesto and the resolution the conference passed, expressing sympathy with the imprisoned and persecuted political fighters, said that the struggle for peace was the struggle for freedom, for an international brotherhood and socialism, and stressed the necessity of sacrifices in fighting for "the common cause", "for the sacred ideals of socialism". They acclaimed the revolutionary fighters as an example to follow and asserted the need to "awaken the revolutionary spirit". But, although the manifesto repeated the draft resolution in that the struggle for peace meant revolutionary struggle for socialism, it failed to say anything directly about revolutionary means of struggle.

The Zimmerwald Left signed the manifesto viewing it as a call to struggle it was ready to join "hand in hand with the other parts of the International". At the same time, they issued a special statement, which noted the shortcomings in the manifesto and proclaimed their intention "to uphold resolutely the Marxist position with regard to the tasks that the era of imperialism has faced the proletariat with".¹

Lenin said it would be a sectarian mistake to refuse to take that step when the situation still offered complete freedom and the opportunity to criticise inconsistency and accomplish more: "It would be poor war tactics to refuse to adhere to the mounting international protest movement against social-chauvinism just because this movement is slow, because it takes 'only' a single step forward and because it is ready and willing to take a step backward tomorrow."²

The Zimmerwald Conference made it possible to consolidate an international group of revolutionary Social-Democracy, the Zimmerwald Left, and opened the way to a unification in which that group agreed to "certain compromises with the Kautskyites, with the Left Mensheviks ... and with a section of the Socialist-Revolutionaries".³ That compromise, which implied an ideological and political struggle against those of its participants who were inconsistent, vacillated and sometimes even opposed revolution, spelled, in the final analysis, progress towards a break with social-chauvinism and opportunism along the line charted in *The War and Russian Social-Democracy*, a Lenin-drafted manifesto of the RSDLP Central Committee (1914), and insistently upheld by the Bolsheviks.

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Complete Works*, Vol. 27, pp. 492, 493 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, "The First Step", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 387.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Left-Wing' Communism—an Infantile Disorder", *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 72.

Another sign was the setting up at the Conference of the International Socialist Commission (ISC), which, although headed by semi-Centrists, was formed over the objections by the old ISB and on the basis of a manifesto condemning the latter's tactics. Significance of the conference, Lenin wrote, is the "first step to the III International; half-hearted and inconsistent step *towards a split* with opportunism...."¹

The subsequent development of the Zimmerwald movement fully bore out that description. For a certain period, the word "Zimmerwald" emerged as a slogan consolidating forces for the anti-war struggle; it influenced the development of the socialist and mass working-class movement throughout the world. Despite efforts by the leaders of several Social-Democratic parties who condemned the Zimmerwald decisions and did all they could to hamper their dissemination, these decisions did make headway. Many Social-Democratic and other workers' organisations and opposition groups favoured joining the Zimmerwald Union. Its influence kept spreading to the working masses across countries and continents.²

At the same time, the centrist orientation of the right wing of the Zimmerwald Union made itself felt too, as did its reluctance to break with social-chauvinism and its pacifist interpretation of the anti-war struggle. The right wing kept pushing the Union into strengthening its ties with Kautsky. In turn, Kautsky and Haase said they supported the Zimmerwald Conference decisions. A typical situation in this respect was that in Germany, on the one hand, the growing mass anti-war movement and discontent led the Social-Democratic centrists in the Reichstag under Haase, Bernstein and Ledebour to vote against war appropriations on December 21, 1915, but, on the other hand, they fought against the course of the revolutionary Internationale group aimed at unifying the revolutionary elements of German Social-Democracy and establishing the Third International. In the former case the Centrists' "rebellion" did not go beyond opposing the continuation of the war; they alleged that since Germany's frontiers and independence were no longer in danger, the Centrist course was based, among other things, on the Zimmerwald Conference decisions. Simultaneously, right-wing Zimmerwalders tried to argue that the course of the Internationale ran counter to the Zimmerwald manifesto.

Meanwhile, the Zimmerwald Left continued their course towards a break with social-chauvinism. They saw the Zimmerwald manifesto only as a starting point and tried to develop its provisions

¹ V. I. Lenin to G. Y. Zinoviev, after September 8, 1915, *Collected Works*, Vol. 43, p. 489.

² See Arnold Reisberg, *Lenin und die Zimmerwalder Bewegung*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1966, S. 186-92.

further by consolidating the truly revolutionary forces. In November 1915, Lenin wrote: "The Zimmerwald Manifesto itself is *inadequate*; Kautsky and Co. are ready to put up with it, on *condition* that there is 'not a step further'. We *don't* accept this, because it is *complete hypocrisy*."¹ The Zimmerwald Left disseminated the materials they had prepared for the Conference. The publication of *International Leaflets* and *Der Vorbote*, a theoretical periodical, was launched. Bolshevik organisations in Russia and abroad made an enormous contribution to the struggle for the Zimmerwald Left course. All those efforts by Lenin and his comrades in the international socialist movement were based on developing mass revolutionary activity. The left wing in the Zimmerwald movement was growing stronger under their influence. However, the ISC under Grimm tried to interpret the Zimmerwald decisions in a right-of-centre spirit.

Lenin opposed those schemes and insisted that further efforts to specify and develop the principles unanimously approved by the Zimmerwald Conference should not distort them. In a letter, he reminded the ISC that the Zimmerwald documents spoke about the link between the struggle for peace and the struggle for socialism, the proletariat's revolutionary class struggle, and about the Conference's "solemn promise" "to arouse the revolutionary spirit in the masses of the international proletariat". Lenin suggested discussing issues concerning the link between the struggle for peace and mass revolutionary action, the link between social-patriotism and opportunism, and of national self-determination at ISC sessions and then at a new conference of internationalists "since giving effect to *united action* on an international scale calls for both clarity of fundamental ideological views and a precise definiteness in all practical methods of action". Lenin did not expect to bring about prompt unification "of the *basic currents and trends* in present-day international socialism". However, he thought it important to at least identify the differing positions and still more important to explain them to the workers. That would help the masses understand the various trends within the Zimmerwald movement, especially with relation to their own practical action.² Lenin pursued the same course at an expanded conference convened by the ISC in February 1916 and in the course of preparations for the second conference of the Zimmerwald Union. His "Proposals Submitted by the Central Committee of the RSDLP to the Second Socialist Conference" were circulated to all Bolshevik organisations and left-wing Social-

¹ V. I. Lenin to Alexandra Kollontai, November 9, 1915, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 211.

² See V. I. Lenin, "To the International Socialist Committee (I.S.C.)", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 372, 373.

Democrats in France, Germany, Britain, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and other countries, to be discussed.¹

By that time the growth of the anti-war movements prompted the centrists and some right-wing socialists to step up their anti-war propaganda; however, they merely demanded a democratic peace and avoided slogans of revolutionary struggle. An alliance of the Centrists and social-chauvinists on a pacifist platform posed a very real threat not only to the development but also to the survival of the Zimmerwald movement. Therefore, Lenin and internationalists from other countries decided to use the second conference of the Zimmerwald Union to further expose the social-chauvinists, to criticise social-pacifists, to publicise a revolutionary withdrawal from the war, and to enlist the support of all those capable of fighting for that goal.

The second Conference of the Zimmerwalders was held at the mountain village of Kienthal, near Berne, from April 24 to 30, 1916. By that time, the Zimmerwald Left had strengthened their position. Despite the fact that some of them were unable to attend (those from Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Latvia, and members of the Bohrhardt group), the left were more numerous than in Zimmerwald; on essential issues, the left-wing group enjoyed the support of the German Internationale group, and of a number of other delegates on various other issues. The strength of the left-wing group at the Conference, according to the positions taken by delegates, varied from 10 to 13; on certain issues it commanded 19 votes, that is, about half of all the votes at the Conference.²

Accordingly, the position of the Zimmerwald Right was weakened, the Zimmerwald Centre expanded but leaned increasingly to the left; generally, the Zimmerwald Right did not have enough majority to pursue their policy.

At the Conference, the Bolsheviks remained the core of the Zimmerwald Left. Lenin conducted several meetings of left-wing delegates and discussed "The Proposals of the RSDLP Central Committee" with them. A draft resolution, "The Question of Peace and Social-Democracy", was worked out on the basis of Lenin's proposals. In the course of his daily contacts with delegates from different countries, Lenin learned about the moods prevalent among workers and explained the position of the Zimmerwald Left. As a result, Grimm's amended theses which were approved by the Conference, contained critical remarks with regard to pacifism, and they reflected the views of the Zimmerwald Left. Lenin also led the struggle against

¹ See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 373, note 65.

² See V. I. Lenin to A. G. Shlyapnikov, between May 6 and 13, 1916, *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, p. 390; Vol. 22, p. 373, note 65.

attempts at resurrecting the old International incorporating the social-chauvinists under the pretext of convening the ISB.

The strengthening of the Zimmerwald Left and the upsurge of the mass anti-war movement forced concessions on the Zimmerwald right wing. It voted for a very harsh denunciation of the ISB and supported a resolution against social-pacifism which warned the workers against the false "socialist" hopes of peace isolated from mass revolutionary struggle for socialism. However, those ideas were not expressed with sufficient resolve in all aspects, and the criticism of the ISB failed to produce a conclusion about a break with the renegades who had abandoned socialism or about the need to build a Third International. The manifesto "To the Peoples Suffering Pillaging and Destruction" was a particularly weak document of the Conference even though it unequivocally denounced social-chauvinists.

Summing up, Lenin described the Conference as "a small step forward; indeed, marking time". He regarded the adoption of the manifesto and resolutions criticising pacifism and harshly condemning the ISB as positive accomplishments. He noted that, on the one hand, the Kienthal decisions reflected a trend towards a break with the social-patriots, but, on the other, the left-of-centre desire to avoid a forthright debate on the struggle against opportunism, let alone resolving to break with opportunists, ran through the entire course of the Conference and its decisions.¹ After Kienthal, it was still not clear whether the Zimmerwald movement would emerge as a step towards the establishment of a new International—without and against social-chauvinists—or the beginnings of a Third International—Zimmerwald and Kienthal would come to nothing. Everything depended on how successful the revolutionary trend would be as opposed to the conciliatory one.

The emergence of the Zimmerwald Left and the drive to expand its influence, the Bolsheviks' participation in the Kienthal Conference where they upheld a consistent revolutionary course, helped revolutionary Social-Democrats work out a correct anti-war programme. The Bolsheviks' organisational and political efforts created conditions for a new international revolutionary centre of the proletariat—the Third International.

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Additional sources on the subject: *A History of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Moscow, 1971; *The German Labour Movement in the Modern Times*, Moscow, 1962 (both in Russian); *Geschichte der*

¹ See V. I. Lenin, "The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 83.

deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, Bd. 2, Berlin, 1966; G. Haupt, *Socialism and the Great War. The Collapse of the Second International*, Oxford, 1972; L. J. Malvy, *Mon crime*, Paris, 1921; M. M. Karliner, *Labour Movement in Britain During the First World War (1914-1918)*, Moscow, 1961; I. M. Krivoguz, *The Second International, 1889-1914*, Moscow, 1964 (both in Russian); J. Kancewicz, "SDKPiL wobec zagadnien wojny, rewolucji i niepodleglosci polski w latach 1914-1918", *Ruch robotniczy i ludowy w Polsce (1914-1923)*, Warszawa, 1961; N. Ye. Korolyov, *Lenin and the International Labour Movement, 1914-1918*, Moscow, 1968; Yu. Bernov and A. Manusevich, *Lenin in Krakow*, Moscow, 1972; M. A. Birman, *The Struggle of the Left Social-Democrats in the Balkans Against Imperialist War in 1914-1915 and the Formation of the Balkan Labour Social-Democratic Federation*, Moscow, 1966; V. V. Oreshkin, *Problems of Imperialism in the Works of Bolsheviks. The Pre-October 1917 Period*, Moscow, 1968; N. Ye. Ovcharenko, *August Bebel. A Critical Survey of Life and Work*, Moscow, 1963; *Imperialism and the Struggle of the Working Class. A Collection of Articles in Memory of Th. Rothstein*, Moscow, 1960 (all in Russian); *August Bebel. Eine Biographie*, Berlin, 1963; J. Schleifstein, *Franz Mehring. Sein marxistisches Schaffen. 1891-1919*, Berlin, 1959; *Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung. Protokolle und Korrespondenz*, The Hague-Paris, 1967; A. Reisberg, *Lenin und die Zimmerwalder Bewegung*, Berlin, 1966; Ya. G. Tyomkin, B. M. Tupolev, *From the Second to the Third International*, Moscow, 1978 (in Russian).

Chapter 11

THE MASS PROLETARIAN MOVEMENT DURING WORLD WAR I

Despite the temporary victory of social-chauvinism in most workers' organisations, despite the collapse of the Second International and the confusion and disorganisation of the working people, the working class soon voiced its first protests against the imperialist war and the anti-popular policies of the ruling quarters. As expected, the proletariat was in the forefront of the mass anti-war movement which began in 1915 and, in some countries, evolved into revolutionary struggle against the existing system.

HOW THE WAR AFFECTED THE WORKING PEOPLE

World War I was unprecedented in its scope and consequences. It involved 34 countries whose direct military expenditures reached 208 billion dollars. Over 70 million people were mobilised to fight in that war; among them, almost 10 million were killed and over 20 million wounded and crippled. Such was the price nations paid for the imperialist bloodbath.

The war devastated the economies of many countries. It destroyed great amount of valuable property and disrupted traditional economic links; industries and transport deteriorated, agricultural output dropped abruptly. Major world resources—metals, fuels, electric power, cotton, etc.—were used for unproductive military purposes, for mutual destruction.

The working people bore the brunt of the imperialist war burden. For over 4 years, millions of workers and peasants wore military uniforms and killed and maimed one another in the name of the ruling classes' vested interests which were alien to them. Those left at home had to bear with merciless exploitation, physical and mental anguish, hunger, poverty and oppression.

The ruling quarters used the war to strangle democratic freedoms and cancel the social gains of the working people, to aim blows

at the working class movement, especially at its revolutionary vanguard.

For the ruling classes, war had long become a source of unprecedented profit. Wrote Lenin: "War is a 'terrible' thing? Yes. But it is a terribly *profitable* thing."¹

The militarisation of the economy during the war helped make enterprises larger, capital more concentrated and centralised, and the monopolies considerably more powerful; they accelerated the transformation of monopoly capital into its state-monopoly stage. "The war," Lenin stressed, "had done more than was done for twenty-five years. State control of industry has made progress in Britain as well as in Germany. Monopoly, in general, has evolved into state monopoly. The objective state of affairs has shown that the war has stepped up capitalist development, which has moved forward from capitalism to imperialism, from monopoly to state control."² The merging of the power of the bourgeois state and of the finance oligarchy during the imperialist war gave rise to military-state capitalism. Specially established military-economic state bodies which were, as a rule, headed by the big bourgeoisie directed the restructuring and militarisation of the economy and channeled the use of the entire production, power, raw materials and manpower to suit the interests of the largest monopoly conglomerates engaged in the war effort. They also controlled relations between labour and capital, and therefore the economic coercion of the workers was reinforced by direct violence.

Combining the giant power of the monopolies with that of the state, state-monopoly capitalism ensured the largest possible profits and crushed action by the working class and the oppressed nations. Lenin wrote of the increasingly "monstrous oppression of the working people by the state, which is merging more and more with the all-powerful capitalist associations... The advanced countries—we mean their hinterland—are becoming military convict prisons for the workers."³

The exceptionally rapid deterioration in the situation of the working people during the war, compared to their living and working conditions in the preceding period of peace, was brought about by the interaction of various factors. Millions of working people were sent to the front, killed and crippled; their families were deprived

¹ V. I. Lenin, "May Day and the War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 36, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971, p. 325.

² "The Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the RSDLP(B), April 24-29, 1917", V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 240.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 387.

of breadwinners, whether permanently or temporarily. In Russia, 15.8 million people were mobilised; in Germany, 13.2 million; in Austria-Hungary, 9 (11.9) million; in France, 7.9 million; in Britain, 5.7 million. The number of those killed in the war was 1.8 million, over 2 million, 1.1 million, 1.3 million and 715,000 respectively.¹ Mobilisation robbed the economy of the most efficient part of manpower, aged 18 to 50, and had a devastating effect on industry, transport and agriculture, exacerbating the already disastrous situation that plagued most of the population. Economic dislocation was especially great in areas where battles were fought or which were occupied by the enemy. Hundreds of thousands were driven from their homes and turned into refugees. The most essential means of sustenance were often commandeered, labour conscription was widespread. The German military established a harsh regime of occupation in the territories they had seized in France, Belgium, Romania, Poland, the Baltic regions and other areas.

The destruction of the productive forces in the course of the hostilities, the switching of major industries to meet war requirements, and the drop in production gave rise to an acute shortage of essential goods—first and foremost, food. Beginning in 1915, the belligerents gradually began to introduce rationing for many types of foodstuffs and industrial goods. At best, consumption quotas were only enough for near-starvation. Simultaneously, prices were rising. Already in 1915, malnutrition among the working population was common, and in 1916 famine began in many warring countries. The élite lived differently: war profiteering enabled them to buy food at black-market prices. The gluttony of the élite was in glaring contrast to the near-starvation and outright starvation of most of the population.

The war inflicted particular hardships on the proletariat of Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Serbia and other Balkan countries.

In Germany, the calory content of the daily per capita diet dropped to 40 per cent by the autumn of 1916 compared to the prewar level; the situation deteriorated further by the end of the war. The average daily per capita consumption of bread was 250 grams, and sometimes considerably less; the figure for meat consumption was 250 grams a week, consumption of fats was from 60 to 90 grams a week. Various ersatz foods were on the market.²

¹ B. Uralis, *Wars and the European Population. European Casualties in the Wars of the 17th to 20th Centuries (a Historical Statistical Study)*, Sotsekgiz, Moscow, 1960, pp. 391-92 (in Russian).

² *Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruchs im Jahre 1918*, Bd. 5, 2. Teil, Berlin, 1928, S. 137; A. Dix, *Wirtschaftskrieg und Kriegswirtschaft. Zur Geschichte des deutschen Zusammenbruchs*, Berlin, 1920, S. 293.

From 1915, strict rationing of foodstuffs was introduced in Austria-Hungary. After one year of the war, prices for mass consumption goods rose by 60 per cent. The plight of the working people in the Hapsburg monarchy was exacerbated by the fact that several categories of workers had their wages cut drastically. To maintain the war effort, labour conscription was forced on some of those mobilised to serve with the militia, and their wages cut.¹

In Italy, the situation of the working people began to deteriorate already before the country joined the war, mostly due to the rapid growth of unemployment. By January 1915 at least 1.5 million people were out of work. After Italy's entry into the war, living standards began to deteriorate faster, and despite mobilisation, unemployment persisted. Employers launched a large-scale offensive against the rights workers had won: collective bargaining agreements were canceled everywhere, wages decreased, working conditions worsened, and those voicing discontent were dismissed. Rationing was introduced in several cities only: the government did not believe it could ensure even rationed supplies. Food was not issued against rationing cards for weeks and even months. Profiteering was thriving. Over the war years, the cost of living (even according to official figures) rose by 200 to 300 per cent. The housing and fuel crisis grew increasingly acute.

Among the larger belligerents, the war brought the greatest hardships to Russia, above all to the proletariat and other urban and rural working people. Farms were deprived of a considerable part of their work force and of most draft animals. By mid-1917 the number of workhorses on farms fell by 5 million. Cultivation areas under cereals and fodder crops shrank considerably. The plight of the population was exacerbated by the widespread profiteering in foodstuffs. Inflation rapidly depreciated paper money. By 1917, bread prices almost doubled, meat prices more than tripled, there was an almost sixfold increase in salt prices; and respective figures were almost 5 times for cotton fabrics, 7 times for matches and 9 times for footwear. Cost-of-living adjustments lagged far behind growing prices: by early 1917 real wages were, on the average, only about 50 per cent of the prewar level. Consumption by the Russian working class, which had left much to be desired before the war, was about 57 per cent of the 1913 level in 1916; in 1916-1917 the figure dropped even lower, to 47 per cent. Constant malnutrition and starvation plagued a vast proportion of Russia's population.

The working people of Serbia, especially in Belgrade, suffered greatly from food shortages. Already in early 1915 bread prices

¹ Robert Danneberg, *Politik und Volkswirtschaft im dritten Kriegsjahre*, Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung Ignaz Brand und Co., Wien, 1917, S. 33.

grew fivefold. Chronic emaciation made people easily susceptible to various contagious diseases. By the summer of 1915, 130,000 people succumbed to epidemics in Serbia.

The world war disrupted Romania's traditional economic contacts. Raw materials were in short supply. In February 1915 the number of workers at metalworking enterprises in Bucharest decreased by 65 per cent compared to the prewar level. A drop in demand and an abrupt decline in foreign trade caused mass unemployment in the woodworking industry and among longshoremen. Already in October 1914 the supply of bread was erratic, other foodstuffs were unavailable or grew increasingly expensive. Food shortages especially worsened after Romania entered the war. In January 1917 there were bread riots in Jași. Epidemics were rampant.

The working people of Bulgaria were no better off. From 1915 to 1917, average market prices grew by 200 to 400 per cent, and for certain goods, 10 and even 12 times. Even though nominal wages somewhat increased, real wages diminished dramatically by 1917. The poorer sections of the working people began to starve as early as 1916.¹

The wartime deterioration of the situation of the working people in Britain and France was not as severe. The British and French ruling quarters ruthlessly plundered their colonies of food and raw materials and thus managed to alleviate the food crisis to a certain degree, to prevent it from becoming a famine which was ravaging other European belligerents.

But even though Britain and France were better off, the conditions of the working masses there deteriorated perceptibly during the war. As far as Britain was concerned, by late 1915 retail food prices rose by 45 per cent compared to July 1914, and in the summer of 1917, by 102 per cent. Bread and meat prices rose much faster. In 1916, real wages fell almost 20 per cent compared to July 1914. In France, the situation of the working people was in many respects similar. From 1914 to 1917 average money wages grew by 30 per cent, whereas the cost of living, by about 75 per cent.²

As to the United States, the 1914-1915 worsening in the situation of the working class was above all due to growing unemployment; the drop in the trade with European countries resulted in 6.5 million people being out of work in January 1915.³ Among those unemployed, unskilled immigrant workers, blacks and elderly workers were

¹ *Работнически вестник*, 1. 10. 1917, 25.04. 1918.

² Lucien March, *Mouvement des prix et des salaires pendant la guerre*, Les presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1925, pp. 297, 301.

³ *WASTE IN INDUSTRY*. By the Committee on Elimination of Waste in Industry of the Federated American Engineering Societies, Washington, 1921, p. 274.

especially numerous. Employment increased abruptly by early 1917, when the United States began vigorously preparing for entry into the war.

In Scandinavian countries, partial rationing was introduced by 1917. Simultaneously, the black market was flourishing. In Norway, the cost of living grew by 125 per cent in 1917 against the prewar level, while wages only grew by 77 per cent. In Sweden, a daily per capita bread ratio of 200 grams was introduced in February 1917. Even in Denmark, an agricultural country, bread and flour rationing was introduced in early 1917, and butter and fat rationing by the end of the year. Long lines in front of food stores became commonplace in Scandinavian cities.¹

The war brought about considerable changes in the composition of the proletariat and stepped up its exploitation. Non-proletarian elements, women and teenagers replaced mobilised workers. In some countries, the number of women and children employed in the mining, engineering, chemical and other industries increased by 4 to 8 times.² The labour of refugees from enemy-held territories, foreign workers, POWs and soldiers was also widely used. They all received meager wages.

By 1917, the strength of the industrial proletariat in Russia had grown from 4.3-4.5 to 4.6-4.8 million people. But since about 20 per cent of industrial workers had been mobilised, they were replaced with semi-proletarian and petty-bourgeois urban and rural elements, women and children. The share of women among industrial workers rose from 39 per cent in 1913 to 44 per cent in 1916. Young teenagers made up 11 per cent of the entire male work force in 1916 (25 per cent more than in 1913).³ New legislation allowed using women and children on night shifts and under ground, without strictly limiting their working hours. Women received only three quarters of adult male wages; teenagers, one half; and children, one third.

Like several other countries, Russia widely used the labour of POWs. In 1916, 1,636,000 POWs were employed in Russia,⁴ receiving starvation wages for hard labour. The plight of foreign workers—from China, Korea and Iran—was similar; the same was true of non-Russian workers, members of the country's national minorities.

¹ A. Kan. *A History of the Scandinavian Countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden)*, Visshaya Shkola, Moscow, 1971, p. 185 (in Russian).

² *The World War in Figures*, Gospolitizdat, Moscow-Leningrad, 1934, pp. 76, 79-80 (in Russian).

³ "The Factory Industry in 1913-1918", *Central Statistical Agency Transactions*, Vol. 26, Politizdat, Moscow, 1926, pp. 50, 100 (in Russian).

⁴ A. Sidorov, *Russia's Economic Situation During World War I*, Nauka, Moscow, 1973, p. 418 (in Russian).

The authorities also freely used conscripted refugee labour. Nevertheless, although there was a manpower shortage, over 500,000 people lost their jobs by 1917 due to bankruptcies of small enterprises.

During the war, the number of workers at defence enterprises, particularly in heavy industry, grew by 60 per cent. The large enterprises in the European part of the country employed about 72 per cent of the total number of workers.

Important changes occurred in the structure of the British working class. The share of highly skilled workers decreased, even in engineering and shipbuilding, while the number of unskilled workers grew by 50 per cent.¹ About 1,500,000 women joined the labour force, including that in the steel and mining industries. By the autumn of 1917, 250,000 teenagers aged 12 to 16 worked at enterprises controlled by the Munitions Ministry alone. Women, working 12 to 16, and sometimes even 18 to 20 hours a day, received one half and even one third of male wages; children received half what women made. In the summer of 1915, more than 250,000 workers imported from the colonies were employed in the British mining industry for meager wages.

The situation was similar in other countries too. The number of women employed in the French defence industry grew by 3 to 4 times, and they were often given hazardous jobs.² As many as 140,000 workers were brought in from China, Korea and Indochina to work under a special regime and discipline. In Germany, by the autumn of 1916, 4.3 million women were employed in industry³, including underground work. In Austria-Hungary, where women often made up 40 to 45 per cent of all workers, they were also employed in mining and at iron foundries. POW labour was widely used in Germany and Austria-Hungary; their wages were meager but working hours and conditions were established arbitrarily. In Romania, workshops and factories were full of ten-, eight- and even seven-year-olds; women and children often worked for months without a single Sunday off.

Working conditions deteriorated greatly in all nations involved in war. Hiding behind "patriotic" slogans, employers expanded and intensified the workday. A workday of 12 and more hours, including night-time work, Sundays and holidays, was quite common. In Austria-Hungary, the workday was 12 to 14, and sometimes 16 to 18 hours; in Bulgaria, the average was 10 to 12 but sometimes

¹ J. B. Jefferys, *The Story of the Engineers. 1800-1945*, Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., London, 1945, pp. 134-35.

² Arthur Fontaine, *French Industry during the War*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1926, pp. 53-54.

³ Karl Heinz Roth, *Die "andere" Arbeiterbewegung*, C. Trikont Verlag, München, 1976, S. 40.

15 to 16 hours; Russia's industrial workday, including compulsory overtime, was 16 hours; the workweek at British defence enterprises often reached 100 hours. The situation was similar in France and many other countries.

The intensive and protracted labour coupled with constant undernourishment and even outright hunger, with women, children, refugees and POWs employed in production greatly increased the number of industrial accidents (by over 50 per cent) and extremely adversely affected the workers' health, pushing the sickness rate high up. Ruthless exploitation, the abrupt worsening of the working and living conditions exhausted workers. "This slow death is not so conspicuous," the "War and Rising Prices" appeal to the nation by the RSDLP(B) Central Committee said on November 1, 1915. "There is no gunfire, no spectacular deaths; undernourishment, poor housing, cold and dreadfully unsanitary conditions are slowly and imperceptibly killing off workers in damp basements and attics, out of sight of the well-fed crowd."¹

By 1917 the working masses were in a disastrous situation. The unprecedented drop in the living standard, the trampling underfoot of the rights and freedoms it had taken decades to win, and the deaths of millions exacerbated social antagonisms to such an extent that the working people in many countries rose resolutely not only against the war itself but also against the system that had generated it. "Europe is pregnant with revolution," Lenin wrote in January 1917. "The monstrous horrors of the imperialist war, the suffering caused by the high cost of living everywhere engender a revolutionary mood; and the ruling classes, the bourgeoisie, and its servitors, the governments, are more and more moving into a blind alley from which they can never extricate themselves without tremendous upheavals."²

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MASS WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT

Extremely adverse conditions seriously hampered the development of the working-class movement during the world war; the processes that emerged in the working class were complex and contradictory. Freedom of speech and assembly was suppressed. Those who took part in strikes, rallies and demonstrations, those who wrote, published and distributed anti-war literature were severely persecuted, sent to the front or jailed. The workers' press had to contend with draconian wartime censorship or was simply banned.

¹ Quoted from: *The Working-Class Movement during the War*, Moscow, 1925, p. 8 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p. 253.

All that was true not only of countries with anti-democratic regimes (like Russia) but also of nations with bourgeois-democratic traditions (like Britain). Although the policy of "civil peace" between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie—a policy imposed by the authorities and supported by the social-chauvinists—differed in its forms, methods and intensity, in all countries it pursued essentially the same objective: mobilising the working class to fight the war to the victorious end.

The labour aristocracy and especially bureaucracy were agents of that policy. They were functionaries of labour organisations and their representatives in parliaments, city councils and various military-industrial committees—people who neglected the interests of the masses. The fact that many labour leaders openly sided with "their own" bourgeoisie and betrayed socialist ideals contributed, on the one hand, to confusion, disorder and vacillation among the proletariat; on the other hand, it all helped the more politically aware part of the workers see what conciliation was leading to; polarisation and the struggle of the revolutionary forces against social-chauvinism intensified in the movement.

The serious structural changes in the composition of the working class also exerted a contradictory influence on the development of the labour and socialist movement during the war years. The drafting of many proletarians into the army, the influx of a mass of petty-bourgeois elements, women and young people into industry and transport at first inevitably lowered the level of the proletariat's political awareness and its movement. But the harsh wartime conditions soon filled the new proletarian strata with discontent and indignation, thus expanding the mass basis of anti-war and anti-capitalist action.

In turn, the influx of the working class into the army made the latter more responsive to anti-war and anti-capitalist propaganda, in which conscripted revolutionary workers engaged actively in many countries, above all in Russia. As the war led to more deaths and increased the sufferings of the masses of soldiers, the army was awakening, turning from a reliable tool of militarism into a centre of discontent, dissent and, in some countries, into a force capable of turning its weapons against the ruling classes.

Already in late 1914 and early 1915 the workers began to gradually free themselves from the flag-waving enthusiasm. Open social-chauvinists were increasingly losing their influence with the masses. But the rise of class awareness, the understanding of the true causes and character of the war, of the path to a revolutionary withdrawal from it were a much more complex, slow and uneven process.

As the 1915-1916 developments showed, the accumulation by the masses of their own experience and the stepping up of the struggle

against social-chauvinism and Centrism played a decisive role in that. Polarisation was under way in Social-Democratic parties; some right-wing and Centrist Social-Democrats had to change their position. In Germany, things went as far as a split in the SPD. In other countries (France, Italy, Britain) the crisis of social-chauvinism was expressed in the diminishing moral and political prestige of right-wing leaders, in demands that socialist ministers resign from government, in the strengthening of the left and the growth of opposition among labour organisations.

The spontaneous upsurge of anti-war sentiment and action by the proletarian masses was combined with the growing political influence of revolutionary Social-Democrats. In both the warring and the neutral countries, their influence accelerated the transition of the working-class movement to revolutionary thinking and revolutionary action. Lenin defined 1915 as the year when mass action began. It first started in the belligerent countries and then in many neutral ones.

The proletariat's struggle was on the rise in *Russia*. Soon after the war broke out, mass mobilisation and repression temporarily hamstrung the working-class movement.

Many legal proletarian organisations were banned, and the trade unions that survived were under "special surveillance". Over the first 5 months of the hostilities, only 70 strikes occurred, and the number of strikers was less than 40,000. However, Lenin noted, by and large, the Russian working class proved immune to chauvinism.¹ As early as February and March 1915 the working-class movement was showing clear signs of revival; in spring and summer it grew rapidly despite tsarist reprisals (workers shot by firing squads in Kostroma and Ivanovo-Voznesensk).

After the start of the war the Bolsheviks continued to exert paramount influence on Russia's proletariat; in this they enjoyed the support of politically conscious workers, *Pravda's* permanent reading audience. Lenin wrote in March 1915: "The Pravdist papers and the 'Muranov type' of work have brought about the unity of four-fifths of the class-conscious workers of Russia. [The reference is to the Bolshevik faction in the Duma (M. K. Muranov was a member) which made revolutionary use of parliamentarianism and conducted clandestine propaganda and organisational work as the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee.] About forty thousand workers have been buying *Pravda*; far more read it. Even if war, prison, Siberia, and hard labour should destroy five or even ten times as many—this section of the workers *cannot* be annihilated. It is alive.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Socialism and War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 319.

It is imbued with the revolutionary spirit, is anti-chauvinist. It *alone* stands in the midst of the masses, with deep roots in the latter, as the champion of the internationalism of the toilers, the exploited, and the oppressed. It *alone* has held its ground in the general *débâcle*. It alone is leading the semi-proletarian elements *away* from the social-chauvinism of the Cadets, the Trudoviks, Plekhanov and *Nasha Zarya*, and *towards* socialism."¹

By the spring and summer of 1915 Bolshevik organisations had been largely re-established. The Central Committee under Lenin directed their work from abroad. In the autumn of 1915, the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee was reinstated. The largest regional organisations and party committees of Petrograd and Moscow played an important part. The press was also active: *Sotsial-Demokrat*, the central organ, was published abroad; in Russia, there were clandestine newspapers and legal publications formally unconnected to the Bolsheviks. Despite the growing difficulties, Russia's permanent contacts with foreign-based Bolshevik centres (the exchange of couriers, literature and correspondence) were restored within two months after the outbreak of the war. At that time, too, the Bolshevik leadership in Russia received Lenin's documents outlining internationalist tactics. The slogan on turning the imperialist war into a civil war was central to these documents.

The dissemination of clandestine leaflets was of special significance in awakening the working masses and directing their struggle, especially in conditions of draconian wartime censorship. The Bolsheviks used these leaflets to comment on all important current developments, commemorate revolutionary anniversaries, bring the truth about the war to workers, soldiers and peasants, and explain the revolutionary party's slogans. Before February 1917, Bolshevik organisations had published and disseminated over 580 different leaflets, a total of some 2 million copies.²

Petrograd Bolsheviks were the fastest and most thorough to reestablish their party organisation that adopted Lenin's tactics. By the summer of 1915 despite numerous arrests (from July 1914 to December 31, 1915, 411 Bolsheviks were arrested), the Petrograd party organisation numbered up to 500 members; by the autumn the figure rose to 1,200. It was larger than the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary organisations in the capital.³ In the working-class movement of Moscow which was regaining its strength after

¹ V. I. Lenin, "What Has Been Revealed by the Trial of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Duma Group", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 176.

² I. Dazhina, "On the Clandestine Bolshevik Press During World War I", *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Problems of CPSU History), No. 2, 1961, pp. 116-18, 123.

³ *Sotsial-Demokrat*, No. 47, October 13 (September 30), 1915, p. 1; I. Leiberov, "On the Emergence of the Revolutionary Situation in Russia during World War I", *Istoriya SSSR* (History of the USSR), No. 6, 1964, p. 41.

the arrests, Bolshevik organisations also predominated; by the autumn of 1915, their membership had reached 550. Bolsheviks worked through trade unions that had survived the reprisals, insurance agencies, hospital funds, legitimate periodicals and educational establishments. Simultaneously, they urged the proletariat to boycott the elections of representatives to "workers' groups" under the military-industrial committees (MICs).

The bourgeoisie initiated these committees in May 1915 to support tsarism and step up the industrial war effort; in July, it was decided to include workers' representatives in these bodies. The August plenary session of the RSDLP Central Committee decided to oppose the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries who supported the scheme, and to use the election campaign—the government-permitted mass rallies at Petrograd enterprises—to wage legal anti-war propaganda, to explain the Bolshevik attitude to the war and the revolutionary way to withdraw from it, and then to boycott the elections.

In the course of the election campaign, the Bolsheviks vied with the Mensheviks, who were allied with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, for influence on the industrial workers of the country's major centres. In Petrograd, the September city meeting of representatives to elect delegates to the Central MIC's workers' group adopted a resolution drafted by the St. Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP which proclaimed it "inadmissible in principle for representatives of the proletariat to serve on organisations promoting the current war in whatever way".¹ And only at a second, unlawfully convened meeting did the Mensheviks manage to elect delegates to the CMIC workers' group. However, they represented a minority of the Petrograd proletariat. The situation was the same in Moscow. In an overwhelming majority of other industrial centres, workers responded to the Bolshevik appeal and boycotted the elections; workers' groups were set up under only 58 of the 244 military-industrial committees.

Lenin highly valued the campaign to boycott the elections of representatives to workers' groups: "For the first time during the war, these elections have drawn *masses* of the proletarians into a discussion and solution of basic problems of present-day politics; they have revealed the real picture of the *state of affairs* within Social-Democracy as a mass party."²

Bolsheviks were also active in the army and navy. Their influence

¹ "The Petrograd Proletariat and the Bolshevik Organisation during the Imperialist War. 1914-1917. A Collection of Documents and Materials", *Voprosy Truda*, Leningrad, 1939, p. 88 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, "Social-Chauvinist Policy Behind a Cover of Internationalist Phrases", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 429.

transformed mass protest typical of the period, disturbances among reservists during mobilisation, refusal to carry out orders, draft evasion, etc., into vigorous concerted action: soldiers joining defence industry workers in strikes, fraternising with enemy soldiers and open confrontations with military authorities. In October 1915 a naval mutiny broke out on board the Baltic Fleet warship *Gangut*, where Bolshevik Party groups were active. The naval authorities managed to promptly suppress the mutiny. To forestall reprisals against the arrested sailors, the St. Petersburg Bolshevik Committee called for unity of the army with the revolutionary proletariat and with all the people. The Petrograd working class responded by calling a protracted protest strike. As a result, the tribunal did not dare sentence the sailors to death.

The Bolsheviks worked to further organised strikes. In the second 6-month period of the war—from February to July 1915—574 strikes were recorded in Russia, with 241,000 workers involved. In the third 6-month period, up to January 1916, the number of strikes reached 606 and that of strikers, 432,000. In that period, 36 per cent of the strikes were political, and their participants made up 45 per cent of all strikers.¹

Metal-workers, the core of the industrial proletariat, gradually emerged as the most active strikers. It became increasingly obvious beginning in the autumn of 1915. In 1916 metal-workers held more strikes than all others taken together.² The workers of the largest enterprises, above all in Petrograd and Moscow, were in the forefront of the rapidly growing strike movement.

The upsurge of strikes in the spring, summer and autumn of 1915 generated nationwide political response. That upsurge, coinciding with grave military setbacks and the growing economic dislocation, especially in agriculture, helped draw soldiers and the peasant masses into the struggle against tsarism and the war. Peasants had many ties to the cities and were usually informed of the workers' action. Bolshevik leaflets exposed the nature of the war, pointed out its culprits, explained the causes of peasant landlessness, and called on the peasants to support the workers. By the autumn of 1915 unrest had spread across the rural areas.³ All that led to a crisis at the top. "Today we are again advancing towards a revolution,"⁴ Lenin wrote in November 1915.

¹ *The Working-Class Movement During the War*, pp. 6-7.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96; *Labour Statistics*, No. 8, Moscow, 1920, pp. 64-65 (in Russian).

³ *The Peasant Movement in Russia during World War I. July 1914 to February 1917. A Collection of Documents*, Sotsekgiz, Moscow-Leningrad, 1965, pp. 487-97 (in Russian).

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "On the Two Lines in the Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 418.

In the autumn of 1915, when it was obvious that Russia was again approaching a revolution, many complex problems and important tasks faced the Bolshevik Party. The situation called for a profound Marxist analysis of the mounting revolutionary crisis, of the revolution's prospects, for drawing up a political course and tactics, particularly vis-à-vis the manoeuvring by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties. Lenin's strategy and tactics leading to a revolutionary withdrawal from the imperialist war were pivotal in the Bolshevik approach to these problems.

As the bourgeois-democratic revolution was drawing closer, Lenin considered it the most appropriate course to advance the slogan of "the three pillars" (a democratic republic, confiscation of the landed estates and an eight-hour workday) and to add "a call for the workers' international solidarity in the struggle for socialism and the revolutionary overthrow of the belligerent governments, and against the war".¹ Proceeding from the precept that the proletariat and the peasants would, as before, be the motive forces of the coming revolution in Russia, Lenin answered the question whether the proletariat's leading role was possible in a Russian bourgeois revolution in the affirmative. That possibility was due to the fact that "the petty bourgeoisie swings to the left at the decisive moment", and, as Lenin pointed out, a whole range of objective factors and Bolshevik propaganda were pushing it to the left. "Only a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry," Lenin wrote, "can form the social content of the impending revolution in Russia." That dictatorship was to ensure the completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and its transition into a socialist one. Therefore he supported Social-Democratic participation in a provisional revolutionary government together with the democratic petty bourgeoisie, but he rejected participation in government jointly with "revolutionary chauvinists", who wanted to defeat tsarism in order to defeat Germany and plunder other nations.

Lenin considered the development of the strike movement, "the consolidation and extension of Social-Democratic work among the proletariat and its extension to the rural proletariat, the rural poor and the army"² a task of utmost importance for revolutionary Social-Democracy. The liberal-bourgeois course upheld by the Constitutional Democrats and Octobrists, and, in the working-class movement, by the Mensheviks had to be resolutely countered with a proletarian course expressed by the Bolsheviks.³ Lenin's guidelines

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Several Theses", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 401.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 402, 403.

³ See V. I. Lenin, "On the Two Lines in the Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, pp. 416-18.

were decisive in the party's leadership of the further struggle of the Russian proletariat.

The upsurge of the strike movement in late 1915 and early 1916 was followed by a still more powerful wave in the spring and summer of 1916. It began in Petrograd in the latter half of February with strikes against the imperialist war and high prices and in support of the striking workers of the Putilov plant. Guided by the Bolsheviks, it was transformed into a struggle against militarisation of the economy already in early March 1916. Decisive action by the Petrograd proletariat upset the plans of the bourgeoisie and the government who had banked on enslaving the workers through militarisation. The draft legislation on the militarisation of factories drawn up by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the Duma was tabled. The latter half of 1916 witnessed equally acute proletarian strikes. According to the figures of the Industrial Monitoring Board, 1916 produced 1,410 strikes in which 1,086,000 workers took part, including 1,167 economic strikes by 776,000 strikers and 243 political strikes by 310,000 strikers. Each year, strikes, especially political ones, were spreading to include ever more strikers and becoming more protracted.¹

The proletariat's struggle awakened Russia's rural areas and particularly affected the mood of the army. Setbacks at the front, enormous casualties, the rapidly growing prices, hunger and other privations on the home front, an acute shortage of seeding grain and fodder, with most of the rural poor suffering from the lack of draft animals, and many going landless and breadless—all that fomented discontent among the peasants and army soldiers, and stimulated their active interest in politics, and the workers' revolutionary struggle. In 1915 there were 117 cases of large-scale peasant action; in 1916, 294 cases. Over two-thirds of outbreaks in 1916 occurred in May, June and July²; in June, the upswing in the workers' strikes and peasant unrest coincided. Soldiers' discontent and their letters home prompted peasants to increasingly raise the question of land; in many areas whole villages refused to pay rent to the landlord and other dues or to perform various duties. Manors were sometimes burned down, etc. "There is revolutionary ferment in the villages, similar to what happened in 1905-1907," the secret police reported with considerable alarm in the autumn of 1916. "Political questions are being discussed everywhere, statements are adopted aimed against landlords and merchants, branches of various organisations are being set up... Thus the peasants will no doubt

¹ *The Working-Class Movement during the War*, p. 5.

² *The Peasant Movement in Russia during World War I...*, pp. 514, 501-08.

become quite an active participant of a new and inevitable movement."¹

The secret police viewed the rapidly revolutionising situation in the army with even greater alarm. Those soldiers who for this or that reason returned home, even for a brief stay, defying severe persecution engaged in "criminal agitation" in their talks with neighbours or even openly at village meetings. "Close contacts between workers in the capital and soldiers also show that... the mood of the army has become extremely restless if not revolutionary."²

The revolutionary struggle of the Russian proletariat had a great impact on the working people of the empire's oppressed national minorities. From mid-1916 action against autocratic rule rose sharply in the outlying regions of Russia. The tsar's decree on mobilising "the non-Russian population of the empire" for war effort works generated great indignation in the Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. In Kazakhstan and Central Asia, riots by the poor broke out in early July; in the middle of the month the martial law was introduced throughout Turkestan. Large but poorly armed and scattered insurgent groups in Central Asia were put down by force of arms in the autumn of 1916. However, the tsarist authorities failed to suppress the uprising in the Turgai Region. Led by A. Imanov and the Bolshevik A. Janghildin, it spread and grew stronger. Counter-insurgency operations with no particular success lasted until and even after the February 1917 Revolution.

The scope, persistence and increasingly political nature of the proletariat's strikes, the rise of the peasant movement, the growing discontent of the working people drafted into the army, and the national liberation movement which became especially acute in the summer and autumn of 1916—all indicated that from 1916 a revolutionary situation was again taking shape in Russia.

The proletariat was the motive force of that process. Petrograd emerged as the centre of struggle; there, Bolsheviks succeeded in launching three powerful waves of political strikes in October 1916. The first was aimed against the food crisis, the skyrocketing prices and profiteering. The movement swelled to include up to 67,000 people. Soldiers sided with workers in clashes with the police. The second wave was in response to the government's attempt at having members of the Bolshevik organisation in the navy executed. On the third day of the strike it spread to about 50 factories with 120,000 workers, to many smaller enterprises and to colleges and universities. That saved the sailors from the death penalty. Simultaneously, ac-

¹ *The Red Archives*, 1926, Vol. 4 (17), p. 20 (in Russian).

² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

tion began against attempts at a mass lockout by the government and the bourgeoisie. Over 180,000 workers took part, and the lockout did not materialise. A total of 250,000 workers took part in the October 1916 strikes in Petrograd. The scope of mass political struggle had never before been greater during the war. The movement was well-organised and led by Bolshevik committees; efforts by the bourgeoisie and conciliatory parties and groups to stop it, or restrict it by "clear-cut limits" and channel it into "the desired direction" failed. The October strike was the prologue to the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia.

Like in most other countries, in *Germany* the start of the hostilities abruptly lowered the class activity of the proletariat. That was also the objective pursued by the open social-chauvinists and Centrists who demanded observance of "civil peace" so that nothing be done to further the defeat of their own country.

The social-chauvinist policy of labour leaders resulted in serious confusion among the German proletariat. Many workers together with most of the urban middle strata and peasants initially succumbed to the pseudopatriotic euphoria and followed the chauvinists.

Gradually, the confusion was replaced by the resolve to fight for their class interests. Some workers and even some trade union associations moved for the reinstatement of the economic and political rights abolished by the ruling quarters, and joined the anti-war struggle. Some Social-Democratic organisations adopted resolutions attacking the "August 4 policy", some declared their loyalty to the class struggle and refused to hand over their revenue to the party's social-chauvinist leadership, spending it instead to publish anti-war leaflets. At times the protest against social-chauvinism was expressed by resignations from the SPD. Already in August and September 1914 strikes occurred in various areas of Germany, mostly in Silesia. In December 1914 a serious conflict arose in Berlin's steel industry. Still, in the latter half of 1914 and even in 1915 the strike movement was at a low level. In 1915, only 66 strikes were held in which a little over 2,000 people took part.

In the difficult conditions of the "patriotic" hysteria during the first months of the war, of the abrupt decline in the working-class movement, Germany's revolutionary Social-Democrats, Lenin noted, were the first among the internationalists in large European Social-Democratic parties to raise a loud voice of protest. They used several newspapers as mainstays of anti-war propaganda—*Schwäbische Tagwacht*, *Hamburger Echo*, *Bremer Bürger-Zeitung*, *Braunschweiger Volksfreund*, etc. Berlin was the centre of revolutionary activities. By the end of 1914, groups of revolutionary Social-Democrats in Berlin, Bremen, Stuttgart, Chemnitz, Leipzig, Hamburg and other

cities had established contacts with one another, and that contributed to the rise of the anti-war struggle.

Liebkecht's speech in the Reichstag against new war appropriations on December 2, 1914 was important for the strengthening of internationalist trends among German Social-Democrats and development of the anti-war movement. His statement was approved by many Social-Democratic organisations of Berlin, Dresden, Braunschweig, Gotha, Frankfurt-am-Main and other cities. Gradually, Liebkecht, Luxemburg, Zetkin, Mehring, Marchlewski and Pieck gathered around them a nucleus of revolutionary Social-Democrats who worked vigorously to make the German proletarian masses realise the need to counter the imperialist war policy with a policy of the class struggle against the war. In 1915, over one million copies of leaflets were distributed which condemned the war and called on the workers to put an end to it by revolutionary means.

In the spring of 1915 the Internationale group set up by revolutionary Social-Democrats organised the first mass anti-war action in Germany. Mass rallies were held to protest against the war in Magdeburg, Hessen-Nassau and Berlin. In March, near the Reichstag building, women held the first demonstration for peace and against rising prices. In May 1915 about 1,500 people, mostly women workers, staged a demonstration against the war near the Reichstag. Wilhelm Pieck took an active part in organising that demonstration. Manifestations by women workers also took place in Dresden.

At that same time Liebkecht initiated joint action by the revolutionary forces and Centrists against the social-chauvinist course of the right-wing leaders. In June 1915 about one thousand functionaries signed a letter to the SPD Board and the leaders of its Reichstag faction, demanding that they give up the "civil peace" policy and, according to the party's programme principles and decisions, launch an international proletarian struggle against the war.

Protest increased and expanded against the policy of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie pursued by the General Commission of Free Trade Unions, especially by the metal-workers' union. In Berlin and some other cities open opposition groups to the trade union leadership were formed. They were led by elected representatives of large enterprises. Richard Müller, a well-known union activist, became the opposition leader.

In the autumn of 1915 Germany witnessed a new rise in anti-war action. On November 30, 10,000 people converged on the Reichstag chanting "We Want Food and Freedom" and "Down with the War". Mounted policemen with drawn swords attacked the crowd. Still, despite the arrests and beatings, the demonstration lasted for several hours and was resumed the following day. Soldiers also took part in it. Riots against high prices flared up in many cities, accom-

panied with mass rallies and demonstrations against the war. In Chemnitz, things went as far as clashes with the police lasting several days. Serious unrest broke out among the mineworkers of the Rhein Province, Hamburg longshoremen and textile workers.

In the face of enormous difficulties, left-wing Social-Democrats waged revolutionary propaganda in the army and navy. In early 1915, small clandestine anti-war groups emerged on board several naval vessels. In Kiel and Wilhelmshaven they established contact with the opposition-minded workers in the ports and docks.¹

The further upsurge of the anti-war struggle was greatly facilitated by the consolidation of forces of the revolutionary Social-Democrats at the January 1916 conference of the Internationale group which oriented the working class and all those forces of the German people who wanted peace toward a resolute struggle against the main enemy within the country. The group's "Political Letters" signed "Spartacus" subsequently gave that name to the group itself.

In 1916, after Germany suffered several military setbacks and diplomatic manoeuvring failed to produce the expected results, the military group under Hindenburg and Ludendorff which advocated victory at any cost strengthened its hand. The "Hindenburg Programme" which envisaged concentrating all efforts on military objectives exacerbated the nation's plight still further. In their attempts to curb the growing discontent of the masses, the authorities made a wide use of police stool pigeons; anti-war movement activists were arrested and jailed. The sending of anti-war and revolutionary activists to the front became the most widespread form of political reprisals. The so-called Fatherland Auxiliary Service Act, passed in late 1916, introduced a barrack-room regime for the entire able-bodied male population aged 17 to 60, deprived workers of free choice of employment and virtually made them totally dependent on employers.

However, the authorities failed to stop the development of the mass anti-war movement. More and more working people joined the struggle, women and youth were active in it. In April 1916 Liebknecht initiated and took part in a conference of revolutionary youth groups near Jena. The resolution adopted by the conference rejected "the lie of class peace", advanced "international solidarity and the class struggle" as the foremost duty, and called for "all forces and all means to be mobilised to fight against the war, and the situation generated by the war to be used to accelerate the collapse of capitalist society".²

Spartacus members were preparing a demonstration of international

¹ *Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruchs im Jahre 1918*, Bd. 9, Reihe II, Berlin, 1928, S. 243.

² *Jugend-Internationale*, No. 5, 1916, S. 11-12.

solidarity and protest against the imperialist bloodbath for May Day 1916. On May 1, despite reinforced police cordons and mounted police patrols, about 10,000 people took to the streets in Berlin. And when Liebknecht called out, "Down with the War", "Down with the Government", the crowd that filled Potsdam Square repeated the slogans in unison. The police arrested Liebknecht, but thousands of people kept chanting, "Down with the War", "Long Live the International", "Long Live Liebknecht". Anti-war demonstrations were held in several other German cities on that day.¹ They ushered in a wave of new anti-war action which lasted for eight weeks. Hunger riots became perceptibly more frequent at that time. In some cities, the authorities were forced to introduce martial law. New reprisals were unleashed against Spartacus members. After Liebknecht's arrest at the May Day demonstration, a search of his apartment produced leaflets ready to be distributed. He was tried and sentenced to four years and one month in jail. Soon Luxemburg, Marchlewski, Mehring and Ernst Meyer were detained; Pieck and Hugo Eberlein were drafted into the army.

But the mass struggle mounted. Anti-war action in summer reached its peak in a political strike, the first in wartime, of 55,000 Berlin workers, held from June 28 to 30, 1916 to protest against the Liebknecht trial and the war. Its participants, the Spartacus group noted, "showed the government that they would no longer be spineless slaves who allowed their labour to be abused for the sake of imperialist goals".² The Spartacus regarded that strike as a turning point in the working-class movement, and as the awakening of socialist consciousness among the working masses. Simultaneously, a political strike was staged in Braunschweig and many thousands of people held manifestations in Berlin, Bremen and Stuttgart.

The social-chauvinists in the SPD Board and the leadership of the free trade unions were alarmed. In late July 1916 they issued a statement warning the workers against taking part in strikes and against doubting their "leaders". That blatant disdain of the developing mass struggle was condemned even by Centrists. They adapted to the new situation and somewhat altered their course. In March 1916 the Centrist group of Reichstag deputies under Hugo Haase finally voted against war appropriations, albeit with reservations, and established an opposition group called the Social-Democratic Labour Community. Centrists declared: "It is time to work in such a way that the proletariat may gather strength for the coming fierce battles."³

¹ *Spartakusbrieife*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1958, S. 165-68; H. Wohlgenuth, *Karl Liebknecht. Eine Biographie*, Berlin, 1973, S. 328-31.

² *Spartakusbrieife*, S. 196.

³ *Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung* (DMGDA), Reche II, Bd. I, S. 327, 423-28.

Such statements and actions which sometimes ran counter to the chauvinist course exerted certain influence on the masses. At the same time, however, Centrists were out to oppose revolutionary Social-Democrats and undermine their growing popularity. That was borne out, specifically, by the refusal of the Social-Democratic Labour Community leadership to take part in the 1916 May Day demonstration which the Spartacus suggested holding under revolutionary slogans jointly with the socialist members of the group.

In the late summer and autumn of 1916 a new wave of anti-war demonstrations, strikes and violent clashes between the working people and the authorities swept through Germany. In August, a mass manifestation was held in Hamburg under the slogans "Long Live Liebknecht", "Down with the War", "Down with the Government" and "We Want Bread". Manifestations attended by many thousands and brief strikes occurred in Essen, Halle, Duisburg and Chemnitz. "Today Liebknecht is the most popular man with front-line soldiers," Karl Kautsky wrote to Victor Adler on August 7, 1916. "All those returning from there corroborate that. The disaffected masses understand nothing about his special politics, but they see in him a man who advocates an end to the war, and that is all that matters to them now."¹

On November 2 a mass demonstration of 7 to 8 thousand workers was held in Dresden. The demonstrators converged on the building of the provincial government demanding better food supplies. The left wanted to turn the demonstration into an anti-war manifestation to defend Liebknecht, but right-wingers and Centrists prevented that.

In early November 1916 a political strike by the workers of several war factories broke out in Berlin. The strike, a manifestation of class solidarity against the war plight and expression of support for the Spartacus group, involved a total of over 6 thousand workers from engineering and munitions factories, AEG aviation plants and several other enterprises. The overall 1916 total was 240 strikes and 124,000 strikers. And, although an overwhelming majority of organised labour continued to follow right-wingers or Centrists who either hampered the spread of the mass movement or distracted the attention of the working class from revolutionary tasks, the class struggle in Germany grew perceptibly more acute in 1916 and especially in 1917. The influence of revolutionary Social-Democrats and the prestige of the Spartacus group were growing. Despite the fact that the left lacked a close-knit clandestine organisation, "despite all their weaknesses, they kept winning over newer and newer working masses".²

¹ V. Adler, *Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky*, Wien, 1954, S. 630.

² Wilhelm Pieck, *Zur Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands. 30 Jahre Kampf*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1949, S. 8.

Political strikes and other types of mass action against the war, hunger and high prices, the growing discontent among large segments of the population with the "dictatorship of the sword" and ruthless exploitation showed that "civil peace" was about to be replaced with a period of extreme social tensions and large-scale class battles.

The war laid bare the profound social and national contradictions and the inevitable disintegration of the multinational *Austro-Hungarian Empire*. An acute shortage of resources for waging a protracted war, the dependence on the stronger ally, the German imperialists who treated Austro-Hungarian resources as their own, the increasingly lopsided economic development in different regions and the consequent exacerbation of political contradictions among them, and finally, military setbacks and enormous casualties—all that combined to feed the growing mass discontent and was bringing the empire's collapse nearer. However, for a long time these processes remained latent. The hands of the Austro-Hungarian working class were tied by "civil peace" propaganda, ethnic strife and a system of military-bureaucratic coercion.

Open anti-government action was also hampered by the lack of a revolutionary organisation of the proletariat, by the fragmentation of the proletariat by national affiliation, and the sway of right-wingers and Centrists in the working-class movement; they were used by the bourgeoisie to foment chauvinism among the working people.

Right-wing leaders of Austrian Social-Democrats, Renner one of them, called on the workers to support the war effort "to avoid enslavement by foreign imperialism". Centrists worked to preserve party unity at any cost and thus impeded the development of the anti-war movement. They argued that "the fear of a tsarist victory rallied together all classes of the German-Austrian people, and it also rallied together the German-Austrian proletarian masses".¹ In Hungary, right-wing Social-Democrats also tried to convince their people that they were shedding their blood to defend "European civilisation" from tsarism, "from Russian barbarity, from Russian absolutism and from Russian oppression, for better wages, a shorter workday and political rights".²

Another obstacle to the development of mass action was the position of the trade union leadership. True, unlike the labour leaders of Germany and some other countries, it did not conclude a formal agreement on "civil peace" with the employers. In practice, however, trade union leaders sought to prevent the working people from fight-

¹ Otto Bauer, *Die österreichische Revolution*, Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, Wien, 1923, S. 53, 55.

² *A Magyar munkásmozgalom történetének válogatott dokumentumai* (MMTVD), 4/B Kossuth könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1969, pp. 31-32.

ing for their rights, to enhance class collaboration with the bourgeoisie in the interests of the imperialist war.

Nevertheless, even at the initial stage of the war small-scale strikes, rallies and manifestations occurred in some parts of Austria. In late 1914 and early 1915 there were strikes against lower wages, longer working hours and high prices in the Czech and Austrian mining industry, the Czech textile industry and by metal-workers of Vienna. Strikes were often accompanied with hunger riots and manifestations demanding better food supplies and an end to the arbitrary rule of the military authorities. But the scope of the struggle was small: there were only 39 strikes in Austria in 1915, with less than 10,000 strikers.

From the spring of 1916 strikes grew more frequent, larger (the number of strikers doubled compared to 1915) and more successful: the share of the strikes in which workers secured partial or complete agreement to their demands increased noticeably. In 1916, large-scale strikes occurred in the mining industry of Ostrava, in Teplitz, at the Škoda factories in Plzen, at the metalworking enterprises of Vienna and in some other regions of Austria. Hunger demonstrations occurred in Kladno, Witkowitz, Plzen, Donawitz (Schtiria), Lvov and Upper Austria. The May Day demonstration by Plzen workers numbered about 15,000 people. These types of action, often accompanied with clashes with the police and the army, were expressly aimed against the war, as borne out by the slogans advanced at the demonstrations: "Down with the War", "We Want Peace", "Give Us Back Our Fathers and Husbands", etc.

In Hungary, the strike movement and the struggle against high prices revived noticeably as early as the spring of 1915. Strikes were initiated by defence industry workers—that is, those from the largest enterprises with a high level of manpower concentration, such as the munitions factories of Csepel and Pest. Class battles improved the proletariat's organisation. Unlike Austria, where the number of trade unions was diminishing in 1914-1916, in Hungary, the decline in the trade union membership caused by the start of the war stopped as early as 1915, and by the end of 1916 it increased by about 20 per cent.

The upsurge in the working-class movement in Hungary forced the government to accept the proposal advanced by the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party and the trade unions about setting up arbitration committees on industrial disputes which would comprise representatives of management, trade unions and the Defence Ministry.¹ These committees adopted compromise decisions on workers' complaints, preventing conflicts between labour and capital from

¹ MMTVD, 4/B, pp. 153-56.

turning into strikes; they sought in every way to impede any further development of the proletariat's class struggle. However, the contradictions separating workers from employers were too great and irreconcilable for such halfhearted measures to abolish the struggle between them.

In the spring of 1916 the strike movement in the Kingdom of Hungary broke out with increased power. Begun in Budapest, it spread to the provinces, which had previously been comparatively quiet. In May the workers of the munitions factory in Dios-györ (in the North) walked out, the miners of Petroșani (in Transylvania) followed suit in June; in May and June a strike broke out at mining enterprises along the Jihl River in Transylvania, over 10,000 Hungarian, Romanian and German workers took part. Throughout the latter half of the year, there were almost incessant small and large strike battles in Csepel. In the summer of 1916 the strike movement resumed among the agricultural proletariat during the harvesting period.

Thus the third year of the war clearly marked an exacerbation of social antagonisms in Austria-Hungary and a rise in the anti-war sentiment. In the socialist movement, a group of the so-called left-wing legalists was set up who criticised the policy of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party leadership. The group was led by Friedrich Adler, a Secretary of the Party's Board and editor of its theoretical periodical *Der Kampf*. As early as the autumn of 1914 a small group of pacifists rallied around him, including Robert Danneberg, Julius Deutsch, Therese Schlesinger and others. That group emerged as the nucleus of the opposition society Karl Marx-Verein which, according to different sources, numbered from 120 to 200 members. After F. Adler's arrest in the autumn of 1916 the society was headed by Dannenberg, Secretary of the International of Socialist Youth. When the society was disbanded by the authorities, Dannenberg, together with Leopold Winarsky, succeeded in making the newspaper *Volkstribüne* into the opposition's mouthpiece which harshly criticised the nationalist and promilitarist course of the party's official leadership. In response to a statement by Renner who advocated continuing the war and openly put "general national interests" above the class interests of the proletariat, Friedrich and Victor Adler published a series of articles as early as 1915 in which they demanded a turn in the party's course, restoration of international solidarity and concerted action in the interests of the struggle against imperialism, war, chauvinism and nationalism.

After the Zimmerwald Conference, the opposition stepped up its anti-war propaganda. In December 1915, a manifesto was issued, drafted by Friedrich Adler, which, "welcoming the Zimmerwald Conference as an expression of the internationalist principle", de-

nounced the party's leadership which, it said, had turned into "a plain tool of the military authorities".¹ On the whole, however, the policy of that left-wing group was ambiguous and inconsistent. Although criticising right-wing Social-Democrats for social-chauvinism, the group was unable to advance a visible programme of anti-war struggle. It renounced the organisation of clandestine anti-war activities. On the national question, its position differed little from the "national-cultural autonomy" programme of the right-wing reformers. Essentially, the left led by F. Adler held a centrist position in the party.

The Second Conference of the Social-Democratic Party of Austria, held in March 1916, witnessed a violent clash between the official leadership and the opposition. The latter's left wing was represented by a group of the so-called Left Radicals—revolutionary Socialists who formed an Action Committee in September 1915. Their representatives Franz Koritschoner, Leo Rothziegel, Karl Steinhardt and others were members of the Karl Marx-Verein. The Left Radical group, which soon established itself as an independent political trend, also comprised revolutionary Social-Democrats from the Vienna Young Workers' Association, a certain part of Social-Democratic workers and some intellectuals. In several cities they set up clandestine groups and societies which waged active anti-war propaganda from the Zimmerwald Left positions and distributed leaflets and other clandestine printed matter. Theoretically allied to the Zimmerwald Left, the Left Radicals, although criticising the pacifist-centrist views of F. Adler, could not shake off his ideological influence.

The Kienthal Conference, which awakened new forces in the opposition, contributed to a more sharply defined polarisation of trends among Austrian Social-Democrats. F. Adler published an open letter to Camille Huysmans in which he resolutely condemned the slogan of "defending the fatherland" and the "interests of the smaller peoples" as a nationalist justification of the imperialist war. On October 21, 1916 he shot and killed Prime Minister Karl von Stürgkh, shouting, "Down with absolutism, we want peace". That was an expression of indignation and protest against the senseless killing of thousands of people; at the same time, however, it bore witness to the inability to find viable means of struggle against militarism and chauvinism. The party's leadership described the assassination as an act of a madman. Lenin rejected that description but advised Austria's Left Radicals to explain it to the Austrian workers that "not terrorism but systematic, prolonged, self-sacrificing activity

¹ F. Adler, *Vor dem Ausnahmegericht*, Thüringer Verlagsanstalt und Druckerei, Jena, 1923, S. 27, 33.

in revolutionary propaganda and agitation, demonstrations, etc., etc., *against* the lackey-like opportunist party, *against* the imperialists, *against* one's own governments, *against* the war—that is what is needed”.¹

The shot fired by Adler and the trial that followed exerted a revolutionary influence on the popular masses. The Left Radicals' struggle against the imperialist war, their efforts to organise work in the army and their growing contacts with the revolutionary forces in different parts of Austria-Hungary and abroad, with the internationalists of Serbia and Italy, helped in the ideological and political advancement of that trend and attracted popular sympathies to it.

After the defeats of the Austro-Hungarian armies in November and December 1914, when the military-chauvinist hysteria subsided, leaders of the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party, in January 1915, began talking about a peace “without victors”. In the late summer of 1915 they published a Peace Manifesto which called on the socialist parties of France and Germany to seek ways towards mutual understanding and demanded democratisation of the country's social system, a land reform, a change of the tax policy to favour the poorer classes, etc.² *Népszava* welcomed the Zimmerwald Conference “as an important and gratifying event in international proletarian politics” and stressed that the conference had expressed the desire of the working class for peace and “loyalty to the basic principles of socialism and the idea of the class struggle.”³

However, neither the decision to take vigorous steps to publicise the idea of peace adopted at a September 1915 conference of Hungarian Social-Democratic Party leaders nor the positive response to the Zimmerwald Conference meant that the Party had switched over to a revolutionary anti-war course; what emerged on top was a pacifist policy favouring a compromise peace among imperialist governments. Universal suffrage, rather than resolute struggle against imperialism and militarism, was pushed to the foreground. It was the slogan of universal suffrage that the party leaders advanced as the central one in January 1917.⁴ They failed to provide the answers to the questions of mass anxiety, above all the paramount question of how to end the war. Only the left-wing opposition in the party fought for an independent working-class policy to end the international imperialist bloodbath and achieve social emancipation and national liberation. It was in that spirit that the left carried on their prop-

¹ V. I. Lenin to Franz Koritschoner, October 25, 1916, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, pp. 238-39.

² MMTVD, 4/B, pp. 128-37.

³ Ibid., 4/B, pp. 139-40.

⁴ Ibid., p. 234.

aganda among the masses, strengthening their ties at the grassroots level.

The war broadened the gulf not only between the ruling classes and the exploited working masses but also between the ruling and oppressed peoples of the empire. Russian troops took ten times as many Austro-Hungarian as German prisoners of war. (Already in September 1914, Russian troops took prisoner 100,000 officers and men of the monarchy; by January 1916 their number had exceeded one million.)¹ Indirectly, that pointed to the acuteness of national contradictions in Austria-Hungary. Like Russia, it was an imperialist power in which conditions were maturing particularly rapidly for revolutionary upheavals. Draft evasion, voluntary surrender to the enemy, organised defection of whole groups and units under officers to the enemy, refusal to carry out orders to proceed to the front, etc.—such were frequent forms of protest (they assumed increasingly alarming proportions from 1915) by representatives of the oppressed nationalities; the latter comprised over 50 per cent of the Hapsburg armed forces.

Southern Slavs did not want to make war on Serbia and Montenegro and openly sympathised with those nations, just as the Italian and Romanian soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian army sent to the Italian and Romanian fronts in 1915 and 1916 did not want to fight their own countrymen. Even Hungarian regiments fought halfheartedly, laying down their arms and surrendering as soon as an opportunity arose. Czechs were so much the less eager to honour the Austrian banner at the price of their own blood. That became obvious at the first contact of Czech units with the enemy on the Bulgarian front in September and October 1914. It was there that the first cases of fraternising between soldiers of enemy armies were recorded.² There were calls "Do not shoot at Russians, surrender" during anti-war demonstrations in Prague in September 1914. And in October 1914 two complete Czech regiments and parts of a third crossed the San River over to the Russian side.

From 1915, fraternisation by soldiers of oppressed nationalities with enemy soldiers became a regular occurrence, especially on the Eastern Front; various religious holidays, both Catholic and Orthodox, Christmas, Easter, etc., served as convenient pretexts. In the spring of 1915, Austro-German and Hungarian units used armed force to put down a mutiny by several Czech and Slovak regiments. From the summer of 1915 the Austro-Hungarian command was forced

¹ *The Internationalists*, Moscow, 1967, p. 14 (in Russian).

² Karel Pichlik, "Deutsche und tschechische Soldaten in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee im Kampf gegen den Krieg und die Monarchie, 1914 bis 1918", *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, No. 1, 1961, S. 82.

to give up the idea of national units in which soldiers of oppressed nationalities made up more than 50 per cent of their total strength.

The mutinies and organised defection by Czech and Slovak units were formidable signs of the imminent disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian empire. The formation of whole regiments, brigades and divisions from among defectors and POWs in several Entente countries and the setting up of émigré national committees of Yugoslavs, Czechs and Slovaks indicated that the bourgeois leaders of the oppressed peoples' national movement abandoned their erstwhile loyalty to the Hapsburg monarchy.

War privations were accompanied with an aggravation of contradictions between Austria and Hungary. The opposition was becoming increasingly outspoken in Hungary's parliament. It demanded a loosening of the dual ties connecting the two states and, subsequently, a dissolution of the alliance with Germany, an alliance that imperilled both Hungary and the monarchy as a whole. By late 1916 severe military setbacks and the growing economic and political crisis greatly enhanced bourgeoisie's trend favouring a compromise peace. Acute contradictions surfaced increasingly among Hungary's ruling quarters; opposition was growing to the dictatorial regime of Count Tiso and the war. The oppressed classes and nationalities of Austria-Hungary increasingly realised that the war they were fighting was aimed against their interests. The ground was obviously shaking under the Hapsburg monarchy, and the disintegration of Austria-Hungary was becoming a historical necessity.

In *France*, a giant wave of blatant chauvinism, assiduously fomented both by the bourgeoisie and by the socialist press, swept the popular masses in the first days of the war. After the tragic death of Jean Jaurès, Pierre Renaudel became editor-in-chief of *L'Humanité*, and transformed the central organ of the SFIO into a mouthpiece of social-chauvinists in the party. The bourgeoisie skilfully used the German invasion of French territory in August and September 1914, the seizure of a large part of the country and the threat to Paris to publicise the idea of "national defence". Having joined the "national defence" government, SFIO leaders (Guesde, Sembat and Thomas) emerged as zealous champions of the "holy union" and "class peace" policy, opposing any action by the working people to defend their vital interests. SFIO and CGT leaders reduced the functions of labour organisations to social activities like aiding the wounded, POWs, refugees, etc.

For all the considerable deterioration in the living standards of the French working people, their economic struggle did not assume any significant proportions either in the latter half of 1914 or in 1915. Mobilisation deprived trade unions of over half their members; some of the smaller unions simply disintegrated. CGT membership

by the end of 1915 was almost one seventh of its previous size. Between August and December 1914 only 18 small-scale strikes occurred in which 1,000 people took part; in 1915 there were 98 strikes and 9,300 strikers. In August 1914 Paris diggers called a strike demanding higher wages. In August 1915 over 50 per cent of the workers, about 1,500, at four fulling mills in Vienne (Isère Department), that supplied the army, struck for two weeks and won a pay rise. A strike by Lagors textile workers also was successful.¹

As the war burdened the working people with more and more privations, the chauvinist intoxication gradually evaporated. Already in December 1914 there was fraternisation between French and German soldiers at some sections of the front; they spontaneously established a truce for several days. That happened in Champagne, Quarrancy (Pas de Calais) and elsewhere. In 1915-1916 the anti-war movement grew stronger and expanded.

The left-wing opposition in trade unions played an important part in the advancement of the French anti-war movement. Its core was made up of the syndicalists who rallied around the newspaper *La Vie Ouvrière*. They were the first in France to protest against the imperialist carnage. The anti-war position of Pierre Monatte who spoke out against the chauvinist policy was supported by the syndicalists of Lyons under Francis Million. In May 1915, Arthur Merrheim, Secretary of the Metal-Workers' Federation, said in print plainly: "This war is not our war." The Federation's leadership adopted a resolution which welcomed the anti-war appeal by the German revolutionary Social-Democrats Liebknecht, Zetkin and Luxemburg. On May 1, 1915 the metal-workers joined hands with construction workers and diggers to stage a rally in Paris calling for international solidarity and struggle for peace without annexations or indemnities. The coopers' syndicate also demanded resumption of class action.² In late 1915, opposition syndicalists set up a Committee of International Action which also comprised some socialists and anarchists.

An opposition to chauvinism within the SFIO began to take shape later than in the CGT. Amédeé Dunois and Charles Rappoport were among the first party members to take an anti-chauvinist stand. In May 1915 the Upper Vienne Federation came out for peace and criticised the social-chauvinist policy of the SFIO leadership. It was supported in varying degrees by the Socialists of the Rhône, Isère and Paris federations (followers of Jean Longuet). The newly emergent minority (*minoritaires*) movement advocated pacifist, centrist

¹ Arthur Fontaine, *French Industry during the War*, pp. 53-54.

² *Cahiers du communisme*, 1957. No 10, p. 1464; A. Rosmer, *Le mouvement ouvrier pendant la première guerre mondiale*, t. 1, Paris, 1936, pp. 238-39.

views, proclaiming its dedication to peace and a re-establishment of the International.¹ At the December 1915 Congress of the SFIO, the Centrist minority, supported by advocates of the Zimmerwald Movement, came out against the chauvinist leadership and criticised it for participating in the bourgeois government. In January 1916 the syndicalist Committee of International Action and the Socialist Minority Committee, set up after the December 1915 SFIO Congress, merged to form a joint organisation, the Committee to Restore International Ties (CRRI), which began the consolidation of France's revolutionary forces.

The Syndicalist Defence Committee (CDS), organised in the spring of 1916, declared it would fight against the conciliatory policy of the "holy union", pursued by the CGT leadership "to the detriment of the syndicalist ideal" based on class struggle principles.² The CDS tried to make trade union action more vigorous and advocated the convening of a congress to make the leadership heed the activists. CDS membership grew: the opposition trade unions in Paris, Seine, Le Havre, Saint-Etienne, Lyons, Grenoble, Marseilles, Vienne and other places allied themselves with it. The CDS proclaimed that it upheld mass proletarian struggle as opposed to the CGT official "class peace" stand; its members were active in the strike movement.

That movement considerably expanded in 1916. Compared to the previous year, the number of strikes more than tripled (315), that of strikers more than quadrupled (41,000) and that of days lost grew more than fivefold (236,000).³ The strike movement was growing increasingly persistent. For example, 2,000 textile workers at 14 factories in Tyzy (Rhône Department) struck for several weeks in January 1916, and about 2,000 textile workers downed tools at 51 factories in Vienne in May. The struggle was joined by transport, metal, chemical, tramcar and defence industry workers. In the summer of 1916 a successful two-week strike was held at a munitions factory in Puteaux (near Paris); women workers, who were a majority there, secured a pay rise and reinstatement of all those dismissed for having taken part in the strike.

By late 1916 the strike movement mounted, some strikes even turned general. The movement was led by textile, transport, metal and chemical workers. One of the largest strikes of 1916 was that staged by the metal-workers of Paris munitions factory in December; 50 per cent of the 6,000-strong work force went on strike and

¹ Jean Fréville, *La nuit finit à Tours*, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1951, pp. 48-49; Jacques Duclos, *Octobre 17 vu de France*, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1967, p. 35.

² *Demain*, No. 9. September 1916, p. 171.

³ *République Française. Ministère du travail. Statistique des grèves survenues pendant les années 1915-1918*, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1921, pp. 290-91, 299.

won a pay rise. The strikers not only demanded higher wages and a limit on capitalist profits but also criticised the government, above all the Socialist ministers. Anti-war and internationalist sentiment increasingly surfaced among certain sections of the working class (mechanics, metal-workers, diggers, longshoremen) and some intellectuals (for example, teachers), and infiltrated the army.

In 1916, the anti-war movement continued to spread and strengthen. Leaflets circulated by French internationalists helped further mass discontent in the country and especially in the army. In October 1915, 10,000 copies of a pamphlet with Zimmerwald Conference documents were printed and sent to all Socialist sections and trade union organisations. The preface contained criticism of the social-chauvinist policy. The weekly *La Vague*, launched by the French Zimmerwald Movement soon after the Kienthal Conference (April 1916) became popular with troops. The newspaper waged vigorous propaganda against the war. The government observed with alarm that discontent was growing, especially among territorial troops. In 1916 that was corroborated, among other things, by the influx of protest letters by servicemen to *L'Humanité* and other socialist newspapers.¹ Soldiers told internationalist Socialists: "We are with you", "Let those who went to Kienthal act with more courage, soldiers from the front hail you." The report by the French delegation at the Kienthal Conference said that a rather strong opposition had emerged in parliament, made up of 30 to 40 Socialist deputies² who had the support of peasant regions and front-line soldiers. These deputies reacted to an ultraimperialist speech by President Poincaré about war to the victorious end by stating that they would vote against war loans, for peace, for France, for socialism. The growth of anti-war and revolutionary feelings in the army was reflected in Henri Barbusse's brutally truthful book *Le Feu*, written in the trenches and evoking hatred of the war's culprits. Progressive French intellectuals, like Barbusse, Raymond Lefebvre, and Paul Vaillant-Couturier, became active in the widespread anti-war movement.

Thus already in 1916 the discontent with the war and the imperialist policy of the French bourgeoisie reached nationwide proportions; anti-war protest was growing and produced mass action by the working class, peasants and soldiers.

Like their counterparts on the Continent, most Labour Party and trade unionist leaders in *Great Britain* strenuously advocated a policy of national unity and class collaboration in the name of war to a victorious end. On August 24, 1914 the British Trades Union Congress

¹ *L'Humanité*, February 22, 1916.

² N. E. Korolev, *Lenin and the International Labour Movement. 1914-1918*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1968, p. 174 (in Russian).

(TUC) concluded an industrial truce with the employers; this meant that trade unions gave up strikes for the duration of the war. On August 29, the Executive Committee of the Labour Party approved an electoral truce with the bourgeois parties for the duration of the war and agreed to take part in the army draft campaign. Those labour leaders justified their refusal to observe the anti-war decisions of the Second International by asserting that "victory for German imperialism would be the defeat and the destruction of democracy and liberty in Europe".¹ In March 1915 British trade union leaders agreed to government arbitration as the principal means of settling industrial conflicts, to an abrupt restriction of trade union rights in regulating the hire of women and youth, and to abolish restrictions on overtime, night-time and work on holidays.

Britain's ruling quarters duly appreciated the compliance of Labour Party and trade union leaders. Arthur Henderson, Secretary of the Labour Party, joined the coalition government as a Cabinet member; two other LP leaders also received responsible positions in the government. In turn, social-chauvinists went to great lengths to push the working class towards serving the war. The Labour Party Executive Committee and the TUC Parliamentary Committee endorsed the 1916 Military Service Act which introduced universal compulsory military service in Britain for the first time since Cromwell.

However, the policy of class collaboration soon ran into growing resistance by the working people. In early 1915, the strike movement began to rise rapidly. The initiative belonged to Scottish workers who staged the first large wartime strike in the Clyde valley in February and March 1915.

The comparatively young working class of Scotland concentrated at large enterprises was less infected with craft unionism and the class collaboration mentality and was more receptive to revolutionary ideas. Propaganda of those ideas in Scotland was conducted by the more determined activists of the left wing, first and foremost by John Maclean. The Clyde strike was directed by the revolutionary shop stewards, members of the British Socialist Party (BSP) and the Socialist Labour Party (SLP), William Gallacher, Arthur MacManus, Jack Murphy and others, elected to serve on the Clyde Workers' Committee. Similar committees soon sprang up in most engineering centres and, a little later, in many other industries. In late 1916 and early 1917 the shop stewards and workers' committees formed a nationwide organisation—the National Shop Stewards' and Workers' Committee Movement. Its charter said that the Movement was

¹ Francis Williams, *Fifty Years' March. The Rise of the Labour Party*, Odhams Press Limited, London, 1951, p. 226.

"to obtain an ever-increasing control of workshop conditions, the regulation of the terms upon which the workers shall be employed, the organisation of the workers upon a class basis to prosecute the interests of the working class until the triumph of the workers is assured".¹ The shop stewards' activities reflected revolutionary views and served to expand the trade union movement: in 1915-1916 trade union membership increased by 12 per cent and reached 4,640,000 by the end of 1916.²

In England, the strike movement assumed impressive proportions in 1915. While in the latter half of 1914, 151 strikes occurred with 25 thousand workers taking part and 147 thousand days lost, respective figures for 1915 were 627, 448,000 and 2,953,000. Many strikes ended in the workers' victory. Between February and June 1915 persistent struggle produced some pay rises for about 2,200,000 workers.

In 1916 the struggle somewhat subsided but still continued: 532 strikes occurred over the year, with 276,000 persons involved and 2,446,000 man-days lost. Large-scale strikes broke out in war industries too. For example, 12,000 workers at Vickers in Sheffield and 8,000 workers of the same company in Barrow-in-Furness struck in November 1916; in December, 8,000 shipbuilders in Liverpool and Birkenhead went on strike.

An overwhelming majority of the 1915-1916 strikes were wildcat, that is, they were not authorised by the union leadership. The government responded by adopting several harsh anti-labour measures. Under the Munitions of War Act which entered into force in July 1915 and was supplemented in January 1916 arbitration in industrial disputes became compulsory. That act seriously restricted trade union rights and virtually banned strikes. At first the act was applicable only in engineering and shipbuilding but was later extended to cover all industries essential to the war effort. In 1915 the bans were in force for 1,500,000 people; by the end of the war they applied to 80 per cent of all workers. Besides, the act forbade workers at munitions factories to change jobs without the so-called certificate of resignation issued by the owner of the enterprise.³

To implement the Act, Munitions Tribunals were established locally whose mandate included all workers in the munitions and related industries. Any worker who took part in a strike could be fined £5 for each day he refused to work; failure to pay the fine re-

¹ W. Hannington, *Industrial History in Wartime. Including a Record of the Shop Stewards' Movement*, London, Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1941, Appendix (I).

² *The Labour Year Book, 1919*, Joint Labour Publications Dept., London, p. 315; *The Labour Year Book, 1924*, p. 43; see also James Hinton, *The First Shop Stewards' Movement*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1973.

³ A. X. Morton and G. Tate, *The British Labour Movement*, p. 262.

sulted in imprisonment. Over 12 months only (July 1915 to June 1916), Munitions Tribunals punished 1,612 people for going on strike and over 15,000 workers for violating other regulations.¹ Another widely used method was dismissing the more defiant workers and sending them to the front.

And yet, neither the compromise policy of the LP and trade union leaders nor government reprisals were able to curb the working-class and democratic movement. The first wave of mass anti-war action swept the country already in the spring and summer of 1915. In May, mass rallies in London, Glasgow, Bristol, Birmingham, Leeds and several other cities adopted resolutions condemning the war as annexationist and imperialist.

Anti-war action grew further in the winter of 1915 and the spring of 1916, when a mass nationwide campaign against conscription was launched. In wartime conditions, the struggle of the working people assumed an expressly political character. Committees against conscription were set up in many industrial centres—London, Cardiff, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Belfast and other cities. These committees organised and coordinated the mass drive against the conscription bill submitted to Parliament in early January 1916. Many trade union organisations joined the drive. In mid-January 1916 the No Conscription Fellowship was formed. However, apart from Glasgow and Leeds where the movement was headed by shop stewards and members of the British Socialist Party, leadership was taken over by Labour Party leaders who tried to reduce the movement merely to advocating a volunteer army. The movement against conscription continued even after the Military Service Act was passed in February 1916. Rallies and manifestations were held throughout the country. The Scottish Trades Union Conference threatened a general strike. A national conference of delegates from trade unions, the Independent Labour Party and several other organisations, held on May 13, condemned the government's action. However, the movement failed to reach a scope that would have forced the government to give up universal conscription.

The Socialist Labour Party and the British Socialist Party played a noticeable part in stepping up the struggle by Britain's workers during World War I. The BSP was the largest left political organisation in the country, with a membership of about 14,000 in 1914. Unlike Hyndman, most of them opposed the imperialist war from the very start. At an April 1916 conference, Hyndman and his social-chauvinist followers found themselves in the minority and were forced to resign from the BSP.² Thanks to John Maclean, Theodore

¹ *The Labour Year Book, 1919*, pp. 106-07.

² L. J., Macfarlane, *The British Communist Party. Its Origin and Development until 1929*, Macgibbon and Kee, London, 1966, pp. 19-20.

Rothstein, Albert Inkpin and other Marxists, the revolutionary trend emerged victorious in the BSP. But the price was high too: only a little over 50 per cent of its previous membership remained in the party in 1916.

In the Socialist Labour Party, the chauvinist influence was less pronounced than in the BSP. An April 1915 conference of the SLP proclaimed that the party would fight against the imperialist carnage "by all means in our power".¹ Despite serious sectarian mistakes which stemmed from the syndicalist influence and despite its small membership, the SLP, along with the BSP, was very active in the wartime class struggle, especially in Scotland.

The national liberation struggle of the Irish people was closely connected to the anti-war drive of the British proletariat. That struggle mounted abruptly when, under the pretext of the hostilities, the British government postponed the introduction of Home Rule, legislation on limited autonomy for Ireland adopted in 1912 under powerful pressure from the national liberation movement, and persuaded the Irish Home Rulers to launch a campaign to recruit Irish soldiers for the British army. Ireland's progressive forces and a large part of its population responded with resolute protest. James Connolly, leader of the Irish proletariat, believed that the world war created favourable conditions for armed liberation from British imperialism. He hoped to launch a nationwide uprising, with socialism as the movement's ultimate goal. By the spring of 1916, a militant union had emerged between the progressive workers of the Irish Citizens Army and the Irish Volunteers, a revolutionary-democratic organisation which had previously expelled Home Rulers from its ranks as traitors to the nation. On April 24, 1916 an armed uprising broke out in Dublin, which Lenin called an integral part of Europe's coming social revolution.² The insurgents set up a republican government under President F. H. Pearse and Vice President Connolly, and the Provisional Government issued an appeal to the Irish people proclaiming an Irish republic as an independent sovereign state and the right of its people to freely choose their national destiny; all Irish citizens were guaranteed religious freedom, civil rights and equal opportunities.

The uneven struggle lasted for six days, with 1,200 insurgents keeping at bay 12,000 British punitive troops. However, their strongholds were too weak and soon ceased to exist. On April 29 the republican fighters lay down their arms. Their 15 leaders were shot. Fatally wounded, James Connolly faced the firing squad sitting in

¹ Walter Kendall, *The Revolutionary Movement in Britain. 1900-21. The Origins of British Communism*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1969, p. 111.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up", *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 355-56.

a folding chair—he could not stand up. As many as 3,500 Irish were arrested.¹

However, British imperialism was no longer able to completely suppress the Irish national liberation movement. A year after the Dublin Uprising was defeated, 2,000 revolutionary clubs were active in Ireland, with a membership of about 300,000 national liberation fighters. Lenin highly valued that “heroic revolt of the most mobile and enlightened section of certain classes in an oppressed nation”.²

In *Italy*, explosive action by the working people continued virtually unabated between August 1914 and May 1915, when the country entered the war. In August 1914 a wave of protest against unemployment, high prices and lower wages swept Italy. Strikes were called by the autoworkers in Turin and the tram workers in Catanzaro. In the autumn of 1914, mass rallies and demonstrations were held in Turin, Venice, Pisa, Milan, Florence and other cities under the slogans “No to the War” and “We Want Bread and Jobs”. A September 1914 congress of Italian trade unions called on the working people in all belligerent and neutral countries to use the crisis generated by the war for overthrowing bourgeois and monarchist regimes.

The government fought vigorously against anti-war action. In early 1915, the police attacked a manifestation in Reggio Emilia protesting against Italy’s planned entry into the war. Demonstrators put up a stubborn resistance. People were killed and wounded on both sides. The government seized on the pretext and issued a decree which empowered police chiefs to ban meetings and demonstrations if they “threatened public order”. The workers’ democratic rights were thus subjected to arbitrary action by the police. Local police chiefs used the decree to ban not only anti-war but also community, trade union and other meetings. So, even before Italy’s entry into the war, its ruling quarters began to introduce military and police rule.

A joint conference of the governing bodies of the PSI, the General Confederation of Labour (CGL) and the Italian Syndical Union was held on August 4, 1914. Conference participants spoke out against Italy’s entry into the war and said it was necessary for the country to observe strict neutrality. They called on the proletariat to take immediate action using any means if neutrality was violated. On the whole, that decision was better than the social-chauvinist resolutions passed by most Social-Democratic parties.

¹ A. Kolpakov, *Ireland, a Rebel Island*, Nauka, Moscow, 1965, pp. 28-29; idem., *Ireland on the Way to the Revolution, 1900-1918*, Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1976, pp. 218-27 (both in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, “The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 358.

However, when in the summer of 1915 Italy did enter the war, social-reformists led by Turati and right-wing CGL leaders did everything possible to make previous decisions on action to prevent the war remain a dead letter; like the social-chauvinists of other West European countries, they zealously pursued the "civil peace" policy. In May 1915 when Italy's entry into the war was an especially urgent issue, a general strike of protest was about to begin, and in Turin it did. But the PSI leadership stopped it. The great potential was left unused. Subsequently, Turati supported Italy's fighting in the war on the side of the Entente, and CGL leaders collaborated readily with the authorities and employers and served on industrial committees. As to the Italian maximalist centrists, they advanced a rather ambiguous slogan in relation to the war—"Neither Participate Nor Sabotage". An internationalist group under Giacinto Menotti Serrati which emerged from among the maximalists protested against the war but did not agree to Lenin's proposal that they condemn social-chauvinists and break with them organisationally.

Soon after Italy joined the war the government issued "industrial mobilisation" decrees under which the wage and salary earners at enterprises under contracts to the defence ministry were considered mobilised. They lost their right to strike, to leave their jobs or seek work at another enterprise, any violation of regulations was treated like a breach of wartime laws. The draft deferment they were entitled to could be annulled by the management at any moment. Each month the regime at Italian munitions factories became stricter. In these militarised conditions, workers were fined for the slightest offence, arrested and jailed. Even 15-year-olds were tried as deserters by military tribunals for failure to show up for work.¹

Nevertheless, all those measures could not stem the gradual upsurge of the mass movement. The siding of social-reformists from the PSI and the CGL with "their own" bourgeoisie and the employers' assault on the working-class living standard encountered resolute resistance by the workers' new organisations—the factory committees which sprang up during the war. Elected directly by workers, they were the largest and most active bodies, and their activities reflected the growing revolutionary trend in the working-class movement. In the latter half of 1915 turbulent spontaneous demonstrations and meetings against military loans were held in Venice, Milan, in Sicily and other regions. Strikes grew more numerous; in June and July 1915 they spread to almost all industries. The nationwide total for 1915 was 539 strikes, 132,000 strikers and 637,000 man-days lost. In 1916 the number of strikes and strikers somewhat declined but that of man-days lost grew to 737,000. Italy's workers, driven

¹ *Avanti!*, January 3, 1916; *La Stampa*, February 15, 1916.

to desperation by the severe privations, increased unemployment, a thriving black market in foodstuffs and intensification of labour, were in no mood to observe the "truce between the classes". There was also rural unrest. Unemployed labourers began to seize landed estates in the Bari Province in October 1915. Leaflets calling for disobeying orders were distributed among servicemen; desertion and draft evasion were becoming increasingly frequent. Soldiers' mutinees broke out in some places.

Gradually, a militant vanguard of the proletariat was taking shape. In 1914-1916 progressive workers, intellectuals and youth in the PSI began to form revolutionary groups seeking a break with opportunists. Revolutionary internationalists included Antonio Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti. Leftist socialist propaganda, particularly that conducted by the newspaper *Avanti!* played an important role in spreading anti-war sentiment.

The Zimmerwald Conference generated wide response in Italy. As many as 300,000 CGL members joined the Zimmerwald Movement. Having learned about the ideas of the Zimmerwald Left, Antonio Gramsci, at that time editor of the Turin socialist weekly *Ordine nuovo*, worked to establish close ties with the Bolsheviks. Lenin's works and Bolshevik documents, Togliatti recalled, circulated from hand to hand at factories. Gramsci was the soul of the labour cause.¹

Gradually, the war sucked the Balkan countries into its vortex too. Both groups of belligerents tried to win them over to their side, offering lavish advantages at others' expense to Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie of those countries was also vigorously preparing for entry into the war, waiting for an opportune moment. This meant that, with the exception of Serbia and Montenegro which had fallen victim to Austro-Hungarian aggression, the initial task of the working people in Balkan countries was preventing their entry into the imperialist war. However, they failed to achieve that goal. The failure was facilitated to a certain degree by the opportunist policy of right-wing Social-Democrats and centrists.

In *Bulgaria* the Broad Socialists paid lip service to neutrality while in fact supporting the aggressive nationalist policy of the ruling quarters who favoured joining the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Only the Tesnyaks led by Blagoev did not stray from their anti-war stand. The 21st Congress of the BSDLP(T), held in August 1915, resolutely rejected any participation by the Bulgarian people in the war on any side.² Together with Serbia's

¹ Palmiro Togliatti, *Gramsci*, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1972, p. 20.

² Българската комунистическа партия в резолюции и решения..., т. I, стр. 321.

Social-Democrats, the Tesnyaks came out against the ruling quarters of Bulgaria and Serbia who were clamouring for a military conflict. When in September 1915 the Bulgarian government decided to start mobilisation, the Tesnyak parliamentary group addressed a special appeal to the Bulgarian people saying: "Across the frontiers we extend our hand to the fraternal workers of Serbia, Romania, Greece and Turkey and, together with the entire Balkan proletariat, proclaim: 'Down with War', 'Long Live Peace', 'Long Live Workers' International Solidarity', 'Long Live a Balkan Federated Republic', 'Long Live Revolutionary Socialism, and the Liberation It Brings'."¹

After Bulgaria joined the war the Tesnyaks initiated and led mass rallies and manifestations in many cities, demanding a stop to the hostilities. By late 1915, disgruntlement with the war spread to army units, and there were cases of disobeying combat orders among servicemen.² In 1916, the anti-war movement mounted even higher.

In *Romania*, before the country joined the war in August 1916, the mass anti-war sentiment took the shape of rallies, meetings, manifestations, draft evasion and strikes. The strike movement was especially powerful in the summer of 1916. It engulfed Bucharest, Ploesti and several other industrial centres. The Galati strike was especially turbulent: the manifestation there, staged under the slogans "Open the Factories", "We Want a Lower Cost of Living", "An Eight-Hour Working Day" and "Down with the War", was attacked by the police who massacred the demonstrators. The funerals of the victims turned into mass manifestations.

Despite the extremely unfavourable conditions after Romania's entry into the war, the proletariat's struggle continued. Strikes flared up at enterprises, albeit weak and poorly organised. Some left-wing socialist groups published leaflets calling for a revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeois system.

Romania's anti-war movement was headed by the Social-Democratic Party in which Centrists enjoyed considerable influence. Even the left-wing Social-Democrats, Alecu Constantinescu, Dimitrie Marinescu, Ecaterina Arbore, Ion Constantin Frimu and others, failed to draw up a specific programme of revolutionary struggle. They only gradually, influenced by the Bolsheviks, came to support the slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil war.

In *Serbia*, discontent with the war was already growing in 1915. Servicemen increasingly realised that they were fighting not so much for their country as for the imperialist Entente interests. Anti-war feelings were mounting both at the front and in the interior. Strikes

¹ Quoted from *A History of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1971, p. 197 (in Russian).

² Работа на БКП в армията (1891-1918). Документи и материали, София, 1966, стр. 259-73.

became increasingly frequent. In connection with workers' action on economic issues, Serbian Social-Democrats advanced political demands too, above all to end the imperialist war. In August 1915, Social-Democratic members of parliament issued a declaration about the need to preserve peace with Bulgaria. After the Serbian army was defeated in late 1915, a national liberation struggle against invaders began on the territories of Serbia and Montenegro overrun by the Austro-Hungarian army.

In *Japan*, which used its involvement in the war to annex Chinese territories, the industry was on the rise. Nevertheless, the situation of the working people deteriorated. High prices, typical in wartime, dealt a severe blow to the population, first and foremost to the working people. The strike movement was gradually rising. There were 50 strikes in 1914, 64 in 1915 and 108 in 1916. As a rule, they were small-scale and spontaneous due to the lack of mass trade union organisations and a working-class party. Strikes began to turn political only by the end of the war.

By the end of 1915, anti-war action in various forms was also mounting in Europe's neutral countries—Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. The task of keeping out of the war was especially urgent for the working class of *Sweden*, where the reactionary forces and the military wanted the country to side with Germany to annex Finland. However, they encountered stubborn resistance by the popular masses. In 1915 alone, about 1,000 cases of anti-war action occurred in Sweden, in which over 100,000 people were involved. Sweden's socialist youth organisations contributed much to that movement.

In *Norway*, the left forces sought to link anti-war action closely to the drive against high prices and the establishment of special arbitration tribunals to settle industrial conflicts. In 1916, the discontent with the stepped-up oppression and deterioration of the economic situation took the shape of a giant general strike in which over 200,000 people took part.¹

The growth of the anti-war movement and economic action by the working class of the neutral countries undermined the "civil peace" policy, pursued with particular zeal by right-wing Social-Democrats like Thorwald Stauning of Denmark, Karl Hjalmar Branting of Sweden and others. Their influence affected a considerable part of the working people. That and, even more so, the fact that the workers in the neutral countries did not experience such privations as their class comrades in the warring nations gave rise to pacifist illusions of attaining a democratic peace without revolu-

¹ The "*Sotsial-Demokrat*" Collection, No. 2, 1916, pp. 40-41; *A History of the Second International*, Vol. 2, p. 464 (both in Russian).

tionary struggle. Lenin repeatedly noted that important drawback in the development of the anti-war movement in several neutral countries. Criticising the left in these nations, particularly in Sweden,¹ for the limited nature of the slogans advanced and for concessions to bourgeois pacifism, he helped them work out a truly revolutionary political course and tactics. The Swedish-Norwegian delegation at the Zimmerwald Conference supported the Bolshevik precept of turning the imperialist war into a civil war. Norwegian internationalists, back home, published a full account of the Zimmerwald Conference decisions.

The growing prices and deteriorating supplies in the Scandinavian countries in the autumn of 1916, due especially to the British economic blockade and to the intensification of submarine warfare on the part of Germany, touched off strikes at some Norwegian enterprises. The response was a wave of lockouts. In Sweden, an acute problem arose in connection with the rationing of goods.

In those conditions, right-wing Social-Democratic leaders became more active in their support of a peace agreement between the imperialist governments of the warring countries. Prospects of such an agreement were hypocritically passed off as durable peace among nations. However, the left-wing Social-Democrats in the neutral countries increasingly believed that in the given situation, peace was only feasible as a result of social transformation.

In the *United States*, the world war heightened anti-war feelings which were mostly pacifist; that was often due to religious prejudice against wars and similar sentiment. The sense of solidarity with the proletarians of the countries thrown into the furnace of the world war did play a great role in the spread of anti-war feelings in the US working-class movement. However, the protest against the war and the United States' entry into it was not associated with the need to fight against capitalism.

Initially, the widespread anti-war feelings among the US working class in conditions of the United States' neutrality made a rather noticeable impact on the policy of the AFL. It kept to a pacifist stand. Gradually, however, as preparations for the United States' entry into the war were getting under way, the Federation's leadership was altering its course, proceeding from moderate bourgeois pacifism to active collaboration with the bourgeoisie in building up the country's military potential. Offering help to the bourgeoisie, Gompers and other AFL leaders in exchange demanded material concessions to the workers—better working conditions and higher wages. They did not forget their own interests too, vying for positions in

¹ V. I. Lenin to Alexandra Kollontai, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, p. 189; V. I. Lenin to David Wijnkoop, *ibid.*, p. 195.

the government apparatus, etc.¹ Their shift from pacifism to social-chauvinism gave rise to perceptible resistance in local AFL organisations. However, under the pressure of most AFL leaders, the 1915 convention of the federation approved the militarist campaign launched by the ruling quarters. At the time, at the insistence of a large group of delegates, the convention adopted a resolution aimed against the introduction of permanent military service and military instruction in schools.²

Meanwhile, leaders of the American Socialist Party (ASP) pinned their hopes on the governments' peacemaking efforts and gradually shifted to social-chauvinist positions. The US Socialist Labour Party (SLP) condemned militarism, called for a general strike against the war and waged anti-war propaganda, but it failed to link the anti-war drive to the struggle for socialism.

The US anti-war movement was led by the left wing of the ASP under Eugene Debs and Charles Ruthenberg, the IWW and the Socialist Propaganda League of America which maintained permanent contact with the Bolsheviks. These groups and organisations launched a vigorous propaganda campaign against the United States' entry into the war and against the "national preparedness" for war promoted by the ruling quarters; they staged mass rallies and manifestations, calling on the workers to sabotage work under military contracts.³ In 1915-1916, the IWW-published anti-war and anti-militarist newspapers and pamphlets and IWW decisions reflected some of Lenin's ideas advanced at the Zimmerwald Conference. However, the overrating by the IWW of the economic means of the class struggle and its underestimation of its political aspects impeded the accomplishment of the revolutionary goals it set itself.⁴

The authorities severely persecuted IWW activists and other leaders of the strike and anti-war movement. In 1915 thousands of IWW members were arrested; many were sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Joe Hill (Joseph Hillstrom), one of the most popular figures of the US working-class movement, a staunch fighter and tireless propagandist, was executed on a framed-up charge of murder. In his farewell letter to Big Bill Haywood he wrote: "Good-bye, Bill.

¹ Philip Taft, *Organized Labor in American History*, Harper and Row, New York, Evanston and London, 1964, pp. 309-11.

² *The American Labor Year Book. 1917-1918*, The Rand School of Social Science, New York, 1918, pp. 42-43.

³ James Weinstein, *The Decline of Socialism in America, 1912-1925*, Monthly Review Press, New York-London, 1967, pp. 46-47.

⁴ *The I. W. W. Its First Fifty Years (1905-1955)*, by the Industrial Workers of the World, Chicago, 1955, pp. 109-10; William Z. Foster, *History of the Communist Party of the United States*, International Publishers, New York, 1952, p. 136.

I will die like a true-blue rebel. Don't waste any time in mourning. Organize."¹ The persecution continued into the later years.

The United States witnessed a considerable strike movement during the war and the war-related economic boom. Production growth favoured the workers' struggle for better conditions. In 1915, there were 1,420 strikes in the United States in which 504,000 workers took part. In 1916, respective figures rose to 3,157 and 1,600,000. The states of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Connecticut emerged as centres of the strike movement.² The workers' offensive forced the bourgeoisie to cut working hours, raise wages and agree to other concessions.

The strike movement was accompanied with anti-war manifestations, clashes between workers and "preparedness parades" participants, workers' refusal to volunteer for military service, and resistance to the introduction of universal conscription. The strike movement and anti-militarist action slowed down US war preparations and disrupted the schedule of the country's readiness for war.

* * *

In 1916 the situation at most theatres of operations was such that neither of the warring sides could count on a swift and decisive victory although tens of millions had been called up to fight. Neither the destructive battles along the Somme and at Verdun nor the large-scale engagements on the Eastern and Caucasian fronts secured any perceptible advantage for either side. Submarine warfare failed to turn the tide either.

As the hostilities progressed, the contradiction between monopolist goals and the interests of the popular masses became increasingly obvious. Millions dead at the front and at home, malnutrition and hunger, zooming prices, unbearable working conditions and mounting reprisals by the military authorities and the police triggered a wave of indignation among the working class, soldiers and peasants. That indignation increasingly took openly anti-government forms. In 1916 the class struggle in the belligerent nations exacerbated considerably. The strike movement was growing everywhere, most of all in Russia. Protracted strikes, often lasting for several weeks, occurred at munitions factories in Russia, France, Britain and other countries. Sometimes strikes spread to become general. Manifestations, rallies and other forms of protest were also widespread. By early 1917 a mass anti-war movement emerged in virtually all belligerent nations; the Bolsheviks in Russia and revolutionary Social-

¹ Vern Smith, *The Frame-Up System*, International Publishers, New York, 1930, p. 13.

² *Monthly Labor Review*, Vol. IV, 1917, No. 4. pp. 600-06.

Democrats in other countries contributed to its upsurge and transition to a struggle for a revolutionary withdrawal from the imperialist war.

Mounting social tensions on the one hand and the noticeable drain on the resources of the belligerents on the other forced the ruling quarters to attempt ending the war with an imperialist peace so as to prevent revolutionary upheavals which threatened the very foundations of the existing system. Still, despite the obvious signs of a growing crisis at the top, the bloodshed mounted.

The revolutionary forces grew and consolidated in the struggle against the criminal policy of the ruling quarters, and the class struggle was exacerbated everywhere. And although the revolutionary movement developed unevenly and sometimes amid contradictions, it weakened the existing order of things and undermined the foundations of imperialist domination. All that led Lenin to state in January 1917: "The revolutionary situation in Europe is a fact. The extreme discontent, the unrest and anger of the masses are facts. It is on strengthening *this* torrent that revolutionary Social-Democrats must concentrate all their efforts."¹

Society's polarisation over the issues of war and peace intensified and the general democratic and revolutionary trend was growing stronger, especially in Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The extreme exhaustion of economic, food and human resources, the start of a winter of hunger in Germany and Austria-Hungary, fissures in the Hohenzollern and Hapsburg regimes, the advancement of the anti-militarist and national liberation movements—all that combined to form an objective basis for the ripening of a revolutionary crisis in those countries.

The growing economic, political and military crisis reached its peak in Russia. Led by the Bolshevik Party, the proletariat here staged a resolute offensive, supported by its allies in the liberation struggle. In March through June and October 1916 the strike movement rose to a level comparable only to the revolution of 1905-1907. In the later half of 1916, revolutionary ferment in the army and rural areas was accompanied with unrest and uprisings in the non-Russian regions of the empire. By early 1917 the flames of revolutionary struggle spread throughout the country. A revolutionary situation was obvious.

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¹ V. I. Lenin, "What Next?", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p. 270.

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Chapter 12

THE FEBRUARY BOURGEOIS-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA AND THE RISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

RUSSIA ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION

By early 1917, Russia was on the eve of the second bourgeois-democratic revolution. Far-reaching socio-economic conditions necessary for it had taken shape as far back as the early 1900s. These conditions led to a new revolutionary upsurge in Russia, when the world war "sternly and inexorably faced the working people with the alternative of taking a bold, desperate and fearless step, or of perishing, of dying from starvation".¹

Tsarist Russia was the first among the belligerents to face nationwide economic dislocation and hunger. The output of metals, coal and oil plummeted; the shortages of fuel and electric power brought factories to a halt or forced them to cut down production; railway transport was in disarray; food supplies to cities deteriorated abruptly; enormous bread lines queued up in Petrograd.

The decrepit condition of the entire tsarist system was reflected in the incompetence and corruption of its military and civilian authorities, in the "ministerial leap-frog" and embezzlement of unheard-of proportions. Grigori Rasputin with his gang of crooks and shady characters operated at the court. A conflict was approaching between the autocracy and the bourgeois opposition. The tsar repeatedly rejected the latter's demands of establishing a ministry of "public confidence" capable of waging a victorious war, staffed by tsarist bureaucrats and representatives of "the public" (i.e., the bourgeoisie). The autocracy intended to suppress the bourgeois opposition and disband the Fourth Duma; meanwhile, some bourgeois leaders increasingly favoured a palace coup d'état which would give them their share of power and make it possible to "bring order to the country". However, both sides feared the coming revolutionary explosion most of all.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Speech on the Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly Delivered to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, January 6 (1918)", *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 438.

The real fighter for the country's emancipation, rallying the popular masses against tsarism, was Russia's proletariat. In 1917, the nationwide total of hired workers reached about 18,500,000, with about 3,500,000 employed at large industrial enterprises. On the whole, the proletariat made up about 20 per cent of the country's population. The politically advanced proletariat retained its core despite the draft and the influx of petty-bourgeois elements into its ranks during the war. That core managed to uphold revolutionary traditions in wartime too. The nearly 400,000-strong Petrograd proletariat formed the vanguard in the revolutionary struggle; its action was decisive for the victory of the second bourgeois-democratic revolution throughout the country. "The life of Petrograd is being followed by the whole of Russia," Lenin wrote in 1917. "Every step of Petrograd's is a guideline for the whole of Russia."¹

According to the Industrial Monitoring Board, the total number of strikers in Russia in January and February 1917 reached 676,286—almost four times the number of respective months in 1916. Strikes were continuous; the Petrograd proletariat was joined by the workers of Moscow, the Donets Basin, Kharkov, Baku, Tula and other cities. Political strikes involved 85 per cent of all strikers.² "The idea of a general strike attracts new supporters each day and is growing popular like in 1905..." the secret police reported. "The working masses have concluded that a general strike and a subsequent revolution are necessary and feasible."³ In no other country was the strike movement as widespread and powerful as in Russia during that period.

The proletarian movement merged with the soldiers' protest against the horrors of war and with the growing mass revolutionary upsurge in rural areas and in the non-Russian regions.

Thus, the revolutionary situation in the country reached its peak. The tsarist regime was completely isolated. The Russian Bureau wrote to the RSDLP Central Committee on February 11 (24), 1917: "Political struggle is growing more acute each day. Discontent is raging throughout the country. A revolutionary storm may break out any day now..."⁴

The rapid and powerful upsurge of the working-class movement, the chief factor in the development of the revolutionary situation and its transition to revolution, was due to both objective causes and the

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Meeting of the Petrograd Committee of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks)" *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 543.

² *Data on Labour Statistics*, Issue 8, People's Commissariat of Labour, Moscow, 1920, pp. 6, 14 (in Russian).

³ Quoted from: E. N. Burdzhakov, *The Second Russian Revolution. The Uprising in Petrograd*, Nauka, Moscow, 1967, p. 88 (in Russian).

⁴ Quoted from: *Questions of CPSU History*, No. 9, Pravda Publishing House, Moscow, 1965, p. 81 (in Russian).

efforts by the Bolshevik Party. Despite mass reprisals, the anti-revolutionary stance of the bourgeoisie and the manoeuvring of social-chauvinists attempting to split and disorganise the country's proletarian movement, the Bolsheviks retained their deep roots at enterprises, revived organisations that had been wrecked, and steadily led the working-class movement.

Thanks to the measures taken by the Foreign Bureau of the RSDLP Central Committee, the third wartime Russian Bureau of the Central Committee (A. G. Shlyapnikov, P. A. Zalutsky and V. M. Molotov) began operating in November 1916. By early 1917, the Bolshevik Party membership reached 24,000; the Party was expanding, growing stronger and enhancing its influence among the workers. The Petrograd Bolshevik organisation increased its membership to 2,000; the Moscow organisation, according to far from complete data, comprised up to 600 members. In the Urals, the Bolshevik Party had up to 500 members, in Yekaterinoslav about 400, in Nizhni Novgorod over 300, in Kiev, and Kharkov 200 in each. Other figures were 180 to 200 in Makeyevka, 150 to 200 in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, 120 to 150 in Tver, 170 in Rostov and Nakhichevan, etc.¹ Taking into account the stratum of politically conscious workers supporting the Party, by early 1917 the Bolsheviks were an impressive force with a nationwide organisation. On February 11 (24), 1917 the Russian Bureau reported to the RSDLP Central Committee: "Our organisational work is in good shape... We are now successfully organising in the South, along the Volga and in the Urals.... Expecting news from the Caucasus.... Compared to the state of affairs with others [the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries], we are in excellent shape. One can say that at this moment we are the only ones to possess a nationwide organisation."²

Armed with Lenin's clear-cut programme and policy, the Bolshevik Party was able to assume the leadership of the workers' struggle and, involving other working people in it, to transform it into a movement by millions, even though in the course of the bourgeois-democratic revolution it failed to channel the stream completely into a steadily proletarian direction. As the revolutionary upsurge mounted, the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee suggested, in late 1916, to the St. Petersburg Committee and the Moscow Regional Bolshevik Bureau that they discuss organising a general strike and street manifestations against tsarism and the war, involving the soldier masses into the revolutionary movement, and preparing conditions for an armed uprising.

¹ See *A History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Vol. 2, Politizdat, Moscow, 1966, pp. 652-53 (in Russian).

² Quoted from: *Questions of CPSU History*, No. 9, 1965, p. 81.

Mass proletarian action marked the twelfth anniversary of Bloody Sunday. A political strike, the largest in wartime, was staged in Petrograd, with up to 300,000 workers taking part; mass manifestations and rallies were held in the capital. The movement was led by the Bolsheviks. Although the secret police had considerably thinned Bolshevik ranks in December and early January, the arrests failed to disrupt Bolshevik work in the capital. Action in Petrograd was vigorously supported in Moscow and many other industrial centres. Political strikes continued after the Bloody Sunday anniversary too.

The conciliatory parties of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries tried to wrest the initiative from the Bolsheviks, to restrict the scope of proletarian action and channel it to support the Cadet-Oktoberist majority in the Duma. But they failed.

In mid-February, preparations began to celebrate the International Working Women's Day (February 23 Old Style). In its leaflet "To All Working Men and Women of Petrograd", the Bolshevik Committee urged overthrow of the tsarist government, establishment of a provisional revolutionary government and a democratic republic, introduction of the eight-hour working-day and transfer of all landed estates to the peasants.¹

On the eve of the International Working Women's Day, the Putilov Works became the centre of the mass movement in Petrograd. The workers of most metropolitan enterprises and the population of Petrograd proletarian districts joined the Putilov workers in strikes, rallies and manifestations protesting against oppression, high prices and hunger. These actions merged on the Working Women's Day and transformed the revolutionary situation into a revolution.

In the first days of the revolution, the Bolshevik Party succeeded in leading the movement in Petrograd, the centre of political struggle. Factory chapters which functioned at virtually all large enterprises were a powerful base of the city's Party organisation. Of the 115 grassroots chapters, 84 operated at enterprises. The Vyborg and Narva branches, with over 500 members each, were the most active among the 10 district organisations with a total membership of 2,000.² Bolshevik Party organisations were rallying points for a considerable section of politically advanced workers supporting *Pravda's* course. There were many experienced revolutionaries among them, steeled by many years of hard struggle. Bolshevik influence predominated in the 9,000-strong trade unions. Bolsheviks dominated insurance funds, above all hospital credit unions which com-

¹ *Leaflets of St. Petersburg Bolsheviks, 1902-1917*, Vol. 2, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, Leningrad, 1939, pp. 247-49 (in Russian).

² *Protocols of the Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the RSDLP(B). April 1917*, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1958, p. 201 (in Russian).

prised 176,132 workers¹ — almost 50 per cent of the capital's proletariat. Many prominent Bolsheviks worked in those bodies: A. A. Andreyev, M. I. Kalinin, V. V. Kuibyshev, V. I. Nevsky, N. I. Podvoisky, N. M. Shvernik, and others.

The Bolsheviks skilfully used all the opportunities at their disposal and successfully led the incipient movement. "Our Party," Lenin wrote in this connection, "was found to be with the masses, with the revolutionary proletariat, *in spite of* the arrest and deportation of our Duma deputies to Siberia, as far back as 1914, in spite of the fierce persecution and arrests to which the St. Petersburg Committee was subjected for its underground activities during the war, *against* the war and against tsarism."² However, the fact that Lenin was still in exile, most Central Committee members were in jail, in exile or at the front, and, consequently, many of the best proletarian fighters were away from Petrograd made itself felt too. The Bolsheviks were not strong enough to provide leadership for the rapidly expanding nationwide revolutionary stream, when many thousands of soldiers and petty-bourgeois urban elements quickly joined the struggle.

AUTOCRACY OVERTHROWN

On the morning of February 23 (March 8), 1917 the strike spread from the Putilov Works to other enterprises in the capital. Striker activists using the tactics of "calling off work" involved new sections of workers in the strike. A highly energetic force were women who were exhausted by hard industrial work and endless bread and kerosene lines. Demonstrators filled the streets, converging on the city centre. The Vyborg Side where Bolshevik influence was strong was at the head of the movement.

No one could say whether things would reach the stage of a decisive confrontation with tsarism, but Bolshevik leaders envisaged that possibility too. Late at night on February 23 a conference was held among representatives of the Russian Bureau of the RSDLP Central Committee, the St. Petersburg Committee, the Vyborg and Petrograd district committees and Bolshevik organisations at major enterprises of the Vyborg Side. The conference assessed the new situation and decided to develop the strike movement and mass political demonstrations of Petrograd's proletariat, to step up propaganda and efforts to win soldiers over to the revolutionary side, and to provide

¹ *The Working-Class Movement in Petrograd in 1912-1917*, Documents and Materials, Lenizdat, Leningrad, 1958, pp. 425, 426 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, "Letters from Afar", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p. 312.

weapons for workers' detachments.¹ That course was directed at a general political strike by the Petrograd proletariat, and it provided for the possibility of armed struggle.

On February 24 (March 9), the strike movement covered all districts of Petrograd; strikes and demonstrations stepped up abruptly. In excess of 200,000 people, over 50 per cent of Petrograd workers, downed tools. The Vyborg district remained the centre of the entire movement. Mass rallies at factories, begun in the morning, turned into political demonstrations. Columns consisting of many thousands of demonstrators responded to a Bolshevik appeal and headed for the city centre, Nevsky Prospekt. Bolshevik slogans dominated: "Down with Autocracy", "Down with the War", "Down with the Tsarist Government", "Long Live a Republic".

The government and the military authorities in Petrograd at first saw the events of February 23-24 as merely a hunger riot by a mob of women. The Duma held essentially the same view. Bourgeois leaders kept harping on the proposal of transferring food administration to municipal bodies, i.e., to bourgeois organisations. The Mensheviks began to realise that a revolution was under way but, as N. Sukhanov, a Menshevik leader, wrote later, they believed that "the power about to replace tsarism would be inevitably bourgeois" and that their policy should be securing power for the Duma "progressive bloc".² That approach predetermined the conciliatory parties' role of passive observers, of the liberal bourgeoisie's willing tool. Of all Russia's political parties, the Bolsheviks alone were in the thick of developments and directed them, supported by the politically advanced workers of the capital.

On February 23, the Petrograd authorities put the plan of suppressing "disturbances", drawn up in advance, into operation. However, despite efforts by the officers, neither the police nor army units displayed any zeal. Many soldiers' sympathies lay with the demonstrators. Bolsheviks launched a citywide drive to win the army over to the side of the people. A strike by Petrograd tramcar drivers was an important landmark in the revolutionary developments: it impeded the authorities in transferring and concentrating army units to suppress revolutionary action.

On February 24, the Russian Bureau of the RSDLP Central Committee decided to expand the movement to "the maximum", to expand the general political strike in Petrograd under the slogan "Down with Autocracy", and to ensure greater further participation by sol

¹ N. Sveshnikov, "Excerpts from Memoirs", *Petrogradskaya Pravda*, March 14, 1923 (in Russian).

² N. Sukhanov, *Notes on the Revolution*, Book I, Z. I. Grzhebin Publishing House, Petrograd, Moscow, 1922, p. 21 (in Russian).

diers in the revolution. Measures were taken to establish contacts with neighbouring cities and with Moscow.

A conference of representatives of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, the St. Petersburg Committee, the Vyborg District Committee and several other Bolshevik district organisations, held late on February 24, fully supported that decision; conference participants, who had spent the day among the masses, were aware that the revolution had begun. Early in the morning on February 25, Party organisations at Petrograd factories were informed of the decision.

On February 25, the political strike became virtually general. Over 300,000 of the 385,000-390,000 Petrograd workers were on strike. Political rallies and demonstrations were held everywhere. Workers assumed control of the situation in the Vyborg and Narva districts. Bolshevik organisations stepped up their work among the masses, directed the movement toward revolutionary demonstrations and fraternisation between workers and soldiers. Contacts with soldiers were being established. On February 25, the St. Petersburg Bolshevik Committee addressed to the soldiers a special leaflet that said: "Remember, soldier comrades, that only a fraternal union between the working class and the revolutionary army will bring emancipation to the oppressed people and put an end to the senseless fratricidal war. Down with the tsar's monarchy! Long live the fraternal union of the revolutionary army with the people!"¹ The leaflet was circulated at once among soldiers in the capital and its suburbs.

Simultaneously, ties with the provinces were growing stronger. Representatives of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg Committee were sent to Moscow, Nizhni Novgorod, Helsingfors, Vyborg, Kronstadt, Riga, and Dvinsk. The slogan of an all-Russian general strike was advanced and a leaflet issued which said: "An outbreak in a particular place can grow and become a nationwide revolution which can prompt a revolution in other countries too. Struggle lies ahead, but so does our certain victory. Everyone rally round the red banner of the revolution! Down with the tsar's monarchy! Long live an eight-hour working-day! All landed estates for the people! Down with the war! Long live the brotherhood of workers throughout the world! Long live the Socialist International!"² The St. Petersburg Committee mapped out a comprehensive plan of action to expand the revolution and decided, if the government took strong measures to suppress the rapidly growing movement, to erect barricades.³

¹ *Leaflets of St. Petersburg Bolsheviks, 1902-1917*, Vol. 2, p. 251.

² *Ibid.*, p. 250.

³ See *Problems of Archive Techniques*, No. 1, 1962, p. 112 (in Russian).

The authorities began to realise that things were becoming serious. Arrests swept the city. Police and army units sent to "restore law and order" in Petrograd were instructed to use arms against demonstrators. Cordons were reinforced and bridges sealed off to keep the demonstrators from the city centre. But the growing mass revolutionary struggle, the demonstrators' appeals to the soldiers and Cossacks, and the work of the Bolsheviks and their proletarian supporters among the Petrograd garrison troops increasingly affected the army.

A conference of the Central Committee Bureau held late on February 25 supported the Party organisations' striving to advance the movement along the revolutionary path and to step up the efforts to win the support of the hesitant troops.

Meanwhile, a heated discussion ensued among the Bolshevik leadership about arming the proletariat and setting up armed units. Some maintained that in conditions of war and mass mobilisation one should concentrate on securing support by the army and not waste time on arming the workers. However, the majority rejected that approach and insisted on action in both directions.

On February 26 (March 11), the struggle rose still higher. Mass arrests on the previous night failed to deprive the Petrograd Bolsheviks of leadership. The Central Committee's Russian Bureau was functioning, the Vyborg District Committee temporarily assumed the mandate of the St. Petersburg Committee; most members of the city Committee escaped the arrests, and along with the Vyborg other district committees were working; members of factory chapters were constantly in the midst of the workers. Strikers were firmly in control of working-class suburbs, and the police did not even dare show their face there. At noon, workers, responding to a Bolshevik appeal, headed for the city centre from the suburbs. Army patrols opened fire and mounted troops attacked the workers. Armed groups of workers who were among the demonstrators returned the fire; strikes and manifestations began to grow into open clashes with the troops. Bloodshed in the streets followed.

The government and the military authorities scheduled further measures to put down the revolution for February 27 (March 12). They even believed that the use of troops on February 26 had produced "excellent results" and that "order" was about to be restored. Nicholas II and his retinue were so sure of their position that they decided to curb the bourgeois "opposition" too—the leaders of the liberal-bourgeois Progressive Bloc insisting that the only way to restore "order", was an imperial manifesto establishing a ministry of "public confidence" under someone trusted both by the tsar and by the "entire country". Instead of that manifesto, the government issued a decree, drawn up well beforehand, suspending the Duma until April 1917.

Petrograd's Menshevik and SR leaders obviously lacked confidence in the power of the revolutionary people. They kept in the power wake of the liberal-bourgeois policy and tried to stop the political strike and subdue the entire movement.¹

But the revolution was in no mood to retreat. The shoot-out on February 26 only exacerbated the mass militant effort and the desire to put an end to autocracy. The revolutionary work in the army was also reaching a turning point. Bolshevik agitators infiltrated barracks, talked to soldiers, staged rallies and disseminated the St. Petersburg Committee's message to the soldiers. In the streets, working men and women fraternised with soldiers and urged them to join the people. Already on February 26, a company of the Pavlovsky Regiment over 1,000-strong defected to the revolutionaries. On the night of that day, decisions not to fight against the people were taken in many barracks.

The upsurge of the movement enabled the Bolsheviks to raise the question of an armed uprising. Late on February 26, a session of the Vyborg District Committee was held, joined by representatives of the Central Committee's Russian Bureau, the St. Petersburg Committee and the district committees of Vasilyevsky Island and the Petrograd Side. The session unanimously decided to transform the general strike into an uprising, increase fraternisation with soldiers as much as possible and keep working to win the army over to the side of the proletarian movement, continue with raiding police stations and disarming the police, seize armouries, arm the workers and free imprisoned Bolsheviks. The session favoured immediately publishing leaflets urging an uprising and a manifesto on behalf of the RSDLP Central Committee.² Factory representatives were informed of the decision taken by the Bolshevik cadre.

On February 27 (March 12) the strike grew into an uprising, and mass arming of the Petrograd proletariat began. Many thousands of proletarians filled the streets and headed for the centre. Rallies sprang up on street-corners and squares; Bolsheviks and militant workers spoke from makeshift platforms, calling on people to fight until the final overthrow of autocracy and to fraternise with the soldiers. Police stations were being overrun everywhere and the police were disarmed. Special detachments captured gun dealers' shops, and, assisted by the guards, seized an armoury in the Lesnoi district. Insurgents secured a great amount of ammunition after they captured an ammunition factory.³ The building of the Petrograd secret police was stormed and set on fire. Police officers scattered in panic.

¹ See *Red Annals*, No. 7, Lenoblizdat, 1923, p. 66; *Red Annals*, No. 2 (23), 1927, p. 52 (in Russian).

² See *Petrogradskaya Pravda*, March 14, 1923; *A History of the CPSU*, Vol. 2, pp. 668-69.

³ See *Pravda*, March 10 (23), 1917.

On February 27, the revolutionary work in the army produced spectacular results. Early in the morning, the Volynsky Regiment mutinied. It was joined by soldiers from the Litovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments. Soon the Moskovsky Regiment also defected to the revolutionary side. That morning there were 10,200 mutinous soldiers; their number grew to 25,700 in the afternoon and to 66,700 in the evening.¹ The revolution was arming itself. The Moskovsky Regiment armoury provided weapons both for soldiers and for Vyborg Side workers. Workers and soldiers stormed the Chief Arsenal and seized about 40,000 rifles and 30,000 handguns. The St. Peter and Paul Fortress with its arsenal was also captured. Political prisoners were being set free, and liberated Bolsheviks immediately joined the revolutionary struggle. The Bolshevik Party emerged from the underground. "At about noon on February 27 Petrograd looked like a city besieged," a participant in the events recalled later. "Gunfire and the rattle of machine-guns were heard everywhere, shouts blended into a single rumble, heavy smoke was rising from the burning circuit court building and police stations."²

Insurgents seized the city's bridges, railway terminals, the telephone exchange and telegraph office and other key sites. In the course of the day, they assumed control over virtually the entire city. The last seats of resistance by the supporters of tsarist rule were being extinguished, and their defenders took to their heels. The rest of the Petrograd garrison and the troops stationed around the city joined the revolutionaries. In the morning of February 28 (March 13) the number of soldiers in revolt reached 72,700, in the afternoon, 112,000, in the evening, 127,000, in the morning of March 1 (14), 144,700, and in the afternoon, about 170,000.³ The chairman of the Council of Ministers, the War Minister, the governor of Petrograd and other officials were placed under arrest. On the morning of February 28, Nicholas II left the General Headquarters for Tsarskoye Selo, but the way was blocked, and he had to head for the Northern Front Headquarters at Pskov. There he abdicated on March 2 (15), 1917. The punitive expedition he planned against Petrograd came to nothing.

Tsarist rule was toppled by the political army of the democratic revolution. It had finally emerged from the flames of class battles as a union of the revolutionary proletariat and revolutionary soldiers, i.e., workers and peasants in soldiers' uniforms. The proletariat played

¹ See *Proletarian Revolution*, No. 1 (13), Partizdat of the CC CPSU(B), Moscow, 1923, p. 167; *The Bolshevisation of the Petrograd Garrison in 1917, A Collection of Documents and Materials*, Lenoblizdat, Leningrad, 1932, p. VI (both in Russian).

² See *Proletarian Revolution*, No. 1 (13), 1923, pp. 167, 168.

³ *The Great October Socialist Revolution. A Chronicle of Events*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1957, p. 23 (in Russian).

the leading part in that army, which was commanded by the Bolsheviks. Facts expressly confirm that from the time the revolution began through the day of the victorious armed uprising in Petrograd, the Bolsheviks directed the rapidly growing mass struggle and were in the centre of the movement. Although they were not strong enough to extend their influence to the entire turbulent revolutionary stream, their slogans, pinpointing the objectives of the struggle, were embraced by the revolutionary people. Led by the Bolshevik Party, the working class was the true driving force of the revolution.

**THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET OF WORKERS'
AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES IN PETROGRAD.
THE EMERGENCE OF DUAL POWER**

As early as the first Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution (1905-1907), the revolutionary mass movement produced the Soviets of Workers' Deputies. During the violent class battles of 1917, the proletariat never forgot that experience. Recalling those events, Lenin later said that "in February 1917 the masses had created the Soviets even before any party had managed to proclaim this slogan. It was the great creative spirit of the people, which had passed through the bitter experience of 1905 and had been made wise by it, that gave rise to this form of proletarian power".¹ There was talk about Soviets at Petrograd factories already on the second day of the February Revolution; moreover, on that day, February 24 (March 9), elections to the Soviet began at some enterprises. On February 27, the Vyborg District Bolshevik Committee in its pamphlet openly urged workers to set up Soviets: "First of all, elect deputies, let them contact one another. Let a Soviet of Deputies emerge under protection of the army."² That same day, the District Committee and the Russian Bureau of the RSDLP Central Committee issued, on behalf of the RSDLP Central Committee, the manifesto "To All Citizens of Russia".

Stating the downfall of tsarist rule and control of the capital by insurgents supported by revolutionary army troops, the manifesto called on the proletariat and the army to save the country from the catastrophe tsarism had in store for it.

The manifesto laid down the task of creating new power represented by a provisional revolutionary government and its bodies in the cities, villages and the army, which were to be elected by the revo-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Extraordinary Seventh Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), March 6-8, 1918", *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 90.

² *The Revolutionary Movement in Russia After the Overthrow of the Autocracy, Documents and Materials*, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1957, p. 5 (in Russian).

lutionary workers, soldiers and peasants. The manifesto said: "Throughout Russia, in cities and villages, set up government by the revolutionary people".¹ Although the manifesto did not refer specifically to Soviets, essentially it urged creation of Soviet power bodies everywhere.

The manifesto mapped out the most important aspects of the revolutionary government's programme of action: 1) drawing up temporary legislation protecting all rights and freedoms of the people; confiscating lands belonging to abbeys, the nobility, the cabinet and the crown and transferring them to the people; introducing an eight-hour working-day; "convening a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage through secret ballot"; 2) immediately transferring the system of food supply for the population and the army to the new government, with confiscation of all the available food supplies stored by the tsarist government and municipal authorities; 3) suppressing all counterrevolutionary action and schemes; 4) immediately addressing the proletariat of the belligerent nations with an appeal "for revolutionary struggle by the peoples of all countries against their oppressors, against monarchist governments and capitalist cliques, and in order to immediately end the carnage imposed on the oppressed peoples".

The manifesto called on the working people to rise everywhere to open political struggle with tsarism and its supporters, to rally round "the red banner of revolution".²

Lenin observed that the manifesto embodied "the only really socialist, really revolutionary tactics".³

It was inevitable that in February the Bolsheviks emerged as the kind of political party which, on the very first day of the victorious armed uprising in Petrograd, advanced a programme of action for a provisional revolutionary government. Neither bourgeois nor conciliatory parties had prepared for the revolution; it caught them by surprise. Not only bourgeois party leaders but also the Mensheviks and the SRs had not taken the revolution seriously at its outset. Conciliators oriented their policy towards the liberal bourgeoisie and had drawn up no programme of action in advance.

The events of February 27 (March 12), 1917, the victorious uprising in the capital, forced the Menshevik and SR leaders to change their position. Conciliatory leaders headed for the Taurida Palace, the seat of the Duma; here they had strongpoints represented by the Menshevik and Trudovik groups.

¹ See *Pravda*, March 5 (18), 1917.

² Ibid.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in the Russian Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 357.

Now that the success of the armed uprising constantly expanded the numbers of the movement, above all by adding people who were absolute novices in politics, especially petty-bourgeois elements, the situation favoured Menshevik and SR leaders. An opportunity arose for them to wrest away from the Bolsheviks control over the newly begun working-class process of establishing Soviets.

While recognising the gains of the revolution which began to create bodies of popular power, the Soviets, Menshevik and SR leaders did not intend to change their policy. They still worked to ensure power by the bourgeoisie, and for that purpose they allied themselves to bourgeois political parties. The petty-bourgeois leaders who assembled in the Taurida Palace—like Chkheidze, Gvozdev, Skobelev, Kerensky and others—were well-known, but had not been connected with revolutionary struggle in the streets. On February 27 (March 12), they declared themselves to be the Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The purpose was not merely to act as the organising committee to convene the Soviet but also to seize key posts there, forcing their own conditions for elections to that body.

A statement was issued on behalf of the Committee to the effect that the first session of the representatives of the Petrograd workers, soldiers and population would be held in the Duma building at 7 p. m. on February 27. All army units who had allied themselves with the people were instructed to immediately elect one representative for each company. Factories elected one representative per 1,000 workers, and those with fewer than 1,000 workers elected one representative each.¹ As a result, the Soviet was dominated by workers from small enterprises and soldiers of the Petrograd garrison.

The session opened in the Taurida Palace at 9 p. m. on February 27 (March 12). By that time, about 40 to 45 deputies with voting rights were in attendance, representing Petrograd factories. However, members of the RSDLP Central Committee's Russian Bureau had been unable to invite many supporters to the opening of the Soviet's session. In all, the hall was filled by up to 250 deputies and guests, mostly supporters of conciliators.²

Such was the complex situation at the first session of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies. The Mensheviks nominated N. S. Chkheidze for Chairman and M. I. Skobelev for Vice-Chairman; the SRs proposed A. F. Kerensky for Vice-Chairman. All three were elected. Then the session elected the Soviet's Executive Com-

¹ See *Izvestiya revolyutsionnoi nedeli*, February 27 (March 12), 1917.

² For details, see Yu. S. Tokarev, *The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in March and April 1917*, Nauka (Leningrad Department), Leningrad, 1976, pp. 32-34 (in Russian).

mittee which included two members of the RSDLP Central Committee's Russian Bureau—A. G. Shlyapnikov and P. A. Zalutsky.

A conflict immediately arose in the Soviet between its Bolshevik and Menshevik-SR groups over the approach to the bourgeoisie and its parties. The leaders of the latter group began to alter their tactics on February 27 under pressure of the revolutionary developments.

On that day, leaders of the Progressive Bloc still tried to keep up their policy of striking a bargain with tsarism. Having learned on the night of February 26 of the tsar's decision to dissolve the Duma, they held a private session of Duma members at which they decided to submit to the tsar's decree; however, they decided not to leave the Taurida Palace in view of the emergency. A notable fact was that when at noon on February 27 the first column of many thousands of soldiers reached the Taurida Palace, the first thing bourgeois leaders did was telling the demonstrators it was imperative to restore order and quiet in the capital.¹ Although they paid lip service to the revolution, their foremost objective was channelling the revolutionary tide towards quiet and safety as soon as possible and using the mass struggle to strike an advantageous bargain with the autocracy. With these objectives in mind, Duma members set up in the afternoon on February 27 a Provisional Committee of Duma Members to Restore Order and for Contacts with Individuals and Agencies. The name was selected on purpose, P. N. Milyukov, a Cadet leader, recalled later, so that in case the regime suppressed the revolution, Duma members would not be accused of having taken part in the uprising and held responsible under the law.² Together with 10 leaders of the Progressive Bloc—Octobrists, Progressists, Cadets and Nationalists—the Menshevik N. S. Chkheidze and the Trudovik A. F. Kerensky joined the Committee, headed by the Octobrist M. V. Rodzyanko, Chairman of the Duma. Rodzyanko and his clique planned to seize state power which had been wrested from the tsarist regime, share it with the still existing dynasty and, consolidating the situation in the country, continue the war.

At the time of its establishment the Duma Provisional Committee declared that it counted on the support of the army and the population. The next thing, it immediately tried to seize control of the Petrograd garrison and use it to put down the "unrest". Army units and individual soldiers were ordered back to their barracks; officers were ordered to return to their units and bring them under control, and senior commanders, to report to the Duma for orders.

However, all that fell through. Orders issued by the Duma Committee were ignored. Real power belonged to the armed workers and

¹ See *Izvestiya revolyutsionnoi nedeli*. February 27 (March 12), 1917.

² See P. Milyukov, *Reminiscences*, Vol. II, New York, 1953, p. 293 (in Russian).

soldiers of Petrograd and, consequently, to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies they themselves had elected. But the conciliators in the Soviet refused to assume full power. Over the objections raised by Bolsheviks and many factory delegates, the first session of the Soviet, held late on February 27, passed a decision on cooperation with the Duma Committee and on Chkheidze and Kerensky serving on the Soviet. At about midnight, Chkheidze and Kerensky hurried to the Duma Committee for talks, bringing with them the news bourgeois leaders welcomed.

Meanwhile, from the very first day the Soviet began acting as a new government. The situation called for urgent and decisive steps. The old apparatus of state and administrative power in the capital was completely disorganised. Urgent measures had to be taken to ward off the threat of hunger looming over Petrograd, to feed the army regiments which sided with the revolution. Soldiers' units and then other detachments of the revolutionary army also exerted certain pressure when they appeared in front of the Taurida Palace to learn what Duma leaders planned to do.

Already during debates on the food question, the Soviet decided to confiscate "all food supplies—quartermaster stores, public (belonging to the Zemstvos and Cities Union) and private supplies". A special food commission took charge of all food supply efforts in the capital. Another question decided in the interests of the new government concerned publication of the newspaper *Izvestia Soveta rabochikh deputatov* (Bulletin of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies), an organ of the Petrograd Soviet; it was decided to use "the city's best printing shop for that purpose". On February 28 (March 13), the first issue appeared. Simultaneously, the Soviet was working to organise government locally. The Soviet's deputies "entrusted the Executive Committee with sending its plenipotentiary representatives to all districts to organise workers and set up local government bodies". For that purpose, the Executive Committee sent its commissars to all districts. A military commission of the Soviet was formed to conduct revolutionary work in the army. The Executive Committee was charged with solving the problem of arming the workers. Accordingly, all enterprises of the city elected members of the militia, 100 per 1,000 workers, who were to report in units to district assembly stations for instructions from the Soviet.

Setting up the workers' militia to maintain revolutionary order, the Soviet was essentially formalising what had already arisen in the course of the armed uprising. The revolution deprived the old regime of its punitive agencies: the army had taken the side of the people, the gendarmerie and the police had been destroyed.

On February 28, the Petrograd Soviet adopted a decision on financial matters. It deprived the old regime of the right to control state

financial resources, assumed authority over expenditure and detailed armed units to guard the State Bank, the Mint, the national and gubernia treasuries, and other financial institutions seized by the insurgents.

The Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies prevented Rodzyanko from meeting with Nicholas II, thus frustrating the attempted deal between the bourgeoisie and the tsarist regime.

The mass defection of Petrograd garrison troops to the revolution raised the issue of soldier representation in the Soviet. Fearing increased influence on the soldiers by the workers of Petrograd and an even more vigorous participation by the army in politics and the revolution, Menshevik and SR leaders opposed the idea of a joint Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The Bolsheviks upheld a joint Soviet as a means to develop the revolution further. Under pressure from the soldiers themselves, the Bolshevik motion was carried, and it was decided that a soldiers' section should be set up under the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. However, at the Mensheviks' insistence, the previously established representation ratio was left unchanged. As a result, representatives of the Petrograd garrison in the Soviet greatly outnumbered workers' delegates.

On March 1 (14), the first plenary session of both—the workers' and the soldiers'—sections of the Petrograd Soviet took place. Discussion centred on the soldier question. Army representatives were indignant at the Duma Provisional Committee's attempts to bring the soldiers back to their barracks and submit them to the officers who were returning to their units. Soldiers' deputies demanded an immediate end to the privates' lack of rights and to their humiliation by the officers. Outside the service, they demanded equal rights with all Russian citizens.

The first plenary session of the Petrograd Soviet was held when leaders of conciliatory parties were absent: on that day they were busy finishing their talks with the Duma Committee and finalising conditions for surrendering power to the bourgeoisie; the Menshevik Sukhanov described their absence from the Soviet on that day as "an omission which led to rather serious consequences".¹

After a heated debate on the issues raised by the Bolsheviks and garrison representatives, provisions were mapped out which constituted the basis of the famous Order No. 1 to the Garrison of the Petrograd Military District. The final draft was dictated by the soldiers themselves to a special commission; then it was read out to the Soviet deputies who approved it by acclamation.

That same plenary session elected the first 10 soldiers' representatives to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. They

¹ N. Sukhanov, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

included two Bolsheviks—A. N. Paderin and A. D. Sadovsky.

Order No. 1 instructed all units to “immediately elect committees to direct the soldiers’ movement ... from among enlisted men” and to ensure representation of all army units in the Soviet.

Of exceptional importance were those paragraphs of the Order which established that all army units in their political action were to “obey the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies and their own committees”, that orders by the military commission of the Duma were to be obeyed only if they did not contradict the Soviet’s decisions. It was also stipulated that arms were to be at the disposal and under control of soldiers’ committees “and never be issued to officers, not even upon demand”. The Order declared that while performing their military duties “soldiers are to observe strict military discipline” and that while not on duty, “in their political, public and private life” they were to enjoy the same rights as did all other citizens of the country.¹

Having formalised the most important revolutionary gains achieved by the masses of Petrograd soldiers, Order No. 1 sent the bourgeoisie and the army command into panic. Conciliators were aghast too. However, all attempts on the part of bourgeois and conciliators’ leaders to use appeals, orders and various “amendments” so as to change the content of that document, undermine its significance or restrict the area of its application led nowhere. Order No. 1 infused the army with the revolutionary spirit and demonstrated the power of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.

The Soviet was becoming the leading revolutionary body which began to act vigorously in the most important areas of the country’s economy and public life; it not only issued decrees but also organised their implementation. Side by side with plenary sessions of the Executive Committee, its commissions were active too: the food commission, the finance, railway, postal and telegraph commissions, those for publishing and printing, propaganda, information, and so on. The Petrograd Soviet enjoyed the confidence of the revolutionary people and wielded real authority. As to the Duma Provisional Committee which, supported by the bourgeois quarters, claimed to represent the government, in fact it possessed no authority. Still, Menshevik and SR leaders did not declare the Soviet to be the sole body of state power.

Moreover, already on February 28 the Menshevik and SR leaders of the Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee started private talks with the Duma’s bourgeois leaders about setting up a national government. They supported the intention of the Duma Provisional Com-

¹ *Izvestiya Petrogradskogo Soveta rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov*, March 2 (15), 1917.

mittee to take charge of the establishment of a provisional government.

At the March 1 (14) session of the Executive Committee, Bolsheviks resolutely opposed the course of its Menshevik and SR leaders. They saw the Petrograd Soviet as an instrument of revolutionary democracy, which was to form a provisional revolutionary government from among its members. They saw the prospect of power being handed over to the Duma elite as surrender to the bourgeoisie. However, the Menshevik and SR majority won. The right wing of the Executive Committee proposed including the Soviet's representatives in the bourgeois government, while the centrist part—Chkheidze and his supporters—objected for fear of compromising themselves. Finally it was decided to merely “present the government with certain political demands and monitor the implementation of those demands and, refusing participation in the government, use only the right to veto the appointment of undesirable ministers”.¹ The plenary session approved that decision.

During the night of March 1 to 2, 1917 a session of the Duma Committee was held jointly with several candidates for the Provisional Government and representatives of the Soviet Executive Committee—the Mensheviks N. S. Chkheidze, N. D. Sokolov, N. Sukhanov, and Yu. M. Steklov, and the SR V. N. Filippovsky. An agreement was reached on providing the Duma Provisional Committee with the right to form the provisional government at its own discretion. The session drew up the conditions under which power would be handed over to the new government (an amnesty for political and religious prisoners, freedom of speech, the press and assembly, repudiation of privileges of the estates, etc.).

The conditions said nothing about the war, peace, confiscation of landed estates, the eight-hour working-day, or the democratic republic—that is, about the fundamental problems of the revolution. (The Duma leaders even hoped to preserve the monarchy by replacing the tsar with his young son on the throne, with the tsar's brother acting as regent.) The Menshevik Sukhanov admitted that the delegation of the Petrograd Soviet's Menshevik and SR leaders “did all they could not to wreck the bargain. Therefore they confined themselves to the minimum programme”, maintaining that “the Soviet's foremost ‘technical’ task” was to “fight against anarchy”—that is, against the rapidly developing revolution.²

Bourgeois spokesmen also insisted on a decision binding conciliatory leaders to draft and secure passage in the Petrograd Soviet of

¹ *The Great October Socialist Revolution. A Chronicle of Events*, Vol I, USSR Academy of Sciences Press, Moscow, 1957, p. 22 (in Russian).

² N. Sukhanov, *op. cit.*, pp. 231, 274.

a declaration that the government formed by the Duma Committee had been created "with the agreement of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and the popular masses are therefore to recognise it as legitimate".¹

After the session the Duma Committee completed the formation of the provisional government under Prince G. Y. Lvov and, on March 2, made its composition public. Key ministerial posts were given to leaders of the bourgeois Octobrist and Cadet parties and their close associates. Kerensky became Minister of Justice.

That same day a plenary session of the Petrograd Soviet discussed the Menshevik-SR report on the results of talks with the Duma Committee regarding the formation of the Provisional Government and on the attitude to it to be adopted by the Executive Committee.

In the course of the heated debate, Bolsheviks criticised the Menshevik-SR draft resolution which promised support to the Provisional Government "inasmuch as" it followed the course of implementing the tasks charted.² They pointed out the danger of the political step Menshevik and SR leaders suggested the Soviet should take; they also stressed that the conditions of the agreement failed to mention the most important revolutionary-democratic demands.

However, numerous speeches by conciliators (who argued that concessions were forced and imperative, that they were not dangerous because the Soviet intended to control the activity of the Provisional Government and support it only "inasmuch as") lulled and confused the mass of the deputies who were rather naive newcomers to politics. Besides, they were euphoric over the recent victory and the new freedom.

As a participant in the plenary session recalled, Executive Committee leaders "marshalled all their resources and truly flooded the Soviet with fiery, passionate speeches which—for the moment—sounded recklessly revolutionary... This passion carried people away. It literally bewitched those who were yet naive, not used and therefore vulnerable to freely flowing speech."³

That was why when proposals by the conciliatory members of the Executive Committee—support of the bourgeois Provisional Government but not participation in it—and the Bolshevik proposal which "rejected any possibility of contact with the Duma Committee and demanded creation of a Provisional Government by the Soviet of

¹ *The Great October Socialist Revolution. A Chronicle of Events*, Vol. I, pp. 22-23.

² *Izvestiya Petrogradskogo Soveta rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov*, March 3 (16), 1917.

³ S. Mstislavsky, *Five Days*, Z. I. Grzhebin Publishing House, Moscow, 1922, p. 35 (in Russian).

Soldiers' and Workers' Representatives"¹ were put to the vote, the draft resolution by the Executive Committee was adopted. That meant that power was being voluntarily handed over to the bourgeoisie and the Soviet was merely to form a committee to monitor the activities of the bourgeois Provisional Government.

That was how dual power emerged in Russia—a simultaneous existence and interweaving of two dictatorships which shared state power: the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasants represented by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie represented by the Provisional Government. A salient feature of dual power was that the Petrograd Soviet, born of the revolutionary creative effort of the masses, supported by the revolutionary people (the proletariat and the revolutionary army) and therefore commanding powerful and real force, voluntarily handed state power over to the bourgeoisie and its Provisional Government. The course of developments was similar throughout the country.

THE REVOLUTION VICTORIOUS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY

Revolutionary developments in Petrograd, Russia's political centre, signalled a nationwide armed uprising against tsarist rule.

In Moscow, a Bolshevik-led general political strike in support of the Petrograd uprising began on February 27 (March 12) and spread on the following day. Soon it grew into an uprising and so greatly expanded the geography of the revolution that all plans of the tsarist high command to seal off and destroy the insurgents in Petrograd fell through at once.

The city authorities tried to suppress the rapidly mounting movement. Under a plan worked out in advance, garrison units occupied strategic points, security detachments guarding government, administrative and some other buildings were reinforced, and mounted patrols appeared in the streets.

However, fraternisation between workers and soldiers was under way in Moscow already in the afternoon of February 28; soldiers defected to the side of the revolution. In many places, demonstrators disarmed the police.

On the very first day of the revolution, elections to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies began at Moscow enterprises; they turned into a mass campaign on March 1. The Soviet replaced the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Committee created by the Mensheviks; that committee lasted for only two days.

¹ *Izvestiya Petrogradskogo Soveta rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov*, March 3 (16), 1917.

As the revolutionary movement was rising rapidly, the Bolsheviks of Moscow, led by R. S. Zemlyachka, M. S. Olminsky, I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov, P. G. Smidovich, and others, began to operate openly on February 28 and assumed leadership of the armed uprising. An appeal by the Moscow Committee and the Moscow Regional Bureau of the RSDLP issued on March 1 called on the workers to arm and capture government buildings, the bank, the treasury, railways, the post office, the telegraph office and the telephone exchange. The appeal reported that most soldiers of the Moscow garrison were on the side of the revolution. The Bolsheviks called on the workers of Moscow to support the revolution in Petrograd most energetically and to prevent the dispatch of a punitive expedition there.¹

Early on March 1, acting under orders of the commander of the Moscow Military District who had declared a state of siege in the city, specially detailed garrison units and police patrols blocked the demonstrators' way to the city centre. However, beginning from noon, powerful columns of workers broke through the pickets and, adding masses of soldiers to their ranks, headed for the centre of Moscow.

An overwhelming majority of soldiers did not obey officers' orders and did not fire upon the demonstrators; more than that, demonstrations very easily carried soldiers along. During March 1, the insurgents occupied all vital points in the city: the post and the telegraph offices, the telephone exchange, the Kremlin, railway terminals, bridges, etc. At night, revolutionary troops stormed the Butyrskaya Prison and freed 350 political prisoners, including F. E. Dzerzhinsky and Ya. E. Rudzutak, who immediately joined the struggle.²

In the afternoon of March 1, when the revolutionary people had already occupied the centre of Moscow, an organising session of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies was held in the City Duma building. It was attended by representatives of 52 enterprises, of trade unions and other organisations; the exact number of deputies present at the session has not been ascertained. The Executive Committee consisting of 30 members was elected.³ The post of the chairman went to the Menshevik A. M. Nikitin, who was replaced, on March 5, by L. M. Khinchuk, also a Menshevik. The Executive Committee's Presidium included the Bolsheviks V. P. Nogin, a Vice-Chairman, and P. G. Smidovich.

Under pressure from the Bolsheviks and the workers supporting them, the Soviet immediately emerged as a body maintaining that "seizure of power in Moscow by the people" was the foremost task of the day. A Committee of 44 was elected for that purpose by the

¹ See *Proletarian Revolution*, No. 1 (13), 1923, pp. 287-88.

² *The Great October Socialist Revolution. A Chronicle of Events*, Vol. I, p. 28.

³ *Ibid.*

Soviet. It comprised 16 Bolsheviks (the largest group), 9 Mensheviks, 7 SRs, 3 Bund members and 9 representatives of trade unions, hospital funds and cooperative societies.¹ The Bolsheviks, who had led the general political strike and then the armed uprising, remained leaders in the Soviet's Committee too.

On the wave of the victorious armed uprising, backed by the power of the revolutionary workers and soldiers, and with a strong Bolshevik group in it, the largest in the Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet acted as the real new authority. To solve the most urgent issues, it set up a food and a military commissions under the Executive Committee and decided, while continuing the general strike, to resume work at enterprises connected with supplying the population with food and other necessities; workers' committees were set up in the city's districts to function in contact with the Soviet; soldiers were invited to its sessions to strengthen contacts with the army.²

Parallel to the organ of revolutionary power, the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, Moscow's big finance, industrial and commercial bourgeoisie set up the Committee of Public Organisations, designed as the organ of bourgeois power. The Committee began with a call to the population to remain calm; bourgeois leaders still hoped to curb the revolution.

Nevertheless it continued to advance. By the night of March 1, the garrison had fully sided with the uprising. As a result, Moscow's revolutionary army was up to 400,000-strong, with workers making up 75 per cent and soldiers, the remaining 25. There was no significant force in the city which could oppose it. The military district commander and the governor were arrested. The armed uprising won.

The timely support of the revolution in Petrograd by Moscow workers was decisive for the success of the nationwide struggle against the autocracy. Under Bolshevik leadership, two most powerful and politically conscious sections of the Russian proletariat, the workers of Petrograd and Moscow, confidently cleared the way for the February bourgeois-democratic revolution; the example set by the political centres was followed by the revolutionary forces throughout the country.

Bolshevik-led workers, followed by soldiers, immediately joined the revolutionary struggle in the cities and railway junctions of the Petrograd region (in Sestroretsk, Kronstadt, Luga and Narva).

¹ See *The Revolutionary Movement in Russia After the Overthrow of the Autocracy*, p. 192.

² See *The Great October Socialist Revolution. A Chronicle of Events*, Vol. I, pp. 28-29.

They started revolts against tsarist rule and organised elections to Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The revolution developed equally successfully around Moscow and in the Central Industrial Region—in Podolsk, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Tula, Tver, Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Kineshma, Kimry, Shuya, and Serpukhov.

In the Volga area, the revolution was led by the proletariat of Nizhni Novgorod, Samara and Saratov, where Soviets of Workers' Deputies sprang up on March 1 and 2 (14 and 15). In the Urals, the struggle against the tsarist regime was headed by the proletarians of Perm, Yekaterinburg, Ufa and of large factories at Lysva, Nevyansk, Chusovoy, Motovilikha, and others. Early in March Soviets of Workers' Deputies were set up everywhere, often reorganised as Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. In Siberia, the proletarians of Omsk, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, and Chita were the first to launch victorious struggle against the tsarist administration. Here, Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies were also created at the very beginning of March. News of the overthrow of tsarism reached the Pacific region between March 2 and 5 (15 and 18). Manifestations, rallies and meetings began in the cities. A Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was established in Vladivostok on March 4.

The proletariat of the non-Russian regions also resolutely joined the struggle. The metal workers of Kharkov set off the revolutionary movement in the Ukraine. In early March 1917, Soviets of Workers' Deputies were established in Kharkov and Yekaterinoslav, another large industrial center. The struggle of Kharkov and Yekaterinoslav workers was welcomed and directly supported by the miners of the Donets Basin and Krivoy Rog. Soviets of Workers' Deputies sprang up everywhere in the Donets Basin literally within a few days.

The revolutionary and Soviet movement advanced rapidly in the Baltic region too. News of the victory in Petrograd and Moscow reached Transcaucasia early in March. The proletariat of Tiflis and Baku launched its struggle and began setting up Soviets. The first session of the Baku Soviet elected S. Shahumyan, leader of the Baku Bolsheviks, its Chairman.

Developments in Tashkent, where the movement was led by the workers of railway repair shops, were decisive for Turkestan. On March 4 (17), the first session of the Tashkent Soviet of Workers' Deputies was held, attended by representatives of workers and soldiers. Following the example of Tashkent, Soviets were set up in other cities of Central Asia. Public committees and Soviets were established even in the most backward areas of Khiva and Bukhara.

The revolution reached even the most remote areas of the vast country practically within the first ten days of March 1917. Over that period, more than 130 Soviets were established, including joint

Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in 30 cities.¹ Everywhere, the movement was led by the proletariat under the guidance of Bolshevik organisations. "The revolution was made by the proletariat," Lenin emphasised. "It displayed heroism; it shed its blood; it swept along with it the broadest masses of the toilers and the poor."²

In the middle and latter half of March 1917, the revolution, begun in industrial centers, spread throughout the country, sweeping rural areas. By late March power had been taken away from the old authorities and the police replaced with militia not only in all gubernia and district centres but also in rural areas, except isolated villages and the most backward non-Russian areas. The number of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies and of various peasant organisations and committees was growing. The poorer peasants—about two-thirds of the total peasant population in 1917—were especially active.

The struggle of Petrograd and Moscow workers, supported by the soldiers of the garrisons, stimulated the revolutionary movement at the front too.

The situation at the front was complicated, information about revolutionary developments fragmentary, and contacts among soldiers in different large and even small army units weak. Nevertheless, the revolution at the front developed successfully. It was especially swift and vigorous on the Northern and Western fronts which were closest to Petrograd and Moscow. Workers' delegations which, despite various obstacles, reached front-line units and brought the truth about the revolution with them, did much to win the army over to the side of the revolution.

The Russian Bureau of the RSDLP Central Committee oriented the Bolsheviks working in the army above all towards its democratisation on the basis of Order No. 1. Bolshevik propagandists and workers' delegations helped rapidly disseminate copies of the order at the Northern and Western fronts. Here, it reached the soldiers already in the first ten days of March and set off a wave of revolutionary enthusiasm.

Revolutionary spirit was permeating all army units at the Northern Front. In Dvinsk, a mass demonstration of workers and soldiers demanded release of political prisoners; when the demand was turned down, the prisoners were freed by force. Soldiers and workers in Pskov, Dvinsk and elsewhere arrested generals and officers. In Vyborg, soldiers arrested the commanding general of the fortress, and soldiers' delegates assumed control of the garrison. In Arensburg the soldiers and sailors of the Moonsund fortifications mutinied; in Abo, ships'

¹ For details see E. N. Burdzhakov, *The Second Russian Revolution: Moscow the Front, the Provinces*, Moscow, 1971 (in Russian).

² V. I. Lenin, "Letters from Afar", *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 340.

crews and soldiers of land forces staged a demonstration and arrested their officers.¹ Other troops stationed in Finland also mutinied. The insurgents disarmed and arrested officers, elected new commanders and set up company and battalion committees and Soviets of Soldiers' Deputies.

The Kronstadt mutiny started the process of the Baltic Fleet going over to the side of the revolution. On March 3 (16), all naval vessels and troops of the Helsingfors garrison mutinied. On March 4, a Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Sailors' Deputies was set up there. That same day, the uprising in the Sveaborg Fortress, led by a Bolshevik military organisation, also won.

At the Western Front, the movement centered around the workers and soldiers of the Minsk garrison. After a victorious uprising of the Minsk Military District units, begun on March 3 (16), the District Commander and other officers were arrested.² The Western Front Command was forced to declare its acceptance of the new order.

On March 4 (17), 1917, during the uprising in Minsk, the city's Bolsheviks convened their first open meeting, held jointly with the Third and Tenth armies of the Western Front. After hearing M. V. Frunze's report "On the Current Situation and the Tasks of the Proletariat", the meeting adopted decisions on supporting Petrograd's revolutionary proletariat in every way and immediately establishing a Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Minsk.

Generally, the revolution triumphed at the Northern and Western Fronts virtually during the first ten days of March 1917.

The progress was slower at the Southwestern Front. It was especially delayed on the Romanian and Caucasian fronts and on the Black Sea Fleet, far from the country's revolutionary centres. Gradually, however, soldiers' committees and Soviets emerged there too. By late March 1917, generals and officers were confronted everywhere by new mass organisations—soldiers' committees and Soviets.

In March 1917, 513 Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies sprang up in 393 cities and other places across Russia.³ Everywhere they emerged as organs of the new popular power, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants.

In some proletarian regions, Bolshevik-led Soviets were virtually the sole organs of authority. For example, that was the case in the Urals—in Yekaterinburg, Kyshtym, Lysva, Minyar, Motovilikha, Nvyansk, Sima, and a number of other large industrial cities; in

¹ See *The Great October Socialist Revolution. A Chronicle of Events*, Vol. I, p. 88.

² See *ibid.*, p. 61.

³ See I. I. Mints, *A History of the October Revolution*, Vol. 1, Nauka, Moscow, 1977, p. 702 (in Russian).

several cities of the Central Industrial Region—such as Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kovrov, Orekhovo-Zuyevo, and Podolsk; in some areas in the Donets Basin and cities near Petrograd. Still, those were isolated, albeit important, places.

The Soviets were opposed everywhere by bourgeois-landlord organs. As early as March 4 (17), the Provisional Government decided to replace governors and vice-governors everywhere with chairmen and vice-chairmen of gubernia Zemstvo boards. Those officials were designated gubernia commissars of the Provisional Government; however, “retaining, whenever possible, the entire existing administrative mechanism” was recognised as desirable.¹ In the course of the revolution, the bourgeoisie set up its own local organs—committees of public organisations, committees of public security, public committees to maintain order, and so on—which tried to assume control of all government.

Thus, in March 1917, mutually opposing organs of the two dictatorships were established in the provinces.

In a subsequent analysis of the class origins and class significance of dual power, Lenin noted that, above all due to the leadership of the proletariat and the power of the popular movement, the February Revolution immediately went further than a usual bourgeois revolution. It “not only swept away the whole tsarist monarchy, not only transferred the entire power to the bourgeoisie, but also *moved close towards* a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry”.² However, the revolution failed to ensure the uncontested authority of that dictatorship.

In analysing the causes of dual power, Lenin first and foremost asserted the indisputable fact that the heroic and selfless fight of the proletariat against the autocracy soon attracted a vast petty-bourgeois mass into the struggle. And that “gigantic petty-bourgeois wave has swept over everything and overwhelmed the class-conscious proletariat, not only by force of numbers but also ideologically; that is, it has infected and imbued very wide circles of workers with the petty-bourgeois political outlook”.³ After the revolution triumphed confidently, that wave raised the conciliatory parties of the Menshevik and the SRs to the top. At the initial stage, they succeeded in wresting control over the Soviet movement away from the Bolsheviks.

The socio-economic soil of the most petty-bourgeois country in Europe, Lenin noted, produced the naively trusting attitude of the masses to the bourgeoisie and its government. That attitude was used and

¹ *The Great October Socialist Revolution. A Chronicle of Events*, Vol. I, pp. 71-72.

² V. I. Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 60.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

cultivated by the Mensheviks and the SRs. Such was the class basis of this concession of power which took the shape of an agreement between the Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. However, the above-mentioned causes of dual power were only one side of the coin. "On the other side," Lenin wrote, "we have the inadequate numerical strength of the proletariat in Russia and its insufficient class-consciousness and organisation."¹

Finally, it was all rooted in the fact that, as Lenin observed, the bourgeoisie itself and the landlords, who had gone completely bourgeois and had long ruled the country economically, succeeded in swiftly organising themselves politically in wartime conditions and seized control of local government bodies and such nationwide organisations as the unions of Zemstvos and Cities, military-industrial committees, and the like. The Progressive Bloc united Octobrists, Cadets, Progressists and several other groups. As a result, the new capitalist class "was already 'almost completely' in power by 1917, and therefore it needed only the first blows to bring tsarism to the ground and clear the way for the bourgeoisie".²

Such were the chief causes of dual power—a most peculiar product of the Russian revolution in February 1917. The emergence and existence of dual power meant that the revolution was going through a transition period, because "there is not the slightest doubt that such an 'interlocking' *cannot* last long. Two powers *cannot* exist in a state."³

The Cadets and Octobrists used the conciliatory attitude of the Mensheviks and SRs who were increasingly merging with them and worked to secure unchallenged authority by the bourgeoisie. The revolutionary proletarian party of the Bolsheviks led the struggle for unchallenged authority by the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Only a further class rivalry in the revolution could solve the paramount contradiction of the two dictatorships.

ISSUES OF THE REVOLUTION'S FURTHER PROGRESS

The February 1917 Revolution which won in Russia was, by Lenin's definition, the first revolution generated by the world imperialist war and the beginning of the transition from the imperialist to a civil war predicted in Bolshevik documents.⁴ That definition by Lenin above all stressed the revolution's global aspects and proceeded not only from its first direct results but also from the prospects it opened.

¹ Ibid.

² V. I. Lenin, "Letters from Afar", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 303.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 61.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Letters from Afar", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 297.

Meanwhile, it was extremely difficult to single out those prospects in March 1917. The situation in the country was complex and unstable; a number of unforeseen circumstances surfaced. Describing the post-February situation in Russia, Lenin observed: "...The Bolshevik slogans and ideas *on the whole* have been confirmed by history; but *concretely* things have worked out *differently*; they are more original, more peculiar, more variegated than anyone could have expected."¹

In the course of the February Revolution, various classes and parties fought to uphold their own policy, but their rivalry was not always clearly discernible, much less understood by the masses who made the revolution. Having awakened to political life but politically inexperienced, they saw February as the birth of universal "brotherhood", "democracy" and "freedom". Bourgeois, and especially Menshevik-SR, propaganda also introduced and maintained such class peace illusions. Besides, the revolution advanced with different speed in different spheres of social life. On the one hand, the revolution had not yet touched upon one of the questions that were essential for its survival—the agrarian question; on the other hand, it had radically solved its chief question, that of political power, by not only overthrowing the autocracy and transferring power to the bourgeoisie, but going much further—creating organs of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants as represented by the Soviets. Another factor crucial for the country's future was its continued participation in the world imperialist war, which bourgeois leaders and conciliators now presented as a war to "defend the revolution". At first, the popular masses swallowed the bait, and "revolutionary defencism" emerged—one of the major obstacles to carrying the revolutionary process further.

In these conditions the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee adopted several tactical resolutions, first and foremost ascertaining its attitude to the Provisional Government and the war. After the revolution's victory, the Central Committee members and the members of the Central Committee's Russian Bureau freed from prisons and returned from exile joined the bureau. In mid-March, it numbered about 20 members. A five-member presidium was elected (M. K. Muranov, A. G. Shlyapnikov, J. V. Stalin, Ye. D. Stasova and P. A. Zalutsky). Viewing the Provisional Government as a bourgeois-landlord one, the Bolsheviks, unlike the Mensheviks and the SRs, considered it absolutely impossible to support it in any way. In opposition to "revolutionary defencism" propagated by bourgeois and conciliatory parties, the Russian Bureau regarded the war as imperialist; the foremost task it advanced was explaining it to the masses that the character of the war had not changed with the advent of the bourgeois Provision-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Letters on Tactics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 44.

al Government. Proceeding from the assumption that the Soviets were an incipient form of revolutionary government, the Russian Bureau adopted an important decision on setting up Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies everywhere in the cities and Soviets of Peasants' Deputies everywhere in rural areas.

From the very start of the revolution, the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee and the Petrograd and other local committees worked to further develop and strengthen Party organisations emerging from the underground, to create trade unions, factory committees and other legitimate labour organisations, and advance to the maximum revolutionary transformations in the country. The Bolsheviks fought for strengthening the role of the Soviets, for their Bolshevikisation and for the eight-hour working-day; they assumed leadership of the workers' militia and began establishing the Red Guard. They advanced and supported the demands about transferring landed estates to the peasants, developed the revolutionary initiative of the proletarian and peasant masses and helped in the democratisation of the army in the interior and at the front.

However, these efforts and decisions did not yet make up an integral platform. Besides, the Russian Bureau failed to understand the dual power situation and, like some other Bolshevik leaders, did not realise at the beginning that the Soviets, born of the revolution, were already an actual form of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants. Bureau members mistakenly held that that dictatorship was yet to be established by advancing the revolution. They failed to see the opportunity of the peaceful development of the revolution emerging in the dual power period, and did not advance the slogan "All Power to the Soviets".

Besides, in mid-March *Pravda* published deeply erroneous articles by L. B. Kamenev which expressed his personal views and were directed against the earlier resolutions by the Central Committee Bureau on the attitude toward the Provisional Government and the war. The articles upheld the Menshevik-SR ideas of conditional support for the Provisional Government and of "revolutionary defensism". The Central Committee's Russian Bureau immediately repudiated these views; it was suggested that, prior to discussion, "resolutions by the Bureau of the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee be observed".¹ Stalin also advanced a view in *Pravda* which was mistaken and hampered the revolutionary education of the masses, calling for "pressure" on the Provisional Government to stop the imperialist war. Essentially, that view was also contained in the Central Committee Bureau's resolution "On War and Peace".²

¹ *Questions of CPSU History*, No. 3, 1962, p. 148.

² J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 3, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1953, pp. 4-9.

Generally, the RSDLP Central Committee's Russian Bureau failed to make sufficient progress in drawing up the tactical platform for the Party before Lenin's arrival in Petrograd.

Lenin had to face the task of working out such a platform which would reflect the new alignment of class forces after the February victory and the full diversity of the revolution's internal and external conditions. That was to be a platform advancing the transition from the first, bourgeois-democratic, to the second, socialist, stage of the revolution as the foremost task and mapping out the specific ways and methods of that transition.

The first news about the victory of the February Revolution which reached Lenin in Zurich on March 2 (15), 1917 did not surprise him. On that day, he wrote: "That Russia has for the last few days been *on the eve* of revolution is beyond doubt."¹

While preparing to return home as soon as possible after receiving news of the revolution, Lenin simultaneously stepped up his theoretical work. At this turn of history, recreating the picture of Russian developments from cursory and biased reports in the bourgeois press, he profoundly analysed the international and domestic conditions of the February Revolution and the distinctive aspects of the situation in Russia. He mapped out the proletariat's further policy in the revolution. Specifically, from March 7 (20) to 12 (25), 1917, Lenin wrote and sent to Russia his famous "Letters from Afar"—"The First Stage of the First Revolution", "The New Government and the Proletariat", "Concerning Proletarian Militia" and "How to Achieve Peace". The fifth letter—"The Tasks Involved in the Building of the Revolutionary Proletarian State"—was begun on March 26 (April 8) but remained unfinished.

Lenin saw the reason for the February Revolution's swift victory in "the combination of a number of factors of world-historic importance". That swift victory was due to the fact that, for a brief moment and in an extremely unique historical situation, "*absolutely dissimilar currents, absolutely heterogeneous class interests, absolutely contrary political and social strivings have merged*".² However, Lenin observed, that state of affairs could not last long. The revolution's advance would soon highlight the difference, polarisation and rivalry of those temporarily merged streams, the heterogeneous class forces. That was precisely the turn of events which Lenin's works urged the Party to prepare for. The telegram he sent as early as March 6 (19), 1917, addressed to Bolsheviks leaving Sweden for Russia, said: "Our tactics: no trust in and no support of the new government; Kerensky

¹ V. I. Lenin to Inessa Armand, March 15, 1917, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 294.

² V. I. Lenin, "Letters from Afar", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 302.

is especially suspect; arming of the proletariat is the only guarantee; immediate elections to the Petrograd City Council; no rapprochement with other parties."¹

Lenin's assessment of the revolution's gains and the degree to which it had advanced was organically linked with his analysis of the alignment of class forces and the essence of political power born of the revolution. He pointed out the necessity to keep in mind not only the "*relation of classes*" but also the "*concrete political institution implementing this relation*".²

Viewed from that angle, two types of authority different in their class nature emerged in Russia in early March, two governments—the landlord-capitalist Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, a government of the workers and peasants. True, in his first works on the February Revolution Lenin did not yet use the term "dual power"; essentially, however, he had already noted, evaluated and comprehensively analysed that extremely important factor before his return to Russia.³ Already from "afar", Lenin had clearly revealed the general course and political essence of each of the "two governments".

As to the bourgeois government, Lenin noted, since it owed its emergence to the revolution and was under pressure from the armed masses, it had embarked on the path of various promises and did its best to proclaim and promise as much as possible while delivering as little as possible. Due to its class character and ties with the monarchist forces and international imperialist groups, that government was unable to satisfy any of the people's basic demands—those for peace, bread, land and freedom. In actual fact, it was merely searching for a deal with the overthrown monarchy, trying to restore the old apparatus of oppression and to continue the war.

Lenin was yet very cautious in his assessment of the way the other, Soviet government acted: information about it in the foreign press was fragmentary and could not provide a comprehensive picture. Nevertheless, from the very start—as early as March 1917—Lenin pointed to the conciliatory, petty-bourgeois trend existing in the Soviets. He saw the appeal by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' Deputies to support the Provisional Government as reflecting a dominant influence on the proletariat by petty-bourgeois politicians. He noted "the fact that Kerensky and Chkheidze are oscillating *between* the bourgeoisie and the proletariat".⁴ Describing their behaviour as the worst kind of "Louis Blanc politics" he countered it with the "second

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 292.

² V. I. Lenin, "Letters on Tactics", *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 44.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Revolution in Russia and the Tasks of the Workers of All Countries", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, pp. 351-52.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "Letters from Afar", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 312.

trend" in the Soviets—"represented by the Central Committee of our Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party".¹ Arguing with the Menshevik-SR conciliators over their chief thesis about supporting bourgeois power, Lenin, already in the first of his "Letters from Afar", advanced the slogan of organising and arming the people under the proletariat's leadership as the only viable guarantee of the revolution's further progress. The first letter already formulated a most important precept concerning the coming transition from the first stage of the revolution to the second: "...The 'task of the day', at *this* moment must be: *Workers, you have performed miracles of proletarian heroism ... in the civil war against tsarism. You must perform miracles of organisation, organisation of the proletariat and of the whole people, to prepare the way for your victory in the second stage of the revolution.*"²

It was impossible to determine in advance the length of the second stage, its specific turns, collisions or intermediate sub-stages. But, from the very beginning of the February and March developments, Lenin was confident that it would end in the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. In this connection the fifth "Letter from Afar" was especially important: it summed up the programme "based on an appraisal of the class forces in the Russian and world revolution, and also on the experience of 1871 and 1905".³

Lenin wrote that at its second stage the revolution should transfer state power from the government of landlords and capitalists to the government of workers and poor peasants. That government, organised along the lines of the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, was to do away with the old state apparatus, typical of all bourgeois countries and already shattered by the revolution, with the old army, police and bureaucracy, to remove them completely and replace them with "the universal organisation of the armed people". Only that government would be capable of solving the central task—achieving a truly durable and democratic, not imperialist, peace. The proletariat's victory would only be possible in Russia if the workers were supported by the vast majority of the peasants fighting for confiscation of all landed estates and nationalisation of all land; if the proletariat, allied with the poorer peasants, aimed at securing control over the production and distribution of the most important goods, at introducing "universal labour service". Such steps, dictated by wartime and post-war conditions, would at the same time "mark the *transition to socialism*, which cannot be achieved in Russia directly, at one stroke, without transitional measures, but

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in the Russian Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 357.

² V. I. Lenin, "Letters from Afar", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, pp. 306-07.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 341.

is quite achievable and urgently necessary as a result of such transitional measures".¹ Lenin also advanced the task of organising the rural proletariat and setting up Soviets of Hired Agricultural Labourers, separate from the Soviets of all other peasants' deputies.

Lenin made some very important notes for the fifth "Letter from Afar". In these notes he raised the question of changing the Party's programme and drew up the fundamental precepts to underlie its amendment and enlargement. These included theses on "imperialism as the last stage of capitalism", "the imperialist war, imperialist wars and 'defence of the fatherland'", "fighting the social-chauvinists and breaking with them", "the *state* that we need and the *w i t h e r i n g a w a y* of the state" and "the international character of the socialist revolution—in detail". Besides, Lenin noted the need to introduce several other changes into the minimum programme, specially stressed a review of the agrarian programme, and raised the issue of changing the party's name. Lenin's notes reflected his foremost theoretical accomplishments made during the war—his study of imperialism and the idea of a revolutionary withdrawal from the world imperialist war, his struggle to renovate the International, and his ideas about the close relationship between the drive for democracy and the struggle for socialism under imperialism.

Within a month after the February Revolution, Lenin prepared a programme which he advanced immediately after his return to Russia on April 3 (16), 1917, and which laid down the Bolshevik course at the second, socialist stage of the revolution. That programme was based on Lenin's previous theoretical effort to assess the new domestic and international conditions of the Russian revolution, on a profound study of Marx's and Engels's heritage, especially the problem of the state and revolution. Naturally, Lenin could not have taken into consideration a number of important tactical factors while abroad. A specific plan of the struggle to eliminate dual power, to transfer all power to the Soviets, to have the Soviets pursue a consistent proletarian policy, a plan of struggle against the mass phenomenon of "revolutionary defencism", a comprehensive definition of that phenomenon, the practical aspects of the revolution's peaceful development—all were to appear in the works Lenin would write in April. But obviously, while still abroad he worked out the basic propositions of the documents in which, after his return home, he expressly determined "the tasks of the proletariat in our revolution".

During his emigration period, Lenin had also thoroughly analysed international prospects of the February Revolution. In the "Farewell Letter to the Swiss Workers", adopted at a meeting of Bolsheviks who were leaving for Russia, Lenin noted that the February

¹ Ibid.

Revolution was opening a way to withdrawal from the imperialist war through international revolutionary action by the proletariat fighting for socialism, a way towards establishing a truly democratic and just peace. But one must not forget that the task was "gigantic", that it "can be carried out only in the course of a long succession of class battles between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie". History had made Russia's proletariat "the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat of the whole world". And the Russian proletariat, Lenin said, must properly carry out its global and historic mission.

In that letter, Lenin also named the country which, it seemed, could be the first to follow Russia as a participant in the "world proletarian revolution". "In Germany," he wrote, "there is already a *seething* unrest of the proletarian masses, who contributed so much to humanity and socialism by their persistent, unyielding, sustained organisational work during the long decades of European 'calm', from 1871 to 1914. The future of German socialism is represented not by the traitors, the Scheidemanns, Legiens, Davids and Co., nor by the vacillating and spineless politicians, Haase, Kautsky and their ilk, who have been enfeebled by the routine of the period of 'peace'. The future belongs to the trend that has given us Karl Liebknecht, created the Spartacus group, has carried on its propaganda in the Bremen *Arbeiterpolitik*. The objective circumstances of the imperialist war make it certain that the revolution will not be limited to the *first* stage of the Russian revolution, that the revolution will *not* be limited to Russia."¹

THE UPSURGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

The bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia took place against the background of a sharp aggravation of the plight of the popular masses worldwide and a rising anti-war, revolutionary movement. The victory over tsarism provided an impetus to the liberation struggle by the working people and oppressed nations throughout the world. The rulers in the imperialist countries found themselves in a dangerous situation. That was another reason for them to try and bring the war to a "victorious conclusion" as soon as possible and thus strengthen their position.

The overthrow of the Russian monarchy stepped up the polarisation of class forces throughout the world, strengthened the revolutionary trend in the international working-class movement, and helped in the break between revolutionaries and opportunists and in the further international consolidation of all militant prole-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, pp. 372-73.

tarian forces. However, while social-chauvinists still held their sway, those processes took a complex and contradictory path. Revolutionary Social-Democrats correctly assessed the significance of the February events in Russia and their inevitable international impact. They increasingly adopted the Bolshevik course aimed at deepening the revolution and called on the working people of their countries to follow the example set by the Russian proletariat. Solidarity and broader ties with the Bolsheviks, appreciation of their vanguard role in the world revolutionary movement and critical reappraisal of their own experience helped revolutionary Social-Democrats identify themselves with Lenin's views.

Social-chauvinists also welcomed the February Revolution, but they distorted its causes and significance, picturing it either as brought about by Germany's and its allies' war of "liberation" against Russia or as a result of the support Russia received from "progressive and democratic" countries of the Entente. In the meantime, they all kept telling the working people in their countries that "their" governments were trying to end the war which the enemy continued to fight; they fostered hopes for a democratic peace under the existing regimes. Social-chauvinists still rejected the need for and the possibility of revolutionary withdrawal from the war.

Centrists had to be more cautious in advocating their view that revolution was impossible during the war. The growing discontent of the masses, which was also aimed against the social-chauvinist policy, pushed centrists to the left, to opposing party leadership. Still, they kept advocating the attainment of peace and democratic goals mostly by parliamentary methods, not by organised mass action. They supported the pseudo-pacifist social-chauvinist pronouncements, thus prolonging the chauvinist influence on the masses. However, neither reprisals by the authorities nor opportunist appeasement were any longer able to stop revolutionary processes.

These processes were especially pronounced in *Germany*. "Germany—truly a prison," a Spartacus leaflet said.¹ That bitter truth could not be hidden by any amount of social-chauvinist rhetoric which described the domestic policy of the ruling quarters as an introduction of "wartime socialism".

Cracks in the facade of the "civil peace" policy were becoming increasingly obvious and deep. Unrest among the hungry population flared up virtually everywhere; people took to the streets to demand better food supplies and an end to black market profiteering. Despite bans and reprisals, workers launched strikes aimed against the war

¹ *Spartakus im Kriege. Die illegalen Flugblätter des Spartakusbundes im Kriege*, Gesammelt und eingeleitet von Ernst Meyer, Vereinigung Internationaler Verlagsanstalten G.m.b.H., Berlin, 1927, S. 153.

and the military dictatorship. Between January and March 1917, large-scale strikes were held in the mining and steel industries of the Ruhr, at munitions and other factories in Essen, Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Kiel and Nuremberg.¹ Sometimes they were spontaneous, and sometimes organised by the Spartacus members or other left Social-Democrats. A considerable part of the workers followed them in some areas (Berlin, Chemnitz, Braunschweig, Bremen and Munich).

The left wing of the SPD, especially the Spartacus group led by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin, Leon Jogiches, Franz Mehring, Julian Marchlewski and Wilhelm Pieck, worked to return the socialist movement to the path of revolutionary struggle. The February Revolution in Russia, which the German workers welcomed enthusiastically, helped open their eyes. The Spartacus group wrote: "The Russian Revolution has torn off the mask of 'democracy' from the face of the Entente bourgeoisie and the mask of liberator from tsarist despotism—from German militarism."² Both the ruling quarters and social-chauvinists found it increasingly difficult to urge continuation of the war against new, revolutionary Russia. The creation of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the reports of the fraternisation between Russian and German soldiers growing more frequent at the front greatly impressed Germany's working masses. More and more German workers and soldiers embraced Liebknecht's slogan "The Main Enemy Is in Your Own Country". The Spartacus group evaluated the February Revolution in Russia from an internationalist stand, saw it as a prologue to new revolutions and called on the German proletariat to take resolute action in its own country. "The victorious Russian revolution in alliance with the victorious German revolution are invincible," the Spartacus group proclaimed.³ Revolutionary propaganda increasingly penetrated the awareness of the masses who suffered from the loss of life and severe privations brought about by the war, from ruthless exploitation which showered the capitalists and landlords with fabulous profits, from spiritual and political oppression.

Increased activity by the anti-war and revolutionary elements in the working-class movement and among the soldiers, the general growth of discontent throughout the country and the deteriorating situation at the front forced the liberal-monarchist wing of the ruling quarters, connected to influential monopoly bourgeoisie, to advocate certain political reforms so as to keep the popular masses

¹ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 2, Berlin, 1966, S. 303-04; *Die Auswirkungen der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution auf Deutschland*, Hrsg. von Leo Stern, Bd. 4/11, Rütten und Loening, Berlin, 1959, S. 369-72 u.a.

² *Spartakusbriefe*, S. 326.

³ *Spartakus im Kriege...*, S. 178-79.

from taking revolutionary action "following the Russian example". Those members of the ruling elite were more sober in their assessment of the worsening military position of Germany (especially after the United States joined the war in April 1917) and demanded that a search for a compromise peace be launched, a peace that could save German imperialism from utter defeat. The liberal-monarchist trend was opposed by the extremely reactionary wing which objected to any reforms, supported military dictatorship and fighting the war "to a German victory"; that wing relied for support on the Prussian landed nobility, on diehard militarists and on the palace clique led by the Kaiser. The contradictions and rivalry between the different groups of the ruling classes were exacerbated, and that led to a crisis at the top—an important element of the revolutionary situation.

SPD leaders mostly supported the bourgeois-liberal elements in the ruling quarters. But that policy increasingly deviated from the growing revolutionary sentiment among the masses. Left Social-Democrats exposed its anti-popular nature and centrists also grumbled against it. The disciplinary action taken by the SPD leadership failed to produce the desired result.

In that situation, the centrists decided to break more decisively with the official leadership and establish a new party, untainted with any support of the Kaiser government. Right-centrist leaders also reckoned with the increasingly leftist sentiment of the masses, but they tried to prevent them from taking a revolutionary stand. In April 1917, the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) was established at the Gotha Congress.¹

In the course of a year, up to 100,000 Social-Democrats, one-third of the SPD membership, crossed over to the USPD. The new party was not politically homogeneous. Most of its members were politically conscious Social-Democratic workers and party activists who decided to break with the right-wing SPD leaders' policy. However, many Social-Democrats who joined the USPD combined readiness to fight for an end to the war and democratic peace with parliamentary illusions and reformist mistakes.² The leadership of the new party comprised people of different politics—from Georg Ledebour on the left wing to Eduard Bernstein, and including such well-known centrists as Karl Kautsky, Hugo Haase and others. Most USPD leaders were right-centrist and they wanted to lead the left-leaning masses, to prevent the establishment of a truly revolutionary party capable of following in Germany the Russian example of 1905 and February 1917. While welcoming the February Revolution, USPD leaders

¹ DMGDA, Rh. II, Bd. I, S. 594-97.

² *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 2, S. 308.

considered its experience inapplicable in Germany¹; they tried to prevent the revolutionising example of the Russian proletarian struggle from influencing the German workers.

At that time, Spartacus leaders did not yet realise the need for a complete break with the centrists and for an independent revolutionary Marxist party (the way the Bolsheviks did), although several local organisations of revolutionary Social-Democrats believed the time for it had come. Planning to win the USPD over to their side from within and to "push the party forward", Spartacus members joined the USPD while retaining their ideological, political and organisational distinctive status. It was Spartacus members and other left elements in the party who often led militant action by the working people in 1917.

In April 1917, a new drop in the bread rationing triggered a mass nationwide strike, the largest since the start of the war. Over 500,000 workers struck in Berlin, Leipzig, Halle, Braunschweig, Magdeburg, Danzig, Kiel, Chemnitz and other cities. Many munitions factories were brought to a halt. Despite attempts by right-wing trade union leaders to confine the issue to questions of food supplies, the striking workers, influenced by the Spartacus and other independent left, including a group of revolutionary shop stewards elected by the workers, also advanced important political demands: an immediate peace without annexations or indemnities, an end to martial law, censorship, compulsory labour and restrictions on the rights of assembly and association, freedom for Liebknecht and all other political prisoners, cessation of political trials, full civil liberties and universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot.² Some rallies chanted "Down with the Government" and called for a democratic government. The strike was especially turbulent in Berlin and Leipzig. There, at the initiative and under the leadership of the Spartacus group, the first workers' councils in Germany were established. And although they did not become true organs of power, the idea of setting up councils similar to the Russian Soviets began to attract more supporters among the masses of workers.

The employers, aided by the authorities and assisted by right-wing Social-Democrats, used intimidation, reprisals, concessions and promises and succeeded in having the strikers resume work. However, the April strike showed that the masses were turning to increasingly resolute anti-war and socio-political action. Disturbances, rallies, manifestations and strikes became an everyday occurrence. While in 1916 there were 240 strikes with 124,600 partic-

¹ *Mitteilungs-Blatt des Verbandes der sozialdemokratischen Wahlvereine Berlins und Umgegend*, Nr. 2, Berlin, den 8. April 1917, S. 2.

² See *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 2, S. 313-15, 494-98.

ipants, the 1917 figures were, respectively, 561 and 651,600.¹ The movement expanded to encompass new areas, new sections of the workers and non-proletarian working people. Despite the opposition by Social-Democratic party and trade union functionaries, 1917 May Day manifestations were held under the slogan "Down with the War". The country continued to be shaken by strikes, manifestations and rallies, by demands of "bread, freedom and peace".

Revolutionary action in the army and navy was a new element of the country's politics. On May 1, red flags were flying not only over Russian but also over German positions at some sections of the front. In summer, unrest broke out aboard naval vessels in the harbours of Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. Navy men included many former workers who maintained contact with the USPD. The influence of the Spartacus group and other left-wing Social-Democrats was of particular importance. Anti-war and revolutionary leaflets were disseminated on board naval vessels, clandestine meetings were held and "caboose commissions" elected which the sailors' leaders saw as "the first step towards creating sailors' councils according to the Russian pattern".²

The clandestine centre of the naval organisation which numbered 5,000 (other sources put it at 10,000) members was formed on board the flagship *Friedrich der Grosse*. Collective refusals to eat unwholesome food, mass rallies, disobedience, sabotage of naval equipment and arms and so on became increasingly frequent. Plans were maturing for holding a general strike in the navy to force the government to conclude a peace. On August 2, an organised group of 400 sailors from the *Prinz-regent Luitpold* disembarked and held a political rally. Mass arrests and ruthless reprisals followed. Two leaders of the sailors' organisation, Albin Köbis and Max Reichpietsch, were shot, and 50 other activists were sentenced to a total of 400 years in prisons or penal colonies; many were transferred to penal battalions.³

The Spartacus group issued a leaflet on the events in which it urged emulation of the heroic example of the revolutionaries in the navy who delivered a blow from within against German militarism.⁴ Since the April strike, the Spartacus group, unlike right-wing Social-Democrats and USPD members, did not confine its demands to an

¹ Herbert Warnke, *Überblick über die Geschichte der deutschen Gewerkschaftsbewegung*, "Tribüne", Verlag und Druckereien des F.D.G.B., Berlin, 1954, S. 70, 71.

² Albert Schreiner, *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Aussenpolitik 1871-1945*, Bd. I, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1955, S. 402.

³ *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. Chronik*, Teil I, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1965, S. 336-38; DMGDA, Reihe II, Bd. II, S. 666-667; Hans Beckers, *Wie ich zum Tode verurteilt wurde*, Ernst Oldenburg Verlag, Leipzig, 1928, S. 33-34, 44-46, 50-55.

⁴ DMGDA, Rh. II, Bd. I, S. 677.

electoral and other partial reforms, but worked to develop and deepen the revolutionary situation in Germany. It steadily connected anti-war propaganda with revolutionary slogans of a united democratic German republic. "This simply suggests itself after the developments in Russia," the group wrote.¹

As the situation was coming to a head, the ruling quarters stepped up their manoeuvring in search of a way out. Government leaders were replaced. In July 1917, the Reichstag passed a resolution on "an agreed peace", and a decree was published on the introduction of equal suffrage in Prussia after the war. But all these promises could not slow down the rising anti-war and anti-government protest.

The 1917 upsurge of the mass struggle for peace, bread and democracy opened a new stage in the German working-class movement, the build-up of the revolutionary situation which was to culminate in the November Revolution of 1918.

By the summer of 1917, multi-national *Austria-Hungary* had lost over 4,000,000 people killed, wounded, taken prisoner or missing in action on the Eastern Front alone.² A severe economic depression had set in, the situation of the working people deteriorated abruptly, political oppression mounted, and ethnic contradictions intensified. In the first months of 1917, when the military and economic situation of Austria-Hungary became critical, a widespread movement began to gather strength under the slogan "We Want Peace, Bread and Freedom"; the oppressed peoples demanded national independence. In many areas there was unrest among the starving and desperate population. The increasingly insistent demands for an end to the war were combined with appeals to the proletarians of the belligerent countries to end the war themselves.

The strike movement grew stronger too. The February Revolution in Russia acted as a powerful impetus of mass action throughout Austria-Hungary. News of the revolution evoked great enthusiasm among the workers of Vienna, Prague, Brno, Cracow, Lvov, Trieste and other industrial centres. Besides, the working people hoped that the development of the Russian revolution would put an end to the war.³ Hungarian trade union leaders noted that in the spring of 1917 "the revolutionary movement in Russia truly awakened the working class to a new life".⁴ The working people of the Southern Slav regions of the empire also welcomed the Russian revolution with enthusiasm.

¹ DMGDA, Rh. II, Bd. I, S. 622-38.

² *Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg. 1914-1918*, Bd. VII, Wien, 1918, S. 47.

³ Rudolf Neck, *Arbeiterschaft und Staat im Ersten Weltkrieg, 1914-1918* (A. Quellen), Bd. I, Tl. 1, Europa-Verlag, Wien, 1964, S. 240-43, 273-74.

⁴ *The Impact of the Great October Revolution on the World Communist Movement*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1977, p. 80 (in Russian).

Strikes spread throughout the country. They were especially large-scale and stubborn in the Czech regions. In April, tens of thousands of metal, textile, footwear and other workers struck in Prague. The strikers welcomed the Russian revolution, demanded freedom for political prisoners, an end to censorship and to persecution of workers and the Czech population in general, and better food supplies. All Austria-Hungary was shaken by the tragedy of the Czech town of Prostějov where army troops fired upon a peaceful demonstration of strikers on April 25, 1917, killing 24 and wounding about 70.¹

These events were a prologue to the first mass May Day action in Austria-Hungary since the start of the war. Cowardly warnings by Social-Democratic leaders were ignored, and the international proletarian solidarity day was marked with strikes, rallies and manifestations in many Czech, Austrian, Hungarian, Slovak and Southern Slav cities. Everywhere, solidarity was expressed with the Russian revolution and demands were voiced for an immediate democratic peace. In the Czech and Slovak regions, the creation of an independent Czechoslovak state was urged openly. Since May Day and up to the general political strike in January 1918, large-scale strikes and mass political action aimed against the war, for national liberation and other objectives flared up throughout the empire. According to the watered-down official statistics, in 1917 there were 131 strikes in Austria alone (against 80 in the previous two years), the number of enterprises hit by strikes tripled, and the number of strikers grew more than seven-fold. The scope of the strike movement in Hungary was also many times that of the previous wartime years.

The struggle of the workers prompted action by the salary earners, the democratic intelligentsia and petty-bourgeois urban elements; rural areas followed the cities. In the summer of 1917, there was widespread peasant action in Galicia, Czechia, Bukovina and some other areas. At the front, Austro-Hungarian soldiers increasingly fraternised with Russians; thousands of servicemen who refused to go on fighting in the war voluntarily surrendered to Russian troops. In the forests and mountains of Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Moravia, Galicia and Lower Austria, "green cadres" were formed; these units consisted of deserters from the army and young draft evaders. In some villages, they were in control.²

The spontaneous revolutionary upsurge increasingly gave rise to leadership centres which helped the masses formulate their demands, helped them against employers and the authorities, prepared new strikes and demonstrations, etc. In the spring of 1917, an under-

¹ Zdeněk Šolle, *Dělnické hnutí v českých zemích za imperialistické světové války*, Nakladatelství Rovnost, Praha, 1952, str. 32.

² Richard Georg Plaschka, Horst Haselsteiner, Arnold Suppan, *Innere Front*, Zweiter Band, E. Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 1974, S. 76-89.

ground Committee of Workers' Representatives was set up at Prague factories to counter the conciliatory policy of Social-Democratic and trade union leaders. In July, influenced by reports about the Russian Soviets of Workers' Deputies, the Committee elected a clandestine Central Workers' Council. In Plzeň, an Action Committee emerged which directed joint action by Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish, Croatian and Serbian workers at the local munitions factories. In some places, workers' action committees helped revive and invigorate the trade unions.

An extraordinary congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Hungary demanded democratisation of the country's social structure, a guarantee of the oppressed peoples' free national development, renunciation of annexations and secret treaties, reinstatement of the International, and a session of the International Socialist Bureau. The Congress welcomed the overthrow of tsarism and warned against using Hungarian troops to restore it.¹

However, the opportunist leaders of Austrian, Czech, Hungarian and Slovak Social-Democracy hampered the advance of the revolutionary movement and confused the working people by promises and appeals to seek only "legitimate" constitutional changes, and that only after the conclusion of a "just peace". Right-wing party and trade union leaders supported the manoeuvres of the government which tried to prevent a military defeat and a revolution.

The centrists who called themselves leftists (Otto Bauer became their leader in 1917) criticised the party leadership and spoke about the coming revolution, but they refused even to think about a break with opportunists, or creating a truly revolutionary party or practically aiding the revolutionary struggle of the working class. The chief concern of both the right wing and the centre was how to preserve the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian state. As a result, the Social-Democratic Party of Austria actually resisted national self-determination.²

The party also comprised a group of "left-wing radical Social-Democrats" which was in contact with the workers of several large factories, with youth, student and soldiers' groups. In the spring of 1917, Lenin, referring to "internationalists in deed", wrote: "...In Austria, the young Left-wing friends of Friedrich Adler, who acted partly through the Karl Marx Club in Vienna...."³ Koritschner, Hornik and Strömer were prominent among the left-wing radicals. That trend fought not only against the policy of the party leader-

¹ MMTVD, 4/B, 251 old.

² Helmut Konrad, *Nationalismus und Internationalismus. Die österreichische Arbeiterbewegung vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, Europa-Verlag, Wien, 1976, S. 51.

³ V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 79.

ship but also against the centrism of Bauer's supporters. The radicals established contact with soldiers and officers, workers' organisations in Kladno and Liberec and revolutionary groups in Budapest.¹ However, they were weak organisationally and ideologically and did not break with right-wing opportunists and centrists. Right-wing Social-Democratic leaders used the weakness of the revolutionary elements and the truckling centrist course to retain their own position.

Still, the strength and scope of the anti-war, class and national liberation movement was mounting. In May 1917, disturbances broke out in army units manned by recruits of various oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary. The influence of left-wing radicals was being increasingly felt in the mass struggle; right-wing Social-Democratic leaders immediately nicknamed them "Bolshevik agitators".

The fear of a revolution and of a complete rout at the front forced the ruling elite to search for ways toward a separate peace in foreign policy and to bolster its rule by partial concessions at home.

In late May 1917, the Reichsrat (Austrian parliament) was convened, for the first time during the war. Spokesmen of the Czech and Southern Slav national bourgeoisie demanded the empire's transformation into a "union of free national states", remaining, however, "under the sceptre of the Hapsburg dynasty".² But even those quite moderate demands infuriated the reactionaries and the chauvinists. Fissures separating different national groups of the bourgeoisie expanded. To placate the workers, a special ministry for social problems was established and shorter working hours for women and teenagers were promised. Parliament decided to ease the censorship and restore the authority of civilian courts. Simultaneously, amnesty was declared for those convicted by military tribunals. Almost simultaneously, legislation was passed investing the government with emergency powers.

The domestic political crisis was coming to a head in Hungary too. Under pressure from the masses and the opposition whose chief slogan was "Down with the War and Tiso", the Hungarian premier whose name was the symbol of a "war to a victorious end", had to resign in May. A coalition emerged between the Social-Democratic Party of Hungary and left-wing bourgeois groups under M. Károlyi. It favoured peace, if necessary without German or even Austrian participation, but only if the kingdom's integrity was retained.

The February Revolution in Russia put the ruling bourgeois-chauvin

¹ Leopold Hornik, "Die Zimmerwalder Linke und die Linksradi kalen in Österreich", *Weg und Ziel*, Nr. 9, September 1955, S. 659-60.

² *Reichsrat. Session XXII*, Bd. 1, Wien, 1917, S. 34.

ist clique in *Bulgaria* in a difficult position too. At the time, the country was facing a rapidly worsening military, political and economic crisis. Fearing a revolutionary explosion in Bulgaria, the ruling clique hastened to pass, in the spring of 1917, labour protection legislation promised as far back as 1914. That, however, failed to slow down the political activity of the Bulgarian proletariat. It was confidently led by the Tesnyak party which was making its conclusions from the February Revolution in Russia and increasingly accepted the experience of the Bolshevik Party.

In April 1917, Vasil Kolarov read out a declaration of the party's parliamentary group in the National Assembly. It stated: "The Russian revolution is a brilliant example of the way the exhausted and oppressed popular masses overthrow the thrones of violence and shatter the chains of slavery to win freedom and establish peace. Bulgarian workers at the front and at home send their fraternal greetings to their teachers over the trenches. The cause of Russia's revolutionary workers is their cause too."¹ In a message of greetings to the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, sent on behalf of the BLSDP(T) Central Committee, the Tesnyak-led trade unions and the party's parliamentary group, Dimitar Blagoev expressed the hope that the European proletariat would follow the lead of the revolutionary proletariat of Russia.

Rabotnicheski vestnik, the Tesnyak organ, regularly published reports on the development of the revolution in Russia, and, on the whole, supported the Bolsheviks. In the summer of 1917, Georgi Kirkov and Vasil Kolarov, who were in Stockholm at the time, joined several members of the Zimmerwald Left in an appeal stressing that only a proletarian revolution would ensure "a peace consonant with the interests of the working class, a peace without annexations or indemnities, a peace for peoples free from the yoke of capitalism and all national oppression".² Under the impact of revolutionary developments in Russia, the anti-war and anti-government movement in Bulgaria expanded and grew stronger, and spread to encompass ever greater popular masses. Strikes and mass demonstrations in the cities began in the spring of 1917 and mounted in the latter half of the year; unrest spread to rural areas. A revolutionary crisis was approaching.³

Along with Russia, the year 1917 also brought a rapid rise to the mass working-class and democratic movement in the other Entente countries. Above all, the strike movement grew substantially. In *France*, the official statistics of 1917 recorded 696 strikes with about

¹ *Стенографски дневници на XVII ОНСШРЕ*, кн. 2, стр. 1610.

² *Българската комунистическа партия в резолюции...*, т. I, стр. 450.

³ *Archiv für die Geschichte der Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, Zwölfter Jahrgang, Verlag von C. L. Hirschfeld, Leipzig, 1926, S. 387.

294,000 participants, and almost 1,500,000 man-hours were lost.¹ The situation was particularly turbulent in Paris. In May and June, 100,000 workers struck here at 71 enterprises.² There was a two-week strike by 40,000 steel workers. The increasing activity and class consciousness of the workers gave rise to a rapid growth of trade unions. Specifically, the CGT membership, which had dropped from 592,000 in 1914 to 82,000 in 1915, climbed back to 493,000 in 1917.³

Simultaneously with the increase in the number of strikes, the French anti-war movement also rose, considerably influenced by the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia. At numerous mass rallies, French working people enthusiastically welcomed the overthrow of tsarism and the creation of Soviets and demanded an end to the hostilities. The largest rally of solidarity with Russia's revolutionary forces was held in Paris on May 1, attended by over 10,000 people. The appeal published by the sponsors of the rally stated: "Everywhere people in revolt should rid themselves of their governments representing the ruling classes and replace them with the power of representatives of workers and soldiers who have sided with the people. The Russian revolution signals a worldwide revolution."⁴

The slogan of a revolutionary withdrawal from the war and the establishment of revolutionary power, advanced in France for the first time, found response and support. For example, a meeting of the Orange Socialist Section (Vaucluse Federation) responded by adopting a resolution which called on workers in all countries to unite against the war and capitalism, to bring off a global revolution.⁵ After a visit to Russia, Marcel Cachin urged, in *L'Humanité*, "wholeheartedly joining the Russian revolution".⁶ His reports about the revolutionary sentiment of the Russian people and the horrors of war helped strengthen the resolve to fight for peace both in the SFIO and in France as a whole.

Each month, the social base of the anti-war movement kept expanding. Many peasants and intellectuals became vigorous opponents of the war. Led by Raymond Lefebvre, Henri Barbusse and Paul Vaillant-Couturier, the Republican Association of War Veterans was established. It advanced the slogan "War on War".

¹ *Statistique des grèves survenues pendant les années 1915-1918*, Paris, 1929, pp. 294-95.

² L. P. Kozhevnikova, *The Working-Class and Socialist Movement in France in 1917-1920*, Sotsekgiz, Moscow, 1959, p. 36 (in Russian).

³ S. Sorborsky, op. cit., p. 52.

⁴ *Cahiers du communisme*, No. 10, 1957, p. 1467.

⁵ *Populaire*, May 14-20, 1917.

⁶ *L'Humanité*, June 1, 1917.

In the spring of 1917, serious unrest broke out in the French army too. Its causes included the tremendous losses the army suffered during the abortive April offensive between Reims and Soissons. Protest against the war was growing among soldiers. Open disobedience was becoming increasingly frequent. Clandestine councils of soldiers' delegates were set up in some regiments; anti-war leaflets were widespread.

The impact of the February Revolution in Russia was reflected in the "Ten Commandments of the French Soldier", spread by word of mouth among frontline soldiers. They comprised such demands as equal rights for soldiers and officers, no more capital punishment, peace without annexations, etc. Unrest in the army grew still further in the latter half of May and June 1917. Whole units refused to be sent to the front and demanded an immediate end to the war. Here is an excerpt from a soldier's letter that may serve as an illustration: "The wind of mutiny is blowing everywhere.... All soldiers are unusually excited.... Entire companies have decided not to return to the trenches any more."¹ Cases of desertion multiplied. In 1917, over 21,000 servicemen left the front without permission, 10 times the 1915 number of deserters.² "The French army," Lenin said, "which kept its morale longer and more persistently than any of the others, likewise shows that it is not immune to demoralisation."³ Mutinies flared up everywhere. Throughout 1917, disturbances occurred in 75 infantry regiments, 23 separate rifle battalions and 12 artillery regiments.⁴ The authorities barely managed to put down unrest in the army which threatened to evolve into mass anti-government action.

The growing revolutionary sentiment in the country, and ferment in the army aggravated contradictions within the Socialist Party and strengthened the left trends in it. The mostly social-chauvinist SFIO leadership was forced to give up an open policy of "national unity". Specifically, when a new government was formed in the autumn of 1917, right-wing Socialists refused the ministerial posts they were offered.

The revolutionary developments in Russia also strengthened the hand of the SFIO left wing. In March and April 1917, left-wing Socialists assumed leadership of the Committee to Restore International Relations (CRRI). Fernand Loriot was elected secretary of

¹ Annie Kriegel, *Aux origines du communisme français (1914-1920)*, tome I, Mouton and Co., Paris, 1964, p. 157.

² *Cahiers du communisme*, No. 10, 1957, p. 1466.

³ V. I. Lenin, "Speech in Polytechnical Museum, August 23, 1918", *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, pp. 81-82.

⁴ *The Revolutionary Movement in the French Army in 1917*, Sotsekgiz, Moscow-Leningrad, 1934, p. 258 (in Russian).

the Committee, and its leadership included Charles Rappoport, Louise Saumoneau and others. In its first leaflet, one devoted to the February Revolution, the CRRI wrote: "We are profoundly convinced that the Russian revolution will not only free the peoples of Russia but ... will also lead the international proletariat to the struggle for its complete liberation."¹

During that period, the CRRI was thoroughly reorganised. Preparations began for launching a newspaper. In late March, organisational principles and a programme of action for the Socialist Section of the CRRI were adopted. And although the programme was still oriented toward reviving the Second and not creating a new, Third International, it nevertheless stressed that in order to achieve their objectives, the Zimmerwalders should form distinct groups within the party because of continued centrist appeasement of social-chauvinists who had betrayed the interests of the working class.² The more radical members of the CRRI Socialist Section went further and demanded that a Third International be created.

The exhaustion brought on by the war, rising prices, the drop in the living standard, suppression of the working people's political rights, heavy losses and setbacks at the front—all that combined to make conditions favourable for a further aggravation of the class struggle in *Britain* too. Besides, the February Revolution in Russia noticeably accelerated the growth of left-wing, militant feelings and trends in the British working-class movement. That helped raise it to a new, essentially higher level. The anti-war movement became perceptibly more active in the spring and summer of 1917.

The British proletariat wholeheartedly acclaimed the victory of the Russian people over autocracy. In March and April 1917, scores of mass rallies and demonstrations were held in Britain to display solidarity with the revolution in Russia.

Under the impact of Russian developments, the idea of forming councils became widespread among the British working people, even encompassing some British troops. "The Army is closely following the Council of Workmen and Soldiers' Delegates at Petrograd...", the British Socialist Party newspaper *The Call* wrote late in May 1917, "and freely express the desirability of changes nearer home."³

The movement to create Soviet-like councils in Britain reached its peak at a workers' conference in Leeds, convened at the initiative of the British Socialist Party and the Independent Labour Party

¹ S. Bantke, *The Struggle for the Formation of the Communist Party of France*, Part I, Moscow, 1936, p. 131 (in Russian).

² *Comité pour la reprise des relations internationales (Section Socialiste). Organisation et action de la section*, Paris, 1917.

³ *The Call*, May 24, 1917.

on June 3, 1917. The 1,150 delegates represented over 5,000,000 working people; they not only warmly welcomed the heroic struggle of Russia's workers and soldiers but also decided to establish, "in every town, urban and rural district, Councils of Workmen and Soldiers' Delegates for initiating and co-ordinating working-class activity".¹

True, the debate at the conference showed that the slogan of establishing such councils was interpreted quite differently by the right-wing and centre on the one hand and by left-wing Socialists on the other. The former preached "reasonable change" within the constitutional framework, the latter advocated revolutionary objectives. Robert Williams, leader of transport workers, urged conference delegates: "Have as little concern for the British Constitution as the Russians you are praising had for the dynasty of the Romanoffs.... The need for far-reaching, for revolutionary changes is as great in this country as it was in Russia."² The conference decision to create the councils everywhere remained unfulfilled, for necessary objective conditions were lacking, but it bore out important changes in the mood of the British working people.

Their anti-war sentiment was expressed in the celebration of May Day in 1917. Over 30,000 London workers responded to an appeal by the BSP and held a rally in Finsbury Park, demanding peace and restoration of their political rights. "The demonstration has made it clear to the authorities that, unless they end the war soon, the workers themselves will, like our comrades in Russia, take the matter into their own hands."³ That same day mass rallies and demonstrations were held in Glasgow, Newcastle, Hull, Edinburgh, Southampton and many other cities. Anti-war feeling was becoming more widespread in the army. In 1917, 221 servicemen were convicted for acts of insubordination, compared to 60 in 1916.⁴ In 1917, cases of desertion reached 18,600 and those of absences without leave, 18,000.

The year 1917 also witnessed a steep rise in the number of strikes. The wave began in March, when 202,000 man-days were lost due to strikes—almost 5 times the February 1917 figure. The high point of the March strikes was the action by 20,000 workers of the largest munitions concerns—Vickers, Armstrong-Whitworth and several others. And in May 1917 the largest wartime strike flared up in Britain. It began at engineering factories in Southern Lancashire on April 29 and 30 and quickly spread throughout the country. The

¹ *What Happened at Leeds: Report Published by the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates*, London, 1917, p. 13.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 17.

³ *The Call*, May 10, 1917.

⁴ Tom Bell, *The British Communist Party. A Short History*, Lawrence & Wishart. London, 1937. n. 37.

number of strikers rose from 30,000 to over 200,000. The stubborn struggle lasted for almost 4 weeks; some strikers resumed work only in early June.

The strike of engineering workers, which paralysed most of Britain's munitions factories, was led by shop stewards' committees, whose position in the British working-class movement strengthened considerably in 1917. In August 1917, they succeeded in holding a representative national conference attended by delegates from 23 shop stewards' committees. The conference elected a National Administrative Council to coordinate the Shop Stewards' and Workers' Committees Movement. The most prominent activists of the left socialist wing in the British working-class movement served on the Council, including William Gallacher, Arthur MacManus and Jack Murphy, who were later to take part in founding the British Communist Party. The Conference stressed that the Shop Stewards' and Workers' Committees Movement was aimed above all at "the organization of the workers upon a class basis to prosecute the interests of the working-class until the triumph of the workers is assured".¹ Despite some of their flaws and weaknesses stemming from widespread syndicalist views, shop stewards' committees were an important factor in making the working-class movement more radical, aware of its strength and militant.

In *Italy*, the first signs of a coming revolutionary crisis became clearly obvious in late 1916 and early 1917. The February Revolution in Russia greatly accelerated that process. Umberto Terracini, a prominent activist of the Italian working-class movement, recalled: "Weariness and pessimism gradually found their way into people's hearts, and hatred of the war which had seized the masses was growing.

"And at that very moment, the news of an uprising in Petrograd in February 1917 circled the world with lightning speed, followed by news of the revolution which had toppled the obsolete and semi-feudal Russian Empire.... That momentous event evoked in Italy ... a wave of enthusiasm in virtually the entire population—excepting, of course, the court, the nobility and the big latifundistas.... And everyone in Italy understood, if vaguely, that the victory of the revolution in Russia pointed the way to a new future for other peoples."²

The slogan "Do It the Russian Way", born in Turin, Italy's industrial capital, became one of the most popular with the Italian

¹ L. J. Macfarlane, *op. cit.*, p. 39; for details on the shop stewards' and workers' committees see James Hinton, *The First Shop Stewards' Movement*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1973, pp. 240-43.

² Umberto Terracini, "The Great October Socialist Revolution and Italy", *Voprosy istorii*, No. 11, 1967, p. 82.

masses. The number of industrial conflicts rose sharply. Increasingly often, strikers advanced political demands alongside economic ones. At numerous rallies, over 100 in March 1917 and over 40 in the first half of April 1917, attended, respectively, by 15,000 and 12,000 people, workers protested against the war and demanded peace.¹

In its attempts to undermine the rise of anti-war feelings and the revolutionising impact of the February Revolution on the working masses, the Italian bourgeois press interpreted the Russian events as a revolution "in the name of the war and freedom" and tried to convince the readers that Russia intended to continue the war to a victorious end in complete accord with the Allies.

The newspaper *Avanti!*, the organ of Italian Socialists, who enthusiastically welcomed the victory of the February Revolution, resolutely exposed the invention of the bourgeois press to the effect that Russian autocracy had been overthrown allegedly for the sake of war. An editorial *Avanti!* carried on March 30, 1917 stressed that the objective of the Russian revolution was transfer of the land to the people and of the factories to the workers.

The left wing of the Italian socialist movement saw the February Revolution merely as "Act One", to be followed with further steps towards socialism. Among others, the young Antonio Gramsci held that view. He wrote in *Il Grido del Popolo* that the revolution in Russia would inevitably lead to the establishment of a socialist system.²

Italy's left-wing Socialists connected the transition of the Russian revolution into a proletarian and socialist with the Bolsheviks, with Lenin. Giacinto Menotti Serrati repeatedly voiced that view in *Avanti!*; *Il Grido del Popolo* wrote: "The heart of every proletarian beats for Lenin ... and for a new Russia ... which Lenin leads and embodies."³

The leaflets distributed in Italy on May 1, 1917 urged emulation of the revolutionary Russian example. "Russia shows us a remarkable example of proletarian power.... If everyone had followed that example, the war would have already ended.... Comrades, let us follow their example!" one of them said. Another appealed: "Proletarian soldiers! Follow the example of your Russian comrades, do not engage in fratricide...."⁴

¹ K. E. Kirova, *The Russian Revolution and Italy*, Nauka, Moscow, 1968, pp. 43, 45-46 (in Russian).

² Antonio Gramsci, *Scritti giovanili. 1914-1918*, Giulio Einaudi Editore, Torino, 1958, pp. 105-08.

³ *Il Grido del Popolo*, May 12, 1917.

⁴ Paolo Spriano, *Torino operaia nella grande guerra (1914-1918)*, Giulio Einaudi Editore, Torino, 1960, p. 218.

The scope of the popular movement was especially great in Milan in early May, when a demonstration of 20,000 women, labourers and peasants from nearby villages marched through the city bearing posters saying, "We Want Peace and Bread". They were joined by Milan workers who had struck for several days.

Tensions in Italy grew even more late in the summer of 1917, when economic dislocation put the country on the brink of collapse and the war-weary population reacted with increasing force to the growing privations. In late August, an anti-war uprising of the Turin proletariat flared up; tens of thousands of people took part, and barricades circled the city. The uprising lacking a plan, organisation and contacts with other cities, the government put it down within a few days. But the ruling quarters failed to remove the causes of profound popular discontent. Their position was becoming increasingly shaky; rivalry sharpened between advocates of open military dictatorship and those who hoped to avert revolution through reforms. The revolutionary crisis in Italy continued to mount.

Romania, which had entered the war on the side of the Entente in August 1916, suffered several defeats and lost two-thirds of its territory by the end of the year, Bucharest fell, the army was one-tenth the strength it had had at the time of entry into the war. The February Revolution in Russia hastened the demoralisation of the remnants of the army and the growth of widespread popular discontent. Surrender, desertion and disobedience grew frequent in the army, the proletariat in the cities and the peasants in rural areas became active; in some areas clandestine socialist groups stepped up their propaganda. All that was considerably furthered by the influence of the Russian revolutionised army. Romanian workers in Galați, Bârlad, Tecuci and Bacău held May Day demonstrations in 1917 together with the Russian soldiers stationed there. The largest demonstration was held in Iași, at that time residence of the king and seat of the government. The 15,000-strong demonstration carried red banners and posters saying, in Romanian and Russian, "Peace Without Annexations or Indemnities", "Long Live the International", "Long Live Brotherhood Among Nations". In the days that followed, Romanian socialists disseminated a leaflet prepared in connection with the Iași demonstration and urging "overthrow of the mean and idle scum who rule the country and bleed it dry".¹

Some leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of Romania, freed in the course of May Day demonstrations, began working in Odessa, where up to 25,000 Romanian workers, sailors and soldiers were quartered. In June 1917, they formed a Romanian Social-Democratic

¹ See V. N. Vinogradov, *Romania During World War I*, Moscow, 1969, p. 206 (in Russian).

Action Committee there to conduct anti-war and revolutionary propaganda. The Committee broke, ideologically and politically, with reformism and assumed a revolutionary stand. It established a working procedure of cooperation with Odessa Bolsheviks, and a representative of the latter served on the committee.¹

The king promised land and suffrage to the soldiers after the war. Parliament began hastily to revise the constitution; specifically, there were plans to introduce universal suffrage, abolish crown and state land holdings, redeem up to 2,000,000 hectares of landed estates and sell them to the rural population. Differences grew among bourgeois parties, between advocates of a tough line and supporters of reforms. However, all attempts by the ruling quarters to alleviate social and political tensions and prevent a further aggravation of the class struggle led nowhere. The country was approaching new class battles.

Influenced by the February Revolution, the movement of the Romanian workers and peasants against the terrorist regime in enemy-held territories gathered momentum. It took various forms—demonstrations, refusal to work, harbouring Romanian soldiers and officers, disseminating “instigative” news, boycotting food supplies, etc. There were cases of open sabotage: property to be taken out of the country by the enemy was burned, telegraph and telephone lines cut, and enemy soldiers attacked. Despite harsh reprisals by the enemy authorities and the Romanian police who collaborated with them, the liberation struggle gradually mounted.

In late 1916 and early 1917, the anti-war movement grew perceptibly more active in *the United States*. It received a new powerful impetus as a result of the February Revolution in Russia, which made a profound impact on the US working-class and democratic movement. Slogans from Russia—an immediate peace without annexations or indemnities and national self-determination—became the most popular with the US democratic public.² However, the forces of reaction and militarism pushed the United States into the war on the side of the Entente on April 6.

The country's progressive democratic forces condemned the imperialist war. Legislation on compulsory military service set off a great wave of protest; over 330,000 people refused to be drafted. Demonstrations and rallies of protest against the war and the draft were held in many cities; anti-war leaflets were distributed.

Numerous pacifist organisations demanded that the country refuse to enter the war. The composition of these organisations was extreme-

¹ *A History of Romania, 1848-1917*, Nauka, Moscow, 1971, pp. 218-19 (in Russian).

² John Steuben, *Labor in Wartime*, International Publishers, New York, 1940, p. 107.

ly motley—workers, farmers, intellectuals, etc., and they were far from understanding the true causes of imperialist wars or ways to end them. But they advanced slogans consonant with the mass anti-war feelings. That was why some left-wing socialists took part in the pacifist movement; they considered it their duty to support any popular movement against the war.

After the United States entered the war, contradictions reached their peak within the Socialist Party of America between the left-wing socialists, who assumed an uncompromising anti-war stand, and the social-chauvinists who supported the aggressive policy of the ruling quarters. An emergency convention of the SP held on April 7, 1917 passed, by an overwhelming majority of votes (140 against 31), a resolution condemning the imperialist war and the government's militarist propaganda. In it, the party reaffirmed "its allegiance to the principle of internationalism and working-class solidarity the world over" and "emphatically" rejected the proposal that in time of war the workers should suspend their struggle for better conditions. "On the contrary," the resolution said, "the acute situation created by war calls for an even more vigorous prosecution of the class struggle...."¹ In the course of a referendum held in the party in June 1917, an overwhelming majority of its members supported that resolution.

The right-wing leaders of the SP voted against the resolution at the convention. A bit later, some of them established, jointly with Gompers, the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy and Terms of Peace which supported the war policy of the administration. Actually, the alliance became the government's auxiliary body to mobilise human and material resources for the imperialist war.² Centrist leaders under Morris Hillquit took into account the prevailing mood at the convention and were forced to support the anti-war resolution. In actual fact, however, they did little to mobilise the masses for struggle against the war.

Only left-wing Socialists—Eugene Debs, Charles Ruthenberg, Charles Baker and others—campaigns energetically in accordance with the resolution of the emergency convention. They organised demonstrations and rallies to protest against the war and the imperialist policy of the US administration and conducted active anti-war propaganda. On June 1, 1917, left-wing Socialists led a 40,000-strong anti-war demonstration in Boston.

¹ *Revolutionary Radicalism: Its History, Purpose and Tactics*, Part I, *Revolutionary and Subversive Movements Abroad and at Home*, Vol. I, J. B. Lyon Company, Printers, Albany, 1920, pp. 613, 617.

² Simeon Larson, *Labor and Foreign Policy. Gompers, the AFL, and the First World War, 1914-1918*, Associated University Presses, London, 1975, pp. 142-43.

The high degree of the anti-war movement in the United States and the positive impact the revolutionary developments in Russia had made on it were borne out by a representative conference of opponents of the war held in New York on May 30 and 31. The conference supported demands for an immediate democratic peace without annexations or indemnities on the basis of the recognition of the nations' right to self-determination and passed a resolution saying: "We wanted to demonstrate that we supported the Russian democrats and were ready to fight, along with them, until autocracy is abolished throughout the world."¹ The conference followed the example of revolutionary Russia by deciding to establish the People's Council for Democracy and Terms of Peace.² And although conference participants shared many illusions generated by President Wilson's "peacemaking" speeches, they contributed significantly to the expansion of the anti-war movement in the United States. After the national conference, local anti-war conferences were convened in many cities, Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco and Los Angeles among them. Hundreds of local people's councils were set up; this made it possible to establish a nationwide organisation. It was formed in early September 1917 and played a prominent part in national socio-political developments. It enjoyed the support of about 2,000,000 US citizens.³

IWW members stepped up their anti-war activity after the United States' entry into the war. Their press spoke out courageously against the war and denounced the betrayal by AFL leaders and right-wing Socialists.⁴ The IWW joined efforts to organise strikes and anti-war action by the working people. The authorities severely persecuted many IWW activists: in mid-1917, about 250 IWW members were sentenced to long prison terms. Despite that serious blow, the organisation continued to play an important role in the US working-class movement.

In spite of the harsh wartime conditions, the US strike movement remained high in 1917, with a total of 4,233 strikes in which 1,194,000 workers took part.⁵ The largest strike of 1917 was the spring action by 50,000 lumbermen in the states of Ohio, Montana and Washington, led by IWW members. The authorities sent troops against the strikers, hundreds of workers were imprisoned; as a result,

¹ *Report of the First American Conference for Democracy and Terms of Peace. May 1917*, New York, 1917, p. 3.

² Simeon Larson, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-39.

³ John Steuben, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-11.

⁴ *Bill Haywood's Book. The Autobiography of William D. Haywood*, International Publishers, New York, 1929, pp. 294-95.

⁵ Alexander M. Bing, *War-Time Strikes and Their Adjustment*, E. P. Dutton and Company, New York, 1921, p. 293.

after several months of heroic struggle, the strikers were forced to resume work. In June 1917, mineworkers in Butte, Montana, struck; before long, they were joined by 24,000 workers in Arizona. That strike was also put down by armed force. As a rule, strikers demanded higher wages, an eight-hour working-day and recognition of labour unions.¹

The US ruling quarters ruthlessly persecuted participants in the working-class and democratic movement. In this they were aided by rabidly chauvinist AFL leaders headed by Gompers.² Nevertheless, the strenuous struggle against the imperialist war, waged by left-wing Socialists and members of the IWW and some labour unions, did produce results. In 1917, the movement for an end to the war and a democratic peace was clearly gathering strength in the United States; it was considerably influenced by the Bolshevik struggle in Russia for a revolutionary withdrawal from the imperialist war.³

In 1917, the working-class and socialist movement also picked up perceptibly in the countries which did not take part in the war. The February events in Russia stimulated these processes; the left strengthened their positions. In April 1917, Lenin singled out, from among internationalists in the neutral countries, left-wing groups in Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland who campaigned against social-chauvinists and the centre and, as early as February, submitted "a consistently revolutionary resolution against the war".⁴

In May 1917, a left-wing Social-Democratic party emerged in Sweden, which was very important for the development of the working-class movement both in Sweden and in Scandinavia in general. In June 1917, a congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland adopted a resolution submitted by the left wing and condemning "defence of the fatherland" in an imperialist war.

Left socialists in the neutral countries played an important part in establishing contacts between the Bolsheviks and left-wing groups in the belligerent nations. Specifically, through the Swiss workers, Lenin addressed his explanations of the meaning of Russian revolutionary developments to workers in other countries too.⁵

¹ See L. I. Zubok, op. cit., pp. 510-11.

² *The American Labor Year Book, 1917-1918*, New York, 1918, pp. 43-47; William Z. Foster, *History of the Communist Party of the United States*, International Publishers, New York, 1952, pp. 132-33; Lewis L. Lorwin, *The American Federation of Labor. History, Policies, and Prospects*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1933, pp. 139-40.

³ See L. I. Zubok, op. cit., p. 545.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 79.

⁵ For details see Ya. G. Temkin, *Lenin and International Social-Democracy. 1914-1917*, Nauka, Moscow, 1968, pp. 558-60 (in Russian).

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In the spring and summer of 1917, the international situation changed sharply. The second bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia exerted great and positive influence on the entire international working-class movement. It helped the left-wing, revolutionary trends and organisations in it grow stronger; it contributed to the upsurge of mass anti-war action and aided the struggle by the working people for their economic and political rights. Under the impact of the Russian revolution polarisation in the international socialist movement accelerated and revolutionary trends, groups and organisations matured ideologically and consolidated.

Viewing the February Revolution as the beginning of the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war, a factor indispensable for the liberation of mankind from wars, poverty and oppression, Lenin advanced the task of "creating a revolutionary International, an International against the *social-chauvinists* and against the 'Centre' ",¹ as a task directly facing the RSDLP and other revolutionary Social-Democrats. Initiating preparations to set up a Communist International, the Bolshevik Party and the revolutionary Social-Democrats in other countries understood that the anti-war movement was rapidly changing into revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of capitalism. The revolutionary proletariat of Russia was in the forefront of that struggle.

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¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 24.

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Chapter 13 (Conclusion)

THE EVE OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

The relatively short period between 1905 and 1917 was full of developments that were extremely important both for world history in general and for the international working-class movement. Clear indications of a coming general crisis of capitalism emerged and grew. The future of the world was decided in the struggle of the bourgeoisie, defender of obsolete social forms, and the proletariat, creator of new forms. The outcome of the rivalry depended not only on how powerful and well-organised the two sides were but also on their ability to win over to their side the "intermediate" classes and strata—the enormous petty-bourgeois urban and rural masses and the multimillion-strong oppressed nations who were awakening to social activity.

In the early 20th century, the confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat entered a new stage. On the one hand, the reactionary and anti-popular nature of the bourgeoisie became increasingly pronounced; its hostility to historical progress grew obvious in all aspects—both on the domestic and on the international scenes. All that was mercilessly bared by World War I. On the other hand, the reactionary bourgeoisie was opposed by the revolutionary proletariat virtually in every sphere of social life. Of course, the latter was not always and not everywhere up to the tasks facing it, both due to its immaturity and due to the corrupting influence of bourgeois reformism and opportunism. However, it was the proletariat which rose resolutely against the mounting oppression and arbitrary rule of the monopolies, fought to eliminate all vestiges of feudalism and to have democratic political forms introduced everywhere. It was the proletariat which came out in defence of smaller nationalities and against imperialist colonial expansion, which said an increasingly vigorous "no" to militarism and war.

On all basic issues of social development, the interests of the bourgeoisie collided irreconcilably with the interests of the popular

masses. Meanwhile, the basic interests of the proletariat coincided, in the final count, with the interests of the broadest strata of popular masses, of the entire mankind.

The fact that the tasks facing different national sections of the working class were obviously growing more alike helped in the realisation of its world-historic mission of liberation. Anti-imperialism, anti-militarism and the struggle for democracy were essentially slogans common to the entire international proletarian movement. But difficulties also arose due to quite considerable distinctions in conditions, traditions, etc. among different countries and to the quite contradictory course of development of proletarian organisations. Each year, not only the stubborn struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie became more acute, but so did the rivalry between the revolutionary and opportunist trends in the international Social-Democratic, trade union, cooperative, youth and women's working-class movement. The most complete break between the revolutionary and the opportunist wings occurred in Russia, where, despite the highly difficult conditions of struggle, the Bolshevik Party arose and grew strong, a party of a new type, which had cleansed its ranks of opportunists. However, its experience was yet to be taken into account by the proletariat in other countries.

Due to the uneven economic and political development of capitalism under imperialism, the revolutionary transition to socialism could not take place in all countries at once. Initially, it began in one country—Russia where the centre of the revolutionary movement had shifted and where, in the early 1900s, the antagonistic contradictions typical of the entire imperialist system had concentrated and become extremely pronounced. In Russia, the period of struggle against autocracy and especially after its overthrow, highlighted the rivalry of the two decisive forces claiming state power—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The outcome of the struggle depended on which side would prove better organised, more united and capable; which would be able to lead the vacillating petty bourgeoisie, above all the peasants, and the multimillion-strong masses of the army.

In the revolutions of 1848 and 1871 the peasant masses did not support the proletariat in its struggle. In the first Russian revolution of 1905-1907 they did support the proletariat but not yet as powerfully as they could have. That factor played no small part in the defeat of the June 1848 uprising in Paris, of the Paris Commune in 1871 and of the first bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia in the 20th century. The situation changed after February 1917. For the first time in history, the proletariat had a real opportunity of creating a broad anti-bourgeois alliance of the proletarian and petty-bourgeois, above all peasant masses and turning the tide of the

world struggle to its advantage. Comparing the record of the 1871 proletarian revolution to the prospects of the coming proletarian revolution of 1917, Lenin said, on the eve of the October Revolution:

"The bourgeoisie wails about the inevitable defeat of a Commune in Russia, i.e., defeat of the proletariat if it were to conquer power.

"These are false, selfish class wailings.

"If the proletariat gains power it will have *every* chance of retaining it and of leading Russia until there is a victorious revolution in the West.

"In the first place, we have learned much since the Commune, and we would not repeat its fatal errors....

"Secondly, the victorious proletariat would give Russia peace, and no power on earth would be able to overthrow a government of *peace*, a government of an honest, sincere, just peace, after all the horrors of more than three years' butchery of the peoples.

"Thirdly, the victorious proletariat would give the peasantry the land immediately and without compensation. And a tremendous majority of the peasantry ... would support the victorious proletariat absolutely, unreservedly, with every means in its power."¹

True, the proletariat's possible victory was yet to be achieved; the road toward it was complicated and hard. The exploiter classes were in no mood to yield without a fight; they had behind them the power of government, organisation, wealth and knowledge. But, already in the decisive February days, the working class, led by the Bolshevik Party under Lenin, displayed its striking ability, enthusiasm and energy.

The year 1917 concentrated world problems of social development in Russia; international trends found a distinctive and clear reflection within its national framework; and that, in turn, determined the international significance of the experience of Russia's revolution, proletariat and its party. The Russian "model" revealed especially graphically both the implacable hostility of the international bourgeoisie toward historical progress, highlighted by the war of 1914-1918, and the resolve of the proletariat and its ability to show the masses the way out of the impasse.

Due to its class position, the bourgeoisie, to which conciliators were yielding power in 1917, could solve none of the urgent tasks facing the country at a turning point in world history. The bourgeoisie was unable to give peace to the exhausted people because its entire policy, all its past and present involved it in the system of worldwide imperialist exploitation, connected it in a thousand

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Russian Revolution and Civil War", *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, pp. 40-41.

ways to international capital and shackled it with secret treaties. Only an overthrow of the bourgeoisie, only socialism opened the way to a truly democratic peace. The bourgeoisie could not lead the country out of the vast economic dislocation because that was impossible without genuine public control over the entire economy and, consequently, without prejudice to the outrageously exorbitant profits, without putting an end to bleeding the treasury dry through military and other contracts, in the final analysis, without restructuring all of the economy on new, socialist principles. The bourgeoisie could not give land to the dispossessed peasants because an attempt at landed nobility's tenure would have dealt a blow against the sway of private ownership in general, including capitalist ownership. Meanwhile, the socialist revolution was aimed precisely at eliminating all forms of exploiter ownership. The bourgeoisie could not ensure freedom for the nations and ethnic groups oppressed in tsarist Russia, because it had a vested interest in keeping them within its sphere of influence, oppressed and robbed as always. Only an overthrow of the bourgeoisie opened the way to the liberation of oppressed nations.

Only Russia's proletariat, leading the people, could solve the urgent tasks facing the country—and solve them determinedly and comprehensively. The proletariat was vitally interested in a democratic peace among nations. It could assume leadership in controlling the industry and then restructuring it along socialist lines and save the country from the impending catastrophe. It was capable of helping the dispossessed peasants secure land and get rid of exploitation, and the oppressed national minorities win genuine freedom. The Bolsheviks, who led Russia's working class, relied on Lenin's programme of the further development of the revolution. Advancing the slogan of genuine peace as the central point of the popular struggle, a peace unthinkable without an overthrow of the rule of capital, the Bolshevik programme was in fact a programme of Russia's national salvation, a programme to rally together all progressive, intelligent and honest elements. Referring to the problem of peace which Lenin termed "the crucial issue of today", the Menshevik newspaper *Novaya zhizn* claimed that the proletariat was "isolated from the other classes". Lenin contradicted it and wrote: "On this issue the proletariat truly represents the *whole* nation, all live and honest people *in all* classes, the vast majority of the petty bourgeoisie; because only the proletariat, on achieving power, will *immediately* offer a just peace to all the belligerent nations, because only the proletariat will dare take genuinely *revolutionary* measures ... to achieve the speediest and most just peace possible."¹

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?", *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 99.

History charged Russia's proletariat with the task of solving key issues of the country's social development, a task too great for Russia's bourgeoisie. Only the proletariat could cope with it. In elaborating his programme of transition from the first, bourgeois-democratic, to the second, socialist, stage of the revolution, his clear-cut course to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat, as a guarantee that the revolution's problems would be solved, Lenin proceeded from the dialectical interconnection between democratic and socialist transformations, from the necessity and inevitability of progress toward socialism. "It is impossible to stand still in history in general, and in war-time in particular. We must either advance or retreat. It is *impossible* in twentieth-century Russia, which has won a republic and democracy in a revolutionary way, to go forward without *advancing* towards socialism, without taking *steps* towards it (steps conditioned and determined by the level of technology and culture)."¹ Those resolute steps were taken by Russia's proletariat in October 1917, when it took power in its own hands and began to socialise major means of production, while also solving, at that proletarian stage of the struggle, the problems of the country's democratic transformation—those concerning a democratic peace, transfer of land to the peasants and liberation of the oppressed nations.

But Lenin's programme not only took care of Russia's national salvation. Essentially, it showed the way to the salvation of mankind as a whole, to freeing all the suffering peoples from wars and exploitation. The Russian proletariat provided an inspiring example for the proletarian, democratic forces in other countries.

The specific plan Lenin drew up in March and April 1917 for the transition of the Russian revolution from its first, bourgeois-democratic, stage to the second, socialist, stage proceeded from the possibility and necessity of using to the utmost and developing further as far as possible the revolutionary potential, forces and abilities of the people who had awakened to create new social forms.

"In revolutionary times," Lenin wrote in "Letters from Afar", "the limits of what is possible expand a thousandfold."² In the post-February 1917 Russia that expansion of "the limits of what is possible" was born of the massive revolutionary upsurge and creative effort. It was guaranteed by the entire activity of the consistently revolutionary proletarian Bolshevik Party which aimed its efforts at the best possible satisfaction of the people's vitally important, fundamental and urgent demands.

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It", *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, pp. 362-63.

² V. I. Lenin, "Letters from Afar", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p. 323.

In the course of its comparatively short history, Bolshevism succeeded in elaborating and testing in the revolutions of 1905-1907 and February 1917 a remarkable twofold approach to the masses which the proletariat's revolutionary party was now to develop and use at the new stage of the struggle.

On the one hand, the Bolshevik Party supported in every way the initiative and spontaneous action by the masses of which the bourgeoisie was mortally afraid, which it tried to tame and which rendered petty-bourgeois conciliators helpless. The tsarist regime had for decades suppressed and stifled all expressions of the popular will; it had done all it could to slow down the people's independent and free "unionisation", as Lenin put it. After the tsarist regime was overthrown, the country was literally flooded with popular initiative: various organisations were set up spontaneously everywhere—Soviets, the workers' militia, soldier and peasant committees, trade unions, factory committees, supply committees, food committees, conferences and so on. They needed no directives "from above" but invaded practically all aspects of the country's life, eliminating old bodies of power and creating new ones, assuming control of production and seizing landed estates. And while the bourgeoisie immediately responded with efforts to prevent "anarchy" and conciliators began to direct the people's spontaneous action into "moderate" and "legitimate" channels which would not be dangerous to the bourgeoisie, the Bolshevik Party aimed at comprehensively and fearlessly developing popular initiative and spontaneous action. In April 1917 Lenin said: "To us, the thing that matters is revolutionary initiative, and the law must be the result of it. *If you wait until the law is written, and yourselves do not develop revolutionary initiative, you will have neither the law nor the land.*"¹ He saw spontaneous action by the revolutionary forces in all aspects of life as a viable guarantee of the revolution's success, of its further rise.

On the other hand, the Bolshevik Party immediately and everywhere infused popular initiative with the organising proletarian spirit which made it possible to shape the spontaneous action into a concerted, purposeful movement, to merge its separate elements into a single powerful revolutionary stream. In March 1917 Lenin warned in his "Letters from Afar" that it would be impossible for the socialist revolution to retain power without a "magnificent *organisation of the proletariat*, which must lead the entire vast mass of urban and rural poor, the semi-proletariat and small proprietors".²

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Seventh (April) All-Russia Conference of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.)", *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 285.

² V. I. Lenin, "Letters from Afar", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 323.

Efforts to achieve the best possible organisation of the revolutionary forces were organically linked to removing all restrictions from their spontaneous action and initiative; those forces were to rally, above all, round the working class led by the Bolshevik Party under the Leninist Central Committee. The long years of purposeful effort by Lenin and his comrades-in-arms aimed at consolidating the vanguard of the revolutionary forces, the party of a new type, were now producing results.

Unlike the conciliatory parties, the Bolsheviks displayed their ability to learn from the masses and constantly teach them, to live one life with the people. The Bolshevik Party was armed with Lenin's programme which paid comprehensive attention to prospects of development and profoundly reflected the working people's aspirations to peace, land and freedom from capitalists' and landlords' exploitation; the party expertly worked deep in the midst of the people rallying them to the struggle, organising and uniting them. Within a mere 6 or 7 months the Bolsheviks won most Soviet members over to their side and led the most active and politically effective part of Russia's population.

Conversely, the SRs and Mensheviks who had initially been placed in a dominant position in the Soviets by the petty-bourgeois wave were rapidly losing control. First and foremost that was because they were unable to lead the long-suffering Russia out of the war, or realise the age-old peasant dream of land, or meet the demands of national liberation; they sided with the bourgeoisie which pursued a counter-revolutionary policy. Although they were lavish with promises, the conciliatory parties failed to offer a feasible alternative to the nationwide catastrophe which threatened Russia.

Formed actually during the February Revolution, the notorious coalition of the Mensheviks and SRs with the bourgeois Cadet Party took on various shapes and combinations during the critical period between February and October but remained the same in its essence—a coalition that betrayed the people's interests. It took the masses a little over six months to see through its disguise. As the war continued and the economic and political crisis worsened, life itself taught the masses unusually thorough lessons with unprecedented speed. The course of "revolutionary education", begun in February 1917, basically reached graduation point by October.

Developments again showed that, as Lenin put it, the masses differed from their leaders in the way they succumbed to various conciliatory illusions, "and they extricate themselves *differently*, by a different course of development, by different means".¹ The theoretical

¹ V. I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 64.

dogma of petty-bourgeois leaders has a tendency to become frozen; it is hard to break, and it seldom does break, at turning points in history. The mistaken beliefs held by the petty-bourgeois masses are another matter. These masses awaken to political life without the most elementary knowledge of politics past or present; their delusions are due to their meager practical experience, to their trusting attitude toward bourgeois and petty-bourgeois politicians.

The tremendous expansion of practical experience in the course of the revolution enabled the masses to free themselves of illusions and mistaken beliefs comparatively quickly—although, of course, not at all immediately or fully. All that required the Bolsheviks to display flexibility, to agree to compromise in order to raise the revolutionary movement higher and to let the masses learn from their practical experience. That was precisely how the Bolsheviks approached the agrarian question. A tentative peasant mandate was drawn up on the basis of 242 mandates which local deputies brought to the First All-Russia Congress of Peasant Deputies in Petrograd in 1917. Published in August 1917, it immediately attracted Lenin's attention. On the eve of the October Revolution Lenin wrote: "The peasants want to keep their small farms, to set equal standards for all, and to make readjustments on an equalitarian basis from time to time. Fine. No sensible socialist will differ with the peasant poor over this...."

"The crux of the matter lies in political power passing into the hands of the proletariat. When this has taken place, everything that is essential, basic, fundamental in the programme set out in the 242 mandates *will become feasible*. Life will show what modifications it will undergo as it is carried out. This is an issue of secondary importance. We are not doctrinaires. Our theory is a guide to action, not a dogma."

And, explaining that formula, Lenin said: "We do not claim that Marx knew or Marxists know the road to socialism down to the last detail. It would be nonsense to claim anything of the kind. What we know is the direction of this road, and the class forces that follow it; the specific, practical details will come to light only through the *experience of the millions* when they take things into their own hands."¹

A similar process of the masses shedding their illusions concerned the question of peace, the central question over which rival forces collided in the course of the Russian revolution. Its solution was to the everlasting credit of the proletarian revolution in Russia, of the Bolsheviks and Lenin; it was a key element of the "Russian example" both then and today. Notably, the solution of the question of

¹ V. I. Lenin, "From a Publicist's Diary", *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 285.

peace and the revolution's progress to its proletarian stage were obstructed by the illusions of the so-called revolutionary defencism—the belief, cultivated among the masses by the bourgeoisie and conciliators, that after February they were fighting for “popular”, “revolutionary” interests. At the same time, the growing “experience of the millions” manifested itself with particular force precisely in the overcoming of the “revolutionary defencist” illusions. The masses accumulated new experience from life itself, and the Bolsheviks, relying on the lessons life taught, helped the masses grasp the key questions of war and revolution.

In these conditions, it was extremely important for the party's headquarters, its Central Committee led by Lenin, to take prompt account of the rapidly changing situation and reflect it in new slogans of the revolution which would suit the turns of the struggle. And the Bolsheviks proved equal to the task. In that connection Lenin wrote: “The substitution of the abstract for the concrete is one of the greatest and most dangerous sins in a revolution.” More specifically, he explained: “Too often has it happened that, when history has taken a sharp turn, even progressive parties have for some time been unable to adapt themselves to the new situation and have repeated slogans which had formerly been correct but had now lost all meaning—lost it as ‘suddenly’ as the sharp turn in history was ‘sudden’.”¹ It was precisely because the Bolshevik Party was together with the masses at all steep turns of history, because it could flexibly alter its tactics, learn from the masses and teach them, that it secured the turn in favour of the masses, which previous revolutions had failed to achieve.

Guided by the Bolsheviks, the proletariat succeeded in rallying and leading all the viable, honest and selfless forces of the country, the largest masses of the people. The proletariat restored purity and true meaning to the notion “revolutionary democracy”. The conciliators who held forth pompously on “revolutionary democracy” wanted the revolution to stop halfway after the overthrow of the tsar. Lenin countered that by saying: “It all boils down to the same thing: the rule of the bourgeoisie is *irreconcilable* with truly-revolutionary true democracy. We cannot be revolutionary democrats in the twentieth century and in a capitalist country *if we fear* to advance towards socialism.”² These words by Lenin were borne out by subsequent developments in world history.

The year 1917, which began with the February Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution and ended with the October Socialist Revolution,

¹ V. I. Lenin, “On Slogans”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, pp. 191, 185 .

² V. I. Lenin, “The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It”, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 360.

was a turning point in the history of Russia and the entire world. The proletarian revolution in Russia which opened the nations the way to socialism was truly a prologue to the "world proletarian revolution". The rivalry between newly emergent and ever stronger socialism and moribund, decaying capitalism has since been the central content of world history. The outcome of this rivalry which entered a new stage in 1917 depends to a large extent on the ability of the proletarian vanguard in other countries to take note of the lessons of Russia's victorious proletarian revolution and to use them in its practical efforts. "No event in world history has had such a profound and lasting effect on mankind as the Great October Socialist Revolution. The flashes of the October storm illuminated the way into the future for the peoples of many countries. History began to advance literally in seven-league strides."¹

There is no question that the specific historical experience of any revolutionary movement comprises transient or specific elements. However, it also includes the common factor reflecting historical laws and predetermining that which is recurrent in unique historical events. The identification and study of these common factors in particular cases underlies the development of general Marxist theory and makes it possible for the national sections of the working class which follow the principles of proletarian internationalism to exchange experience, learn from and influence one another. As Lenin asserted, "The world's greatest movement for liberation of the oppressed class, the most revolutionary class in history, is impossible without a revolutionary theory. That theory cannot be thought up. It *grows out* of the sum total of the revolutionary experience and the revolutionary thinking of all countries in the world."²

Among other things, a scientific theoretical generalisation of the revolutionary experience of various countries means defining (of course, with a certain approximation) the possible limits and conditions of its international application. On the contrary, any dogmatic approach to the specific experience of a revolutionary movement in a given country as though it were something absolute inevitably leads to national narrow-mindedness, opening the way to nationalism. Lenin, therefore, always demanded a thorough differentiation of the specific forms of a revolutionary process in its distinctive conditions and its essence, maintaining that, in this, a given country could produce more or less typical, "classic" examples.

Such "classic" examples of the proletarian revolutionary drive in

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1978, p. 178.

² V. I. Lenin, "The Voice of an Honest French Socialist", *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 354.

the 19th century came first from France and then from Germany; in the early 20th century it was Russia's turn. The three nationwide revolutions the country went through within a short historical period, the wealth of forms and methods of mass political struggle and the importance of its results, and, finally, the country's position halfway between the "civilised" capitalist world and the "half-civilised", semi-feudal, feudal, dependent and colonial countries, given Russia's advanced forms of the proletarian movement, the powerful peasant and national liberation movement and the organic link between "purely" Russian issues and international problems in the period of imperialism—all that determined the international significance of the Russian revolutionary experience. The three Russian revolutions appeared as though they accumulated the charge of revolutionary energy of the international working-class movement; they highlighted a number of general features of the world process of emancipation, above all, the fact that the proletariat had emerged as leader of all democratic forces. One should specially stress that for some time after the October 1917 Revolution Russia was not only the first but also the only country which had broken free of the system of capitalist relations, a country which was blazing a path to socialism.

Lenin profoundly and comprehensively studied the specific historical, both internal and external, conditions surrounding the development of the revolution in Russia and the general upsurge of the international working-class movement. He did that against the broad background of the laws and peculiarities of that definite period in world history. The doctrine of the proletarian revolution which he raised to a new height has acquired and retains its everlasting significance for understanding the subsequent developments in the 20th century, for the activities of communist and workers' parties of various countries.

* * *

The historical experience and issues of the international working-class movement between 1905 and 1917, the eve of the contemporary era, have always been an object of acute ideological and political struggle. The Marxist-Leninist trend in historiography is opposed by the bourgeois, the social-reformist and the leftist ones. The content, role and character of the international working-class movement of the period in question, the course of the Russian revolutions of 1905-1907 and February 1917 and their place in world history, the activities of those representing different trends of the proletarian movement, especially of Lenin, the Bolsheviks and revolutionary Social-Democrats in other countries, the development of Leninism—

those problems are central to the ideological and theoretical struggle.

A number of works by bourgeois and social-reformist authors contain much information on the important problems of the international working-class movement of 1905-1917. However, an analysis of even those books clearly confirms Lenin's recommendation concerning the need to critically regard those theoretical precepts which are advanced by bourgeois scholars capable of "very valuable contributions in the field of factual and specialised investigations".¹

In studying the working-class movement of 1905-1917, bourgeois historiography usually ignores the new common features which had emerged already by the start of the 1910s in the struggle of the proletariat in certain countries, and the international nature of the upsurge in the working-class movement. The struggle of the working people in various countries is interpreted as something highly specific. The difference between mass revolutionary action in Russia and the revolutionary movement in "the more civilised" countries—in Western Europe and the United States—is obviously exaggerated.² Bourgeois historiography understates, belittles and even completely ignores the profound socio-economic, ideological and political causes behind the growth of the working-class movement and mass action. The objectives of the workers' struggle, the degree of their political awareness are deliberately and unnaturally reduced to the lowest level, that of the least politically conscious part of the working people. The socio-political role of the working class is evaluated without any regard for its revolutionary potential, and efforts by its vanguard, without appraising the significance of its historical activity. As a result, some bourgeois historians view the working-class movement, even that preceding the contemporary era, as an unconscious tool in the triumph of liberalism, and argue the need for mass workers' organisations to "organically" submit to bourgeois parties.³ Some of them maintain that the working-class movement is inherently hostile to socialist ideas.⁴ The acuteness of the conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is played down; mass action by the working people is, in the final analysis, assessed nega-

¹ V. I. Lenin, "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism", *Collected Works* Vol. 14, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1962, p. 342.

² See, for example, *Revolutionary Russia*, Ed. by Richard Pipes, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1968.

³ See, for example, G. Mann, *The History of Germany since 1789*, New York-Washington, 1968.

⁴ See, for example, E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, London, 1963; J. Weinstein, *The Decline of Socialism in America, 1912-1925*, New York-London, 1967.

tively. Certain bourgeois historians harshly condemn that action, especially strikes; some try to falsify the history of the working-class movement in order to "identify" in the past the desirable "examples" of class collaboration, of universal "peace and progress".¹ The Commons-Wisconsinian trend in bourgeois historiography goes to great lengths to prove that the working class (meaning skilled workers only) and the bourgeoisie have identical interests.²

Bourgeois historiography offers an obviously distorted picture of the emergence of the proletariat and the growth of the working-class movement on the outskirts of the imperialist system. Some bourgeois labour historians present the Latin American proletariat as some sort of a privileged group, overrate its distinctive features, declare it inherently alien to Marxism, and extoll the influence on the Latin American workers by Gompersist trade-unionism with its "apolitical" and pragmatist philosophy. Often, the importance of leftist trends in the working-class movement of Latin America is overstated as much as possible. Describing the struggle of the peoples of Asia in 1905-1917, bourgeois historiography often takes care not to single out the workers as a distinct class from the overall mass of the working people. Large-scale proletarian actions are isolated from the general picture, from their entirety; actually, the very existence of the working-class movement is ignored. Besides, since those actions are usually viewed as unconnected to the national liberation movement, the part the proletariat played in the liberation struggle of the Asian peoples is belittled or obscured. Bourgeois historiography does not pay the emergent movement of the workers in Africa the attention it deserves.

For all the diversity of its concepts, social-reformist historiography mostly proceeds from the fact that the increased socio-political role the working class played in 1905-1917 and the emancipatory nature its movement had were natural and logical. However, while recognising that the interests of the proletariat in all countries do have certain features in common, social-reformists still see the world working-class movement as merely a sum total of the struggle by different national groups of the working people. It is typical of both bourgeois and social-reformist historiography to contrapose the experience and distinctive nature of labour in different countries—for example, Britain and Continental Europe, Western and Eastern Europe, Russia and other countries. The identity of the basic interests of the working people throughout the world is clearly downgrad-

¹ See, for example, Graham Adams, *Age of Industrial Violence, 1910-1913*, New York-London, 1966.

² See: John R. Commons et al., op. cit.; Ph. Taft, op. cit.

ed, and the key common features in the development of the proletariat's struggle are slurred over.

Since many social-reformists study the activity of the workers' parties without due regard to the mass movement of the working people or the dynamics of their socio-economic situation, the proletariat's power in political struggle is only judged by the success in elections to representative bodies, by the positive action of workers' representatives in these bodies and by the reforms carried out "from above". Social-reformist works clearly smack of a lack of faith in the possibility of using the parliament for revolutionary purposes and even of rejection of these purposes. For example, the Austrian Socialist Christian Broda has even formulated a sort of "social law" under which "the ability for effecting revolutionary transformation of society declines, with any initially revolutionary movement, in direct proportion to the growth of its political power".¹

Social-reformists see the initial organisation of the masses, the initial stages of their political education, parliamentary struggle and reforms as the highest accomplishment of 1905-1914, and the mass action which crushed the bourgeois law, as an anomaly, a departure from the natural path, explicable but not excusable by the "intransigence" and "brutality" of the authorities and "irresponsibility" of the masses. Besides, political struggle for reforms and economic action are mostly interpreted as parallel, almost separate courses. The ideological and theoretical development of Social-Democracy, the emergence of new ideas and concepts and the clashes of different trends in socialist thought are analysed and evaluated in isolation from the mass struggle and even political activity of the workers' parties, as the play of the leaders' creative imagination which can neither be traced to any cause nor verified in practice. The relative independence of ideology is presented as absolute; simultaneously, its dependence on the practical class struggle of the proletariat and the feedback the latter receives from it are underrated or ignored.

As a result, social-reformist historiography underestimates the power and distorts the content of the revolutionary upsurge of 1905-1917. The 1905-1914 period is viewed as a continuation of the previous so-called peaceful period, with no attention paid to the important changes in the objective conditions of the struggle and the tasks facing the working people in that period. The growing role played by the working class is reduced to its more vigorous drive for reforms and better conditions within the capitalist framework; the working-class movement is pictured as social-reformist; the nat-

¹ Christian Broda, "Wie lernt man aus der Geschichte?", *Die Zukunft*, H. 23/24, 1968, S. 34.

ural strengthening of revolutionary trends is denied; they are declared to be local phenomena of importance for isolated countries or regions only.

On the contrary, the leftist extremists, the various exponents of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary spirit which also influences the working class pay attention only to the more acute clashes of the proletariat and the ruling classes; many underrate or ignore the working people's everyday struggle, their increased organisation and political consciousness. Contrasting the working class to all other strata of the working people and those in the forefront of revolutionary action to other workers is typical of ultra-leftist authors. That is a sign of underestimating the part the working masses play in history, a lack of faith in their revolutionary potential.

Neither the bourgeois nor the social-reformist nor the ultra-left trend can correctly determine the character, growth or aims of the struggle by the international proletariat in 1905-1917. Despite the differences in their approaches to and assessments of the working-class movement of the period in question, they are unable to identify either the genuine socio-political role of the working class or the meaning and significance of its historical struggle which laid the groundwork for breaking the chain of imperialism in Russia and for the opening of the contemporary era.

Distortions are especially pronounced in the assessment of the development of Leninism, the activities of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in Russia, and revolutionary Social-Democrats in other countries. With very few exceptions, bourgeois historiography denies the international significance of Leninism and the Bolsheviks' activity, and it generally denigrates the part revolutionary Social-Democrats played in the history of the Second International. It ignores the deep roots and inevitability of the growth of the revolutionary trend in the international working-class movement of 1905-1917. The history of revolutionary organisations—not only Bolshevik ones but others too, like the IWW in the United States—is subjected to vitriolic attacks.¹ Even the more substantial works by bourgeois historians distort the ideological and political struggle in the working-class movement on the eve of the contemporary era and reduce it either to a unification of centrists and revolutionary Social-Democrats or to a convergence of revolutionary Social-Democrats and anarcho-syndicalists. Such view of the working-class movement of 1905-1917 held by bourgeois historiography is often borrowed by today's mass market anti-communist literature which is below any scholarly criticism.

¹ See, for example, *Science and Society*, No. 3, 1964, pp. 257-74.

Social-reformists see Leninism as a simple version of Russian Marxism, treat it the way they treat Menshevism and deny both the international roots and the international significance of Lenin's ideas. The only distinctive feature they grant Leninism is its alleged "ultra-leftism", or the ostensible symbiosis of Marxism with Blanquism and the Russian Narodnik movement. In this, Lenin's ideas are played against those of Marx and Engels; Leninism is interpreted not as a further development of the doctrine of Marx and Engels but as a deviation from it. Social-reformists believe that Leninism owed its popularity to Russia's backwardness, the poverty, lack of rights and desperate condition of its working masses. These claims are used to try and prove that Leninism is unacceptable for the proletarian movement of the "more civilised" countries. Also, the defeat of the 1905-1907 revolution is used as a pretext to argue that Lenin's course did not suit the possibilities and needs of even Russia's revolutionary movement at that time.

All that means ignoring the international significance of the activities of Lenin and the Bolsheviks; that is often enhanced by crude distortion of the true role Lenin and the Bolsheviks played in the Second International and the International Socialist Bureau.¹

Fencing off the international working-class movement from the experience of the Bolshevik Party, social-reformists "overlook" or slur over its obvious and considerable influence on the resolutions of the Stuttgart, Copenhagen and Basel congresses of the Second International. They cannot deny the international significance of the Bolshevik activities pursued under Lenin during the hard years of World War I. But even then the Bolshevik-led revolutionary trend is not given the credit it deserves; contrary to facts, it is "blamed" for the split in the international working-class movement. Social-reformists hush up the fact that revolutionary Social-Democrats expressed the proletariat's interests in the fullest and the most consistent way. The roots and mass base of the revolutionary trend in Social-Democracy are ignored,² and its activity is often seen only as theoretical, not at all connected to the mass struggle, to the work of Social-Democratic parties. Frequently, the history of revolutionary Social-Democracy is treated as closely approaching or identical with the activity of leftist extremists; it is pictured as the Marxist version of ultra-leftism or leftist Marxism. Simultaneously, the centrist or right-wing revisionist trend in the "Marxism" of that period is presented as the main stream. Incidentally, there is often no

¹ See, for example, R. Schlesinger, "Lenin as a Member of the International Socialist Bureau", *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XVI, No. 4, April 1965.

² See, for example, G. Lefranc, *Le mouvement socialiste sous la Troisième République (1875-1940)*, Payot, Paris, 1963; J. Weinstein, *op. cit.*

clear distinction between bourgeois and social-reformist literature on this and other issues; exchange of concepts between them is thriving.

Social-reformist historiography (with some of its scholars closer to the position of right-wing Social-Democrats, including revisionists, and others to the centrist course) maintains that in 1905-1914 there were no deviations from Marxism in the theory and practice of proletarian parties, no deviations from resolute and persistent defence of the interests of the working people. Social-reformists ignore or slur over the differences that were growing between Marxism and opportunism, between the interests of the working class and the increasingly opportunist course pursued by the elite of Social-Democratic parties.

There is an obviously growing tendency to abandon the view that Bernstein and his followers were revisionists and Kautsky and his supporters, centrists. All that helps in retrospectively eroding the differences between Marxism and opportunism; the "diversity" of Marxism is used to justify the inclusion of opportunism in it.

Slurring over the profound and acute differences in the Social-Democratic movement, denying the basis of principle underlying the struggle of revolutionary Social-Democrats against right-wingers and centrists, social-reformist historiography at the same time tries to credit right-wingers and centrists with the most important accomplishments the masses achieved at the initiative of the revolutionary trend in that period. Some authors see the heritage of revisionists and other right-wing Social-Democrats as proof of today's "democratic socialism"; others extoll centrists for their ability to "integrate", unify all trends, contrasting that kind of "unity" to a revolutionary position of principle. Social-reformist attempts to modernise and strengthen their ideological and political positions by falsifying the history of the working-class movement are clearly becoming more frequent.

Leftist historiography pays special attention to anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism, exaggerating their role and significance in the international working-class movement of 1905-1917. Some authors argue that anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism are much more revolutionary than Leninism. Bolsheviks and other revolutionary Social-Democrats are lumped together with other, opportunist trends in the Social-Democratic movement and criticised indiscriminately. Other authors declare Leninism, the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary Social-Democrats as representing a kind of left-wing extremism, pushing them close to anarchism or anarcho-syndicalism.

The struggle continues in the historiography of the international working-class movement of 1905-1917 over the assessment of the Russian popular revolution of 1905-1907, international working-

class solidarity in the struggle against militarism and wars, the collapse of the Second International, the growth of the revolutionary movement during World War I, and the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia.

Bourgeois historiography displays certain common features in its approach to the two Russian bourgeois-democratic revolutions; it evaluates them obviously using the yardsticks of past bourgeois revolutions, without due regard to the essentially new quality which stemmed from imperialism, from the change in the alignment of class forces and the leading role of the proletariat. As to the 1905-1907 revolution, some bourgeois historians question that it took place at all. They interpret the developments of that period as a process of certain transformations made "from above" and aggravated by mass unrest. Trying to completely denigrate the leading role the working class played in these Russian revolutions and to exaggerate the part played by the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia, some bourgeois historians declare that the latter is a "force above the classes". They play down the degree of political consciousness and organisation displayed by the proletariat, and especially the significance of its political action. They try to reduce the interests and activity of the workers to economic struggle alone. The peasants are pictured as a thoroughly conservative, politically indifferent mass impossible to organise. Armed action by the working people in December 1905, subsequent uprisings and the outbreak of popular discontent in February 1917 are presented as spontaneous and generally regrettable "anomalies". Such assessments of the motive forces in the revolutions of 1905-1907 and early 1917 lead bourgeois authors to conclude that revolutionary parties had no basis, no ties to the masses, nor influence on the development of the mass movement. Denigration and distortion of the Bolsheviks' role both in 1905-1907 and in February 1917 is especially crude. Such works are mostly aimed not to identify the main direction of the Russian liberation movement from the "dress rehearsal" of 1905-1907 to the victory in October 1917, but to artificially contrast one bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia to the other, and especially both of them to the October Revolution. Many bourgeois authors see the practical political objective of studying the Russian revolutions in helping today's bourgeois politicians avoid revolutions, particularly those similar to the October Revolution. For all the diversity in their approaches and evaluations, most bourgeois historians question the logical nature of the Russian revolutions, maintain that they were "accidental", exaggerate their unorganised, "spontaneous" aspects, thereby denigrating or denying their international significance, and hush up the international cooperation and solidarity between the revolutionary forces in Russia and other countries.

Bourgeois historiography ignores both the international solidarity of the working people in the struggle against militarism and wars in 1905-1917 and the significance of that struggle. It "overlooks" the influence the masses exerted on the international relations of that period and the revolutionary and international nature of the upsurge in mass anti-war action during World War I. Nevertheless, some bourgeois historians confirm the Marxist assessment of the causes behind the collapse of the Second International (R. Fester, L. Lorwin).

Social-reformist historiography differs from its bourgeois counterpart in that it recognises the historical need of Russia's two first revolutions. It is sympathetic toward the struggle of Russia's peoples to free themselves from tsarist rule. However, social-reformists, too, fail to see the revolutions of 1905-1907 and February 1917 as bourgeois-democratic revolutions of a new type. Appraisals of the motive forces of those revolutions by social-reformists often coincide with the views of bourgeois historians: hegemony of the proletariat is denied; its political role, consciousness and organisation are denigrated; prospects of the union between the working class and the peasants are distorted and its revolutionary potential belittled. There is a tendency to exaggerate the role and abilities of the bourgeoisie and to seek to justify the Menshevik course supporting that class. Social-reformist historiography extolls the part the Mensheviks played, specifically in the Soviets and other organisations of the working people. At the same time it puts a false construction on the importance of Bolshevik activities. Social-reformists' negative attitude toward armed action by the masses is reflected, among other things, in the fact that they put the blame for the deaths that action brought both on the tsarist regime and on the Bolsheviks.

Social-reformists refuse to recognise the importance of the experience and lessons of the revolutions of 1905-1907 and February 1917 for the working-class movement of Western Europe and the United States. Some even completely exclude those Russian revolutions from the history of the international working-class movement of that period. Simultaneously, they practically ignore the political nature of the international solidarity of the working people in other countries with the revolutionary movement in Russia.

Social-reformist historiography stresses and exaggerates the pacifist trends in the working-class struggle against militarism and wars in 1905-1917. Social-reformists try to vindicate the opportunist policy during World War I, deny or belittle the importance of the collapse of the Second International, ascribe responsibility for it to the working masses and blame the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary Social-Democrats for the split in the international working-class movement. Contrary to facts they claim that at the start of

World War I leaders of most Social-Democratic parties could not have acted differently because there was allegedly no other way to save the labour organisations from destruction. Despite the upsurge of the working-class movement and the fact that the working people proved by action their readiness to fight against the war, many social-reformists assert that the wave of nationalism permeated the masses so fully that it was absolutely impossible to lead them against the warmongers. Others even claim that Social-Democratic votes in favour of war appropriations and the acceptance of ministerial posts in imperialist governments by Social-Democratic leaders was a correct and even heroic step.

Vindicating the alliance between the opportunists and imperialism, social-reformist historiography condemns the refusal by revolutionary Social-Democrats to follow the social-chauvinist course of their party leaders after the start of World War I. It claims that the historical split of the working-class movement was rooted not in the open defection by most leaders of the largest labour parties of the period to the imperialist side but in the revolutionary Social-Democrats' policy, imperative at the time, aimed at a break with opportunists, in the fact that they set up independent revolutionary working-class organisations to defend the fundamental interests of the proletariat.¹ This reversal of cause and effect, usually disguised with references to the persistent centrist efforts to secure cohesion of the working-class movement by uniting the right and the left—in actual fact, with the result of domination of the left by the right—is an especially crude and dangerous case of falsifying the history of the international working-class movement on the eve of the contemporary era. Politically, this trick is aimed not only at vindicating the predecessors of today's social-reformism but also at substantiating the rejection by many leaders of contemporary Social-Democracy of repeated Communist proposals on cooperation, the unacceptable social-reformist conditions for such cooperation, and efforts to perpetuate the split in the international working-class movement and in the working-class movement of many countries.

Social-reformist authors writing on the international working-class movement offer their own, false interpretation of the history and theory of Leninism; they try to distort Lenin's words and confine recognition of his doctrine to the first two decades of the 20th century only, to Russia only or to backward countries. They attempt to oppose those Lenin's ideas they falsified to the ideas of today's international communist movement.

¹ See, for example, G. D. H. Cole, *Communism and Social-Democracy. 1914-1931*, Macmillan, London, 1958; J. Braunthal, *op. cit.*, Bd. I-II.

Ultra-leftist historiography presents a motley picture of views, generally unconvincing and cynically trying to see history only as politics of the past. It distorts the record of the Russian revolutions of 1905-1907 and February 1917, picturing it only as armed struggle, guerrilla action, etc. Leftists disparage both the international solidarity of the working people in 1905-1914 and the anti-war mass action and anti-militarist Social-Democratic efforts. The collapse of the Second International is presented as the disintegration of all trends in the working-class movement, which is not true. Opportunist responsibility for the collapse of the International is belittled, and the collapse itself is used as an argument to deny any gains achieved by the working-class movement prior to 1914. Leftists see the revolutionary movement of 1905-1917 only as beginnings of the anarcho-syndicalist spirit of revolt or as the germ of the Trotskyist "global revolution". At the same time they overestimate the influence of opportunism. That often leads to a lack of faith in the revolutionary nature of the working class and is used by today's leftists in their struggle against Marxism-Leninism and the communist movement.

Marxist-Leninist historiography opposes bourgeois, social-reformist and ultra-leftist literature on the international working-class movement of 1905-1917.

Lenin laid a firm foundation of the Marxist approach to the development of the international working-class movement which directly preceded the October 1917 Socialist Revolution. Simultaneously with Lenin and his comrades-in-arms, that Marxist concept was developed by prominent revolutionary Social-Democrats in many countries—Karl Liebknecht, Paul Lafargue, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Julian Marchlewski, Anton Pannekoek, Herman Gorter, Theodore Rothstein and others.

Lenin's contribution was especially great. His development of the Marxist concept of the international working-class movement in that period was the most consistent, comprehensive and profound. The salient features of his concept of the history of the international working-class movement were developed in the Marxist-Leninist historiography dealing with the period in question.

Soviet and foreign Marxist scholars have proved the growing role of the working class, the mounting antagonism between its interests and those of the bourgeoisie, the abrupt aggravation of their class struggle under imperialism, the logical nature of the rise in the proletariat's activity, consciousness and organisation and of the steady growth of the entire international working-class movement, despite its uneven and not always straightforward progress. Also, the maturing of the subjective factor is traced—the revolutionary forces which set in motion, in 1917, the contemporary world revolu-

tionary process. Special attention has been paid to the revolutionary action by the Russian proletariat, with which the centre of the world revolutionary movement shifted to Russia, to the two Russian bourgeois-democratic revolutions which emerged as the prologue to the October Socialist Revolution, and to highlighting, with that example, the worldwide liberation mission of the working class.

History refutes social-reformist concepts which claim that the class struggle is abating, antagonistic classes collaborate and capitalism grows into socialism. History bears out the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the class struggle of the proletariat, the decisive role of the working class in the revolutionary transformation of the world, the need to create and strengthen revolutionary working-class parties of a new type, the inevitability of democratic revolutions evolving into socialist ones, the need for establishing real political power of the proletariat. The developments of 1905-1917, the international working-class movement of that period, not merely preceded the October Revolution but historically prepared the ground for it. That is what determines their place in history and significance in today's world.

Marxist-Leninist historiography has shown that the working-class parties and other proletarian organisations, the entire Second International owe their major accomplishments in 1905-1914 to the revolutionary trend which developed Marxism, found a Marxist solution to the proletariat's new tasks, pointed to new means of struggle and worked out a revolutionary course. That was what enabled the workers to achieve successes and enlarge the proletarian movement in general despite imperialist resistance and opportunist sabotage. The revolutionary trend defending the workers' fundamental interests was, despite the fact that staunch revolutionary Social-Democrats were few, the leading creative force in the international working-class movement of the early 20th century. Marxist scholars have proved that the development of Leninism, the creation of the revolutionary working-class party of a new type in Russia was the highest achievement of the international working-class movement of 1905-1917.

Marxists-Leninists have demonstrated that the responsibility not only for the collapse of the Second International but also for the split of the international labour movement rests fully with opportunists, revisionists and centrists who hampered the proletariat's preparation for the coming revolutions, openly sided with imperialism, betrayed Marxism, the International and the fundamental interests of the working class. The correct interpretation of the historical record of the movement by Marxist-Leninist historiography plays an important part in the ideological and political struggle for unity

of all revolutionary forces, for the solution of the key problems facing mankind.

Society is not frozen, life marches on faster with each decade; developments are growing increasingly complex in their content, form and succession. Social renovation, begun in practice in Russia in 1917, has since spread to many countries. All in all, the situation in the world has changed so radically in the sixty-odd years since 1917 that proletarian revolutionaries are now dealing with a new historical reality. And in their action they have been guided by Marxism-Leninism, a science which has absorbed all of mankind's accomplishments and which Communists are developing in a creative spirit.

* * *

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